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author | Linus Torvalds <torvalds@woody.linux-foundation.org> | 2007-10-15 08:16:53 -0700 |
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committer | Linus Torvalds <torvalds@woody.linux-foundation.org> | 2007-10-15 08:16:53 -0700 |
commit | 37ca506adc395a028cd12760eca419dd0dc14b5c (patch) | |
tree | bab6f2644ef6bda4df1518f7063852012b69f458 /net | |
parent | b9090071a57185707c27b9d61b81bf941dbdf122 (diff) | |
parent | a16e92edcd0a2846455a30823e1bac964e743baa (diff) | |
download | lwn-37ca506adc395a028cd12760eca419dd0dc14b5c.tar.gz lwn-37ca506adc395a028cd12760eca419dd0dc14b5c.zip |
Merge branch 'nfs-server-stable' of git://linux-nfs.org/~bfields/linux
* 'nfs-server-stable' of git://linux-nfs.org/~bfields/linux:
knfsd: query filesystem for NFSv4 getattr of FATTR4_MAXNAME
knfsd: nfsv4 delegation recall should take reference on client
knfsd: don't shutdown callbacks until nfsv4 client is freed
knfsd: let nfsd manage timing out its own leases
knfsd: Add source address to sunrpc svc errors
knfsd: 64 bit ino support for NFS server
svcgss: move init code into separate function
knfsd: remove code duplication in nfsd4_setclientid()
nfsd warning fix
knfsd: fix callback rpc cred
knfsd: move nfsv4 slab creation/destruction to module init/exit
knfsd: spawn kernel thread to probe callback channel
knfsd: nfs4 name->id mapping not correctly parsing negative downcall
knfsd: demote some printk()s to dprintk()s
knfsd: cleanup of nfsd4 cmp_* functions
knfsd: delete code made redundant by map_new_errors
nfsd: fix horrible indentation in nfsd_setattr
nfsd: remove unused cache_for_each macro
nfsd: tone down inaccurate dprintk
Diffstat (limited to 'net')
-rw-r--r-- | net/sunrpc/auth_gss/svcauth_gss.c | 144 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | net/sunrpc/svc.c | 40 |
2 files changed, 107 insertions, 77 deletions
diff --git a/net/sunrpc/auth_gss/svcauth_gss.c b/net/sunrpc/auth_gss/svcauth_gss.c index 7da7050f06c3..73940df6c460 100644 --- a/net/sunrpc/auth_gss/svcauth_gss.c +++ b/net/sunrpc/auth_gss/svcauth_gss.c @@ -631,7 +631,8 @@ svc_safe_putnetobj(struct kvec *resv, struct xdr_netobj *o) return 0; } -/* Verify the checksum on the header and return SVC_OK on success. +/* + * Verify the checksum on the header and return SVC_OK on success. * Otherwise, return SVC_DROP (in the case of a bad sequence number) * or return SVC_DENIED and indicate error in authp. */ @@ -961,6 +962,78 @@ gss_write_init_verf(struct svc_rqst *rqstp, struct rsi *rsip) } /* + * Having read the cred already and found we're in the context + * initiation case, read the verifier and initiate (or check the results + * of) upcalls to userspace for help with context initiation. If + * the upcall results are available, write the verifier and result. + * Otherwise, drop the request pending an answer to the upcall. + */ +static int svcauth_gss_handle_init(struct svc_rqst *rqstp, + struct rpc_gss_wire_cred *gc, __be32 *authp) +{ + struct kvec *argv = &rqstp->rq_arg.head[0]; + struct kvec *resv = &rqstp->rq_res.head[0]; + struct xdr_netobj tmpobj; + struct rsi *rsip, rsikey; + + /* Read the verifier; should be NULL: */ + *authp = rpc_autherr_badverf; + if (argv->iov_len < 2 * 4) + return SVC_DENIED; + if (svc_getnl(argv) != RPC_AUTH_NULL) + return