LSM: add SafeSetID module that gates setid calls

SafeSetID gates the setid family of syscalls to restrict UID/GID
transitions from a given UID/GID to only those approved by a
system-wide whitelist. These restrictions also prohibit the given
UIDs/GIDs from obtaining auxiliary privileges associated with
CAP_SET{U/G}ID, such as allowing a user to set up user namespace UID
mappings. For now, only gating the set*uid family of syscalls is
supported, with support for set*gid coming in a future patch set.

Signed-off-by: Micah Morton <mortonm@chromium.org>
Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.morris@microsoft.com>

5 files changed, 522 insertions, 0 deletions

diff --git a/security/safesetid/Kconfig b/security/safesetid/Kconfig
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..bf89a47ffcc8
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/safesetid/Kconfig
@@ -0,0 +1,12 @@
+config SECURITY_SAFESETID
+        bool "Gate setid transitions to limit CAP_SET{U/G}ID capabilities"
+        default n
+        help
+          SafeSetID is an LSM module that gates the setid family of syscalls to
+          restrict UID/GID transitions from a given UID/GID to only those
+          approved by a system-wide whitelist. These restrictions also prohibit
+          the given UIDs/GIDs from obtaining auxiliary privileges associated
+          with CAP_SET{U/G}ID, such as allowing a user to set up user namespace
+          UID mappings.
+
+          If you are unsure how to answer this question, answer N.
diff --git a/security/safesetid/Makefile b/security/safesetid/Makefile
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..6b0660321164
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/safesetid/Makefile
@@ -0,0 +1,7 @@
+# SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+#
+# Makefile for the safesetid LSM.
+#
+
+obj-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_SAFESETID) := safesetid.o
+safesetid-y := lsm.o securityfs.o
diff --git a/security/safesetid/lsm.c b/security/safesetid/lsm.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..3a2c75ac810c
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/safesetid/lsm.c
@@ -0,0 +1,277 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+/*
+ * SafeSetID Linux Security Module
+ *
+ * Author: Micah Morton <mortonm@chromium.org>
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 2018 The Chromium OS Authors.
+ *
+ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
+ * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License version 2, as
+ * published by the Free Software Foundation.
+ *
+ */
+
+#define pr_fmt(fmt) "SafeSetID: " fmt
+
+#include <asm/syscall.h>
+#include <linux/hashtable.h>
+#include <linux/lsm_hooks.h>
+#include <linux/module.h>
+#include <linux/ptrace.h>
+#include <linux/sched/task_stack.h>
+#include <linux/security.h>
+
+/* Flag indicating whether initialization completed */
+int safesetid_initialized;
+
+#define NUM_BITS 8 /* 128 buckets in hash table */
+
+static DEFINE_HASHTABLE(safesetid_whitelist_hashtable, NUM_BITS);
+
+/*
+ * Hash table entry to store safesetid policy signifying that 'parent' user
+ * can setid to 'child' user.
+ */
+struct entry {
+	struct hlist_node next;
+	struct hlist_node dlist; /* for deletion cleanup */
+	uint64_t parent_kuid;
+	uint64_t child_kuid;
+};
+
+static DEFINE_SPINLOCK(safesetid_whitelist_hashtable_spinlock);
+
+static bool check_setuid_policy_hashtable_key(kuid_t parent)
+{
+	struct entry *entry;
+
+	rcu_read_lock();
+	hash_for_each_possible_rcu(safesetid_whitelist_hashtable,
+				   entry, next, __kuid_val(parent)) {
+		if (entry->parent_kuid == __kuid_val(parent)) {
+			rcu_read_unlock();
+			return true;
+		}
+	}
+	rcu_read_unlock();
+
+	return false;
+}
+
+static bool check_setuid_policy_hashtable_key_value(kuid_t parent,
+						    kuid_t child)
+{
+	struct entry *entry;
+
+	rcu_read_lock();
+	hash_for_each_possible_rcu(safesetid_whitelist_hashtable,
+				   entry, next, __kuid_val(parent)) {
+		if (entry->parent_kuid == __kuid_val(parent) &&
+		    entry->child_kuid == __kuid_val(child)) {
+			rcu_read_unlock();
+			return true;
+		}
+	}
+	rcu_read_unlock();
+
+	return false;
+}
+
+static int safesetid_security_capable(const struct cred *cred,
+				      struct user_namespace *ns,
+				      int cap,
+				      unsigned int opts)
+{
+	if (cap == CAP_SETUID &&
+	    check_setuid_policy_hashtable_key(cred->uid)) {
+		if (!(opts & CAP_OPT_INSETID)) {
+			/*
+			 * Deny if we're not in a set*uid() syscall to avoid
+			 * giving powers gated by CAP_SETUID that are related
+			 * to functionality other than calling set*uid() (e.g.
