Merge branch 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security

Pull security subsystem updates from James Morris:
 "In this update, Smack learns to love IPv6 and to mount a filesystem
  with a transmutable hierarchy (i.e.  security labels are inherited
  from parent directory upon creation rather than creating process).

  The rest of the changes are maintenance"

* 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security: (37 commits)
  tpm/tpm_i2c_infineon: Remove unused header file
  tpm: tpm_i2c_infinion: Don't modify i2c_client->driver
  evm: audit integrity metadata failures
  integrity: move integrity_audit_msg()
  evm: calculate HMAC after initializing posix acl on tmpfs
  maintainers:  add Dmitry Kasatkin
  Smack: Fix the bug smackcipso can't set CIPSO correctly
  Smack: Fix possible NULL pointer dereference at smk_netlbl_mls()
  Smack: Add smkfstransmute mount option
  Smack: Improve access check performance
  Smack: Local IPv6 port based controls
  tpm: fix regression caused by section type conflict of tpm_dev_release() in ppc builds
  maintainers: Remove Kent from maintainers
  tpm: move TPM_DIGEST_SIZE defintion
  tpm_tis: missing platform_driver_unregister() on error in init_tis()
  security: clarify cap_inode_getsecctx description
  apparmor: no need to delay vfree()
  apparmor: fix fully qualified name parsing
  apparmor: fix setprocattr arg processing for onexec
  apparmor: localize getting the security context to a few macros
  ...

31 files changed, 949 insertions, 583 deletions

diff --git a/security/apparmor/audit.c b/security/apparmor/audit.c
index 3ae28db5a64f..031d2d9dd695 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/audit.c
+++ b/security/apparmor/audit.c
@@ -88,7 +88,7 @@ static const char *const aa_audit_type[] = {
 	"HINT",
 	"STATUS",
 	"ERROR",
-	"KILLED"
+	"KILLED",
 	"AUTO"
 };
 
diff --git a/security/apparmor/context.c b/security/apparmor/context.c
index 8a9b5027c813..d5af1d15f26d 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/context.c
+++ b/security/apparmor/context.c
@@ -69,6 +69,23 @@ void aa_dup_task_context(struct aa_task_cxt *new, const struct aa_task_cxt *old)
 }
 
 /**
+ * aa_get_task_profile - Get another task's profile
+ * @task: task to query  (NOT NULL)
+ *
+ * Returns: counted reference to @task's profile
+ */
+struct aa_profile *aa_get_task_profile(struct task_struct *task)
+{
+	struct aa_profile *p;
+
+	rcu_read_lock();
+	p = aa_get_profile(__aa_task_profile(task));
+	rcu_read_unlock();
+
+	return p;
+}
+
+/**
  * aa_replace_current_profile - replace the current tasks profiles
  * @profile: new profile  (NOT NULL)
  *
@@ -76,7 +93,7 @@ void aa_dup_task_context(struct aa_task_cxt *new, const struct aa_task_cxt *old)
  */
 int aa_replace_current_profile(struct aa_profile *profile)
 {
-	struct aa_task_cxt *cxt = current_cred()->security;
+	struct aa_task_cxt *cxt = current_cxt();
 	struct cred *new;
 	BUG_ON(!profile);
 
@@ -87,17 +104,13 @@ int aa_replace_current_profile(struct aa_profile *profile)
 	if (!new)
 		return -ENOMEM;
 
-	cxt = new->security;
-	if (unconfined(profile) || (cxt->profile->ns != profile->ns)) {
+	cxt = cred_cxt(new);
+	if (unconfined(profile) || (cxt->profile->ns != profile->ns))
 		/* if switching to unconfined or a different profile namespace
 		 * clear out context state
 		 */
-		aa_put_profile(cxt->previous);
-		aa_put_profile(cxt->onexec);
-		cxt->previous = NULL;
-		cxt->onexec = NULL;
-		cxt->token = 0;
-	}
+		aa_clear_task_cxt_trans(cxt);
+
 	/* be careful switching cxt->profile, when racing replacement it
 	 * is possible that cxt->profile->replacedby is the reference keeping
 	 * @profile valid, so make sure to get its reference before dropping
@@ -123,7 +136,7 @@ int aa_set_current_onexec(struct aa_profile *profile)
 	if (!new)
 		return -ENOMEM;
 
-	cxt = new->security;
+	cxt = cred_cxt(new);
 	aa_get_profile(profile);
 	aa_put_profile(cxt->onexec);
 	cxt->onexec = profile;
@@ -150,7 +163,7 @@ int aa_set_current_hat(struct aa_profile *profile, u64 token)
 		return -ENOMEM;
 	BUG_ON(!profile);
 
-	cxt = new->security;
+	cxt = cred_cxt(new);
 	if (!cxt->previous) {
 		/* transfer refcount */
 		cxt->previous = cxt->profile;
@@ -187,7 +200,7 @@ int aa_restore_previous_profile(u64 token)
 	if (!new)
 		return -ENOMEM;
 
-	cxt = new->security;
+	cxt = cred_cxt(new);
 	if (cxt->token != token) {
 		abort_creds(new);
 		return -EACCES;
@@ -205,11 +218,10 @@ int aa_restore_previous_profile(u64 token)
 		aa_get_profile(cxt->profile);
 		aa_put_profile(cxt->previous);
 	}
-	/* clear exec && prev information when restoring to previous context */
+	/* ref has been transfered so avoid putting ref in clear_task_cxt */
 	cxt->previous = NULL;
-	cxt->token = 0;
-	aa_put_profile(cxt->onexec);
-	cxt->onexec = NULL;
+	/* clear exec && prev information when restoring to previous context */
+	aa_clear_task_cxt_trans(cxt);
 
 	commit_creds(new);
 	return 0;
diff --git a/security/apparmor/domain.c b/security/apparmor/domain.c
index 859abdaac1ea..01b7bd669a88 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/domain.c
+++ b/security/apparmor/domain.c
@@ -62,17 +62,14 @@ static int may_change_ptraced_domain(struct task_struct *task,
 				     struct aa_profile *to_profile)
 {
 	struct task_struct *tracer;
-	const struct cred *cred = NULL;
 	struct aa_profile *tracerp = NULL;
 	int error = 0;
 
 	rcu_read_lock();
 	tracer = ptrace_parent(task);
-	if (tracer) {
+	if (tracer)
 		/* released below */
-		cred = get_task_cred(tracer);
-		tracerp = aa_cred_profile(cred);
-	}
+		tracerp = aa_get_task_profile(tracer);
 
 	/* not ptraced */
 	if (!tracer || unconfined(tracerp))
@@ -82,8 +79,7 @@ static int may_change_ptraced_domain(struct task_struct *task,
 
 out:
 	rcu_read_unlock();
-	if (cred)
-		put_cred(cred);
+	aa_put_profile(tracerp);
 
 	return error;
 }
@@ -360,7 +356,7 @@ int apparmor_bprm_set_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
 	if (bprm->cred_prepared)
 		return 0;
 
-	cxt = bprm->cred->security;
+	cxt = cred_cxt(bprm->cred);
 	BUG_ON(!cxt);
 
 	profile = aa_get_profile(aa_newest_version(cxt->profile));
@@ -443,6 +439,8 @@ int apparmor_bprm_set_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
 			} else {
 				error = -ENOENT;
 				info = "profile not found";
+				/* remove MAY_EXEC to audit as failure */
+				perms.allow &= ~MAY_EXEC;
 			}
 		}
 	} else if (COMPLAIN_MODE(profile)) {
@@ -514,11 +512,7 @@ x_clear:
 	cxt->profile = new_profile;
 
 	/* clear out all temporary/transitional state from the context */
-	aa_put_profile(cxt->previous);
-	aa_put_profile(cxt->onexec);
-	cxt->previous = NULL;
-	cxt->onexec = NULL;
-	cxt->token = 0;
+	aa_clear_task_cxt_trans(cxt);
 
 audit:
 	error = aa_audit_file(profile, &perms, GFP_KERNEL, OP_EXEC, MAY_EXEC,
@@ -557,7 +551,7 @@ int apparmor_bprm_secureexec(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
 void apparmor_bprm_committing_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
 {
 	struct aa_profile *profile = __aa_current_profile();
-	struct aa_task_cxt *new_cxt = bprm->cred->security;
+	struct aa_task_cxt *new_cxt = cred_cxt(bprm->cred);
 
 	/* bail out if unconfined or not changing profile */
 	if ((new_cxt->profile == profile) ||
@@ -634,7 +628,7 @@ int aa_change_hat(const char *hats[], int count, u64 token, bool permtest)
 
 	/* released below */
 	cred = get_current_cred();
-	cxt = cred->security;
+	cxt = cred_cxt(cred);
 	profile = aa_cred_profile(cred);
 	previous_profile = cxt->previous;
 
@@ -750,7 +744,6 @@ int aa_change_profile(const char *ns_name, const char *hname, bool onexec,
 		      bool permtest)
 {
 	const struct cred *cred;
-	struct aa_task_cxt *cxt;
 	struct aa_profile *profile, *target = NULL;
 	struct aa_namespace *ns = NULL;
 	struct file_perms perms = {};
@@ -770,7 +763,6 @@ int aa_change_profile(const char *ns_name, const char *hname, bool onexec,
 	}
 
 	cred = get_current_cred();
-	cxt = cred->security;
 	profile = aa_cred_profile(cred);
 
 	/*
diff --git a/security/apparmor/include/apparmor.h b/security/apparmor/include/apparmor.h
index 40aedd9f73ea..1ba2ca56a6ef 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/include/apparmor.h
+++ b/security/apparmor/include/apparmor.h
@@ -15,6 +15,7 @@
 #ifndef __APPARMOR_H
 #define __APPARMOR_H
 
+#include <linux/slab.h>
 #include <linux/fs.h>
 
 #include "match.h"
@@ -64,9 +65,18 @@ extern int apparmor_initialized __initdata;
 /* fn's in lib */
 char *aa_split_fqname(char *args, char **ns_name);
 void aa_info_message(const char *str);
-void *kvmalloc(size_t size);
+void *__aa_kvmalloc(size_t size, gfp_t flags);
 void kvfree(void *buffer);
 
+static inline void *kvmalloc(size_t size)
+{
+	return __aa_kvmalloc(size, 0);
+}
+
+static inline void *kvzalloc(size_t size)
+{
+	return __aa_kvmalloc(size, __GFP_ZERO);
+}
 
 /**
  * aa_strneq - compare null terminated @str to a non null terminated substring
diff --git a/security/apparmor/include/context.h b/security/apparmor/include/context.h
index a9cbee4d9e48..d44ba5802e3d 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/include/context.h
+++ b/security/apparmor/include/context.h
@@ -21,6 +21,9 @@
 
 #include "policy.h"
 
+#define cred_cxt(X) (X)->security
+#define current_cxt() cred_cxt(current_cred())
+
 /* struct aa_file_cxt - the AppArmor context the file was opened in
  * @perms: the permission the file was opened with
  *
@@ -80,23 +83,8 @@ int aa_replace_current_profile(struct aa_profile *profile);
 int aa_set_current_onexec(struct aa_profile *profile);
 int aa_set_current_hat(struct aa_profile *profile, u64 token);
 int aa_restore_previous_profile(u64 cookie);
+struct aa_profile *aa_get_task_profile(struct task_struct *task);
 
-/**
- * __aa_task_is_confined - determine if @task has any confinement
- * @task: task to check confinement of  (NOT NULL)
- *
- * If @task != current needs to be called in RCU safe critical section
- */
-static inline bool __aa_task_is_confined(struct task_struct *task)
-{
-	struct aa_task_cxt *cxt = __task_cred(task)->security;
-
-	BUG_ON(!cxt || !cxt->profile);
-	if (unconfined(aa_newest_version(cxt->profile)))
-		return 0;
-
-	return 1;
-}
 
 /**
  * aa_cred_profile - obtain cred's profiles
@@ -108,12 +96,36 @@ static inline bool __aa_task_is_confined(struct task_struct *task)
  */
 static inline struct aa_profile *aa_cred_profile(const struct cred *cred)
 {
-	struct aa_task_cxt *cxt = cred->security;
+	struct aa_task_cxt *cxt = cred_cxt(cred);
 	BUG_ON(!cxt || !cxt->profile);
 	return aa_newest_version(cxt->profile);
 }
 
 /**
+ * __aa_task_profile - retrieve another task's profile
+ * @task: task to query  (NOT NULL)
+ *
+ * Returns: @task's profile without incrementing its ref count
+ *
+ * If @task != current needs to be called in RCU safe critical section
+ */
+static inline struct aa_profile *__aa_task_profile(struct task_struct *task)
+{
+	return aa_cred_profile(__task_cred(task));
+}
+
+/**
+ * __aa_task_is_confined - determine if @task has any confinement
+ * @task: task to check confinement of  (NOT NULL)
+ *
+ * If @task != current needs to be called in RCU safe critical section
+ */
+static inline bool __aa_task_is_confined(struct task_struct *task)
+{
+	return !unconfined(__aa_task_profile(task));
+}
+
+/**
  * __aa_current_profile - find the current tasks confining profile
  *
  * Returns: up to date confining profile or the ns unconfined profile (NOT NULL)
@@ -136,7 +148,7 @@ static inline struct aa_profile *__aa_current_profile(void)
  */
 static inline struct aa_profile *aa_current_profile(void)
 {
-	const struct aa_task_cxt *cxt = current_cred()->security;
+	const struct aa_task_cxt *cxt = current_cxt();
 	struct aa_profile *profile;
 	BUG_ON(!cxt || !cxt->profile);
 
@@ -151,4 +163,17 @@ static inline struct aa_profile *aa_current_profile(void)
 	return profile;
 }
 
+/**
+ * aa_clear_task_cxt_trans - clear transition tracking info from the cxt
+ * @cxt: task context to clear (NOT NULL)
+ */
+static inline void aa_clear_task_cxt_trans(struct aa_task_cxt *cxt)
+{
+	aa_put_profile(cxt->previous);
+	aa_put_profile(cxt->onexec);
+	cxt->previous = NULL;
+	cxt->onexec = NULL;
+	cxt->token = 0;
+}
+
 #endif /* __AA_CONTEXT_H */
diff --git a/security/apparmor/include/file.h b/security/apparmor/include/file.h
index 967b2deda376..2c922b86bd44 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/include/file.h
+++ b/security/apparmor/include/file.h
@@ -186,11 +186,6 @@ static inline void aa_free_file_rules(struct aa_file_rules *rules)
 	aa_free_domain_entries(&rules->trans);
 }
 
-#define ACC_FMODE(x) (("\000\004\002\006"[(x)&O_ACCMODE]) | (((x) << 1) & 0x40))
-
-/* from namei.c */
-#define MAP_OPEN_FLAGS(x) ((((x) + 1) & O_ACCMODE) ? (x) + 1 : (x))
-
 /**
  * aa_map_file_perms - map file flags to AppArmor permissions
  * @file: open file to map flags to AppArmor permissions
@@ -199,8 +194,13 @@ static inline void aa_free_file_rules(struct aa_file_rules *rules)
  */
 static inline u32 aa_map_file_to_perms(struct file *file)
 {
-	int flags = MAP_OPEN_FLAGS(file->f_flags);
-	u32 perms = ACC_FMODE(file->f_mode);
+	int flags = file->f_flags;
+	u32 perms = 0;
+
+	if (file->f_mode & FMODE_WRITE)
+		perms |= MAY_WRITE;
+	if (file->f_mode & FMODE_READ)
+		perms |= MAY_READ;
 
 	if ((flags & O_APPEND) && (perms & MAY_WRITE))
 		perms = (perms & ~MAY_WRITE) | MAY_APPEND;
diff --git a/security/apparmor/include/match.h b/security/apparmor/include/match.h
index 775843e7f984..001c43aa0406 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/include/match.h
+++ b/security/apparmor/include/match.h
@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@
  * This file contains AppArmor policy dfa matching engine definitions.
  *
  * Copyright (C) 1998-2008 Novell/SUSE
- * Copyright 2009-2010 Canonical Ltd.
+ * Copyright 2009-2012 Canonical Ltd.
  *
  * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
  * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as
@@ -16,25 +16,30 @@
 #define __AA_MATCH_H
 
 #include <linux/kref.h>
-#include <linux/workqueue.h>
 
 #define DFA_NOMATCH			0
 #define DFA_START			1
 
-#define DFA_VALID_PERM_MASK		0xffffffff
-#define DFA_VALID_PERM2_MASK		0xffffffff
 
