summaryrefslogtreecommitdiff
path: root/security
diff options
context:
space:
mode:
authorKees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>2015-09-04 15:44:57 -0700
committerGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>2015-09-21 10:05:45 -0700
commitd3b428f0361d6dcbe7c6665ae0a824517a0b1ca9 (patch)
tree55c0f4bb06938252ed325c91df943100c7eb0ebe /security
parent213abaf9525398c7dd34012b29274261dd8cd797 (diff)
downloadlwn-d3b428f0361d6dcbe7c6665ae0a824517a0b1ca9.tar.gz
lwn-d3b428f0361d6dcbe7c6665ae0a824517a0b1ca9.zip
fs: create and use seq_show_option for escaping
commit a068acf2ee77693e0bf39d6e07139ba704f461c3 upstream. Many file systems that implement the show_options hook fail to correctly escape their output which could lead to unescaped characters (e.g. new lines) leaking into /proc/mounts and /proc/[pid]/mountinfo files. This could lead to confusion, spoofed entries (resulting in things like systemd issuing false d-bus "mount" notifications), and who knows what else. This looks like it would only be the root user stepping on themselves, but it's possible weird things could happen in containers or in other situations with delegated mount privileges. Here's an example using overlay with setuid fusermount trusting the contents of /proc/mounts (via the /etc/mtab symlink). Imagine the use of "sudo" is something more sneaky: $ BASE="ovl" $ MNT="$BASE/mnt" $ LOW="$BASE/lower" $ UP="$BASE/upper" $ WORK="$BASE/work/ 0 0 none /proc fuse.pwn user_id=1000" $ mkdir -p "$LOW" "$UP" "$WORK" $ sudo mount -t overlay -o "lowerdir=$LOW,upperdir=$UP,workdir=$WORK" none /mnt $ cat /proc/mounts none /root/ovl/mnt overlay rw,relatime,lowerdir=ovl/lower,upperdir=ovl/upper,workdir=ovl/work/ 0 0 none /proc fuse.pwn user_id=1000 0 0 $ fusermount -u /proc $ cat /proc/mounts cat: /proc/mounts: No such file or directory This fixes the problem by adding new seq_show_option and seq_show_option_n helpers, and updating the vulnerable show_option handlers to use them as needed. Some, like SELinux, need to be open coded due to unusual existing escape mechanisms. [akpm@linux-foundation.org: add lost chunk, per Kees] [keescook@chromium.org: seq_show_option should be using const parameters] Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com> Acked-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.com> Acked-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com> Cc: J. R. Okajima <hooanon05g@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Diffstat (limited to 'security')
-rw-r--r--security/selinux/hooks.c2
1 files changed, 1 insertions, 1 deletions
diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c
index 7f8d7f19e044..280235cc3a98 100644
--- a/security/selinux/hooks.c
+++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c
@@ -1095,7 +1095,7 @@ static void selinux_write_opts(struct seq_file *m,
seq_puts(m, prefix);
if (has_comma)
seq_putc(m, '\"');
- seq_puts(m, opts->mnt_opts[i]);
+ seq_escape(m, opts->mnt_opts[i], "\"\n\\");
if (has_comma)
seq_putc(m, '\"');
}