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| author | Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com> | 2014-04-23 14:29:27 -0700 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> | 2014-06-26 15:15:38 -0400 |
| commit | be0ef855baab7248d0fc71cdf78a47fcfd3708f1 (patch) | |
| tree | 7c0650a4aa9cb820b8dfd1eb2cdc41fbcb5fdc1b /net/xfrm | |
| parent | d8d52aa168fc662f66b5525b7c16cc9de33b74da (diff) | |
| download | lwn-be0ef855baab7248d0fc71cdf78a47fcfd3708f1.tar.gz lwn-be0ef855baab7248d0fc71cdf78a47fcfd3708f1.zip | |
net: Use netlink_ns_capable to verify the permisions of netlink messages
[ Upstream commit 90f62cf30a78721641e08737bda787552428061e ]
It is possible by passing a netlink socket to a more privileged
executable and then to fool that executable into writing to the socket
data that happens to be valid netlink message to do something that
privileged executable did not intend to do.
To keep this from happening replace bare capable and ns_capable calls
with netlink_capable, netlink_net_calls and netlink_ns_capable calls.
Which act the same as the previous calls except they verify that the
opener of the socket had the desired permissions as well.
Reported-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Diffstat (limited to 'net/xfrm')
| -rw-r--r-- | net/xfrm/xfrm_user.c | 2 |
1 files changed, 1 insertions, 1 deletions
diff --git a/net/xfrm/xfrm_user.c b/net/xfrm/xfrm_user.c index 2f7ddc3a59b4..b10d04fa3933 100644 --- a/net/xfrm/xfrm_user.c +++ b/net/xfrm/xfrm_user.c @@ -2350,7 +2350,7 @@ static int xfrm_user_rcv_msg(struct sk_buff *skb, struct nlmsghdr *nlh) link = &xfrm_dispatch[type]; /* All operations require privileges, even GET */ - if (!ns_capable(net->user_ns, CAP_NET_ADMIN)) + if (!netlink_net_capable(skb, CAP_NET_ADMIN)) return -EPERM; if ((type == (XFRM_MSG_GETSA - XFRM_MSG_BASE) || |