 /**
  * The format used for transition tables is based on the GNU flex table
  * file format (--tables-file option; see Table File Format in the flex
  * info pages and the flex sources for documentation). The magic number
  * used in the header is 0x1B5E783D instead of 0xF13C57B1 though, because
- * the YY_ID_CHK (check) and YY_ID_DEF (default) tables are used
- * slightly differently (see the apparmor-parser package).
+ * new tables have been defined and others YY_ID_CHK (check) and YY_ID_DEF
+ * (default) tables are used slightly differently (see the apparmor-parser
+ * package).
+ *
+ *
+ * The data in the packed dfa is stored in network byte order, and the tables
+ * are arranged for flexibility.  We convert the table data to host native
+ * byte order.
+ *
+ * The dfa begins with a table set header, and is followed by the actual
+ * tables.
  */
 
 #define YYTH_MAGIC	0x1B5E783D
-#define YYTH_DEF_RECURSE 0x1			/* DEF Table is recursive */
 
 struct table_set_header {
 	u32 th_magic;		/* YYTH_MAGIC */
@@ -63,7 +68,7 @@ struct table_set_header {
 #define YYTD_DATA32	4
 #define YYTD_DATA64	8
 
-/* Each ACCEPT2 table gets 6 dedicated flags, YYTD_DATAX define the
+/* ACCEPT & ACCEPT2 tables gets 6 dedicated flags, YYTD_DATAX define the
  * first flags
  */
 #define ACCEPT1_FLAGS(X) ((X) & 0x3f)
diff --git a/security/apparmor/include/policy.h b/security/apparmor/include/policy.h
index bda4569fdd83..b25491a3046a 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/include/policy.h
+++ b/security/apparmor/include/policy.h
@@ -32,13 +32,13 @@
 extern const char *const profile_mode_names[];
 #define APPARMOR_NAMES_MAX_INDEX 3
 
-#define COMPLAIN_MODE(_profile)	\
-	((aa_g_profile_mode == APPARMOR_COMPLAIN) || \
-	 ((_profile)->mode == APPARMOR_COMPLAIN))
+#define PROFILE_MODE(_profile, _mode)		\
+	((aa_g_profile_mode == (_mode)) ||	\
+	 ((_profile)->mode == (_mode)))
 
-#define KILL_MODE(_profile) \
-	((aa_g_profile_mode == APPARMOR_KILL) || \
-	 ((_profile)->mode == APPARMOR_KILL))
+#define COMPLAIN_MODE(_profile)	PROFILE_MODE((_profile), APPARMOR_COMPLAIN)
+
+#define KILL_MODE(_profile) PROFILE_MODE((_profile), APPARMOR_KILL)
 
 #define PROFILE_IS_HAT(_profile) ((_profile)->flags & PFLAG_HAT)
 
@@ -105,6 +105,7 @@ struct aa_ns_acct {
  * @acct: accounting for the namespace
  * @unconfined: special unconfined profile for the namespace
  * @sub_ns: list of namespaces under the current namespace.
+ * @uniq_null: uniq value used for null learning profiles
  *
  * An aa_namespace defines the set profiles that are searched to determine
  * which profile to attach to a task.  Profiles can not be shared between
@@ -127,6 +128,7 @@ struct aa_namespace {
 	struct aa_ns_acct acct;
 	struct aa_profile *unconfined;
 	struct list_head sub_ns;
+	atomic_t uniq_null;
 };
 
 /* struct aa_policydb - match engine for a policy
@@ -148,7 +150,6 @@ struct aa_policydb {
  * @rename: optional profile name that this profile renamed
  * @xmatch: optional extended matching for unconfined executables names
  * @xmatch_len: xmatch prefix len, used to determine xmatch priority
- * @sid: the unique security id number of this profile
  * @audit: the auditing mode of the profile
  * @mode: the enforcement mode of the profile
  * @flags: flags controlling profile behavior
@@ -184,7 +185,6 @@ struct aa_profile {
 
 	struct aa_dfa *xmatch;
 	int xmatch_len;
-	u32 sid;
 	enum audit_mode audit;
 	enum profile_mode mode;
 	u32 flags;
diff --git a/security/apparmor/include/procattr.h b/security/apparmor/include/procattr.h
index 544aa6b766a4..6bd5f33d9533 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/include/procattr.h
+++ b/security/apparmor/include/procattr.h
@@ -21,6 +21,5 @@
 int aa_getprocattr(struct aa_profile *profile, char **string);
 int aa_setprocattr_changehat(char *args, size_t size, int test);
 int aa_setprocattr_changeprofile(char *fqname, bool onexec, int test);
-int aa_setprocattr_permipc(char *fqname);
 
 #endif /* __AA_PROCATTR_H */
diff --git a/security/apparmor/include/sid.h b/security/apparmor/include/sid.h
index 020db35c3010..513ca0e48965 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/include/sid.h
+++ b/security/apparmor/include/sid.h
@@ -16,7 +16,9 @@
 
 #include <linux/types.h>
 
-struct aa_profile;
+/* sid value that will not be allocated */
+#define AA_SID_INVALID 0
+#define AA_SID_ALLOC AA_SID_INVALID
 
 u32 aa_alloc_sid(void);
 void aa_free_sid(u32 sid);
diff --git a/security/apparmor/ipc.c b/security/apparmor/ipc.c
index cf1071b14232..c51d2266587e 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/ipc.c
+++ b/security/apparmor/ipc.c
@@ -95,23 +95,18 @@ int aa_ptrace(struct task_struct *tracer, struct task_struct *tracee,
 	 *       - tracer profile has CAP_SYS_PTRACE
 	 */
 
-	struct aa_profile *tracer_p;
-	/* cred released below */
-	const struct cred *cred = get_task_cred(tracer);
+	struct aa_profile *tracer_p = aa_get_task_profile(tracer);
 	int error = 0;
-	tracer_p = aa_cred_profile(cred);
 
 	if (!unconfined(tracer_p)) {
-		/* lcred released below */
-		const struct cred *lcred = get_task_cred(tracee);
-		struct aa_profile *tracee_p = aa_cred_profile(lcred);
+		struct aa_profile *tracee_p = aa_get_task_profile(tracee);
 
 		error = aa_may_ptrace(tracer, tracer_p, tracee_p, mode);
 		error = aa_audit_ptrace(tracer_p, tracee_p, error);
 
-		put_cred(lcred);
+		aa_put_profile(tracee_p);
 	}
-	put_cred(cred);
+	aa_put_profile(tracer_p);
 
 	return error;
 }
diff --git a/security/apparmor/lib.c b/security/apparmor/lib.c
index 7430298116d6..fcfe0233574c 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/lib.c
+++ b/security/apparmor/lib.c
@@ -45,8 +45,10 @@ char *aa_split_fqname(char *fqname, char **ns_name)
 		*ns_name = skip_spaces(&name[1]);
 		if (split) {
 			/* overwrite ':' with \0 */
-			*split = 0;
-			name = skip_spaces(split + 1);
+			*split++ = 0;
+			if (strncmp(split, "//", 2) == 0)
+				split += 2;
+			name = skip_spaces(split);
 		} else
 			/* a ns name without a following profile is allowed */
 			name = NULL;
@@ -75,15 +77,16 @@ void aa_info_message(const char *str)
 }
 
 /**
- * kvmalloc - do allocation preferring kmalloc but falling back to vmalloc
- * @size: size of allocation
+ * __aa_kvmalloc - do allocation preferring kmalloc but falling back to vmalloc
+ * @size: how many bytes of memory are required
+ * @flags: the type of memory to allocate (see kmalloc).
  *
  * Return: allocated buffer or NULL if failed
  *
  * It is possible that policy being loaded from the user is larger than
  * what can be allocated by kmalloc, in those cases fall back to vmalloc.
  */
-void *kvmalloc(size_t size)
+void *__aa_kvmalloc(size_t size, gfp_t flags)
 {
 	void *buffer = NULL;
 
@@ -92,32 +95,22 @@ void *kvmalloc(size_t size)
 
 	/* do not attempt kmalloc if we need more than 16 pages at once */
 	if (size <= (16*PAGE_SIZE))
-		buffer = kmalloc(size, GFP_NOIO | __GFP_NOWARN);
+		buffer = kmalloc(size, flags | GFP_NOIO | __GFP_NOWARN);
 	if (!buffer) {
 		/* see kvfree for why size must be at least work_struct size
 		 * when allocated via vmalloc
 		 */
 		if (size < sizeof(struct work_struct))
 			size = sizeof(struct work_struct);
-		buffer = vmalloc(size);
+		if (flags & __GFP_ZERO)
+			buffer = vzalloc(size);
+		else
+			buffer = vmalloc(size);
 	}
 	return buffer;
 }
 
 /**
- * do_vfree - workqueue routine for freeing vmalloced memory
- * @work: data to be freed
- *
- * The work_struct is overlaid to the data being freed, as at the point
- * the work is scheduled the data is no longer valid, be its freeing
- * needs to be delayed until safe.
- */
-static void do_vfree(struct work_struct *work)
-{
-	vfree(work);
-}
-
-/**
  * kvfree - free an allocation do by kvmalloc
  * @buffer: buffer to free (MAYBE_NULL)
  *
@@ -125,13 +118,8 @@ static void do_vfree(struct work_struct *work)
  */
 void kvfree(void *buffer)
 {
-	if (is_vmalloc_addr(buffer)) {
-		/* Data is no longer valid so just use the allocated space
-		 * as the work_struct
-		 */
-		struct work_struct *work = (struct work_struct *) buffer;
-		INIT_WORK(work, do_vfree);
-		schedule_work(work);
-	} else
+	if (is_vmalloc_addr(buffer))
+		vfree(buffer);
+	else
 		kfree(buffer);
 }
diff --git a/security/apparmor/lsm.c b/security/apparmor/lsm.c
index b21830eced41..2e2a0dd4a73f 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/lsm.c
+++ b/security/apparmor/lsm.c
@@ -48,8 +48,8 @@ int apparmor_initialized __initdata;
  */
 static void apparmor_cred_free(struct cred *cred)
 {
-	aa_free_task_context(cred->security);
-	cred->security = NULL;
+	aa_free_task_context(cred_cxt(cred));
+	cred_cxt(cred) = NULL;
 }
 
 /*
@@ -62,7 +62,7 @@ static int apparmor_cred_alloc_blank(struct cred *cred, gfp_t gfp)
 	if (!cxt)
 		return -ENOMEM;
 
-	cred->security = cxt;
+	cred_cxt(cred) = cxt;
 	return 0;
 }
 
@@ -77,8 +77,8 @@ static int apparmor_cred_prepare(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old,
 	if (!cxt)
 		return -ENOMEM;
 
-	aa_dup_task_context(cxt, old->security);
-	new->security = cxt;
+	aa_dup_task_context(cxt, cred_cxt(old));
+	cred_cxt(new) = cxt;
 	return 0;
 }
 
@@ -87,8 +87,8 @@ static int apparmor_cred_prepare(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old,
  */
 static void apparmor_cred_transfer(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old)
 {
-	const struct aa_task_cxt *old_cxt = old->security;
-	struct aa_task_cxt *new_cxt = new->security;
+	const struct aa_task_cxt *old_cxt = cred_cxt(old);
+	struct aa_task_cxt *new_cxt = cred_cxt(new);
 
 	aa_dup_task_context(new_cxt, old_cxt);
 }
@@ -469,7 +469,6 @@ static int apparmor_file_lock(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd)
 static int common_mmap(int op, struct file *file, unsigned long prot,
 		       unsigned long flags)
 {
-	struct dentry *dentry;
 	int mask = 0;
 
 	if (!file || !file->f_security)
@@ -486,7 +485,6 @@ static int common_mmap(int op, struct file *file, unsigned long prot,
 	if (prot & PROT_EXEC)
 		mask |= AA_EXEC_MMAP;
 
-	dentry = file->f_path.dentry;
 	return common_file_perm(op, file, mask);
 }
 
@@ -507,11 +505,9 @@ static int apparmor_getprocattr(struct task_struct *task, char *name,
 				char **value)
 {
 	int error = -ENOENT;
-	struct aa_profile *profile;
 	/* released below */
 	const struct cred *cred = get_task_cred(task);
-	struct aa_task_cxt *cxt = cred->security;
-	profile = aa_cred_profile(cred);
+	struct aa_task_cxt *cxt = cred_cxt(cred);
 
 	if (strcmp(name, "current") == 0)
 		error = aa_getprocattr(aa_newest_version(cxt->profile),
@@ -533,6 +529,8 @@ static int apparmor_getprocattr(struct task_struct *task, char *name,
 static int apparmor_setprocattr(struct task_struct *task, char *name,
 				void *value, size_t size)
 {
+	struct common_audit_data sa;
+	struct apparmor_audit_data aad = {0,};
 	char *command, *args = value;
 	size_t arg_size;
 	int error;
@@ -576,30 +574,31 @@ static int apparmor_setprocattr(struct task_struct *task, char *name,
 		} else if (strcmp(command, "permprofile") == 0) {
 			error = aa_setprocattr_changeprofile(args, !AA_ONEXEC,
 							     AA_DO_TEST);
-		} else if (strcmp(command, "permipc") == 0) {
-			error = aa_setprocattr_permipc(args);
-		} else {
-			struct common_audit_data sa;
-			struct apparmor_audit_data aad = {0,};
-			sa.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NONE;
-			sa.aad = &aad;
-			aad.op = OP_SETPROCATTR;
-			aad.info = name;
-			aad.error = -EINVAL;
-			return aa_audit(AUDIT_APPARMOR_DENIED,
-					__aa_current_profile(), GFP_KERNEL,
-					&sa, NULL);
-		}
+		} else
+			goto fail;
 	} else if (strcmp(name, "exec") == 0) {
-		error = aa_setprocattr_changeprofile(args, AA_ONEXEC,
-						     !AA_DO_TEST);
-	} else {
+		if (strcmp(command, "exec") == 0)
+			error = aa_setprocattr_changeprofile(args, AA_ONEXEC,
+							     !AA_DO_TEST);
+		else
+			goto fail;
+	} else
 		/* only support the "current" and "exec" process attributes */
 		return -EINVAL;
-	}
+
 	if (!error)
 		error = size;
 	return error;
+
+fail:
+	sa.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NONE;
+	sa.aad = &aad;
+	aad.profile = aa_current_profile();
+	aad.op = OP_SETPROCATTR;
+	aad.info = name;
+	aad.error = -EINVAL;
+	aa_audit_msg(AUDIT_APPARMOR_DENIED, &sa, NULL);
+	return -EINVAL;
 }
 
 static int apparmor_task_setrlimit(struct task_struct *task,
@@ -886,7 +885,7 @@ static int __init set_init_cxt(void)
 		return -ENOMEM;
 
 	cxt->profile = aa_get_profile(root_ns->unconfined);
-	cred->security = cxt;
+	cred_cxt(cred) = cxt;
 
 	return 0;
 }
@@ -915,8 +914,11 @@ static int __init apparmor_init(void)
 
 	error = register_security(&apparmor_ops);
 	if (error) {
+		struct cred *cred = (struct cred *)current->real_cred;
+		aa_free_task_context(cred_cxt(cred));
+		cred_cxt(cred) = NULL;
 		AA_ERROR("Unable to register AppArmor\n");
-		goto set_init_cxt_out;
+		goto register_security_out;
 	}
 
 	/* Report that AppArmor successfully initialized */
@@ -930,9 +932,6 @@ static int __init apparmor_init(void)
 
 	return error;
 
-set_init_cxt_out:
-	aa_free_task_context(current->real_cred->security);
-
 register_security_out:
 	aa_free_root_ns();
 
diff --git a/security/apparmor/match.c b/security/apparmor/match.c
index 90971a8c3789..727eb4200d5c 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/match.c
+++ b/security/apparmor/match.c
@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@
  * This file contains AppArmor dfa based regular expression matching engine
  *
  * Copyright (C) 1998-2008 Novell/SUSE
- * Copyright 2009-2010 Canonical Ltd.
+ * Copyright 2009-2012 Canonical Ltd.
  *
  * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
  * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as
@@ -23,6 +23,8 @@
 #include "include/apparmor.h"
 #include "include/match.h"
 
