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authorLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>2019-05-31 11:08:44 -0700
committerLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>2019-05-31 11:08:44 -0700
commitd266b3f5cac09434eb624af202f9a31307b34a88 (patch)
treed773c0a422644c9e1e91fc2d89db898e4b4e956a /security/integrity
parent8164c5719b864da3bcfee97ad8af8cfd7ee5ad8c (diff)
parent8cdc23a3d9ec0944000ad43bad588e36afdc38cd (diff)
downloadlwn-d266b3f5cac09434eb624af202f9a31307b34a88.tar.gz
lwn-d266b3f5cac09434eb624af202f9a31307b34a88.zip
Merge branch 'next-fixes-for-5.2-rc' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/zohar/linux-integrity
Pull integrity subsystem fixes from Mimi Zohar: "Four bug fixes, none 5.2-specific, all marked for stable. The first two are related to the architecture specific IMA policy support. The other two patches, one is related to EVM signatures, based on additional hash algorithms, and the other is related to displaying the IMA policy" * 'next-fixes-for-5.2-rc' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/zohar/linux-integrity: ima: show rules with IMA_INMASK correctly evm: check hash algorithm passed to init_desc() ima: fix wrong signed policy requirement when not appraising x86/ima: Check EFI_RUNTIME_SERVICES before using
Diffstat (limited to 'security/integrity')
-rw-r--r--security/integrity/evm/evm_crypto.c3
-rw-r--r--security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c28
2 files changed, 19 insertions, 12 deletions
diff --git a/security/integrity/evm/evm_crypto.c b/security/integrity/evm/evm_crypto.c
index e11564eb645b..82a38e801ee4 100644
--- a/security/integrity/evm/evm_crypto.c
+++ b/security/integrity/evm/evm_crypto.c
@@ -89,6 +89,9 @@ static struct shash_desc *init_desc(char type, uint8_t hash_algo)
tfm = &hmac_tfm;
algo = evm_hmac;
} else {
+ if (hash_algo >= HASH_ALGO__LAST)
+ return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
+
tfm = &evm_tfm[hash_algo];
algo = hash_algo_name[hash_algo];
}
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
index e0cc323f948f..1cc822a59054 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
@@ -498,10 +498,11 @@ static void add_rules(struct ima_rule_entry *entries, int count,
list_add_tail(&entry->list, &ima_policy_rules);
}
- if (entries[i].action == APPRAISE)
+ if (entries[i].action == APPRAISE) {
temp_ima_appraise |= ima_appraise_flag(entries[i].func);
- if (entries[i].func == POLICY_CHECK)
- temp_ima_appraise |= IMA_APPRAISE_POLICY;
+ if (entries[i].func == POLICY_CHECK)
+ temp_ima_appraise |= IMA_APPRAISE_POLICY;
+ }
}
}
@@ -1146,10 +1147,10 @@ enum {
};
static const char *const mask_tokens[] = {
- "MAY_EXEC",
- "MAY_WRITE",
- "MAY_READ",
- "MAY_APPEND"
+ "^MAY_EXEC",
+ "^MAY_WRITE",
+ "^MAY_READ",
+ "^MAY_APPEND"
};
#define __ima_hook_stringify(str) (#str),
@@ -1209,6 +1210,7 @@ int ima_policy_show(struct seq_file *m, void *v)
struct ima_rule_entry *entry = v;
int i;
char tbuf[64] = {0,};
+ int offset = 0;
rcu_read_lock();
@@ -1232,15 +1234,17 @@ int ima_policy_show(struct seq_file *m, void *v)
if (entry->flags & IMA_FUNC)
policy_func_show(m, entry->func);
- if (entry->flags & IMA_MASK) {
+ if ((entry->flags & IMA_MASK) || (entry->flags & IMA_INMASK)) {
+ if (entry->flags & IMA_MASK)
+ offset = 1;
if (entry->mask & MAY_EXEC)
- seq_printf(m, pt(Opt_mask), mt(mask_exec));
+ seq_printf(m, pt(Opt_mask), mt(mask_exec) + offset);
if (entry->mask & MAY_WRITE)
- seq_printf(m, pt(Opt_mask), mt(mask_write));
+ seq_printf(m, pt(Opt_mask), mt(mask_write) + offset);
if (entry->mask & MAY_READ)
- seq_printf(m, pt(Opt_mask), mt(mask_read));
+ seq_printf(m, pt(Opt_mask), mt(mask_read) + offset);
if (entry->mask & MAY_APPEND)
- seq_printf(m, pt(Opt_mask), mt(mask_append));
+ seq_printf(m, pt(Opt_mask), mt(mask_append) + offset);
seq_puts(m, " ");
}