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author | Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com> | 2022-04-27 18:31:19 +0100 |
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committer | Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> | 2022-05-08 01:33:08 -0700 |
commit | 9ec79840d6afaf472294588a6bbe145bcdffa28b (patch) | |
tree | 7210d75e5717b1b17ab210be3e3614855d31e0ac /kernel/stackleak.c | |
parent | ac7838b4e1c552d54e67f78a29bc1bd7701c13e8 (diff) | |
download | lwn-9ec79840d6afaf472294588a6bbe145bcdffa28b.tar.gz lwn-9ec79840d6afaf472294588a6bbe145bcdffa28b.zip |
stackleak: rework stack low bound handling
In stackleak_task_init(), stackleak_track_stack(), and
__stackleak_erase(), we open-code skipping the STACK_END_MAGIC at the
bottom of the stack. Each case is implemented slightly differently, and
only the __stackleak_erase() case is commented.
In stackleak_task_init() and stackleak_track_stack() we unconditionally
add sizeof(unsigned long) to the lowest stack address. In
stackleak_task_init() we use end_of_stack() for this, and in
stackleak_track_stack() we use task_stack_page(). In __stackleak_erase()
we handle this by detecting if `kstack_ptr` has hit the stack end
boundary, and if so, conditionally moving it above the magic.
This patch adds a new stackleak_task_low_bound() helper which is used in
all three cases, which unconditionally adds sizeof(unsigned long) to the
lowest address on the task stack, with commentary as to why. This uses
end_of_stack() as stackleak_task_init() did prior to this patch, as this
is consistent with the code in kernel/fork.c which initializes the
STACK_END_MAGIC value.
In __stackleak_erase() we no longer need to check whether we've spilled
into the STACK_END_MAGIC value, as stackleak_track_stack() ensures that
`current->lowest_stack` stops immediately above this, and similarly the
poison scan will stop immediately above this.
For stackleak_task_init() and stackleak_track_stack() this results in no
change to code generation. For __stackleak_erase() the generated
assembly is slightly simpler and shorter.
Signed-off-by: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Cc: Alexander Popov <alex.popov@linux.com>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220427173128.2603085-5-mark.rutland@arm.com
Diffstat (limited to 'kernel/stackleak.c')
-rw-r--r-- | kernel/stackleak.c | 14 |
1 files changed, 4 insertions, 10 deletions
diff --git a/kernel/stackleak.c b/kernel/stackleak.c index f7a0f8cf73c3..24b7cf01b297 100644 --- a/kernel/stackleak.c +++ b/kernel/stackleak.c @@ -72,9 +72,11 @@ late_initcall(stackleak_sysctls_init); static __always_inline void __stackleak_erase(void) { + const unsigned long task_stack_low = stackleak_task_low_bound(current); + /* It would be nice not to have 'kstack_ptr' and 'boundary' on stack */ unsigned long kstack_ptr = current->lowest_stack; - unsigned long boundary = (unsigned long)end_of_stack(current); + unsigned long boundary = task_stack_low; unsigned int poison_count = 0; const unsigned int depth = STACKLEAK_SEARCH_DEPTH / sizeof(unsigned long); @@ -88,13 +90,6 @@ static __always_inline void __stackleak_erase(void) kstack_ptr -= sizeof(unsigned long); } - /* - * One 'long int' at the bottom of the thread stack is reserved and - * should not be poisoned (see CONFIG_SCHED_STACK_END_CHECK=y). - */ - if (kstack_ptr == boundary) - kstack_ptr += sizeof(unsigned long); - #ifdef CONFIG_STACKLEAK_METRICS current->prev_lowest_stack = kstack_ptr; #endif @@ -140,8 +135,7 @@ void __used __no_caller_saved_registers noinstr stackleak_track_stack(void) /* 'lowest_stack' should be aligned on the register width boundary */ sp = ALIGN(sp, sizeof(unsigned long)); if (sp < current->lowest_stack && - sp >= (unsigned long)task_stack_page(current) + - sizeof(unsigned long)) { + sp >= stackleak_task_low_bound(current)) { current->lowest_stack = sp; } } |