+#define base_idx(X) ((X) & 0xffffff)
+
 /**
  * unpack_table - unpack a dfa table (one of accept, default, base, next check)
  * @blob: data to unpack (NOT NULL)
@@ -30,7 +32,7 @@
  *
  * Returns: pointer to table else NULL on failure
  *
- * NOTE: must be freed by kvfree (not kmalloc)
+ * NOTE: must be freed by kvfree (not kfree)
  */
 static struct table_header *unpack_table(char *blob, size_t bsize)
 {
@@ -57,7 +59,7 @@ static struct table_header *unpack_table(char *blob, size_t bsize)
 	if (bsize < tsize)
 		goto out;
 
-	table = kvmalloc(tsize);
+	table = kvzalloc(tsize);
 	if (table) {
 		*table = th;
 		if (th.td_flags == YYTD_DATA8)
@@ -137,8 +139,7 @@ static int verify_dfa(struct aa_dfa *dfa, int flags)
 		for (i = 0; i < state_count; i++) {
 			if (DEFAULT_TABLE(dfa)[i] >= state_count)
 				goto out;
-			/* TODO: do check that DEF state recursion terminates */
-			if (BASE_TABLE(dfa)[i] + 255 >= trans_count) {
+			if (base_idx(BASE_TABLE(dfa)[i]) + 255 >= trans_count) {
 				printk(KERN_ERR "AppArmor DFA next/check upper "
 				       "bounds error\n");
 				goto out;
@@ -314,7 +315,7 @@ unsigned int aa_dfa_match_len(struct aa_dfa *dfa, unsigned int start,
 		u8 *equiv = EQUIV_TABLE(dfa);
 		/* default is direct to next state */
 		for (; len; len--) {
-			pos = base[state] + equiv[(u8) *str++];
+			pos = base_idx(base[state]) + equiv[(u8) *str++];
 			if (check[pos] == state)
 				state = next[pos];
 			else
@@ -323,7 +324,7 @@ unsigned int aa_dfa_match_len(struct aa_dfa *dfa, unsigned int start,
 	} else {
 		/* default is direct to next state */
 		for (; len; len--) {
-			pos = base[state] + (u8) *str++;
+			pos = base_idx(base[state]) + (u8) *str++;
 			if (check[pos] == state)
 				state = next[pos];
 			else
@@ -364,7 +365,7 @@ unsigned int aa_dfa_match(struct aa_dfa *dfa, unsigned int start,
 		u8 *equiv = EQUIV_TABLE(dfa);
 		/* default is direct to next state */
 		while (*str) {
-			pos = base[state] + equiv[(u8) *str++];
+			pos = base_idx(base[state]) + equiv[(u8) *str++];
 			if (check[pos] == state)
 				state = next[pos];
 			else
@@ -373,7 +374,7 @@ unsigned int aa_dfa_match(struct aa_dfa *dfa, unsigned int start,
 	} else {
 		/* default is direct to next state */
 		while (*str) {
-			pos = base[state] + (u8) *str++;
+			pos = base_idx(base[state]) + (u8) *str++;
 			if (check[pos] == state)
 				state = next[pos];
 			else
@@ -409,14 +410,14 @@ unsigned int aa_dfa_next(struct aa_dfa *dfa, unsigned int state,
 		u8 *equiv = EQUIV_TABLE(dfa);
 		/* default is direct to next state */
 
-		pos = base[state] + equiv[(u8) c];
+		pos = base_idx(base[state]) + equiv[(u8) c];
 		if (check[pos] == state)
 			state = next[pos];
 		else
 			state = def[state];
 	} else {
 		/* default is direct to next state */
-		pos = base[state] + (u8) c;
+		pos = base_idx(base[state]) + (u8) c;
 		if (check[pos] == state)
 			state = next[pos];
 		else
diff --git a/security/apparmor/path.c b/security/apparmor/path.c
index e91ffee80162..35b394a75d76 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/path.c
+++ b/security/apparmor/path.c
@@ -174,7 +174,7 @@ static int get_name_to_buffer(struct path *path, int flags, char *buffer,
 	if (info && error) {
 		if (error == -ENOENT)
 			*info = "Failed name lookup - deleted entry";
-		else if (error == -ESTALE)
+		else if (error == -EACCES)
 			*info = "Failed name lookup - disconnected path";
 		else if (error == -ENAMETOOLONG)
 			*info = "Failed name lookup - name too long";
diff --git a/security/apparmor/policy.c b/security/apparmor/policy.c
index 813200384d97..0f345c4dee5f 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/policy.c
+++ b/security/apparmor/policy.c
@@ -87,7 +87,6 @@
 #include "include/policy.h"
 #include "include/policy_unpack.h"
 #include "include/resource.h"
-#include "include/sid.h"
 
 
 /* root profile namespace */
@@ -292,7 +291,6 @@ static struct aa_namespace *alloc_namespace(const char *prefix,
 	if (!ns->unconfined)
 		goto fail_unconfined;
 
-	ns->unconfined->sid = aa_alloc_sid();
 	ns->unconfined->flags = PFLAG_UNCONFINED | PFLAG_IX_ON_NAME_ERROR |
 	    PFLAG_IMMUTABLE;
 
@@ -303,6 +301,8 @@ static struct aa_namespace *alloc_namespace(const char *prefix,
 	 */
 	ns->unconfined->ns = aa_get_namespace(ns);
 
+	atomic_set(&ns->uniq_null, 0);
+
 	return ns;
 
 fail_unconfined:
@@ -497,7 +497,6 @@ static void __replace_profile(struct aa_profile *old, struct aa_profile *new)
 	/* released when @new is freed */
 	new->parent = aa_get_profile(old->parent);
 	new->ns = aa_get_namespace(old->ns);
-	new->sid = old->sid;
 	__list_add_profile(&policy->profiles, new);
 	/* inherit children */
 	list_for_each_entry_safe(child, tmp, &old->base.profiles, base.list) {
@@ -636,83 +635,6 @@ void __init aa_free_root_ns(void)
 }
 
 /**
- * aa_alloc_profile - allocate, initialize and return a new profile
- * @hname: name of the profile  (NOT NULL)
- *
- * Returns: refcount profile or NULL on failure
- */
-struct aa_profile *aa_alloc_profile(const char *hname)
-{
-	struct aa_profile *profile;
-
-	/* freed by free_profile - usually through aa_put_profile */
-	profile = kzalloc(sizeof(*profile), GFP_KERNEL);
-	if (!profile)
-		return NULL;
-
-	if (!policy_init(&profile->base, NULL, hname)) {
-		kzfree(profile);
-		return NULL;
-	}
-
-	/* refcount released by caller */
-	return profile;
-}
-
-/**
- * aa_new_null_profile - create a new null-X learning profile
- * @parent: profile that caused this profile to be created (NOT NULL)
- * @hat: true if the null- learning profile is a hat
- *
- * Create a null- complain mode profile used in learning mode.  The name of
- * the profile is unique and follows the format of parent//null-sid.
- *
- * null profiles are added to the profile list but the list does not
- * hold a count on them so that they are automatically released when
- * not in use.
- *
- * Returns: new refcounted profile else NULL on failure
- */
-struct aa_profile *aa_new_null_profile(struct aa_profile *parent, int hat)
-{
-	struct aa_profile *profile = NULL;
-	char *name;
-	u32 sid = aa_alloc_sid();
-
-	/* freed below */
-	name = kmalloc(strlen(parent->base.hname) + 2 + 7 + 8, GFP_KERNEL);
-	if (!name)
-		goto fail;
-	sprintf(name, "%s//null-%x", parent->base.hname, sid);
-
-	profile = aa_alloc_profile(name);
-	kfree(name);
-	if (!profile)
-		goto fail;
-
-	profile->sid = sid;
-	profile->mode = APPARMOR_COMPLAIN;
-	profile->flags = PFLAG_NULL;
-	if (hat)
-		profile->flags |= PFLAG_HAT;
-
-	/* released on free_profile */
-	profile->parent = aa_get_profile(parent);
-	profile->ns = aa_get_namespace(parent->ns);
-
-	write_lock(&profile->ns->lock);
-	__list_add_profile(&parent->base.profiles, profile);
-	write_unlock(&profile->ns->lock);
-
-	/* refcount released by caller */
-	return profile;
-
-fail:
-	aa_free_sid(sid);
-	return NULL;
-}
-
-/**
  * free_profile - free a profile
  * @profile: the profile to free  (MAYBE NULL)
  *
@@ -749,7 +671,6 @@ static void free_profile(struct aa_profile *profile)
 	aa_free_cap_rules(&profile->caps);
 	aa_free_rlimit_rules(&profile->rlimits);
 
-	aa_free_sid(profile->sid);
 	aa_put_dfa(profile->xmatch);
 	aa_put_dfa(profile->policy.dfa);
 
@@ -790,6 +711,81 @@ void aa_free_profile_kref(struct kref *kref)
 	free_profile(p);
 }
 
+/**
+ * aa_alloc_profile - allocate, initialize and return a new profile
+ * @hname: name of the profile  (NOT NULL)
+ *
+ * Returns: refcount profile or NULL on failure
+ */
+struct aa_profile *aa_alloc_profile(const char *hname)
+{
+	struct aa_profile *profile;
+
+	/* freed by free_profile - usually through aa_put_profile */
+	profile = kzalloc(sizeof(*profile), GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (!profile)
+		return NULL;
+
+	if (!policy_init(&profile->base, NULL, hname)) {
+		kzfree(profile);
+		return NULL;
+	}
+
+	/* refcount released by caller */
+	return profile;
+}
+
+/**
+ * aa_new_null_profile - create a new null-X learning profile
+ * @parent: profile that caused this profile to be created (NOT NULL)
+ * @hat: true if the null- learning profile is a hat
+ *
+ * Create a null- complain mode profile used in learning mode.  The name of
+ * the profile is unique and follows the format of parent//null-<uniq>.
+ *
+ * null profiles are added to the profile list but the list does not
+ * hold a count on them so that they are automatically released when
+ * not in use.
+ *
+ * Returns: new refcounted profile else NULL on failure
+ */
+struct aa_profile *aa_new_null_profile(struct aa_profile *parent, int hat)
+{
+	struct aa_profile *profile = NULL;
+	char *name;
+	int uniq = atomic_inc_return(&parent->ns->uniq_null);
+
+	/* freed below */
+	name = kmalloc(strlen(parent->base.hname) + 2 + 7 + 8, GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (!name)
+		goto fail;
+	sprintf(name, "%s//null-%x", parent->base.hname, uniq);
+
+	profile = aa_alloc_profile(name);
+	kfree(name);
+	if (!profile)
+		goto fail;
+
+	profile->mode = APPARMOR_COMPLAIN;
+	profile->flags = PFLAG_NULL;
+	if (hat)
+		profile->flags |= PFLAG_HAT;
+
+	/* released on free_profile */
+	profile->parent = aa_get_profile(parent);
+	profile->ns = aa_get_namespace(parent->ns);
+
+	write_lock(&profile->ns->lock);
+	__list_add_profile(&parent->base.profiles, profile);
+	write_unlock(&profile->ns->lock);
+
+	/* refcount released by caller */
+	return profile;
+
+fail:
+	return NULL;
+}
+
 /* TODO: profile accounting - setup in remove */
 
 /**
@@ -972,7 +968,6 @@ static void __add_new_profile(struct aa_namespace *ns, struct aa_policy *policy,
 		profile->parent = aa_get_profile((struct aa_profile *) policy);
 	__list_add_profile(&policy->profiles, profile);
 	/* released on free_profile */
-	profile->sid = aa_alloc_sid();
 	profile->ns = aa_get_namespace(ns);
 }
 
@@ -1110,14 +1105,8 @@ audit:
 	if (!error) {
 		if (rename_profile)
 			__replace_profile(rename_profile, new_profile);
-		if (old_profile) {
-			/* when there are both rename and old profiles
-			 * inherit old profiles sid
-			 */
-			if (rename_profile)
-				aa_free_sid(new_profile->sid);
+		if (old_profile)
 			__replace_profile(old_profile, new_profile);
-		}
 		if (!(old_profile || rename_profile))
 			__add_new_profile(ns, policy, new_profile);
 	}
@@ -1167,14 +1156,12 @@ ssize_t aa_remove_profiles(char *fqname, size_t size)
 	if (fqname[0] == ':') {
 		char *ns_name;
 		name = aa_split_fqname(fqname, &ns_name);
-		if (ns_name) {
-			/* released below */
-			ns = aa_find_namespace(root, ns_name);
-			if (!ns) {
-				info = "namespace does not exist";
-				error = -ENOENT;
-				goto fail;
-			}
+		/* released below */
+		ns = aa_find_namespace(root, ns_name);
+		if (!ns) {
+			info = "namespace does not exist";
+			error = -ENOENT;
+			goto fail;
 		}
 	} else
 		/* released below */
diff --git a/security/apparmor/policy_unpack.c b/security/apparmor/policy_unpack.c
index 329b1fd30749..6dac7d77cb4d 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/policy_unpack.c
+++ b/security/apparmor/policy_unpack.c
@@ -27,7 +27,6 @@
 #include "include/match.h"
 #include "include/policy.h"
 #include "include/policy_unpack.h"
-#include "include/sid.h"
 
 /*
  * The AppArmor interface treats data as a type byte followed by the
@@ -290,6 +289,9 @@ static int unpack_strdup(struct aa_ext *e, char **string, const char *name)
 	return res;
 }
 
+#define DFA_VALID_PERM_MASK		0xffffffff
+#define DFA_VALID_PERM2_MASK		0xffffffff
+
 /**
  * verify_accept - verify the accept tables of a dfa
  * @dfa: dfa to verify accept tables of (NOT NULL)
diff --git a/security/apparmor/procattr.c b/security/apparmor/procattr.c
index 1b41c542d376..6c9390179b89 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/procattr.c
+++ b/security/apparmor/procattr.c
@@ -163,9 +163,3 @@ int aa_setprocattr_changeprofile(char *fqname, bool onexec, int test)
 	name = aa_split_fqname(fqname, &ns_name);
 	return aa_change_profile(ns_name, name, onexec, test);
 }
-
-int aa_setprocattr_permipc(char *fqname)
-{
-	/* TODO: add ipc permission querying */
-	return -ENOTSUPP;
-}
diff --git a/security/apparmor/resource.c b/security/apparmor/resource.c
index e1f3d7ef2c54..748bf0ca6c9f 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/resource.c
+++ b/security/apparmor/resource.c
@@ -15,6 +15,7 @@
 #include <linux/audit.h>
 
 #include "include/audit.h"
+#include "include/context.h"
 #include "include/resource.h"
 #include "include/policy.h"
 
@@ -90,17 +91,25 @@ int aa_map_resource(int resource)
 int aa_task_setrlimit(struct aa_profile *profile, struct task_struct *task,
 		      unsigned int resource, struct rlimit *new_rlim)
 {
+	struct aa_profile *task_profile;
 	int error = 0;
 
+	rcu_read_lock();
+	task_profile = aa_get_profile(aa_cred_profile(__task_cred(task)));
+	rcu_read_unlock();
+
 	/* TODO: extend resource control to handle other (non current)
-	 * processes.  AppArmor rules currently have the implicit assumption
-	 * that the task is setting the resource of the current process
+	 * profiles.  AppArmor rules currently have the implicit assumption
+	 * that the task is setting the resource of a task confined with
+	 * the same profile.
 	 */
-	if ((task != current->group_leader) ||
+	if (profile != task_profile ||
 	    (profile->rlimits.mask & (1 << resource) &&
 	     new_rlim->rlim_max > profile->rlimits.limits[resource].rlim_max))
 		error = -EACCES;
 
+	aa_put_profile(task_profile);
+
 	return audit_resource(profile, resource, new_rlim->rlim_max, error);
 }
 
diff --git a/security/integrity/Kconfig b/security/integrity/Kconfig
index 4bb3a775a996..245c6d92065b 100644
--- a/security/integrity/Kconfig
+++ b/security/integrity/Kconfig
@@ -17,6 +17,21 @@ config INTEGRITY_SIGNATURE
 	  This is useful for evm and module keyrings, when keys are
 	  usually only added from initramfs.
 
