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author | Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> | 2022-12-13 09:14:50 -0800 |
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committer | Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> | 2022-12-13 09:14:50 -0800 |
commit | 299e2b1967578b1442128ba8b3e86ed3427d3651 (patch) | |
tree | babd06008fd18541f5e39bffbe09fbfa0526b14d /samples | |
parent | e529d3507a93d3c9528580081bbaf931a50de154 (diff) | |
parent | f6e53fb2d7bd70547ba53232415976cb70ad6d97 (diff) | |
download | lwn-299e2b1967578b1442128ba8b3e86ed3427d3651.tar.gz lwn-299e2b1967578b1442128ba8b3e86ed3427d3651.zip |
Merge tag 'landlock-6.2-rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/mic/linux
Pull landlock updates from Mickaël Salaün:
"This adds file truncation support to Landlock, contributed by Günther
Noack. As described by Günther [1], the goal of these patches is to
work towards a more complete coverage of file system operations that
are restrictable with Landlock.
The known set of currently unsupported file system operations in
Landlock is described at [2]. Out of the operations listed there,
truncate is the only one that modifies file contents, so these patches
should make it possible to prevent the direct modification of file
contents with Landlock.
The new LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_TRUNCATE access right covers both the
truncate(2) and ftruncate(2) families of syscalls, as well as open(2)
with the O_TRUNC flag. This includes usages of creat() in the case
where existing regular files are overwritten.
Additionally, this introduces a new Landlock security blob associated
with opened files, to track the available Landlock access rights at
the time of opening the file. This is in line with Unix's general
approach of checking the read and write permissions during open(), and
associating this previously checked authorization with the opened
file. An ongoing patch documents this use case [3].
In order to treat truncate(2) and ftruncate(2) calls differently in an
LSM hook, we split apart the existing security_path_truncate hook into
security_path_truncate (for truncation by path) and
security_file_truncate (for truncation of previously opened files)"
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20221018182216.301684-1-gnoack3000@gmail.com [1]
Link: https://www.kernel.org/doc/html/v6.1/userspace-api/landlock.html#filesystem-flags [2]
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20221209193813.972012-1-mic@digikod.net [3]
* tag 'landlock-6.2-rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/mic/linux:
samples/landlock: Document best-effort approach for LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_REFER
landlock: Document Landlock's file truncation support
samples/landlock: Extend sample tool to support LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_TRUNCATE
selftests/landlock: Test ftruncate on FDs created by memfd_create(2)
selftests/landlock: Test FD passing from restricted to unrestricted processes
selftests/landlock: Locally define __maybe_unused
selftests/landlock: Test open() and ftruncate() in multiple scenarios
selftests/landlock: Test file truncation support
landlock: Support file truncation
landlock: Document init_layer_masks() helper
landlock: Refactor check_access_path_dual() into is_access_to_paths_allowed()
security: Create file_truncate hook from path_truncate hook
Diffstat (limited to 'samples')
-rw-r--r-- | samples/landlock/sandboxer.c | 29 |
1 files changed, 25 insertions, 4 deletions
diff --git a/samples/landlock/sandboxer.c b/samples/landlock/sandboxer.c index f29bb3c72230..e2056c8b902c 100644 --- a/samples/landlock/sandboxer.c +++ b/samples/landlock/sandboxer.c @@ -76,7 +76,8 @@ static int parse_path(char *env_path, const char ***const path_list) #define ACCESS_FILE ( \ LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_EXECUTE | \ LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_WRITE_FILE | \ - LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_READ_FILE) + LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_READ_FILE | \ + LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_TRUNCATE) /* clang-format on */ @@ -160,11 +161,12 @@ out_free_name: LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_MAKE_FIFO | \ LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_MAKE_BLOCK | \ LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_MAKE_SYM | \ - LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_REFER) + LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_REFER | \ + LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_TRUNCATE) /* clang-format on */ -#define LANDLOCK_ABI_LAST 2 +#define LANDLOCK_ABI_LAST 3 int main(const int argc, char *const argv[], char *const *const envp) { @@ -232,8 +234,27 @@ int main(const int argc, char *const argv[], char *const *const envp) /* Best-effort security. */ switch (abi) { case 1: - /* Removes LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_REFER for ABI < 2 */ + /* + * Removes LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_REFER for ABI < 2 + * + * Note: The "refer" operations (file renaming and linking + * across different directories) are always forbidden when using + * Landlock with ABI 1. + * + * If only ABI 1 is available, this sandboxer knowingly forbids + * refer operations. + * + * If a program *needs* to do refer operations after enabling + * Landlock, it can not use Landlock at ABI level 1. To be + * compatible with different kernel versions, such programs + * should then fall back to not restrict themselves at all if + * the running kernel only supports ABI 1. + */ ruleset_attr.handled_access_fs &= ~LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_REFER; + __attribute__((fallthrough)); + case 2: + /* Removes LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_TRUNCATE for ABI < 3 */ + ruleset_attr.handled_access_fs &= ~LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_TRUNCATE; fprintf(stderr, "Hint: You should update the running kernel " |