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| author | Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> | 2013-03-28 13:43:46 -0700 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> | 2013-03-28 13:43:46 -0700 |
| commit | 2c3de1c2d7d68c6ba4c1ecd82c68285f34d9609e (patch) | |
| tree | 6a09ce761173a966718f9009514dcc90bd9947b7 /net/core | |
| parent | 9064171268d838b8f283fe111ef086b9479d059a (diff) | |
| parent | 87a8ebd637dafc255070f503909a053cf0d98d3f (diff) | |
| download | lwn-2c3de1c2d7d68c6ba4c1ecd82c68285f34d9609e.tar.gz lwn-2c3de1c2d7d68c6ba4c1ecd82c68285f34d9609e.zip | |
Merge branch 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/ebiederm/user-namespace
Pull userns fixes from Eric W Biederman:
"The bulk of the changes are fixing the worst consequences of the user
namespace design oversight in not considering what happens when one
namespace starts off as a clone of another namespace, as happens with
the mount namespace.
The rest of the changes are just plain bug fixes.
Many thanks to Andy Lutomirski for pointing out many of these issues."
* 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/ebiederm/user-namespace:
userns: Restrict when proc and sysfs can be mounted
ipc: Restrict mounting the mqueue filesystem
vfs: Carefully propogate mounts across user namespaces
vfs: Add a mount flag to lock read only bind mounts
userns: Don't allow creation if the user is chrooted
yama: Better permission check for ptraceme
pid: Handle the exit of a multi-threaded init.
scm: Require CAP_SYS_ADMIN over the current pidns to spoof pids.
Diffstat (limited to 'net/core')
| -rw-r--r-- | net/core/scm.c | 4 |
1 files changed, 3 insertions, 1 deletions
diff --git a/net/core/scm.c b/net/core/scm.c index 905dcc6ad1e3..2dc6cdaaae8a 100644 --- a/net/core/scm.c +++ b/net/core/scm.c @@ -24,6 +24,7 @@ #include <linux/interrupt.h> #include <linux/netdevice.h> #include <linux/security.h> +#include <linux/pid_namespace.h> #include <linux/pid.h> #include <linux/nsproxy.h> #include <linux/slab.h> @@ -52,7 +53,8 @@ static __inline__ int scm_check_creds(struct ucred *creds) if (!uid_valid(uid) || !gid_valid(gid)) return -EINVAL; - if ((creds->pid == task_tgid_vnr(current) || nsown_capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) && + if ((creds->pid == task_tgid_vnr(current) || + ns_capable(current->nsproxy->pid_ns->user_ns, CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) && ((uid_eq(uid, cred->uid) || uid_eq(uid, cred->euid) || uid_eq(uid, cred->suid)) || nsown_capable(CAP_SETUID)) && ((gid_eq(gid, cred->gid) || gid_eq(gid, cred->egid) || |