+config INTEGRITY_AUDIT
+	bool "Enables integrity auditing support "
+	depends on INTEGRITY && AUDIT
+	default y
+	help
+	  In addition to enabling integrity auditing support, this
+	  option adds a kernel parameter 'integrity_audit', which
+	  controls the level of integrity auditing messages.
+	  0 - basic integrity auditing messages (default)
+	  1 - additional integrity auditing messages
+
+	  Additional informational integrity auditing messages would
+	  be enabled by specifying 'integrity_audit=1' on the kernel
+	  command line.
+
 config INTEGRITY_ASYMMETRIC_KEYS
 	boolean "Enable asymmetric keys support"
 	depends on INTEGRITY_SIGNATURE
diff --git a/security/integrity/Makefile b/security/integrity/Makefile
index ebb6409b3fcb..0f9cffb1f9ad 100644
--- a/security/integrity/Makefile
+++ b/security/integrity/Makefile
@@ -3,6 +3,7 @@
 #
 
 obj-$(CONFIG_INTEGRITY) += integrity.o
+obj-$(CONFIG_INTEGRITY_AUDIT) += integrity_audit.o
 obj-$(CONFIG_INTEGRITY_SIGNATURE) += digsig.o
 obj-$(CONFIG_INTEGRITY_ASYMMETRIC_KEYS) += digsig_asymmetric.o
 
diff --git a/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c b/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c
index cdbde1762189..df0fa451a871 100644
--- a/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c
+++ b/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c
@@ -16,6 +16,7 @@
 
 #include <linux/module.h>
 #include <linux/crypto.h>
+#include <linux/audit.h>
 #include <linux/xattr.h>
 #include <linux/integrity.h>
 #include <linux/evm.h>
@@ -24,6 +25,9 @@
 
 int evm_initialized;
 
+static char *integrity_status_msg[] = {
+	"pass", "fail", "no_label", "no_xattrs", "unknown"
+};
 char *evm_hmac = "hmac(sha1)";
 char *evm_hash = "sha1";
 int evm_hmac_version = CONFIG_EVM_HMAC_VERSION;
@@ -262,9 +266,15 @@ static int evm_protect_xattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *xattr_name,
 		if ((evm_status == INTEGRITY_PASS) ||
 		    (evm_status == INTEGRITY_NOXATTRS))
 			return 0;
-		return -EPERM;
+		goto out;
 	}
 	evm_status = evm_verify_current_integrity(dentry);
+out:
+	if (evm_status != INTEGRITY_PASS)
+		integrity_audit_msg(AUDIT_INTEGRITY_METADATA, dentry->d_inode,
+				    dentry->d_name.name, "appraise_metadata",
+				    integrity_status_msg[evm_status],
+				    -EPERM, 0);
 	return evm_status == INTEGRITY_PASS ? 0 : -EPERM;
 }
 
@@ -357,6 +367,9 @@ int evm_inode_setattr(struct dentry *dentry, struct iattr *attr)
 	if ((evm_status == INTEGRITY_PASS) ||
 	    (evm_status == INTEGRITY_NOXATTRS))
 		return 0;
+	integrity_audit_msg(AUDIT_INTEGRITY_METADATA, dentry->d_inode,
+			    dentry->d_name.name, "appraise_metadata",
+			    integrity_status_msg[evm_status], -EPERM, 0);
 	return -EPERM;
 }
 
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/Kconfig b/security/integrity/ima/Kconfig
index d232c73647ae..39196abaff0d 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/Kconfig
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/Kconfig
@@ -38,18 +38,6 @@ config IMA_MEASURE_PCR_IDX
 	  that IMA uses to maintain the integrity aggregate of the
 	  measurement list.  If unsure, use the default 10.
 
-config IMA_AUDIT
-	bool "Enables auditing support"
-	depends on IMA
-	depends on AUDIT
-	default y
-	help
-	  This option adds a kernel parameter 'ima_audit', which
-	  allows informational auditing messages to be enabled
-	  at boot.  If this option is selected, informational integrity
-	  auditing messages can be enabled with 'ima_audit=1' on
-	  the kernel command line.
-
 config IMA_LSM_RULES
 	bool
 	depends on IMA && AUDIT && (SECURITY_SELINUX || SECURITY_SMACK)
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/Makefile b/security/integrity/ima/Makefile
index 3f2ca6bdc384..56dfee7cbf61 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/Makefile
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/Makefile
@@ -7,5 +7,4 @@ obj-$(CONFIG_IMA) += ima.o
 
 ima-y := ima_fs.o ima_queue.o ima_init.o ima_main.o ima_crypto.o ima_api.o \
 	 ima_policy.o
-ima-$(CONFIG_IMA_AUDIT) += ima_audit.o
 ima-$(CONFIG_IMA_APPRAISE) += ima_appraise.o
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima.h b/security/integrity/ima/ima.h
index a41c9c18e5e0..b3dd616560f7 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima.h
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima.h
@@ -62,20 +62,6 @@ struct ima_queue_entry {
 };
 extern struct list_head ima_measurements;	/* list of all measurements */
 
-#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_AUDIT
-/* declarations */
-void integrity_audit_msg(int audit_msgno, struct inode *inode,
-			 const unsigned char *fname, const char *op,
-			 const char *cause, int result, int info);
-#else
-static inline void integrity_audit_msg(int audit_msgno, struct inode *inode,
-				       const unsigned char *fname,
-				       const char *op, const char *cause,
-				       int result, int info)
-{
-}
-#endif
-
 /* Internal IMA function definitions */
 int ima_init(void);
 void ima_cleanup(void);
diff --git a/security/integrity/integrity.h b/security/integrity/integrity.h
index 84c37c4db914..c42fb7a70dee 100644
--- a/security/integrity/integrity.h
+++ b/security/integrity/integrity.h
@@ -113,5 +113,19 @@ static inline int asymmetric_verify(struct key *keyring, const char *sig,
 }
 #endif
 
+#ifdef CONFIG_INTEGRITY_AUDIT
+/* declarations */
+void integrity_audit_msg(int audit_msgno, struct inode *inode,
+			 const unsigned char *fname, const char *op,
+			 const char *cause, int result, int info);
+#else
+static inline void integrity_audit_msg(int audit_msgno, struct inode *inode,
+				       const unsigned char *fname,
+				       const char *op, const char *cause,
+				       int result, int info)
+{
+}
+#endif
+
 /* set during initialization */
 extern int iint_initialized;
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_audit.c b/security/integrity/integrity_audit.c
index c586faae8fd6..d7efb30404aa 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_audit.c
+++ b/security/integrity/integrity_audit.c
@@ -13,20 +13,20 @@
 #include <linux/fs.h>
 #include <linux/gfp.h>
 #include <linux/audit.h>
-#include "ima.h"
+#include "integrity.h"
 
-static int ima_audit;
+static int integrity_audit_info;
 
 /* ima_audit_setup - enable informational auditing messages */
-static int __init ima_audit_setup(char *str)
+static int __init integrity_audit_setup(char *str)
 {
 	unsigned long audit;
 
 	if (!strict_strtoul(str, 0, &audit))
-		ima_audit = audit ? 1 : 0;
+		integrity_audit_info = audit ? 1 : 0;
 	return 1;
 }
-__setup("ima_audit=", ima_audit_setup);
+__setup("integrity_audit=", integrity_audit_setup);
 
 void integrity_audit_msg(int audit_msgno, struct inode *inode,
 			 const unsigned char *fname, const char *op,
@@ -34,7 +34,7 @@ void integrity_audit_msg(int audit_msgno, struct inode *inode,
 {
 	struct audit_buffer *ab;
 
-	if (!ima_audit && audit_info == 1) /* Skip informational messages */
+	if (!integrity_audit_info && audit_info == 1)	/* Skip info messages */
 		return;
 
 	ab = audit_log_start(current->audit_context, GFP_KERNEL, audit_msgno);
diff --git a/security/smack/smack.h b/security/smack/smack.h
index 8ad30955e15d..339614c76e63 100644
--- a/security/smack/smack.h
+++ b/security/smack/smack.h
@@ -29,6 +29,38 @@
 #define SMK_LONGLABEL	256
 
 /*
+ * This is the repository for labels seen so that it is
+ * not necessary to keep allocating tiny chuncks of memory
+ * and so that they can be shared.
+ *
+ * Labels are never modified in place. Anytime a label
+ * is imported (e.g. xattrset on a file) the list is checked
+ * for it and it is added if it doesn't exist. The address
+ * is passed out in either case. Entries are added, but
+ * never deleted.
+ *
+ * Since labels are hanging around anyway it doesn't
+ * hurt to maintain a secid for those awkward situations
+ * where kernel components that ought to use LSM independent
+ * interfaces don't. The secid should go away when all of
+ * these components have been repaired.
+ *
+ * The cipso value associated with the label gets stored here, too.
+ *
+ * Keep the access rules for this subject label here so that
+ * the entire set of rules does not need to be examined every
+ * time.
+ */
+struct smack_known {
+	struct list_head		list;
+	char				*smk_known;
+	u32				smk_secid;
+	struct netlbl_lsm_secattr	smk_netlabel;	/* on wire labels */
+	struct list_head		smk_rules;	/* access rules */
+	struct mutex			smk_rules_lock;	/* lock for rules */
+};
+
+/*
  * Maximum number of bytes for the levels in a CIPSO IP option.
  * Why 23? CIPSO is constrained to 30, so a 32 byte buffer is
  * bigger than can be used, and 24 is the next lower multiple
@@ -46,25 +78,25 @@ struct superblock_smack {
 };
 
 struct socket_smack {
-	char		*smk_out;	/* outbound label */
-	char		*smk_in;	/* inbound label */
-	char		*smk_packet;	/* TCP peer label */
+	struct smack_known	*smk_out;	/* outbound label */
+	char			*smk_in;	/* inbound label */
+	char			*smk_packet;	/* TCP peer label */
 };
 
 /*
  * Inode smack data
  */
 struct inode_smack {
-	char		*smk_inode;	/* label of the fso */
-	char		*smk_task;	/* label of the task */
-	char		*smk_mmap;	/* label of the mmap domain */
-	struct mutex	smk_lock;	/* initialization lock */
-	int		smk_flags;	/* smack inode flags */
+	char			*smk_inode;	/* label of the fso */
+	struct smack_known	*smk_task;	/* label of the task */
+	struct smack_known	*smk_mmap;	/* label of the mmap domain */
+	struct mutex		smk_lock;	/* initialization lock */
+	int			smk_flags;	/* smack inode flags */
 };
 
 struct task_smack {
-	char			*smk_task;	/* label for access control */
-	char			*smk_forked;	/* label when forked */
+	struct smack_known	*smk_task;	/* label for access control */
+	struct smack_known	*smk_forked;	/* label when forked */
 	struct list_head	smk_rules;	/* per task access rules */
 	struct mutex		smk_rules_lock;	/* lock for the rules */
 };
@@ -78,7 +110,7 @@ struct task_smack {
  */
 struct smack_rule {
 	struct list_head	list;
-	char			*smk_subject;
+	struct smack_known	*smk_subject;
 	char			*smk_object;
 	int			smk_access;
 };
@@ -94,35 +126,14 @@ struct smk_netlbladdr {
 };
 
 /*
- * This is the repository for labels seen so that it is
- * not necessary to keep allocating tiny chuncks of memory
- * and so that they can be shared.
- *
- * Labels are never modified in place. Anytime a label
- * is imported (e.g. xattrset on a file) the list is checked
- * for it and it is added if it doesn't exist. The address
- * is passed out in either case. Entries are added, but
- * never deleted.
- *
- * Since labels are hanging around anyway it doesn't
- * hurt to maintain a secid for those awkward situations
- * where kernel components that ought to use LSM independent
- * interfaces don't. The secid should go away when all of
- * these components have been repaired.
- *
- * The cipso value associated with the label gets stored here, too.
- *
- * Keep the access rules for this subject label here so that
- * the entire set of rules does not need to be examined every
- * time.
+ * An entry in the table identifying ports.
  */
-struct smack_known {
-	struct list_head		list;
-	char				*smk_known;
-	u32				smk_secid;
-	struct netlbl_lsm_secattr	smk_netlabel;	/* on wire labels */
-	struct list_head		smk_rules;	/* access rules */
-	struct mutex			smk_rules_lock;	/* lock for rules */
+struct smk_port_label {
+	struct list_head	list;
+	struct sock		*smk_sock;	/* socket initialized on */
+	unsigned short		smk_port;	/* the port number */
+	char			*smk_in;	/* incoming label */
+	struct smack_known	*smk_out;	/* outgoing label */
 };
 
 /*
@@ -132,6 +143,7 @@ struct smack_known {
 #define SMK_FSFLOOR	"smackfsfloor="
 #define SMK_FSHAT	"smackfshat="
 #define SMK_FSROOT	"smackfsroot="
+#define SMK_FSTRANS	"smackfstransmute="
 
 #define SMACK_CIPSO_OPTION 	"-CIPSO"
 
@@ -203,9 +215,9 @@ struct inode_smack *new_inode_smack(char *);
  * These functions are in smack_access.c
  */
 int smk_access_entry(char *, char *, struct list_head *);
-int smk_access(char *, char *, int, struct smk_audit_info *);
+int smk_access(struct smack_known *, char *, int, struct smk_audit_info *);
 int smk_curacc(char *, u32, struct smk_audit_info *);
-char *smack_from_secid(const u32);
+struct smack_known *smack_from_secid(const u32);
 char *smk_parse_smack(const char *string, int len);
 int smk_netlbl_mls(int, char *, struct netlbl_lsm_secattr *, int);
 char *smk_import(const char *, int);
@@ -218,7 +230,7 @@ u32 smack_to_secid(const char *);
  */
 extern int smack_cipso_direct;
 extern int smack_cipso_mapped;
-extern char *smack_net_ambient;
+extern struct smack_known *smack_net_ambient;
 extern char *smack_onlycap;
 extern const char *smack_cipso_option;
 
@@ -254,17 +266,17 @@ static inline char *smk_of_inode(const struct inode *isp)
 }
 
 /*
- * Present a pointer to the smack label in an task blob.
+ * Present a pointer to the smack label entry in an task blob.
  */
-static inline char *smk_of_task(const struct task_smack *tsp)
+static inline struct smack_known *smk_of_task(const struct task_smack *tsp)
 {
 	return tsp->smk_task;
 }
 
 /*
- * Present a pointer to the forked smack label in an task blob.
+ * Present a pointer to the forked smack label entry in an task blob.
  */
-static inline char *smk_of_forked(const struct task_smack *tsp)
+static inline struct smack_known *smk_of_forked(const struct task_smack *tsp)
 {
 	return tsp->smk_forked;
 }
@@ -272,7 +284,7 @@ static inline char *smk_of_forked(const struct task_smack *tsp)
 /*
  * Present a pointer to the smack label in the current task blob.
  */
-static inline char *smk_of_current(void)
+static inline struct smack_known *smk_of_current(void)
 {
 	return smk_of_task(current_security());
 }
@@ -283,9 +295,11 @@ static inline char *smk_of_current(void)
  */
 static inline int smack_privileged(int cap)
 {
+	struct smack_known *skp = smk_of_current();
+
 	if (!capable(cap))
 		return 0;
-	if (smack_onlycap == NULL || smack_onlycap == smk_of_current())
+	if (smack_onlycap == NULL || smack_onlycap == skp->smk_known)
 		return 1;
 	return 0;
 }
diff --git a/security/smack/smack_access.c b/security/smack/smack_access.c
index 2e397a88d410..6a0377f38620 100644
--- a/security/smack/smack_access.c
+++ b/security/smack/smack_access.c
@@ -93,7 +93,7 @@ int smk_access_entry(char *subject_label, char *object_label,
 
 	list_for_each_entry_rcu(srp, rule_list, list) {
 		if (srp->smk_object == object_label &&
-		    srp->smk_subject == subject_label) {
+		    srp->smk_subject->smk_known == subject_label) {
 			may = srp->smk_access;
 			break;
 		}
@@ -104,7 +104,7 @@ int smk_access_entry(char *subject_label, char *object_label,
 
 /**
  * smk_access - determine if a subject has a specific access to an object
- * @subject_label: a pointer to the subject's Smack label
+ * @subject_known: a pointer to the subject's Smack label entry
  * @object_label: a pointer to the object's Smack label
  * @request: the access requested, in "MAY" format
  * @a : a pointer to the audit data
@@ -115,10 +115,9 @@ int smk_access_entry(char *subject_label, char *object_label,
  *
  * Smack labels are shared on smack_list
  */
-int smk_access(char *subject_label, char *object_label, int request,
-	       struct smk_audit_info *a)
+int smk_access(struct smack_known *subject_known, char *object_label,
+		int request, struct smk_audit_info *a)
 {
-	struct smack_known *skp;
 	int may = MAY_NOT;
 	int rc = 0;
 