SVC_DENIED; + if (svc_getnl(argv) != 0) + return SVC_DENIED; + + /* Martial context handle and token for upcall: */ + *authp = rpc_autherr_badcred; + if (gc->gc_proc == RPC_GSS_PROC_INIT && gc->gc_ctx.len != 0) + return SVC_DENIED; + memset(&rsikey, 0, sizeof(rsikey)); + if (dup_netobj(&rsikey.in_handle, &gc->gc_ctx)) + return SVC_DROP; + *authp = rpc_autherr_badverf; + if (svc_safe_getnetobj(argv, &tmpobj)) { + kfree(rsikey.in_handle.data); + return SVC_DENIED; + } + if (dup_netobj(&rsikey.in_token, &tmpobj)) { + kfree(rsikey.in_handle.data); + return SVC_DROP; + } + + /* Perform upcall, or find upcall result: */ + rsip = rsi_lookup(&rsikey); + rsi_free(&rsikey); + if (!rsip) + return SVC_DROP; + switch (cache_check(&rsi_cache, &rsip->h, &rqstp->rq_chandle)) { + case -EAGAIN: + case -ETIMEDOUT: + case -ENOENT: + /* No upcall result: */ + return SVC_DROP; + case 0: + /* Got an answer to the upcall; use it: */ + if (gss_write_init_verf(rqstp, rsip)) + return SVC_DROP; + if (resv->iov_len + 4 > PAGE_SIZE) + return SVC_DROP; + svc_putnl(resv, RPC_SUCCESS); + if (svc_safe_putnetobj(resv, &rsip->out_handle)) + return SVC_DROP; + if (resv->iov_len + 3 * 4 > PAGE_SIZE) + return SVC_DROP; + svc_putnl(resv, rsip->major_status); + svc_putnl(resv, rsip->minor_status); + svc_putnl(resv, GSS_SEQ_WIN); + if (svc_safe_putnetobj(resv, &rsip->out_token)) + return SVC_DROP; + } + return SVC_COMPLETE; +} + +/* * Accept an rpcsec packet. * If context establishment, punt to user space * If data exchange, verify/decrypt @@ -974,11 +1047,9 @@ svcauth_gss_accept(struct svc_rqst *rqstp, __be32 *authp) struct kvec *argv = &rqstp->rq_arg.head[0]; struct kvec *resv = &rqstp->rq_res.head[0]; u32 crlen; - struct xdr_netobj tmpobj; struct gss_svc_data *svcdata = rqstp->rq_auth_data; struct rpc_gss_wire_cred *gc; struct rsc *rsci = NULL; - struct rsi *rsip, rsikey; __be32 *rpcstart; __be32 *reject_stat = resv->iov_base + resv->iov_len; int ret; @@ -1023,30 +1094,14 @@ svcauth_gss_accept(struct svc_rqst *rqstp, __be32 *authp) if ((gc->gc_proc != RPC_GSS_PROC_DATA) && (rqstp->rq_proc != 0)) goto auth_err; - /* - * We've successfully parsed the credential. Let's check out the - * verifier. An AUTH_NULL verifier is allowed (and required) for - * INIT and CONTINUE_INIT requests. AUTH_RPCSEC_GSS is required for - * PROC_DATA and PROC_DESTROY. - * - * AUTH_NULL verifier is 0 (AUTH_NULL), 0 (length). - * AUTH_RPCSEC_GSS verifier is: - * 6 (AUTH_RPCSEC_GSS), length, checksum. - * checksum is calculated over rpcheader from xid up to here. - */ *authp = rpc_autherr_badverf; switch (gc->gc_proc) { case RPC_GSS_PROC_INIT: case RPC_GSS_PROC_CONTINUE_INIT: - if (argv->iov_len < 2 * 4) - goto auth_err; - if (svc_getnl(argv) != RPC_AUTH_NULL) - goto auth_err; - if (svc_getnl(argv) != 0) - goto auth_err; - break; + return svcauth_gss_handle_init(rqstp, gc, authp); case RPC_GSS_PROC_DATA: case RPC_GSS_PROC_DESTROY: + /* Look up the context, and check the verifier: */ *authp = rpcsec_gsserr_credproblem; rsci = gss_svc_searchbyctx(&gc->gc_ctx); if (!rsci) @@ -1067,51 +1122,6 @@ svcauth_gss_accept(struct svc_rqst *rqstp, __be32 *authp) /* now act upon the command: */ switch (gc->gc_proc) { - case RPC_GSS_PROC_INIT: - case RPC_GSS_PROC_CONTINUE_INIT: - *authp = rpc_autherr_badcred; - if (gc->gc_proc == RPC_GSS_PROC_INIT && gc->gc_ctx.len != 0) - goto auth_err; - memset(&rsikey, 0, sizeof(rsikey)); - if (dup_netobj(&rsikey.in_handle, &gc->gc_ctx)) - goto drop; - *authp = rpc_autherr_badverf; - if (svc_safe_getnetobj(argv, &tmpobj)) { - kfree(rsikey.in_handle.data); - goto auth_err; - } - if (dup_netobj(&rsikey.in_token, &tmpobj)) { - kfree(rsikey.in_handle.data); - goto drop; - } - - rsip = rsi_lookup(&rsikey); - rsi_free(&rsikey); - if (!rsip) { - goto drop; - } - switch(cache_check(&rsi_cache, &rsip->h, &rqstp->rq_chandle)) { - case -EAGAIN: - case -ETIMEDOUT: - case -ENOENT: - goto drop; - case 0: - if (gss_write_init_verf(rqstp, rsip)) - goto drop; - if (resv->iov_len + 4 > PAGE_SIZE) - goto drop; - svc_putnl(resv, RPC_SUCCESS); - if (svc_safe_putnetobj(resv, &rsip->out_handle)) - goto drop; - if (resv->iov_len + 3 * 4 > PAGE_SIZE) - goto drop; - svc_putnl(resv, rsip->major_status); - svc_putnl(resv, rsip->minor_status); - svc_putnl(resv, GSS_SEQ_WIN); - if (svc_safe_putnetobj(resv, &rsip->out_token)) - goto drop; - } - goto complete; case RPC_GSS_PROC_DESTROY: if (gss_write_verf(rqstp, rsci->mechctx, gc->gc_seq)) goto auth_err; @@ -1158,7 +1168,7 @@ svcauth_gss_accept(struct svc_rqst *rqstp, __be32 *authp) goto out; } auth_err: - /* Restore write pointer to original value: */ + /* Restore write pointer to its original value: */ xdr_ressize_check(rqstp, reject_stat); ret = SVC_DENIED; goto out; diff --git a/net/sunrpc/svc.c b/net/sunrpc/svc.c index 55ea6df069de..a4a6bf7deaa4 100644 --- a/net/sunrpc/svc.c +++ b/net/sunrpc/svc.c @@ -777,6 +777,30 @@ svc_register(struct svc_serv *serv, int proto, unsigned short port) } /* + * Printk the given error with the address of the client that caused it. + */ +static int +__attribute__ ((format (printf, 2, 3))) +svc_printk(struct svc_rqst *rqstp, const char *fmt, ...) +{ + va_list args; + int r; + char buf[RPC_MAX_ADDRBUFLEN]; + + if (!net_ratelimit()) + return 0; + + printk(KERN_WARNING "svc: %s: ", + svc_print_addr(rqstp, buf, sizeof(buf))); + + va_start(args, fmt); + r = vprintk(fmt, args); + va_end(args); + + return r; +} + +/* * Process the RPC request. */ int @@ -963,14 +987,13 @@ svc_process(struct svc_rqst *rqstp) return 0; err_short_len: - if (net_ratelimit()) - printk("svc: short len %Zd, dropping request\n", argv->iov_len); + svc_printk(rqstp, "short len %Zd, dropping request\n", + argv->iov_len); goto dropit; /* drop request */ err_bad_dir: - if (net_ratelimit()) - printk("svc: bad direction %d, dropping request\n", dir); + svc_printk(rqstp, "bad direction %d, dropping request\n", dir); serv->sv_stats->rpcbadfmt++; goto dropit; /* drop request */ @@ -1000,8 +1023,7 @@ err_bad_prog: goto sendit; err_bad_vers: - if (net_ratelimit()) - printk("svc: unknown version (%d for prog %d, %s)\n", + svc_printk(rqstp, "unknown version (%d for prog %d, %s)\n", vers, prog, progp->pg_name); serv->sv_stats->rpcbadfmt++; @@ -1011,16 +1033,14 @@ err_bad_vers: goto sendit; err_bad_proc: - if (net_ratelimit()) - printk("svc: unknown procedure (%d)\n", proc); + svc_printk(rqstp, "unknown procedure (%d)\n", proc); serv->sv_stats->rpcbadfmt++; svc_putnl(resv, RPC_PROC_UNAVAIL); goto sendit; err_garbage: - if (net_ratelimit()) - printk("svc: failed to decode args\n"); + svc_printk(rqstp, "failed to decode args\n"); rpc_stat = rpc_garbage_args; err_bad: |