+			 * allowing user to set up userns uid mappings).
+			 */
+			pr_warn("Operation requires CAP_SETUID, which is not available to UID %u for operations besides approved set*uid transitions",
+				__kuid_val(cred->uid));
+			return -1;
+		}
+	}
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int check_uid_transition(kuid_t parent, kuid_t child)
+{
+	if (check_setuid_policy_hashtable_key_value(parent, child))
+		return 0;
+	pr_warn("UID transition (%d -> %d) blocked",
+		__kuid_val(parent),
+		__kuid_val(child));
+	/*
+	 * Kill this process to avoid potential security vulnerabilities
+	 * that could arise from a missing whitelist entry preventing a
+	 * privileged process from dropping to a lesser-privileged one.
+	 */
+	force_sig(SIGKILL, current);
+	return -EACCES;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Check whether there is either an exception for user under old cred struct to
+ * set*uid to user under new cred struct, or the UID transition is allowed (by
+ * Linux set*uid rules) even without CAP_SETUID.
+ */
+static int safesetid_task_fix_setuid(struct cred *new,
+				     const struct cred *old,
+				     int flags)
+{
+
+	/* Do nothing if there are no setuid restrictions for this UID. */
+	if (!check_setuid_policy_hashtable_key(old->uid))
+		return 0;
+
+	switch (flags) {
+	case LSM_SETID_RE:
+		/*
+		 * Users for which setuid restrictions exist can only set the
+		 * real UID to the real UID or the effective UID, unless an
+		 * explicit whitelist policy allows the transition.
+		 */
+		if (!uid_eq(old->uid, new->uid) &&
+			!uid_eq(old->euid, new->uid)) {
+			return check_uid_transition(old->uid, new->uid);
+		}
+		/*
+		 * Users for which setuid restrictions exist can only set the
+		 * effective UID to the real UID, the effective UID, or the
+		 * saved set-UID, unless an explicit whitelist policy allows
+		 * the transition.
+		 */
+		if (!uid_eq(old->uid, new->euid) &&
+			!uid_eq(old->euid, new->euid) &&
+			!uid_eq(old->suid, new->euid)) {
+			return check_uid_transition(old->euid, new->euid);
+		}
+		break;
+	case LSM_SETID_ID:
+		/*
+		 * Users for which setuid restrictions exist cannot change the
+		 * real UID or saved set-UID unless an explicit whitelist
+		 * policy allows the transition.
+		 */
+		if (!uid_eq(old->uid, new->uid))
+			return check_uid_transition(old->uid, new->uid);
+		if (!uid_eq(old->suid, new->suid))
+			return check_uid_transition(old->suid, new->suid);
+		break;
+	case LSM_SETID_RES:
+		/*
+		 * Users for which setuid restrictions exist cannot change the
+		 * real UID, effective UID, or saved set-UID to anything but
+		 * one of: the current real UID, the current effective UID or
+		 * the current saved set-user-ID unless an explicit whitelist
+		 * policy allows the transition.
+		 */
+		if (!uid_eq(new->uid, old->uid) &&
+			!uid_eq(new->uid, old->euid) &&
+			!uid_eq(new->uid, old->suid)) {
+			return check_uid_transition(old->uid, new->uid);
+		}
+		if (!uid_eq(new->euid, old->uid) &&
+			!uid_eq(new->euid, old->euid) &&
+			!uid_eq(new->euid, old->suid)) {
+			return check_uid_transition(old->euid, new->euid);
+		}
+		if (!uid_eq(new->suid, old->uid) &&
+			!uid_eq(new->suid, old->euid) &&
+			!uid_eq(new->suid, old->suid)) {
+			return check_uid_transition(old->suid, new->suid);
+		}
+		break;
+	case LSM_SETID_FS:
+		/*
+		 * Users for which setuid restrictions exist cannot change the
+		 * filesystem UID to anything but one of: the current real UID,
+		 * the current effective UID or the current saved set-UID
+		 * unless an explicit whitelist policy allows the transition.