@@ -127,7 +126,7 @@ int smk_access(char *subject_label, char *object_label, int request,
 	 *
 	 * A star subject can't access any object.
 	 */
-	if (subject_label == smack_known_star.smk_known) {
+	if (subject_known == &smack_known_star) {
 		rc = -EACCES;
 		goto out_audit;
 	}
@@ -137,7 +136,7 @@ int smk_access(char *subject_label, char *object_label, int request,
 	 * An internet subject can access any object.
 	 */
 	if (object_label == smack_known_web.smk_known ||
-	    subject_label == smack_known_web.smk_known)
+	    subject_known == &smack_known_web)
 		goto out_audit;
 	/*
 	 * A star object can be accessed by any subject.
@@ -148,7 +147,7 @@ int smk_access(char *subject_label, char *object_label, int request,
 	 * An object can be accessed in any way by a subject
 	 * with the same label.
 	 */
-	if (subject_label == object_label)
+	if (subject_known->smk_known == object_label)
 		goto out_audit;
 	/*
 	 * A hat subject can read any object.
@@ -157,7 +156,7 @@ int smk_access(char *subject_label, char *object_label, int request,
 	if ((request & MAY_ANYREAD) == request) {
 		if (object_label == smack_known_floor.smk_known)
 			goto out_audit;
-		if (subject_label == smack_known_hat.smk_known)
+		if (subject_known == &smack_known_hat)
 			goto out_audit;
 	}
 	/*
@@ -167,9 +166,9 @@ int smk_access(char *subject_label, char *object_label, int request,
 	 * good. A negative response from smk_access_entry()
 	 * indicates there is no entry for this pair.
 	 */
-	skp = smk_find_entry(subject_label);
 	rcu_read_lock();
-	may = smk_access_entry(subject_label, object_label, &skp->smk_rules);
+	may = smk_access_entry(subject_known->smk_known, object_label,
+				&subject_known->smk_rules);
 	rcu_read_unlock();
 
 	if (may > 0 && (request & may) == request)
@@ -179,7 +178,8 @@ int smk_access(char *subject_label, char *object_label, int request,
 out_audit:
 #ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT
 	if (a)
-		smack_log(subject_label, object_label, request, rc, a);
+		smack_log(subject_known->smk_known, object_label, request,
+				rc, a);
 #endif
 	return rc;
 }
@@ -198,20 +198,21 @@ out_audit:
 int smk_curacc(char *obj_label, u32 mode, struct smk_audit_info *a)
 {
 	struct task_smack *tsp = current_security();
-	char *sp = smk_of_task(tsp);
+	struct smack_known *skp = smk_of_task(tsp);
 	int may;
 	int rc;
 
 	/*
 	 * Check the global rule list
 	 */
-	rc = smk_access(sp, obj_label, mode, NULL);
+	rc = smk_access(skp, obj_label, mode, NULL);
 	if (rc == 0) {
 		/*
 		 * If there is an entry in the task's rule list
 		 * it can further restrict access.
 		 */
-		may = smk_access_entry(sp, obj_label, &tsp->smk_rules);
+		may = smk_access_entry(skp->smk_known, obj_label,
+					&tsp->smk_rules);
 		if (may < 0)
 			goto out_audit;
 		if ((mode & may) == mode)
@@ -228,7 +229,7 @@ int smk_curacc(char *obj_label, u32 mode, struct smk_audit_info *a)
 out_audit:
 #ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT
 	if (a)
-		smack_log(sp, obj_label, mode, rc, a);
+		smack_log(skp->smk_known, obj_label, mode, rc, a);
 #endif
 	return rc;
 }
@@ -402,6 +403,8 @@ int smk_netlbl_mls(int level, char *catset, struct netlbl_lsm_secattr *sap,
 	sap->flags |= NETLBL_SECATTR_MLS_CAT;
 	sap->attr.mls.lvl = level;
 	sap->attr.mls.cat = netlbl_secattr_catmap_alloc(GFP_ATOMIC);
+	if (!sap->attr.mls.cat)
+		return -ENOMEM;
 	sap->attr.mls.cat->startbit = 0;
 
 	for (cat = 1, cp = catset, byte = 0; byte < len; cp++, byte++)
@@ -513,10 +516,10 @@ char *smk_import(const char *string, int len)
  * smack_from_secid - find the Smack label associated with a secid
  * @secid: an integer that might be associated with a Smack label
  *
- * Returns a pointer to the appropriate Smack label if there is one,
+ * Returns a pointer to the appropriate Smack label entry if there is one,
  * otherwise a pointer to the invalid Smack label.
  */
-char *smack_from_secid(const u32 secid)
+struct smack_known *smack_from_secid(const u32 secid)
 {
 	struct smack_known *skp;
 
@@ -524,7 +527,7 @@ char *smack_from_secid(const u32 secid)
 	list_for_each_entry_rcu(skp, &smack_known_list, list) {
 		if (skp->smk_secid == secid) {
 			rcu_read_unlock();
-			return skp->smk_known;
+			return skp;
 		}
 	}
 
@@ -533,7 +536,7 @@ char *smack_from_secid(const u32 secid)
 	 * of a secid that is not on the list.
 	 */
 	rcu_read_unlock();
-	return smack_known_invalid.smk_known;
+	return &smack_known_invalid;
 }
 
 /**
diff --git a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
index d52c780bdb78..6a083303501d 100644
--- a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
+++ b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
@@ -27,10 +27,13 @@
 #include <linux/ip.h>
 #include <linux/tcp.h>
 #include <linux/udp.h>
+#include <linux/dccp.h>
 #include <linux/slab.h>
 #include <linux/mutex.h>
 #include <linux/pipe_fs_i.h>
 #include <net/cipso_ipv4.h>
+#include <net/ip.h>
+#include <net/ipv6.h>
 #include <linux/audit.h>
 #include <linux/magic.h>
 #include <linux/dcache.h>
@@ -45,6 +48,12 @@
 #define TRANS_TRUE	"TRUE"
 #define TRANS_TRUE_SIZE	4
 
+#define SMK_CONNECTING	0
+#define SMK_RECEIVING	1
+#define SMK_SENDING	2
+
+LIST_HEAD(smk_ipv6_port_list);
+
 /**
  * smk_fetch - Fetch the smack label from a file.
  * @ip: a pointer to the inode
@@ -53,11 +62,12 @@
  * Returns a pointer to the master list entry for the Smack label
  * or NULL if there was no label to fetch.
  */
-static char *smk_fetch(const char *name, struct inode *ip, struct dentry *dp)
+static struct smack_known *smk_fetch(const char *name, struct inode *ip,
+					struct dentry *dp)
 {
 	int rc;
 	char *buffer;
-	char *result = NULL;
+	struct smack_known *skp = NULL;
 
 	if (ip->i_op->getxattr == NULL)
 		return NULL;
@@ -68,11 +78,11 @@ static char *smk_fetch(const char *name, struct inode *ip, struct dentry *dp)
 
 	rc = ip->i_op->getxattr(dp, name, buffer, SMK_LONGLABEL);
 	if (rc > 0)
-		result = smk_import(buffer, rc);
+		skp = smk_import_entry(buffer, rc);
 
 	kfree(buffer);
 
-	return result;
+	return skp;
 }
 
 /**
@@ -102,7 +112,8 @@ struct inode_smack *new_inode_smack(char *smack)
  *
  * Returns the new blob or NULL if there's no memory available
  */
-static struct task_smack *new_task_smack(char *task, char *forked, gfp_t gfp)
+static struct task_smack *new_task_smack(struct smack_known *task,
+					struct smack_known *forked, gfp_t gfp)
 {
 	struct task_smack *tsp;
 
@@ -164,17 +175,17 @@ static int smack_ptrace_access_check(struct task_struct *ctp, unsigned int mode)
 {
 	int rc;
 	struct smk_audit_info ad;
-	char *tsp;
+	struct smack_known *skp;
 
 	rc = cap_ptrace_access_check(ctp, mode);
 	if (rc != 0)
 		return rc;
 
-	tsp = smk_of_task(task_security(ctp));
+	skp = smk_of_task(task_security(ctp));
 	smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_TASK);
 	smk_ad_setfield_u_tsk(&ad, ctp);
 
-	rc = smk_curacc(tsp, MAY_READWRITE, &ad);
+	rc = smk_curacc(skp->smk_known, MAY_READWRITE, &ad);
 	return rc;
 }
 
@@ -190,17 +201,17 @@ static int smack_ptrace_traceme(struct task_struct *ptp)
 {
 	int rc;
 	struct smk_audit_info ad;
-	char *tsp;
+	struct smack_known *skp;
 
 	rc = cap_ptrace_traceme(ptp);
 	if (rc != 0)
 		return rc;
 
-	tsp = smk_of_task(task_security(ptp));
+	skp = smk_of_task(task_security(ptp));
 	smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_TASK);
 	smk_ad_setfield_u_tsk(&ad, ptp);
 
-	rc = smk_curacc(tsp, MAY_READWRITE, &ad);
+	rc = smk_curacc(skp->smk_known, MAY_READWRITE, &ad);
 	return rc;
 }
 
@@ -215,12 +226,12 @@ static int smack_ptrace_traceme(struct task_struct *ptp)
 static int smack_syslog(int typefrom_file)
 {
 	int rc = 0;
-	char *sp = smk_of_current();
+	struct smack_known *skp = smk_of_current();
 
 	if (smack_privileged(CAP_MAC_OVERRIDE))
 		return 0;
 
-	 if (sp != smack_known_floor.smk_known)
+	 if (skp != &smack_known_floor)
 		rc = -EACCES;
 
 	return rc;
@@ -250,8 +261,9 @@ static int smack_sb_alloc_security(struct super_block *sb)
 	sbsp->smk_default = smack_known_floor.smk_known;
 	sbsp->smk_floor = smack_known_floor.smk_known;
 	sbsp->smk_hat = smack_known_hat.smk_known;
-	sbsp->smk_initialized = 0;
-
+	/*
+	 * smk_initialized will be zero from kzalloc.
+	 */
 	sb->s_security = sbsp;
 
 	return 0;
@@ -295,6 +307,8 @@ static int smack_sb_copy_data(char *orig, char *smackopts)
 			dp = smackopts;
 		else if (strstr(cp, SMK_FSROOT) == cp)
 			dp = smackopts;
+		else if (strstr(cp, SMK_FSTRANS) == cp)
+			dp = smackopts;
 		else
 			dp = otheropts;
 
@@ -330,8 +344,9 @@ static int smack_sb_kern_mount(struct super_block *sb, int flags, void *data)
 	char *op;
 	char *commap;
 	char *nsp;
+	int transmute = 0;
 
-	if (sp->smk_initialized != 0)
+	if (sp->smk_initialized)
 		return 0;
 
 	sp->smk_initialized = 1;
@@ -362,6 +377,13 @@ static int smack_sb_kern_mount(struct super_block *sb, int flags, void *data)
 			nsp = smk_import(op, 0);
 			if (nsp != NULL)
 				sp->smk_root = nsp;
+		} else if (strncmp(op, SMK_FSTRANS, strlen(SMK_FSTRANS)) == 0) {
+			op += strlen(SMK_FSTRANS);
+			nsp = smk_import(op, 0);
+			if (nsp != NULL) {
+				sp->smk_root = nsp;
+				transmute = 1;
+			}
 		}
 	}
 
@@ -369,11 +391,15 @@ static int smack_sb_kern_mount(struct super_block *sb, int flags, void *data)
 	 * Initialize the root inode.
 	 */
 	isp = inode->i_security;
-	if (isp == NULL)
+	if (inode->i_security == NULL) {
 		inode->i_security = new_inode_smack(sp->smk_root);
-	else
+		isp = inode->i_security;
+	} else
 		isp->smk_inode = sp->smk_root;
 
+	if (transmute)
+		isp->smk_flags |= SMK_INODE_TRANSMUTE;
+
 	return 0;
 }
 
@@ -524,7 +550,9 @@ static int smack_bprm_secureexec(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
  */
 static int smack_inode_alloc_security(struct inode *inode)
 {
-	inode->i_security = new_inode_smack(smk_of_current());
+	struct smack_known *skp = smk_of_current();
+
+	inode->i_security = new_inode_smack(skp->smk_known);
 	if (inode->i_security == NULL)
 		return -ENOMEM;
 	return 0;
@@ -557,9 +585,8 @@ static int smack_inode_init_security(struct inode *inode, struct inode *dir,
 				     const struct qstr *qstr, char **name,
 				     void **value, size_t *len)
 {
-	struct smack_known *skp;
 	struct inode_smack *issp = inode->i_security;
-	char *csp = smk_of_current();
+	struct smack_known *skp = smk_of_current();
 	char *isp = smk_of_inode(inode);
 	char *dsp = smk_of_inode(dir);
 	int may;
@@ -571,9 +598,8 @@ static int smack_inode_init_security(struct inode *inode, struct inode *dir,
 	}
 
 	if (value) {
-		skp = smk_find_entry(csp);
 		rcu_read_lock();
-		may = smk_access_entry(csp, dsp, &skp->smk_rules);
+		may = smk_access_entry(skp->smk_known, dsp, &skp->smk_rules);
 		rcu_read_unlock();
 
 		/*
@@ -862,29 +888,31 @@ static int smack_inode_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name,
 static void smack_inode_post_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name,
 				      const void *value, size_t size, int flags)
 {
-	char *nsp;
+	struct smack_known *skp;
 	struct inode_smack *isp = dentry->d_inode->i_security;
 
+	if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACKTRANSMUTE) == 0) {
+		isp->smk_flags |= SMK_INODE_TRANSMUTE;
+		return;
+	}
+
+	skp = smk_import_entry(value, size);
 	if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACK) == 0) {
-		nsp = smk_import(value, size);
-		if (nsp != NULL)
-			isp->smk_inode = nsp;
+		if (skp != NULL)
+			isp->smk_inode = skp->smk_known;
 		else
 			isp->smk_inode = smack_known_invalid.smk_known;
 	} else if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACKEXEC) == 0) {
-		nsp = smk_import(value, size);
-		if (nsp != NULL)
-			isp->smk_task = nsp;
+		if (skp != NULL)
+			isp->smk_task = skp;
 		else
-			isp->smk_task = smack_known_invalid.smk_known;
+			isp->smk_task = &smack_known_invalid;
 	} else if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACKMMAP) == 0) {
-		nsp = smk_import(value, size);
-		if (nsp != NULL)
-			isp->smk_mmap = nsp;
+		if (skp != NULL)
+			isp->smk_mmap = skp;
 		else
-			isp->smk_mmap = smack_known_invalid.smk_known;
-	} else if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACKTRANSMUTE) == 0)
-		isp->smk_flags |= SMK_INODE_TRANSMUTE;
+			isp->smk_mmap = &smack_known_invalid;
+	}
 
 	return;
 }
@@ -990,7 +1018,7 @@ static int smack_inode_getsecurity(const struct inode *inode,
 	if (strcmp(name, XATTR_SMACK_IPIN) == 0)
 		isp = ssp->smk_in;
 	else if (strcmp(name, XATTR_SMACK_IPOUT) == 0)
-		isp = ssp->smk_out;
+		isp = ssp->smk_out->smk_known;
 	else
 		return -EOPNOTSUPP;
 
@@ -1070,7 +1098,9 @@ static int smack_file_permission(struct file *file, int mask)
  */
 static int smack_file_alloc_security(struct file *file)
 {
-	file->f_security = smk_of_current();
+	struct smack_known *skp = smk_of_current();
+
+	file->f_security = skp->smk_known;
 	return 0;
 }
 
