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author | Josh Boyer <jwboyer@fedoraproject.org> | 2018-12-09 01:57:04 +0530 |
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committer | Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com> | 2018-12-12 22:09:10 -0500 |
commit | 386b49f51dc24d1f9139eb11f49aa075eeb35363 (patch) | |
tree | a9c07a6c594719a8faab034bbb4f8e9d129defb5 /security/integrity/platform_certs | |
parent | 15ea0e1e3e185040bed6119f815096f2e4326242 (diff) | |
download | lwn-386b49f51dc24d1f9139eb11f49aa075eeb35363.tar.gz lwn-386b49f51dc24d1f9139eb11f49aa075eeb35363.zip |
efi: Allow the "db" UEFI variable to be suppressed
If a user tells shim to not use the certs/hashes in the UEFI db variable
for verification purposes, shim will set a UEFI variable called
MokIgnoreDB. Have the uefi import code look for this and ignore the db
variable if it is found.
[zohar@linux.ibm.com: removed reference to "secondary" keyring comment]
Signed-off-by: Josh Boyer <jwboyer@fedoraproject.org>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Nayna Jain <nayna@linux.ibm.com>
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>
Reviewed-by: James Morris <james.morris@microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Diffstat (limited to 'security/integrity/platform_certs')
-rw-r--r-- | security/integrity/platform_certs/load_uefi.c | 45 |
1 files changed, 35 insertions, 10 deletions
diff --git a/security/integrity/platform_certs/load_uefi.c b/security/integrity/platform_certs/load_uefi.c index 8ceafa58d98c..81b19c52832b 100644 --- a/security/integrity/platform_certs/load_uefi.c +++ b/security/integrity/platform_certs/load_uefi.c @@ -16,6 +16,26 @@ static efi_guid_t efi_cert_x509_sha256_guid __initdata = static efi_guid_t efi_cert_sha256_guid __initdata = EFI_CERT_SHA256_GUID; /* + * Look to see if a UEFI variable called MokIgnoreDB exists and return true if + * it does. + * + * This UEFI variable is set by the shim if a user tells the shim to not use + * the certs/hashes in the UEFI db variable for verification purposes. If it + * is set, we should ignore the db variable also and the true return indicates + * this. + */ +static __init bool uefi_check_ignore_db(void) +{ + efi_status_t status; + unsigned int db = 0; + unsigned long size = sizeof(db); + efi_guid_t guid = EFI_SHIM_LOCK_GUID; + + status = efi.get_variable(L"MokIgnoreDB", &guid, NULL, &size, &db); + return status == EFI_SUCCESS; +} + +/* * Get a certificate list blob from the named EFI variable. */ static __init void *get_cert_list(efi_char16_t *name, efi_guid_t *guid, @@ -114,7 +134,9 @@ static __init efi_element_handler_t get_handler_for_dbx(const efi_guid_t * } /* - * Load the certs contained in the UEFI databases + * Load the certs contained in the UEFI databases into the platform trusted + * keyring and the UEFI blacklisted X.509 cert SHA256 hashes into the blacklist + * keyring. */ static int __init load_uefi_certs(void) { @@ -130,15 +152,18 @@ static int __init load_uefi_certs(void) /* Get db, MokListRT, and dbx. They might not exist, so it isn't * an error if we can't get them. */ - db = get_cert_list(L"db", &secure_var, &dbsize); - if (!db) { - pr_err("Couldn't get UEFI db list\n"); - } else { - rc = parse_efi_signature_list("UEFI:db", - db, dbsize, get_handler_for_db); - if (rc) - pr_err("Couldn't parse db signatures: %d\n", rc); - kfree(db); + if (!uefi_check_ignore_db()) { + db = get_cert_list(L"db", &secure_var, &dbsize); + if (!db) { + pr_err("MODSIGN: Couldn't get UEFI db list\n"); + } else { + rc = parse_efi_signature_list("UEFI:db", + db, dbsize, get_handler_for_db); + if (rc) + pr_err("Couldn't parse db signatures: %d\n", + rc); + kfree(db); + } } mok = get_cert_list(L"MokListRT", &mok_var, &moksize); |