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authorJohannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>2011-07-07 18:24:54 +0200
committerJohn W. Linville <linville@tuxdriver.com>2011-07-07 13:06:09 -0400
commit34459512ffa7236c849466e3bd604801389734e1 (patch)
treef363cdbf9618fe2bd424c9288cbee89abdc15584 /net/mac80211
parent1186980dafcd14d0e257a4dd6990cefdc6f3e362 (diff)
downloadlwn-34459512ffa7236c849466e3bd604801389734e1.tar.gz
lwn-34459512ffa7236c849466e3bd604801389734e1.zip
mac80211: fix TKIP replay vulnerability
Unlike CCMP, the presence or absence of the QoS field doesn't change the encryption, only the TID is used. When no QoS field is present, zero is used as the TID value. This means that it is possible for an attacker to take a QoS packet with TID 0 and replay it as a non-QoS packet. Unfortunately, mac80211 uses different IVs for checking the validity of the packet's TKIP IV when it checks TID 0 and when it checks non-QoS packets. This means it is vulnerable to this replay attack. To fix this, use the same replay counter for TID 0 and non-QoS packets by overriding the rx->queue value to 0 if it is 16 (non-QoS). This is a minimal fix for now. I caused this issue in commit 1411f9b531f0a910cd1c85a337737c1e6ffbae6a Author: Johannes Berg <johannes@sipsolutions.net> Date: Thu Jul 10 10:11:02 2008 +0200 mac80211: fix RX sequence number check while fixing a sequence number issue (there, a separate counter needs to be used). Cc: stable@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com> Signed-off-by: John W. Linville <linville@tuxdriver.com>
Diffstat (limited to 'net/mac80211')
-rw-r--r--net/mac80211/wpa.c16
1 files changed, 13 insertions, 3 deletions
diff --git a/net/mac80211/wpa.c b/net/mac80211/wpa.c
index d91c1a26630d..8f6a302d2ac3 100644
--- a/net/mac80211/wpa.c
+++ b/net/mac80211/wpa.c
@@ -86,6 +86,11 @@ ieee80211_rx_h_michael_mic_verify(struct ieee80211_rx_data *rx)
struct sk_buff *skb = rx->skb;
struct ieee80211_rx_status *status = IEEE80211_SKB_RXCB(skb);
struct ieee80211_hdr *hdr = (struct ieee80211_hdr *)skb->data;
+ int queue = rx->queue;
+
+ /* otherwise, TKIP is vulnerable to TID 0 vs. non-QoS replays */
+ if (rx->queue == NUM_RX_DATA_QUEUES - 1)
+ queue = 0;
/*
* it makes no sense to check for MIC errors on anything other
@@ -148,8 +153,8 @@ ieee80211_rx_h_michael_mic_verify(struct ieee80211_rx_data *rx)
update_iv:
/* update IV in key information to be able to detect replays */
- rx->key->u.tkip.rx[rx->queue].iv32 = rx->tkip_iv32;
- rx->key->u.tkip.rx[rx->queue].iv16 = rx->tkip_iv16;
+ rx->key->u.tkip.rx[queue].iv32 = rx->tkip_iv32;
+ rx->key->u.tkip.rx[queue].iv16 = rx->tkip_iv16;
return RX_CONTINUE;
@@ -241,6 +246,11 @@ ieee80211_crypto_tkip_decrypt(struct ieee80211_rx_data *rx)
struct ieee80211_key *key = rx->key;
struct sk_buff *skb = rx->skb;
struct ieee80211_rx_status *status = IEEE80211_SKB_RXCB(skb);
+ int queue = rx->queue;
+
+ /* otherwise, TKIP is vulnerable to TID 0 vs. non-QoS replays */
+ if (rx->queue == NUM_RX_DATA_QUEUES - 1)
+ queue = 0;
hdrlen = ieee80211_hdrlen(hdr->frame_control);
@@ -261,7 +271,7 @@ ieee80211_crypto_tkip_decrypt(struct ieee80211_rx_data *rx)
res = ieee80211_tkip_decrypt_data(rx->local->wep_rx_tfm,
key, skb->data + hdrlen,
skb->len - hdrlen, rx->sta->sta.addr,
- hdr->addr1, hwaccel, rx->queue,
+ hdr->addr1, hwaccel, queue,
&rx->tkip_iv32,
&rx->tkip_iv16);
if (res != TKIP_DECRYPT_OK)