@@ -1181,10 +1211,9 @@ static int smack_mmap_file(struct file *file,
 			   unsigned long flags)
 {
 	struct smack_known *skp;
+	struct smack_known *mkp;
 	struct smack_rule *srp;
 	struct task_smack *tsp;
-	char *sp;
-	char *msmack;
 	char *osmack;
 	struct inode_smack *isp;
 	int may;
@@ -1198,11 +1227,10 @@ static int smack_mmap_file(struct file *file,
 	isp = file_inode(file)->i_security;
 	if (isp->smk_mmap == NULL)
 		return 0;
-	msmack = isp->smk_mmap;
+	mkp = isp->smk_mmap;
 
 	tsp = current_security();
-	sp = smk_of_current();
-	skp = smk_find_entry(sp);
+	skp = smk_of_current();
 	rc = 0;
 
 	rcu_read_lock();
@@ -1216,13 +1244,13 @@ static int smack_mmap_file(struct file *file,
 		/*
 		 * Matching labels always allows access.
 		 */
-		if (msmack == osmack)
+		if (mkp->smk_known == osmack)
 			continue;
 		/*
 		 * If there is a matching local rule take
 		 * that into account as well.
 		 */
-		may = smk_access_entry(srp->smk_subject, osmack,
+		may = smk_access_entry(srp->smk_subject->smk_known, osmack,
 					&tsp->smk_rules);
 		if (may == -ENOENT)
 			may = srp->smk_access;
@@ -1240,8 +1268,8 @@ static int smack_mmap_file(struct file *file,
 		 * If there isn't one a SMACK64MMAP subject
 		 * can't have as much access as current.
 		 */
-		skp = smk_find_entry(msmack);
-		mmay = smk_access_entry(msmack, osmack, &skp->smk_rules);
+		mmay = smk_access_entry(mkp->smk_known, osmack,
+						&mkp->smk_rules);
 		if (mmay == -ENOENT) {
 			rc = -EACCES;
 			break;
@@ -1250,7 +1278,8 @@ static int smack_mmap_file(struct file *file,
 		 * If there is a local entry it modifies the
 		 * potential access, too.
 		 */
-		tmay = smk_access_entry(msmack, osmack, &tsp->smk_rules);
+		tmay = smk_access_entry(mkp->smk_known, osmack,
+						&tsp->smk_rules);
 		if (tmay != -ENOENT)
 			mmay &= tmay;
 
@@ -1279,7 +1308,9 @@ static int smack_mmap_file(struct file *file,
  */
 static int smack_file_set_fowner(struct file *file)
 {
-	file->f_security = smk_of_current();
+	struct smack_known *skp = smk_of_current();
+
+	file->f_security = skp->smk_known;
 	return 0;
 }
 
@@ -1297,9 +1328,10 @@ static int smack_file_set_fowner(struct file *file)
 static int smack_file_send_sigiotask(struct task_struct *tsk,
 				     struct fown_struct *fown, int signum)
 {
+	struct smack_known *skp;
+	struct smack_known *tkp = smk_of_task(tsk->cred->security);
 	struct file *file;
 	int rc;
-	char *tsp = smk_of_task(tsk->cred->security);
 	struct smk_audit_info ad;
 
 	/*
@@ -1308,13 +1340,14 @@ static int smack_file_send_sigiotask(struct task_struct *tsk,
 	file = container_of(fown, struct file, f_owner);
 
 	/* we don't log here as rc can be overriden */
-	rc = smk_access(file->f_security, tsp, MAY_WRITE, NULL);
+	skp = smk_find_entry(file->f_security);
+	rc = smk_access(skp, tkp->smk_known, MAY_WRITE, NULL);
 	if (rc != 0 && has_capability(tsk, CAP_MAC_OVERRIDE))
 		rc = 0;
 
 	smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_TASK);
 	smk_ad_setfield_u_tsk(&ad, tsk);
-	smack_log(file->f_security, tsp, MAY_WRITE, rc, &ad);
+	smack_log(file->f_security, tkp->smk_known, MAY_WRITE, rc, &ad);
 	return rc;
 }
 
@@ -1469,12 +1502,12 @@ static void smack_cred_transfer(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old)
 static int smack_kernel_act_as(struct cred *new, u32 secid)
 {
 	struct task_smack *new_tsp = new->security;
-	char *smack = smack_from_secid(secid);
+	struct smack_known *skp = smack_from_secid(secid);
 
-	if (smack == NULL)
+	if (skp == NULL)
 		return -EINVAL;
 
-	new_tsp->smk_task = smack;
+	new_tsp->smk_task = skp;
 	return 0;
 }
 
@@ -1492,8 +1525,8 @@ static int smack_kernel_create_files_as(struct cred *new,
 	struct inode_smack *isp = inode->i_security;
 	struct task_smack *tsp = new->security;
 
-	tsp->smk_forked = isp->smk_inode;
-	tsp->smk_task = isp->smk_inode;
+	tsp->smk_forked = smk_find_entry(isp->smk_inode);
+	tsp->smk_task = tsp->smk_forked;
 	return 0;
 }
 
@@ -1509,10 +1542,11 @@ static int smk_curacc_on_task(struct task_struct *p, int access,
 				const char *caller)
 {
 	struct smk_audit_info ad;
+	struct smack_known *skp = smk_of_task(task_security(p));
 
 	smk_ad_init(&ad, caller, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_TASK);
 	smk_ad_setfield_u_tsk(&ad, p);
-	return smk_curacc(smk_of_task(task_security(p)), access, &ad);
+	return smk_curacc(skp->smk_known, access, &ad);
 }
 
 /**
@@ -1558,7 +1592,9 @@ static int smack_task_getsid(struct task_struct *p)
  */
 static void smack_task_getsecid(struct task_struct *p, u32 *secid)
 {
-	*secid = smack_to_secid(smk_of_task(task_security(p)));
+	struct smack_known *skp = smk_of_task(task_security(p));
+
+	*secid = skp->smk_secid;
 }
 
 /**
@@ -1662,6 +1698,8 @@ static int smack_task_kill(struct task_struct *p, struct siginfo *info,
 			   int sig, u32 secid)
 {
 	struct smk_audit_info ad;
+	struct smack_known *skp;
+	struct smack_known *tkp = smk_of_task(task_security(p));
 
 	smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_TASK);
 	smk_ad_setfield_u_tsk(&ad, p);
@@ -1670,15 +1708,14 @@ static int smack_task_kill(struct task_struct *p, struct siginfo *info,
 	 * can write the receiver.
 	 */
 	if (secid == 0)
-		return smk_curacc(smk_of_task(task_security(p)), MAY_WRITE,
-				  &ad);
+		return smk_curacc(tkp->smk_known, MAY_WRITE, &ad);
 	/*
 	 * If the secid isn't 0 we're dealing with some USB IO
 	 * specific behavior. This is not clean. For one thing
 	 * we can't take privilege into account.
 	 */
-	return smk_access(smack_from_secid(secid),
-			  smk_of_task(task_security(p)), MAY_WRITE, &ad);
+	skp = smack_from_secid(secid);
+	return smk_access(skp, tkp->smk_known, MAY_WRITE, &ad);
 }
 
 /**
@@ -1710,7 +1747,9 @@ static int smack_task_wait(struct task_struct *p)
 static void smack_task_to_inode(struct task_struct *p, struct inode *inode)
 {
 	struct inode_smack *isp = inode->i_security;
-	isp->smk_inode = smk_of_task(task_security(p));
+	struct smack_known *skp = smk_of_task(task_security(p));
+
+	isp->smk_inode = skp->smk_known;
 }
 
 /*
@@ -1729,15 +1768,15 @@ static void smack_task_to_inode(struct task_struct *p, struct inode *inode)
  */
 static int smack_sk_alloc_security(struct sock *sk, int family, gfp_t gfp_flags)
 {
-	char *csp = smk_of_current();
+	struct smack_known *skp = smk_of_current();
 	struct socket_smack *ssp;
 
 	ssp = kzalloc(sizeof(struct socket_smack), gfp_flags);
 	if (ssp == NULL)
 		return -ENOMEM;
 
-	ssp->smk_in = csp;
-	ssp->smk_out = csp;
+	ssp->smk_in = skp->smk_known;
+	ssp->smk_out = skp;
 	ssp->smk_packet = NULL;
 
 	sk->sk_security = ssp;
@@ -1824,7 +1863,7 @@ static int smack_netlabel(struct sock *sk, int labeled)
 	    labeled == SMACK_UNLABELED_SOCKET)
 		netlbl_sock_delattr(sk);
 	else {
-		skp = smk_find_entry(ssp->smk_out);
+		skp = ssp->smk_out;
 		rc = netlbl_sock_setattr(sk, sk->sk_family, &skp->smk_netlabel);
 	}
 
@@ -1847,6 +1886,7 @@ static int smack_netlabel(struct sock *sk, int labeled)
  */
 static int smack_netlabel_send(struct sock *sk, struct sockaddr_in *sap)
 {
+	struct smack_known *skp;
 	int rc;
 	int sk_lbl;
 	char *hostsp;
@@ -1865,7 +1905,8 @@ static int smack_netlabel_send(struct sock *sk, struct sockaddr_in *sap)
 		ad.a.u.net->v4info.daddr = sap->sin_addr.s_addr;
 #endif
 		sk_lbl = SMACK_UNLABELED_SOCKET;
-		rc = smk_access(ssp->smk_out, hostsp, MAY_WRITE, &ad);
+		skp = ssp->smk_out;
+		rc = smk_access(skp, hostsp, MAY_WRITE, &ad);
 	} else {
 		sk_lbl = SMACK_CIPSO_SOCKET;
 		rc = 0;
@@ -1878,6 +1919,155 @@ static int smack_netlabel_send(struct sock *sk, struct sockaddr_in *sap)
 }
 
 /**
+ * smk_ipv6_port_label - Smack port access table management
+ * @sock: socket
+ * @address: address
+ *
+ * Create or update the port list entry
+ */
+static void smk_ipv6_port_label(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *address)
+{
+	struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
+	struct sockaddr_in6 *addr6;
+	struct socket_smack *ssp = sock->sk->sk_security;
+	struct smk_port_label *spp;
+	unsigned short port = 0;
+
+	if (address == NULL) {
+		/*
+		 * This operation is changing the Smack information
+		 * on the bound socket. Take the changes to the port
+		 * as well.
+		 */
+		list_for_each_entry(spp, &smk_ipv6_port_list, list) {
+			if (sk != spp->smk_sock)
+				continue;
+			spp->smk_in = ssp->smk_in;
+			spp->smk_out = ssp->smk_out;
+			return;
+		}
+		/*
+		 * A NULL address is only used for updating existing
+		 * bound entries. If there isn't one, it's OK.
+		 */
+		return;
+	}
+
+	addr6 = (struct sockaddr_in6 *)address;
+	port = ntohs(addr6->sin6_port);
+	/*
+	 * This is a special case that is safely ignored.
+	 */
+	if (port == 0)
+		return;
+
+	/*
+	 * Look for an existing port list entry.
+	 * This is an indication that a port is getting reused.
+	 */
+	list_for_each_entry(spp, &smk_ipv6_port_list, list) {
+		if (spp->smk_port != port)
+			continue;
+		spp->smk_port = port;
+		spp->smk_sock = sk;
+		spp->smk_in = ssp->smk_in;
+		spp->smk_out = ssp->smk_out;
+		return;
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 * A new port entry is required.
+	 */
+	spp = kzalloc(sizeof(*spp), GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (spp == NULL)
+		return;
+
+	spp->smk_port = port;
+	spp->smk_sock = sk;
+	spp->smk_in = ssp->smk_in;
+	spp->smk_out = ssp->smk_out;
+
+	list_add(&spp->list, &smk_ipv6_port_list);
+	return;
+}
+
+/**
+ * smk_ipv6_port_check - check Smack port access
+ * @sock: socket
+ * @address: address
+ *
+ * Create or update the port list entry
+ */
+static int smk_ipv6_port_check(struct sock *sk, struct sockaddr *address,
+				int act)
+{
+	__be16 *bep;
+	__be32 *be32p;
+	struct sockaddr_in6 *addr6;
+	struct smk_port_label *spp;
+	struct socket_smack *ssp = sk->sk_security;
+	struct smack_known *skp;
+	unsigned short port = 0;
+	char *object;
+	struct smk_audit_info ad;
+#ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT
+	struct lsm_network_audit net;
+#endif
+
+	if (act == SMK_RECEIVING) {
+		skp = smack_net_ambient;
+		object = ssp->smk_in;
+	} else {
+		skp = ssp->smk_out;
+		object = smack_net_ambient->smk_known;
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 * Get the IP address and port from the address.
+	 */
+	addr6 = (struct sockaddr_in6 *)address;
+	port = ntohs(addr6->sin6_port);
+	bep = (__be16 *)(&addr6->sin6_addr);
+	be32p = (__be32 *)(&addr6->sin6_addr);
+
+	/*
+	 * It's remote, so port lookup does no good.
+	 */
+	if (be32p[0] || be32p[1] || be32p[2] || bep[6] || ntohs(bep[7]) != 1)
+		goto auditout;
+
+	/*
+	 * It's local so the send check has to have passed.
+	 */
+	if (act == SMK_RECEIVING) {
+		skp = &smack_known_web;
+		goto auditout;
+	}
+
+	list_for_each_entry(spp, &smk_ipv6_port_list, list) {
+		if (spp->smk_port != port)
+			continue;
+		object = spp->smk_in;
+		if (act == SMK_CONNECTING)
+			ssp->smk_packet = spp->smk_out->smk_known;
+		break;
+	}
+
+auditout:
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT
+	smk_ad_init_net(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET, &net);
+	ad.a.u.net->family = sk->sk_family;
+	ad.a.u.net->dport = port;
+	if (act == SMK_RECEIVING)
+		ad.a.u.net->v6info.saddr = addr6->sin6_addr;
+	else
+		ad.a.u.net->v6info.daddr = addr6->sin6_addr;
+#endif
+	return smk_access(skp, object, MAY_WRITE, &ad);
+}
+
+/**
  * smack_inode_setsecurity - set smack xattrs
  * @inode: the object
  * @name: attribute name
@@ -1892,7 +2082,7 @@ static int smack_netlabel_send(struct sock *sk, struct sockaddr_in *sap)
 static int smack_inode_setsecurity(struct inode *inode, const char *name,
 				   const void *value, size_t size, int flags)
 {
-	char *sp;
+	struct smack_known *skp;
 	struct inode_smack *nsp = inode->i_security;
 	struct socket_smack *ssp;
 	struct socket *sock;
@@ -1901,12 +2091,12 @@ static int smack_inode_setsecurity(struct inode *inode, const char *name,
 	if (value == NULL || size > SMK_LONGLABEL || size == 0)
 		return -EACCES;
 
-	sp = smk_import(value, size);
-	if (sp == NULL)
+	skp = smk_import_entry(value, size);
+	if (skp == NULL)
 		return -EINVAL;
 
 	if (strcmp(name, XATTR_SMACK_SUFFIX) == 0) {
-		nsp->smk_inode = sp;
+		nsp->smk_inode = skp->smk_known;
 		nsp->smk_flags |= SMK_INODE_INSTANT;
 		return 0;
 	}
@@ -1923,10 +2113,10 @@ static int smack_inode_setsecurity(struct inode *inode, const char *name,
 	ssp = sock->sk->sk_security;
 
 	if (strcmp(name, XATTR_SMACK_IPIN) == 0)
-		ssp->smk_in = sp;
+		ssp->smk_in = skp->smk_known;
 	else if (strcmp(name, XATTR_SMACK_IPOUT) == 0) {
-		ssp->smk_out = sp;
-		if (sock->sk->sk_family != PF_UNIX) {
+		ssp->smk_out = skp;
+		if (sock->sk->sk_family == PF_INET) {
 			rc = smack_netlabel(sock->sk, SMACK_CIPSO_SOCKET);
 			if (rc != 0)
 				printk(KERN_WARNING
@@ -1936,6 +2126,9 @@ static int smack_inode_setsecurity(struct inode *inode, const char *name,
 	} else
 		return -EOPNOTSUPP;
 
+	if (sock->sk->sk_family == PF_INET6)
+		smk_ipv6_port_label(sock, NULL);
+
 	return 0;
 }
 
@@ -1963,6 +2156,25 @@ static int smack_socket_post_create(struct socket *sock, int family,
 }
 
 /**
+ * smack_socket_bind - record port binding information.
+ * @sock: the socket
+ * @address: the port address
+ * @addrlen: size of the address
+ *
+ * Records the label bound to a port.
+ *
+ * Returns 0
+ */
+static int smack_socket_bind(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *address,
+				int addrlen)
+{
+	if (sock->sk != NULL && sock->sk->sk_family == PF_INET6)
+		smk_ipv6_port_label(sock, address);
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/**
  * smack_socket_connect - connect access check
  * @sock: the socket
  * @sap: the other end
@@ -1975,12 +2187,24 @@ static int smack_socket_post_create(struct socket *sock, int family,
 static int smack_socket_connect(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *sap,
 				int addrlen)
 {
-	if (sock->sk == NULL || sock->sk->sk_family != PF_INET)
+	int rc = 0;
+
+	if (sock->sk == NULL)
 		return 0;
-	if (addrlen < sizeof(struct sockaddr_in))
-		return -EINVAL;
 
