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author | Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au> | 2012-01-13 09:32:20 +1030 |
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committer | Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au> | 2012-01-13 09:32:20 +1030 |
commit | 90ab5ee94171b3e28de6bb42ee30b527014e0be7 (patch) | |
tree | fcf89889f6e881f2b231d3d20287c08174ce4b54 /security | |
parent | 476bc0015bf09dad39d36a8b19f76f0c181d1ec9 (diff) | |
download | lwn-90ab5ee94171b3e28de6bb42ee30b527014e0be7.tar.gz lwn-90ab5ee94171b3e28de6bb42ee30b527014e0be7.zip |
module_param: make bool parameters really bool (drivers & misc)
module_param(bool) used to counter-intuitively take an int. In
fddd5201 (mid-2009) we allowed bool or int/unsigned int using a messy
trick.
It's time to remove the int/unsigned int option. For this version
it'll simply give a warning, but it'll break next kernel version.
Acked-by: Mauro Carvalho Chehab <mchehab@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>
Diffstat (limited to 'security')
-rw-r--r-- | security/apparmor/include/apparmor.h | 10 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | security/apparmor/lsm.c | 12 |
2 files changed, 11 insertions, 11 deletions
diff --git a/security/apparmor/include/apparmor.h b/security/apparmor/include/apparmor.h index 38ccaea08204..df3649560818 100644 --- a/security/apparmor/include/apparmor.h +++ b/security/apparmor/include/apparmor.h @@ -21,11 +21,11 @@ /* Control parameters settable through module/boot flags */ extern enum audit_mode aa_g_audit; -extern int aa_g_audit_header; -extern int aa_g_debug; -extern int aa_g_lock_policy; -extern int aa_g_logsyscall; -extern int aa_g_paranoid_load; +extern bool aa_g_audit_header; +extern bool aa_g_debug; +extern bool aa_g_lock_policy; +extern bool aa_g_logsyscall; +extern bool aa_g_paranoid_load; extern unsigned int aa_g_path_max; /* diff --git a/security/apparmor/lsm.c b/security/apparmor/lsm.c index d7f06f8b2837..68d50c54e431 100644 --- a/security/apparmor/lsm.c +++ b/security/apparmor/lsm.c @@ -708,7 +708,7 @@ module_param_call(mode, param_set_mode, param_get_mode, &aa_g_profile_mode, S_IRUSR | S_IWUSR); /* Debug mode */ -int aa_g_debug; +bool aa_g_debug; module_param_named(debug, aa_g_debug, aabool, S_IRUSR | S_IWUSR); /* Audit mode */ @@ -719,7 +719,7 @@ module_param_call(audit, param_set_audit, param_get_audit, /* Determines if audit header is included in audited messages. This * provides more context if the audit daemon is not running */ -int aa_g_audit_header = 1; +bool aa_g_audit_header = 1; module_param_named(audit_header, aa_g_audit_header, aabool, S_IRUSR | S_IWUSR); @@ -727,12 +727,12 @@ module_param_named(audit_header, aa_g_audit_header, aabool, * TODO: add in at boot loading of policy, which is the only way to * load policy, if lock_policy is set */ -int aa_g_lock_policy; +bool aa_g_lock_policy; module_param_named(lock_policy, aa_g_lock_policy, aalockpolicy, S_IRUSR | S_IWUSR); /* Syscall logging mode */ -int aa_g_logsyscall; +bool aa_g_logsyscall; module_param_named(logsyscall, aa_g_logsyscall, aabool, S_IRUSR | S_IWUSR); /* Maximum pathname length before accesses will start getting rejected */ @@ -742,12 +742,12 @@ module_param_named(path_max, aa_g_path_max, aauint, S_IRUSR | S_IWUSR); /* Determines how paranoid loading of policy is and how much verification * on the loaded policy is done. */ -int aa_g_paranoid_load = 1; +bool aa_g_paranoid_load = 1; module_param_named(paranoid_load, aa_g_paranoid_load, aabool, S_IRUSR | S_IWUSR); /* Boot time disable flag */ -static unsigned int apparmor_enabled = CONFIG_SECURITY_APPARMOR_BOOTPARAM_VALUE; +static bool apparmor_enabled = CONFIG_SECURITY_APPARMOR_BOOTPARAM_VALUE; module_param_named(enabled, apparmor_enabled, aabool, S_IRUSR); static int __init apparmor_enabled_setup(char *str) |