diff options
author | Qian Cai <cai@lca.pw> | 2019-01-08 15:23:04 -0800 |
---|---|---|
committer | Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> | 2019-01-08 17:15:11 -0800 |
commit | 7bff3c06997374fb9b9991536a547b840549a813 (patch) | |
tree | 23c6a57630d40220cb06ba15e253886debf473d9 /mm/usercopy.c | |
parent | 09c2e76ed734a1d36470d257a778aaba28e86531 (diff) | |
download | lwn-7bff3c06997374fb9b9991536a547b840549a813.tar.gz lwn-7bff3c06997374fb9b9991536a547b840549a813.zip |
mm/usercopy.c: no check page span for stack objects
It is easy to trigger this with CONFIG_HARDENED_USERCOPY_PAGESPAN=y,
usercopy: Kernel memory overwrite attempt detected to spans multiple pages (offset 0, size 23)!
kernel BUG at mm/usercopy.c:102!
For example,
print_worker_info
char name[WQ_NAME_LEN] = { };
char desc[WORKER_DESC_LEN] = { };
probe_kernel_read(name, wq->name, sizeof(name) - 1);
probe_kernel_read(desc, worker->desc, sizeof(desc) - 1);
__copy_from_user_inatomic
check_object_size
check_heap_object
check_page_span
This is because on-stack variables could cross PAGE_SIZE boundary, and
failed this check,
if (likely(((unsigned long)ptr & (unsigned long)PAGE_MASK) ==
((unsigned long)end & (unsigned long)PAGE_MASK)))
ptr = FFFF889007D7EFF8
end = FFFF889007D7F00E
Hence, fix it by checking if it is a stack object first.
[keescook@chromium.org: improve comments after reorder]
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190103165151.GA32845@beast
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20181231030254.99441-1-cai@lca.pw
Signed-off-by: Qian Cai <cai@lca.pw>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Diffstat (limited to 'mm/usercopy.c')
-rw-r--r-- | mm/usercopy.c | 9 |
1 files changed, 5 insertions, 4 deletions
diff --git a/mm/usercopy.c b/mm/usercopy.c index 852eb4e53f06..14faadcedd06 100644 --- a/mm/usercopy.c +++ b/mm/usercopy.c @@ -247,7 +247,8 @@ static DEFINE_STATIC_KEY_FALSE_RO(bypass_usercopy_checks); /* * Validates that the given object is: * - not bogus address - * - known-safe heap or stack object + * - fully contained by stack (or stack frame, when available) + * - fully within SLAB object (or object whitelist area, when available) * - not in kernel text */ void __check_object_size(const void *ptr, unsigned long n, bool to_user) @@ -262,9 +263,6 @@ void __check_object_size(const void *ptr, unsigned long n, bool to_user) /* Check for invalid addresses. */ check_bogus_address((const unsigned long)ptr, n, to_user); - /* Check for bad heap object. */ - check_heap_object(ptr, n, to_user); - /* Check for bad stack object. */ switch (check_stack_object(ptr, n)) { case NOT_STACK: @@ -282,6 +280,9 @@ void __check_object_size(const void *ptr, unsigned long n, bool to_user) usercopy_abort("process stack", NULL, to_user, 0, n); } + /* Check for bad heap object. */ + check_heap_object(ptr, n, to_user); + /* Check for object in kernel to avoid text exposure. */ check_kernel_text_object((const unsigned long)ptr, n, to_user); } |