-	return smack_netlabel_send(sock->sk, (struct sockaddr_in *)sap);
+	switch (sock->sk->sk_family) {
+	case PF_INET:
+		if (addrlen < sizeof(struct sockaddr_in))
+			return -EINVAL;
+		rc = smack_netlabel_send(sock->sk, (struct sockaddr_in *)sap);
+		break;
+	case PF_INET6:
+		if (addrlen < sizeof(struct sockaddr_in6))
+			return -EINVAL;
+		rc = smk_ipv6_port_check(sock->sk, sap, SMK_CONNECTING);
+		break;
+	}
+	return rc;
 }
 
 /**
@@ -2011,7 +2235,9 @@ static int smack_flags_to_may(int flags)
  */
 static int smack_msg_msg_alloc_security(struct msg_msg *msg)
 {
-	msg->security = smk_of_current();
+	struct smack_known *skp = smk_of_current();
+
+	msg->security = skp->smk_known;
 	return 0;
 }
 
@@ -2046,8 +2272,9 @@ static char *smack_of_shm(struct shmid_kernel *shp)
 static int smack_shm_alloc_security(struct shmid_kernel *shp)
 {
 	struct kern_ipc_perm *isp = &shp->shm_perm;
+	struct smack_known *skp = smk_of_current();
 
-	isp->security = smk_of_current();
+	isp->security = skp->smk_known;
 	return 0;
 }
 
@@ -2169,8 +2396,9 @@ static char *smack_of_sem(struct sem_array *sma)
 static int smack_sem_alloc_security(struct sem_array *sma)
 {
 	struct kern_ipc_perm *isp = &sma->sem_perm;
+	struct smack_known *skp = smk_of_current();
 
-	isp->security = smk_of_current();
+	isp->security = skp->smk_known;
 	return 0;
 }
 
@@ -2287,8 +2515,9 @@ static int smack_sem_semop(struct sem_array *sma, struct sembuf *sops,
 static int smack_msg_queue_alloc_security(struct msg_queue *msq)
 {
 	struct kern_ipc_perm *kisp = &msq->q_perm;
+	struct smack_known *skp = smk_of_current();
 
-	kisp->security = smk_of_current();
+	kisp->security = skp->smk_known;
 	return 0;
 }
 
@@ -2460,8 +2689,8 @@ static void smack_d_instantiate(struct dentry *opt_dentry, struct inode *inode)
 	struct super_block *sbp;
 	struct superblock_smack *sbsp;
 	struct inode_smack *isp;
-	char *csp = smk_of_current();
-	char *fetched;
+	struct smack_known *skp;
+	struct smack_known *ckp = smk_of_current();
 	char *final;
 	char trattr[TRANS_TRUE_SIZE];
 	int transflag = 0;
@@ -2528,7 +2757,7 @@ static void smack_d_instantiate(struct dentry *opt_dentry, struct inode *inode)
 		 * Programs that change smack have to treat the
 		 * pty with respect.
 		 */
-		final = csp;
+		final = ckp->smk_known;
 		break;
 	case SOCKFS_MAGIC:
 		/*
@@ -2583,9 +2812,9 @@ static void smack_d_instantiate(struct dentry *opt_dentry, struct inode *inode)
 		 * Get the dentry for xattr.
 		 */
 		dp = dget(opt_dentry);
-		fetched = smk_fetch(XATTR_NAME_SMACK, inode, dp);
-		if (fetched != NULL)
-			final = fetched;
+		skp = smk_fetch(XATTR_NAME_SMACK, inode, dp);
+		if (skp != NULL)
+			final = skp->smk_known;
 
 		/*
 		 * Transmuting directory
@@ -2625,7 +2854,7 @@ static void smack_d_instantiate(struct dentry *opt_dentry, struct inode *inode)
 	}
 
 	if (final == NULL)
-		isp->smk_inode = csp;
+		isp->smk_inode = ckp->smk_known;
 	else
 		isp->smk_inode = final;
 
@@ -2648,13 +2877,14 @@ unlockandout:
  */
 static int smack_getprocattr(struct task_struct *p, char *name, char **value)
 {
+	struct smack_known *skp = smk_of_task(task_security(p));
 	char *cp;
 	int slen;
 
 	if (strcmp(name, "current") != 0)
 		return -EINVAL;
 
-	cp = kstrdup(smk_of_task(task_security(p)), GFP_KERNEL);
+	cp = kstrdup(skp->smk_known, GFP_KERNEL);
 	if (cp == NULL)
 		return -ENOMEM;
 
@@ -2680,7 +2910,7 @@ static int smack_setprocattr(struct task_struct *p, char *name,
 {
 	struct task_smack *tsp;
 	struct cred *new;
-	char *newsmack;
+	struct smack_known *skp;
 
 	/*
 	 * Changing another process' Smack value is too dangerous
@@ -2698,14 +2928,14 @@ static int smack_setprocattr(struct task_struct *p, char *name,
 	if (strcmp(name, "current") != 0)
 		return -EINVAL;
 
-	newsmack = smk_import(value, size);
-	if (newsmack == NULL)
+	skp = smk_import_entry(value, size);
+	if (skp == NULL)
 		return -EINVAL;
 
 	/*
 	 * No process is ever allowed the web ("@") label.
 	 */
-	if (newsmack == smack_known_web.smk_known)
+	if (skp == &smack_known_web)
 		return -EPERM;
 
 	new = prepare_creds();
@@ -2713,7 +2943,7 @@ static int smack_setprocattr(struct task_struct *p, char *name,
 		return -ENOMEM;
 
 	tsp = new->security;
-	tsp->smk_task = newsmack;
+	tsp->smk_task = skp;
 
 	commit_creds(new);
 	return size;
@@ -2731,6 +2961,7 @@ static int smack_setprocattr(struct task_struct *p, char *name,
 static int smack_unix_stream_connect(struct sock *sock,
 				     struct sock *other, struct sock *newsk)
 {
+	struct smack_known *skp;
 	struct socket_smack *ssp = sock->sk_security;
 	struct socket_smack *osp = other->sk_security;
 	struct socket_smack *nsp = newsk->sk_security;
@@ -2744,15 +2975,17 @@ static int smack_unix_stream_connect(struct sock *sock,
 	smk_ad_setfield_u_net_sk(&ad, other);
 #endif
 
-	if (!smack_privileged(CAP_MAC_OVERRIDE))
-		rc = smk_access(ssp->smk_out, osp->smk_in, MAY_WRITE, &ad);
+	if (!smack_privileged(CAP_MAC_OVERRIDE)) {
+		skp = ssp->smk_out;
+		rc = smk_access(skp, osp->smk_in, MAY_WRITE, &ad);
+	}
 
 	/*
 	 * Cross reference the peer labels for SO_PEERSEC.
 	 */
 	if (rc == 0) {
-		nsp->smk_packet = ssp->smk_out;
-		ssp->smk_packet = osp->smk_out;
+		nsp->smk_packet = ssp->smk_out->smk_known;
+		ssp->smk_packet = osp->smk_out->smk_known;
 	}
 
 	return rc;
@@ -2770,8 +3003,8 @@ static int smack_unix_may_send(struct socket *sock, struct socket *other)
 {
 	struct socket_smack *ssp = sock->sk->sk_security;
 	struct socket_smack *osp = other->sk->sk_security;
+	struct smack_known *skp;
 	struct smk_audit_info ad;
-	int rc = 0;
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT
 	struct lsm_network_audit net;
@@ -2780,10 +3013,11 @@ static int smack_unix_may_send(struct socket *sock, struct socket *other)
 	smk_ad_setfield_u_net_sk(&ad, other->sk);
 #endif
 
-	if (!smack_privileged(CAP_MAC_OVERRIDE))
-		rc = smk_access(ssp->smk_out, osp->smk_in, MAY_WRITE, &ad);
+	if (smack_privileged(CAP_MAC_OVERRIDE))
+		return 0;
 
-	return rc;
+	skp = ssp->smk_out;
+	return smk_access(skp, osp->smk_in, MAY_WRITE, &ad);
 }
 
 /**
@@ -2792,22 +3026,32 @@ static int smack_unix_may_send(struct socket *sock, struct socket *other)
  * @msg: the message
  * @size: the size of the message
  *
- * Return 0 if the current subject can write to the destination
- * host. This is only a question if the destination is a single
- * label host.
+ * Return 0 if the current subject can write to the destination host.
+ * For IPv4 this is only a question if the destination is a single label host.
+ * For IPv6 this is a check against the label of the port.
  */
 static int smack_socket_sendmsg(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg,
 				int size)
 {
 	struct sockaddr_in *sip = (struct sockaddr_in *) msg->msg_name;
+	struct sockaddr *sap = (struct sockaddr *) msg->msg_name;
+	int rc = 0;
 
 	/*
 	 * Perfectly reasonable for this to be NULL
 	 */
-	if (sip == NULL || sip->sin_family != AF_INET)
+	if (sip == NULL)
 		return 0;
 
-	return smack_netlabel_send(sock->sk, sip);
+	switch (sip->sin_family) {
+	case AF_INET:
+		rc = smack_netlabel_send(sock->sk, sip);
+		break;
+	case AF_INET6:
+		rc = smk_ipv6_port_check(sock->sk, sap, SMK_SENDING);
+		break;
+	}
+	return rc;
 }
 
 /**
@@ -2815,13 +3059,12 @@ static int smack_socket_sendmsg(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg,
  * @sap: netlabel secattr
  * @ssp: socket security information
  *
- * Returns a pointer to a Smack label found on the label list.
+ * Returns a pointer to a Smack label entry found on the label list.
  */
-static char *smack_from_secattr(struct netlbl_lsm_secattr *sap,
-				struct socket_smack *ssp)
+static struct smack_known *smack_from_secattr(struct netlbl_lsm_secattr *sap,
+						struct socket_smack *ssp)
 {
-	struct smack_known *kp;
-	char *sp;
+	struct smack_known *skp;
 	int found = 0;
 
 	if ((sap->flags & NETLBL_SECATTR_MLS_LVL) != 0) {
@@ -2836,11 +3079,11 @@ static char *smack_from_secattr(struct netlbl_lsm_secattr *sap,
 		 * ambient value.
 		 */
 		rcu_read_lock();
-		list_for_each_entry(kp, &smack_known_list, list) {
-			if (sap->attr.mls.lvl != kp->smk_netlabel.attr.mls.lvl)
+		list_for_each_entry(skp, &smack_known_list, list) {
+			if (sap->attr.mls.lvl != skp->smk_netlabel.attr.mls.lvl)
 				continue;
 			if (memcmp(sap->attr.mls.cat,
-				kp->smk_netlabel.attr.mls.cat,
+				skp->smk_netlabel.attr.mls.cat,
 				SMK_CIPSOLEN) != 0)
 				continue;
 			found = 1;
@@ -2849,17 +3092,17 @@ static char *smack_from_secattr(struct netlbl_lsm_secattr *sap,
 		rcu_read_unlock();
 
 		if (found)
-			return kp->smk_known;
+			return skp;
 
 		if (ssp != NULL && ssp->smk_in == smack_known_star.smk_known)
-			return smack_known_web.smk_known;
-		return smack_known_star.smk_known;
+			return &smack_known_web;
+		return &smack_known_star;
 	}
 	if ((sap->flags & NETLBL_SECATTR_SECID) != 0) {
 		/*
 		 * Looks like a fallback, which gives us a secid.
 		 */
-		sp = smack_from_secid(sap->attr.secid);
+		skp = smack_from_secid(sap->attr.secid);
 		/*
 		 * This has got to be a bug because it is
 		 * impossible to specify a fallback without
@@ -2867,8 +3110,8 @@ static char *smack_from_secattr(struct netlbl_lsm_secattr *sap,
 		 * it has a secid, and the only way to get a
 		 * secid is from a fallback.
 		 */
-		BUG_ON(sp == NULL);
-		return sp;
+		BUG_ON(skp == NULL);
+		return skp;
 	}
 	/*
 	 * Without guidance regarding the smack value
@@ -2878,6 +3121,54 @@ static char *smack_from_secattr(struct netlbl_lsm_secattr *sap,
 	return smack_net_ambient;
 }
 
+static int smk_skb_to_addr_ipv6(struct sk_buff *skb, struct sockaddr *sap)
+{
+	struct sockaddr_in6 *sip = (struct sockaddr_in6 *)sap;
+	u8 nexthdr;
+	int offset;
+	int proto = -EINVAL;
+	struct ipv6hdr _ipv6h;
+	struct ipv6hdr *ip6;
+	__be16 frag_off;
+	struct tcphdr _tcph, *th;
+	struct udphdr _udph, *uh;
+	struct dccp_hdr _dccph, *dh;
+
+	sip->sin6_port = 0;
+
+	offset = skb_network_offset(skb);
+	ip6 = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_ipv6h), &_ipv6h);
+	if (ip6 == NULL)
+		return -EINVAL;
+	sip->sin6_addr = ip6->saddr;
+
+	nexthdr = ip6->nexthdr;
+	offset += sizeof(_ipv6h);
+	offset = ipv6_skip_exthdr(skb, offset, &nexthdr, &frag_off);
+	if (offset < 0)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	proto = nexthdr;
+	switch (proto) {
+	case IPPROTO_TCP:
+		th = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_tcph), &_tcph);
+		if (th != NULL)
+			sip->sin6_port = th->source;
+		break;
+	case IPPROTO_UDP:
+		uh = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_udph), &_udph);
+		if (uh != NULL)
+			sip->sin6_port = uh->source;
+		break;
+	case IPPROTO_DCCP:
+		dh = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_dccph), &_dccph);
+		if (dh != NULL)
+			sip->sin6_port = dh->dccph_sport;
+		break;
+	}
+	return proto;
+}
+
 /**
  * smack_socket_sock_rcv_skb - Smack packet delivery access check
  * @sk: socket
@@ -2889,43 +3180,52 @@ static int smack_socket_sock_rcv_skb(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
 {
 	struct netlbl_lsm_secattr secattr;
 	struct socket_smack *ssp = sk->sk_security;
-	char *csp;
-	int rc;
+	struct smack_known *skp;
+	struct sockaddr sadd;
+	int rc = 0;
 	struct smk_audit_info ad;
 #ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT
 	struct lsm_network_audit net;
 #endif
-	if (sk->sk_family != PF_INET && sk->sk_family != PF_INET6)
-		return 0;
-
-	/*
-	 * Translate what netlabel gave us.
-	 */
-	netlbl_secattr_init(&secattr);
+	switch (sk->sk_family) {
+	case PF_INET:
+		/*
+		 * Translate what netlabel gave us.
+		 */
+		netlbl_secattr_init(&secattr);
 
-	rc = netlbl_skbuff_getattr(skb, sk->sk_family, &secattr);
-	if (rc == 0)
-		csp = smack_from_secattr(&secattr, ssp);
-	else
-		csp = smack_net_ambient;
+		rc = netlbl_skbuff_getattr(skb, sk->sk_family, &secattr);
+		if (rc == 0)
+			skp = smack_from_secattr(&secattr, ssp);
+		else
+			skp = smack_net_ambient;
 
-	netlbl_secattr_destroy(&secattr);
+		netlbl_secattr_destroy(&secattr);
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT
-	smk_ad_init_net(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET, &net);
-	ad.a.u.net->family = sk->sk_family;
-	ad.a.u.net->netif = skb->skb_iif;
-	ipv4_skb_to_auditdata(skb, &ad.a, NULL);
+		smk_ad_init_net(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET, &net);
+		ad.a.u.net->family = sk->sk_family;
+		ad.a.u.net->netif = skb->skb_iif;
+		ipv4_skb_to_auditdata(skb, &ad.a, NULL);
 #endif
-	/*
-	 * Receiving a packet requires that the other end
-	 * be able to write here. Read access is not required.
-	 * This is the simplist possible security model
-	 * for networking.
-	 */
-	rc = smk_access(csp, ssp->smk_in, MAY_WRITE, &ad);
-	if (rc != 0)
-		netlbl_skbuff_err(skb, rc, 0);
+		/*
+		 * Receiving a packet requires that the other end
+		 * be able to write here. Read access is not required.
+		 * This is the simplist possible security model
+		 * for networking.
+		 */
+		rc = smk_access(skp, ssp->smk_in, MAY_WRITE, &ad);
+		if (rc != 0)
+			netlbl_skbuff_err(skb, rc, 0);
+		break;
+	case PF_INET6:
+		rc = smk_skb_to_addr_ipv6(skb, &sadd);
+		if (rc == IPPROTO_UDP || rc == IPPROTO_TCP)
+			rc = smk_ipv6_port_check(sk, &sadd, SMK_RECEIVING);
+		else
+			rc = 0;
+		break;
+	}
 	return rc;
 }
 