+		 */
+		if (!uid_eq(new->fsuid, old->uid)  &&
+			!uid_eq(new->fsuid, old->euid)  &&
+			!uid_eq(new->fsuid, old->suid) &&
+			!uid_eq(new->fsuid, old->fsuid)) {
+			return check_uid_transition(old->fsuid, new->fsuid);
+		}
+		break;
+	default:
+		pr_warn("Unknown setid state %d\n", flags);
+		force_sig(SIGKILL, current);
+		return -EINVAL;
+	}
+	return 0;
+}
+
+int add_safesetid_whitelist_entry(kuid_t parent, kuid_t child)
+{
+	struct entry *new;
+
+	/* Return if entry already exists */
+	if (check_setuid_policy_hashtable_key_value(parent, child))
+		return 0;
+
+	new = kzalloc(sizeof(struct entry), GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (!new)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+	new->parent_kuid = __kuid_val(parent);
+	new->child_kuid = __kuid_val(child);
+	spin_lock(&safesetid_whitelist_hashtable_spinlock);
+	hash_add_rcu(safesetid_whitelist_hashtable,
+		     &new->next,
+		     __kuid_val(parent));
+	spin_unlock(&safesetid_whitelist_hashtable_spinlock);
+	return 0;
+}
+
+void flush_safesetid_whitelist_entries(void)
+{
+	struct entry *entry;
+	struct hlist_node *hlist_node;
+	unsigned int bkt_loop_cursor;
+	HLIST_HEAD(free_list);
+
+	/*
+	 * Could probably use hash_for_each_rcu here instead, but this should
+	 * be fine as well.
+	 */
+	spin_lock(&safesetid_whitelist_hashtable_spinlock);
+	hash_for_each_safe(safesetid_whitelist_hashtable, bkt_loop_cursor,
+			   hlist_node, entry, next) {
+		hash_del_rcu(&entry->next);
+		hlist_add_head(&entry->dlist, &free_list);
+	}
+	spin_unlock(&safesetid_whitelist_hashtable_spinlock);
+	synchronize_rcu();
+	hlist_for_each_entry_safe(entry, hlist_node, &free_list, dlist) {
+		hlist_del(&entry->dlist);
+		kfree(entry);
+	}
+}
+
+static struct security_hook_list safesetid_security_hooks[] = {
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_fix_setuid, safesetid_task_fix_setuid),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(capable, safesetid_security_capable)
+};
+
+static int __init safesetid_security_init(void)
+{
+	security_add_hooks(safesetid_security_hooks,
+			   ARRAY_SIZE(safesetid_security_hooks), "safesetid");
+
+	/* Report that SafeSetID successfully initialized */
+	safesetid_initialized = 1;
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+DEFINE_LSM(safesetid_security_init) = {
+	.init = safesetid_security_init,
+};
diff --git a/security/safesetid/lsm.h b/security/safesetid/lsm.h
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..c1ea3c265fcf
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/safesetid/lsm.h
@@ -0,0 +1,33 @@
+/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */
+/*
+ * SafeSetID Linux Security Module
+ *
+ * Author: Micah Morton <mortonm@chromium.org>
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 2018 The Chromium OS Authors.
+ *
+ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
+ * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License version 2, as
+ * published by the Free Software Foundation.
+ *
+ */
+#ifndef _SAFESETID_H
+#define _SAFESETID_H
+
+#include <linux/types.h>
+
+/* Flag indicating whether initialization completed */
+extern int safesetid_initialized;
+
+/* Function type. */
+enum safesetid_whitelist_file_write_type {
+	SAFESETID_WHITELIST_ADD, /* Add whitelist policy. */
+	SAFESETID_WHITELIST_FLUSH, /* Flush whitelist policies. */
+};
+
+/* Add entry to safesetid whitelist to allow 'parent' to setid to 'child'. */
+int add_safesetid_whitelist_entry(kuid_t parent, kuid_t child);
+
+void flush_safesetid_whitelist_entries(void);
+
+#endif /* _SAFESETID_H */
diff --git a/security/safesetid/securityfs.c b/security/safesetid/securityfs.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..61be4ee459cc
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/safesetid/securityfs.c
@@ -0,0 +1,193 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+/*
+ * SafeSetID Linux Security Module
+ *
+ * Author: Micah Morton <mortonm@chromium.org>
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 2018 The Chromium OS Authors.
+ *
+ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
+ * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License version 2, as
+ * published by the Free Software Foundation.
+ *
+ */
+#include <linux/security.h>
+#include <linux/cred.h>
+
+#include "lsm.h"
+
+static struct dentry *safesetid_policy_dir;
+
+struct safesetid_file_entry {
+	const char *name;
+	enum safesetid_whitelist_file_write_type type;
+	struct dentry *dentry;
+};
+
+static struct safesetid_file_entry safesetid_files[] = {
+	{.name = "add_whitelist_policy",
+	 .type = SAFESETID_WHITELIST_ADD},
+	{.name = "flush_whitelist_policies",
+	 .type = SAFESETID_WHITELIST_FLUSH},
+};
+
+/*
+ * In the case the input buffer contains one or more invalid UIDs, the kuid_t
+ * variables pointed to by 'parent' and 'child' will get updated but this
+ * function will return an error.
