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authorMimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>2012-02-13 10:15:05 -0500
committerMimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>2012-09-07 14:57:44 -0400
commit2fe5d6def1672ae6635dd71867bf36dcfaa7434b (patch)
treef83878d309605440b5bc2d2d43a16ccece64c645 /security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
parent4199d35cbc90c15db447d115bd96ffa5f1d60d3a (diff)
downloadlwn-2fe5d6def1672ae6635dd71867bf36dcfaa7434b.tar.gz
lwn-2fe5d6def1672ae6635dd71867bf36dcfaa7434b.zip
ima: integrity appraisal extension
IMA currently maintains an integrity measurement list used to assert the integrity of the running system to a third party. The IMA-appraisal extension adds local integrity validation and enforcement of the measurement against a "good" value stored as an extended attribute 'security.ima'. The initial methods for validating 'security.ima' are hashed based, which provides file data integrity, and digital signature based, which in addition to providing file data integrity, provides authenticity. This patch creates and maintains the 'security.ima' xattr, containing the file data hash measurement. Protection of the xattr is provided by EVM, if enabled and configured. Based on policy, IMA calls evm_verifyxattr() to verify a file's metadata integrity and, assuming success, compares the file's current hash value with the one stored as an extended attribute in 'security.ima'. Changelov v4: - changed iint cache flags to hex values Changelog v3: - change appraisal default for filesystems without xattr support to fail Changelog v2: - fix audit msg 'res' value - removed unused 'ima_appraise=' values Changelog v1: - removed unused iint mutex (Dmitry Kasatkin) - setattr hook must not reset appraised (Dmitry Kasatkin) - evm_verifyxattr() now differentiates between no 'security.evm' xattr (INTEGRITY_NOLABEL) and no EVM 'protected' xattrs included in the 'security.evm' (INTEGRITY_NOXATTRS). - replace hash_status with ima_status (Dmitry Kasatkin) - re-initialize slab element ima_status on free (Dmitry Kasatkin) - include 'security.ima' in EVM if CONFIG_IMA_APPRAISE, not CONFIG_IMA - merged half "ima: ima_must_appraise_or_measure API change" (Dmitry Kasatkin) - removed unnecessary error variable in process_measurement() (Dmitry Kasatkin) - use ima_inode_post_setattr() stub function, if IMA_APPRAISE not configured (moved ima_inode_post_setattr() to ima_appraise.c) - make sure ima_collect_measurement() can read file Changelog: - add 'iint' to evm_verifyxattr() call (Dimitry Kasatkin) - fix the race condition between chmod, which takes the i_mutex and then iint->mutex, and ima_file_free() and process_measurement(), which take the locks in the reverse order, by eliminating iint->mutex. (Dmitry Kasatkin) - cleanup of ima_appraise_measurement() (Dmitry Kasatkin) - changes as a result of the iint not allocated for all regular files, but only for those measured/appraised. - don't try to appraise new/empty files - expanded ima_appraisal description in ima/Kconfig - IMA appraise definitions required even if IMA_APPRAISE not enabled - add return value to ima_must_appraise() stub - unconditionally set status = INTEGRITY_PASS *after* testing status, not before. (Found by Joe Perches) Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@us.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Dmitry Kasatkin <dmitry.kasatkin@intel.com>
Diffstat (limited to 'security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c')
-rw-r--r--security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c32
1 files changed, 24 insertions, 8 deletions
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
index 1a9583008aae..3e22e17da295 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
@@ -25,7 +25,13 @@
#define IMA_FSMAGIC 0x0004
#define IMA_UID 0x0008
-enum ima_action { UNKNOWN = -1, DONT_MEASURE = 0, MEASURE };
+#define UNKNOWN 0
+#define MEASURE 1 /* same as IMA_MEASURE */
+#define DONT_MEASURE 2
+#define MEASURE_MASK 3
+#define APPRAISE 4 /* same as IMA_APPRAISE */
+#define DONT_APPRAISE 8
+#define APPRAISE_MASK 12
#define MAX_LSM_RULES 6
enum lsm_rule_types { LSM_OBJ_USER, LSM_OBJ_ROLE, LSM_OBJ_TYPE,
@@ -34,7 +40,7 @@ enum lsm_rule_types { LSM_OBJ_USER, LSM_OBJ_ROLE, LSM_OBJ_TYPE,
struct ima_measure_rule_entry {
struct list_head list;
- enum ima_action action;
+ int action;
unsigned int flags;
enum ima_hooks func;
int mask;
@@ -163,18 +169,28 @@ static bool ima_match_rules(struct ima_measure_rule_entry *rule,
* as elements in the list are never deleted, nor does the list
* change.)
*/
-int ima_match_policy(struct inode *inode, enum ima_hooks func, int mask)
+int ima_match_policy(struct inode *inode, enum ima_hooks func, int mask,
+ int flags)
{
struct ima_measure_rule_entry *entry;
+ int action = 0, actmask = flags | (flags << 1);
list_for_each_entry(entry, ima_measure, list) {
- bool rc;
- rc = ima_match_rules(entry, inode, func, mask);
- if (rc)
- return entry->action;
+ if (!(entry->action & actmask))
+ continue;
+
+ if (!ima_match_rules(entry, inode, func, mask))
+ continue;
+
+ action |= (entry->action & (IMA_APPRAISE | IMA_MEASURE));
+ actmask &= (entry->action & APPRAISE_MASK) ?
+ ~APPRAISE_MASK : ~MEASURE_MASK;
+ if (!actmask)
+ break;
}
- return 0;
+
+ return action;
}
/**