@@ -2979,7 +3279,7 @@ static int smack_socket_getpeersec_dgram(struct socket *sock,
 {
 	struct netlbl_lsm_secattr secattr;
 	struct socket_smack *ssp = NULL;
-	char *sp;
+	struct smack_known *skp;
 	int family = PF_UNSPEC;
 	u32 s = 0;	/* 0 is the invalid secid */
 	int rc;
@@ -2995,7 +3295,7 @@ static int smack_socket_getpeersec_dgram(struct socket *sock,
 
 	if (family == PF_UNIX) {
 		ssp = sock->sk->sk_security;
-		s = smack_to_secid(ssp->smk_out);
+		s = ssp->smk_out->smk_secid;
 	} else if (family == PF_INET || family == PF_INET6) {
 		/*
 		 * Translate what netlabel gave us.
@@ -3005,8 +3305,8 @@ static int smack_socket_getpeersec_dgram(struct socket *sock,
 		netlbl_secattr_init(&secattr);
 		rc = netlbl_skbuff_getattr(skb, family, &secattr);
 		if (rc == 0) {
-			sp = smack_from_secattr(&secattr, ssp);
-			s = smack_to_secid(sp);
+			skp = smack_from_secattr(&secattr, ssp);
+			s = skp->smk_secid;
 		}
 		netlbl_secattr_destroy(&secattr);
 	}
@@ -3027,13 +3327,15 @@ static int smack_socket_getpeersec_dgram(struct socket *sock,
 static void smack_sock_graft(struct sock *sk, struct socket *parent)
 {
 	struct socket_smack *ssp;
+	struct smack_known *skp = smk_of_current();
 
 	if (sk == NULL ||
 	    (sk->sk_family != PF_INET && sk->sk_family != PF_INET6))
 		return;
 
 	ssp = sk->sk_security;
-	ssp->smk_in = ssp->smk_out = smk_of_current();
+	ssp->smk_in = skp->smk_known;
+	ssp->smk_out = skp;
 	/* cssp->smk_packet is already set in smack_inet_csk_clone() */
 }
 
@@ -3055,7 +3357,6 @@ static int smack_inet_conn_request(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb,
 	struct netlbl_lsm_secattr secattr;
 	struct sockaddr_in addr;
 	struct iphdr *hdr;
-	char *sp;
 	char *hsp;
 	int rc;
 	struct smk_audit_info ad;
@@ -3063,16 +3364,24 @@ static int smack_inet_conn_request(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb,
 	struct lsm_network_audit net;
 #endif
 
-	/* handle mapped IPv4 packets arriving via IPv6 sockets */
-	if (family == PF_INET6 && skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_IP))
-		family = PF_INET;
+	if (family == PF_INET6) {
+		/*
+		 * Handle mapped IPv4 packets arriving
+		 * via IPv6 sockets. Don't set up netlabel
+		 * processing on IPv6.
+		 */
+		if (skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_IP))
+			family = PF_INET;
+		else
+			return 0;
+	}
 
 	netlbl_secattr_init(&secattr);
 	rc = netlbl_skbuff_getattr(skb, family, &secattr);
 	if (rc == 0)
-		sp = smack_from_secattr(&secattr, ssp);
+		skp = smack_from_secattr(&secattr, ssp);
 	else
-		sp = smack_known_huh.smk_known;
+		skp = &smack_known_huh;
 	netlbl_secattr_destroy(&secattr);
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT
@@ -3085,7 +3394,7 @@ static int smack_inet_conn_request(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb,
 	 * Receiving a packet requires that the other end be able to write
 	 * here. Read access is not required.
 	 */
-	rc = smk_access(sp, ssp->smk_in, MAY_WRITE, &ad);
+	rc = smk_access(skp, ssp->smk_in, MAY_WRITE, &ad);
 	if (rc != 0)
 		return rc;
 
@@ -3093,7 +3402,7 @@ static int smack_inet_conn_request(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb,
 	 * Save the peer's label in the request_sock so we can later setup
 	 * smk_packet in the child socket so that SO_PEERCRED can report it.
 	 */
-	req->peer_secid = smack_to_secid(sp);
+	req->peer_secid = skp->smk_secid;
 
 	/*
 	 * We need to decide if we want to label the incoming connection here
@@ -3106,10 +3415,9 @@ static int smack_inet_conn_request(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb,
 	hsp = smack_host_label(&addr);
 	rcu_read_unlock();
 
-	if (hsp == NULL) {
-		skp = smk_find_entry(sp);
+	if (hsp == NULL)
 		rc = netlbl_req_setattr(req, &skp->smk_netlabel);
-	} else
+	else
 		netlbl_req_delattr(req);
 
 	return rc;
@@ -3126,10 +3434,12 @@ static void smack_inet_csk_clone(struct sock *sk,
 				 const struct request_sock *req)
 {
 	struct socket_smack *ssp = sk->sk_security;
+	struct smack_known *skp;
 
-	if (req->peer_secid != 0)
-		ssp->smk_packet = smack_from_secid(req->peer_secid);
-	else
+	if (req->peer_secid != 0) {
+		skp = smack_from_secid(req->peer_secid);
+		ssp->smk_packet = skp->smk_known;
+	} else
 		ssp->smk_packet = NULL;
 }
 
@@ -3155,7 +3465,9 @@ static void smack_inet_csk_clone(struct sock *sk,
 static int smack_key_alloc(struct key *key, const struct cred *cred,
 			   unsigned long flags)
 {
-	key->security = smk_of_task(cred->security);
+	struct smack_known *skp = smk_of_task(cred->security);
+
+	key->security = skp->smk_known;
 	return 0;
 }
 
@@ -3184,7 +3496,7 @@ static int smack_key_permission(key_ref_t key_ref,
 {
 	struct key *keyp;
 	struct smk_audit_info ad;
-	char *tsp = smk_of_task(cred->security);
+	struct smack_known *tkp = smk_of_task(cred->security);
 
 	keyp = key_ref_to_ptr(key_ref);
 	if (keyp == NULL)
@@ -3198,15 +3510,14 @@ static int smack_key_permission(key_ref_t key_ref,
 	/*
 	 * This should not occur
 	 */
-	if (tsp == NULL)
+	if (tkp == NULL)
 		return -EACCES;
 #ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT
 	smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_KEY);
 	ad.a.u.key_struct.key = keyp->serial;
 	ad.a.u.key_struct.key_desc = keyp->description;
 #endif
-	return smk_access(tsp, keyp->security,
-				 MAY_READWRITE, &ad);
+	return smk_access(tkp, keyp->security, MAY_READWRITE, &ad);
 }
 #endif /* CONFIG_KEYS */
 
@@ -3288,7 +3599,7 @@ static int smack_audit_rule_known(struct audit_krule *krule)
 static int smack_audit_rule_match(u32 secid, u32 field, u32 op, void *vrule,
 				  struct audit_context *actx)
 {
-	char *smack;
+	struct smack_known *skp;
 	char *rule = vrule;
 
 	if (!rule) {
@@ -3300,7 +3611,7 @@ static int smack_audit_rule_match(u32 secid, u32 field, u32 op, void *vrule,
 	if (field != AUDIT_SUBJ_USER && field != AUDIT_OBJ_USER)
 		return 0;
 
-	smack = smack_from_secid(secid);
+	skp = smack_from_secid(secid);
 
 	/*
 	 * No need to do string comparisons. If a match occurs,
@@ -3308,9 +3619,9 @@ static int smack_audit_rule_match(u32 secid, u32 field, u32 op, void *vrule,
 	 * label.
 	 */
 	if (op == Audit_equal)
-		return (rule == smack);
+		return (rule == skp->smk_known);
 	if (op == Audit_not_equal)
-		return (rule != smack);
+		return (rule != skp->smk_known);
 
 	return 0;
 }
@@ -3338,11 +3649,11 @@ static void smack_audit_rule_free(void *vrule)
  */
 static int smack_secid_to_secctx(u32 secid, char **secdata, u32 *seclen)
 {
-	char *sp = smack_from_secid(secid);
+	struct smack_known *skp = smack_from_secid(secid);
 
 	if (secdata)
-		*secdata = sp;
-	*seclen = strlen(sp);
+		*secdata = skp->smk_known;
+	*seclen = strlen(skp->smk_known);
 	return 0;
 }
 
@@ -3498,6 +3809,7 @@ struct security_operations smack_ops = {
 	.unix_may_send = 		smack_unix_may_send,
 
 	.socket_post_create = 		smack_socket_post_create,
+	.socket_bind =			smack_socket_bind,
 	.socket_connect =		smack_socket_connect,
 	.socket_sendmsg =		smack_socket_sendmsg,
 	.socket_sock_rcv_skb = 		smack_socket_sock_rcv_skb,
@@ -3577,8 +3889,8 @@ static __init int smack_init(void)
 	if (!security_module_enable(&smack_ops))
 		return 0;
 
-	tsp = new_task_smack(smack_known_floor.smk_known,
-				smack_known_floor.smk_known, GFP_KERNEL);
+	tsp = new_task_smack(&smack_known_floor, &smack_known_floor,
+				GFP_KERNEL);
 	if (tsp == NULL)
 		return -ENOMEM;
 
diff --git a/security/smack/smackfs.c b/security/smack/smackfs.c
index 53a08b85bda4..ab167037b2dd 100644
--- a/security/smack/smackfs.c
+++ b/security/smack/smackfs.c
@@ -66,7 +66,7 @@ static DEFINE_MUTEX(smk_netlbladdr_lock);
  * If it isn't somehow marked, use this.
  * It can be reset via smackfs/ambient
  */
-char *smack_net_ambient;
+struct smack_known *smack_net_ambient;
 
 /*
  * This is the level in a CIPSO header that indicates a
@@ -112,7 +112,7 @@ struct smack_master_list {
 LIST_HEAD(smack_rule_list);
 
 struct smack_parsed_rule {
-	char			*smk_subject;
+	struct smack_known	*smk_subject;
 	char			*smk_object;
 	int			smk_access1;
 	int			smk_access2;
@@ -163,9 +163,11 @@ static inline void smack_catset_bit(unsigned int cat, char *catsetp)
  */
 static void smk_netlabel_audit_set(struct netlbl_audit *nap)
 {
+	struct smack_known *skp = smk_of_current();
+
 	nap->loginuid = audit_get_loginuid(current);
 	nap->sessionid = audit_get_sessionid(current);
-	nap->secid = smack_to_secid(smk_of_current());
+	nap->secid = skp->smk_secid;
 }
 
 /*
@@ -306,7 +308,7 @@ static int smk_fill_rule(const char *subject, const char *object,
 	struct smack_known *skp;
 
 	if (import) {
-		rule->smk_subject = smk_import(subject, len);
+		rule->smk_subject = smk_import_entry(subject, len);
 		if (rule->smk_subject == NULL)
 			return -1;
 
@@ -321,7 +323,7 @@ static int smk_fill_rule(const char *subject, const char *object,
 		kfree(cp);
 		if (skp == NULL)
 			return -1;
-		rule->smk_subject = skp->smk_known;
+		rule->smk_subject = skp;
 
 		cp = smk_parse_smack(object, len);
 		if (cp == NULL)
@@ -445,7 +447,6 @@ static ssize_t smk_write_rules_list(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
 					struct list_head *rule_list,
 					struct mutex *rule_lock, int format)
 {
-	struct smack_known *skp;
 	struct smack_parsed_rule *rule;
 	char *data;
 	int datalen;
@@ -505,12 +506,10 @@ static ssize_t smk_write_rules_list(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
 			goto out_free_rule;
 	}
 
-
 	if (rule_list == NULL) {
 		load = 1;
-		skp = smk_find_entry(rule->smk_subject);
-		rule_list = &skp->smk_rules;
-		rule_lock = &skp->smk_rules_lock;
+		rule_list = &rule->smk_subject->smk_rules;
+		rule_lock = &rule->smk_subject->smk_rules_lock;
 	}
 
 	rc = smk_set_access(rule, rule_list, rule_lock, load);
@@ -579,13 +578,14 @@ static void smk_rule_show(struct seq_file *s, struct smack_rule *srp, int max)
 	 * because you should expect to be able to write
 	 * anything you read back.
 	 */
-	if (strlen(srp->smk_subject) >= max || strlen(srp->smk_object) >= max)
+	if (strlen(srp->smk_subject->smk_known) >= max ||
+	    strlen(srp->smk_object) >= max)
 		return;
 
 	if (srp->smk_access == 0)
 		return;
 
-	seq_printf(s, "%s %s", srp->smk_subject, srp->smk_object);
+	seq_printf(s, "%s %s", srp->smk_subject->smk_known, srp->smk_object);
 
 	seq_putc(s, ' ');
 
@@ -738,9 +738,9 @@ static void smk_unlbl_ambient(char *oldambient)
 			       __func__, __LINE__, rc);
 	}
 	if (smack_net_ambient == NULL)
-		smack_net_ambient = smack_known_floor.smk_known;
+		smack_net_ambient = &smack_known_floor;
 
-	rc = netlbl_cfg_unlbl_map_add(smack_net_ambient, PF_INET,
+	rc = netlbl_cfg_unlbl_map_add(smack_net_ambient->smk_known, PF_INET,
 				      NULL, NULL, &nai);
 	if (rc != 0)
 		printk(KERN_WARNING "%s:%d add rc = %d\n",
@@ -881,7 +881,7 @@ static ssize_t smk_set_cipso(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
 	if (format == SMK_FIXED24_FMT)
 		rule += SMK_LABELLEN;
 	else
-		rule += strlen(skp->smk_known);
+		rule += strlen(skp->smk_known) + 1;
 
 	ret = sscanf(rule, "%d", &maplevel);
 	if (ret != 1 || maplevel > SMACK_CIPSO_MAXLEVEL)
@@ -1535,11 +1535,12 @@ static ssize_t smk_read_ambient(struct file *filp, char __user *buf,
 	 */
 	mutex_lock(&smack_ambient_lock);
 
-	asize = strlen(smack_net_ambient) + 1;
+	asize = strlen(smack_net_ambient->smk_known) + 1;
 
 	if (cn >= asize)
 		rc = simple_read_from_buffer(buf, cn, ppos,
-					     smack_net_ambient, asize);
+					     smack_net_ambient->smk_known,
+					     asize);
 	else
 		rc = -EINVAL;
 
@@ -1560,8 +1561,8 @@ static ssize_t smk_read_ambient(struct file *filp, char __user *buf,
 static ssize_t smk_write_ambient(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
 				 size_t count, loff_t *ppos)
 {
+	struct smack_known *skp;
 	char *oldambient;
-	char *smack = NULL;
 	char *data;
 	int rc = count;
 
@@ -1577,16 +1578,16 @@ static ssize_t smk_write_ambient(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
 		goto out;
 	}
 
-	smack = smk_import(data, count);
-	if (smack == NULL) {
+	skp = smk_import_entry(data, count);
+	if (skp == NULL) {
 		rc = -EINVAL;
 		goto out;
 	}
 
 	mutex_lock(&smack_ambient_lock);
 
-	oldambient = smack_net_ambient;
-	smack_net_ambient = smack;
+	oldambient = smack_net_ambient->smk_known;
+	smack_net_ambient = skp;
 	smk_unlbl_ambient(oldambient);
 
 	mutex_unlock(&smack_ambient_lock);
@@ -1645,7 +1646,7 @@ static ssize_t smk_write_onlycap(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
 				 size_t count, loff_t *ppos)
 {
 	char *data;
-	char *sp = smk_of_task(current->cred->security);
+	struct smack_known *skp = smk_of_task(current->cred->security);
 	int rc = count;
 
 	if (!smack_privileged(CAP_MAC_ADMIN))
@@ -1656,7 +1657,7 @@ static ssize_t smk_write_onlycap(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
 	 * explicitly for clarity. The smk_access() implementation
 	 * would use smk_access(smack_onlycap, MAY_WRITE)
 	 */
-	if (smack_onlycap != NULL && smack_onlycap != sp)
+	if (smack_onlycap != NULL && smack_onlycap != skp->smk_known)
 		return -EPERM;
 
 	data = kzalloc(count, GFP_KERNEL);
@@ -1866,8 +1867,8 @@ static ssize_t smk_user_access(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
 	if (res)
 		return -EINVAL;
 
-	res = smk_access(rule.smk_subject, rule.smk_object, rule.smk_access1,
-			  NULL);
+	res = smk_access(rule.smk_subject, rule.smk_object,
+				rule.smk_access1, NULL);
 	data[0] = res == 0 ? '1' : '0';
 	data[1] = '\0';