+ */
+static int parse_safesetid_whitelist_policy(const char __user *buf,
+					    size_t len,
+					    kuid_t *parent,
+					    kuid_t *child)
+{
+	char *kern_buf;
+	char *parent_buf;
+	char *child_buf;
+	const char separator[] = ":";
+	int ret;
+	size_t first_substring_length;
+	long parsed_parent;
+	long parsed_child;
+
+	/* Duplicate string from user memory and NULL-terminate */
+	kern_buf = memdup_user_nul(buf, len);
+	if (IS_ERR(kern_buf))
+		return PTR_ERR(kern_buf);
+
+	/*
+	 * Format of |buf| string should be <UID>:<UID>.
+	 * Find location of ":" in kern_buf (copied from |buf|).
+	 */
+	first_substring_length = strcspn(kern_buf, separator);
+	if (first_substring_length == 0 || first_substring_length == len) {
+		ret = -EINVAL;
+		goto free_kern;
+	}
+
+	parent_buf = kmemdup_nul(kern_buf, first_substring_length, GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (!parent_buf) {
+		ret = -ENOMEM;
+		goto free_kern;
+	}
+
+	ret = kstrtol(parent_buf, 0, &parsed_parent);
+	if (ret)
+		goto free_both;
+
+	child_buf = kern_buf + first_substring_length + 1;
+	ret = kstrtol(child_buf, 0, &parsed_child);
+	if (ret)
+		goto free_both;
+
+	*parent = make_kuid(current_user_ns(), parsed_parent);
+	if (!uid_valid(*parent)) {
+		ret = -EINVAL;
+		goto free_both;
+	}
+
+	*child = make_kuid(current_user_ns(), parsed_child);
+	if (!uid_valid(*child)) {
+		ret = -EINVAL;
+		goto free_both;
+	}
+
+free_both:
+	kfree(parent_buf);
+free_kern:
+	kfree(kern_buf);
+	return ret;
+}
+
+static ssize_t safesetid_file_write(struct file *file,
+				    const char __user *buf,
+				    size_t len,
+				    loff_t *ppos)
+{
+	struct safesetid_file_entry *file_entry =
+		file->f_inode->i_private;
+	kuid_t parent;
+	kuid_t child;
+	int ret;
+
+	if (!ns_capable(current_user_ns(), CAP_MAC_ADMIN))
+		return -EPERM;
+
+	if (*ppos != 0)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	switch (file_entry->type) {
+	case SAFESETID_WHITELIST_FLUSH:
+		flush_safesetid_whitelist_entries();
+		break;
+	case SAFESETID_WHITELIST_ADD:
+		ret = parse_safesetid_whitelist_policy(buf, len, &parent,
+								 &child);
+		if (ret)
+			return ret;
+
+		ret = add_safesetid_whitelist_entry(parent, child);
+		if (ret)
+			return ret;
+		break;
+	default:
+		pr_warn("Unknown securityfs file %d\n", file_entry->type);
+		break;
+	}
+
+	/* Return len on success so caller won't keep trying to write */
+	return len;
+}
+
+static const struct file_operations safesetid_file_fops = {
+	.write = safesetid_file_write,
+};
+
+static void safesetid_shutdown_securityfs(void)
+{
+	int i;
+
+	for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(safesetid_files); ++i) {
+		struct safesetid_file_entry *entry =
+			&safesetid_files[i];
+		securityfs_remove(entry->dentry);
+		entry->dentry = NULL;
+	}
+
+	securityfs_remove(safesetid_policy_dir);
+	safesetid_policy_dir = NULL;
+}
+
+static int __init safesetid_init_securityfs(void)
+{
+	int i;
+	int ret;
+
+	if (!safesetid_initialized)
+		return 0;
+
+	safesetid_policy_dir = securityfs_create_dir("safesetid", NULL);
+	if (!safesetid_policy_dir) {
+		ret = PTR_ERR(safesetid_policy_dir);
+		goto error;
+	}
+
+	for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(safesetid_files); ++i) {
+		struct safesetid_file_entry *entry =
+			&safesetid_files[i];
+		entry->dentry = securityfs_create_file(
+			entry->name, 0200, safesetid_policy_dir,
+			entry, &safesetid_file_fops);
+		if (IS_ERR(entry->dentry)) {
+			ret = PTR_ERR(entry->dentry);
+			goto error;
+		}
+	}
+
+	return 0;
+
+error:
+	safesetid_shutdown_securityfs();
+	return ret;
+}
+fs_initcall(safesetid_init_securityfs);