diff options
author | Martin KaFai Lau <kafai@fb.com> | 2019-02-09 23:22:24 -0800 |
---|---|---|
committer | Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> | 2019-02-10 19:46:17 -0800 |
commit | 655a51e536c09d15ffa3603b1b6fce2b45b85a1f (patch) | |
tree | c918f6f95d890735a86370630fd7791f2a5a5360 /kernel/bpf | |
parent | 9b1f3d6e5af295a72deb5e3f04db07a6a58be72e (diff) | |
download | lwn-655a51e536c09d15ffa3603b1b6fce2b45b85a1f.tar.gz lwn-655a51e536c09d15ffa3603b1b6fce2b45b85a1f.zip |
bpf: Add struct bpf_tcp_sock and BPF_FUNC_tcp_sock
This patch adds a helper function BPF_FUNC_tcp_sock and it
is currently available for cg_skb and sched_(cls|act):
struct bpf_tcp_sock *bpf_tcp_sock(struct bpf_sock *sk);
int cg_skb_foo(struct __sk_buff *skb) {
struct bpf_tcp_sock *tp;
struct bpf_sock *sk;
__u32 snd_cwnd;
sk = skb->sk;
if (!sk)
return 1;
tp = bpf_tcp_sock(sk);
if (!tp)
return 1;
snd_cwnd = tp->snd_cwnd;
/* ... */
return 1;
}
A 'struct bpf_tcp_sock' is also added to the uapi bpf.h to provide
read-only access. bpf_tcp_sock has all the existing tcp_sock's fields
that has already been exposed by the bpf_sock_ops.
i.e. no new tcp_sock's fields are exposed in bpf.h.
This helper returns a pointer to the tcp_sock. If it is not a tcp_sock
or it cannot be traced back to a tcp_sock by sk_to_full_sk(), it
returns NULL. Hence, the caller needs to check for NULL before
accessing it.
The current use case is to expose members from tcp_sock
to allow a cg_skb_bpf_prog to provide per cgroup traffic
policing/shaping.
Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Martin KaFai Lau <kafai@fb.com>
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Diffstat (limited to 'kernel/bpf')
-rw-r--r-- | kernel/bpf/verifier.c | 31 |
1 files changed, 29 insertions, 2 deletions
diff --git a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c index b755d55a3791..1b9496c41383 100644 --- a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c +++ b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c @@ -334,14 +334,16 @@ static bool type_is_pkt_pointer(enum bpf_reg_type type) static bool type_is_sk_pointer(enum bpf_reg_type type) { return type == PTR_TO_SOCKET || - type == PTR_TO_SOCK_COMMON; + type == PTR_TO_SOCK_COMMON || + type == PTR_TO_TCP_SOCK; } static bool reg_type_may_be_null(enum bpf_reg_type type) { return type == PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_OR_NULL || type == PTR_TO_SOCKET_OR_NULL || - type == PTR_TO_SOCK_COMMON_OR_NULL; + type == PTR_TO_SOCK_COMMON_OR_NULL || + type == PTR_TO_TCP_SOCK_OR_NULL; } static bool type_is_refcounted(enum bpf_reg_type type) @@ -407,6 +409,8 @@ static const char * const reg_type_str[] = { [PTR_TO_SOCKET_OR_NULL] = "sock_or_null", [PTR_TO_SOCK_COMMON] = "sock_common", [PTR_TO_SOCK_COMMON_OR_NULL] = "sock_common_or_null", + [PTR_TO_TCP_SOCK] = "tcp_sock", + [PTR_TO_TCP_SOCK_OR_NULL] = "tcp_sock_or_null", }; static char slot_type_char[] = { @@ -1209,6 +1213,8 @@ static bool is_spillable_regtype(enum bpf_reg_type type) case PTR_TO_SOCKET_OR_NULL: case PTR_TO_SOCK_COMMON: case PTR_TO_SOCK_COMMON_OR_NULL: + case PTR_TO_TCP_SOCK: + case PTR_TO_TCP_SOCK_OR_NULL: return true; default: return false; @@ -1662,6 +1668,9 @@ static int check_sock_access(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int insn_idx, case PTR_TO_SOCKET: valid = bpf_sock_is_valid_access(off, size, t, &info); break; + case PTR_TO_TCP_SOCK: + valid = bpf_tcp_sock_is_valid_access(off, size, t, &info); + break; default: valid = false; } @@ -1823,6 +1832,9 @@ static int check_ptr_alignment(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, case PTR_TO_SOCK_COMMON: pointer_desc = "sock_common "; break; + case PTR_TO_TCP_SOCK: + pointer_desc = "tcp_sock "; + break; default: break; } @@ -3148,6 +3160,10 @@ static int check_helper_call(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int func_id, int insn /* For mark_ptr_or_null_reg() */ regs[BPF_REG_0].id = ++env->id_gen; } + } else if (fn->ret_type == RET_PTR_TO_TCP_SOCK_OR_NULL) { + mark_reg_known_zero(env, regs, BPF_REG_0); + regs[BPF_REG_0].type = PTR_TO_TCP_SOCK_OR_NULL; + regs[BPF_REG_0].id = ++env->id_gen; } else { verbose(env, "unknown return type %d of func %s#%d\n", fn->ret_type, func_id_name(func_id), func_id); @@ -3409,6 +3425,8 @@ static int adjust_ptr_min_max_vals(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, case PTR_TO_SOCKET_OR_NULL: case PTR_TO_SOCK_COMMON: case PTR_TO_SOCK_COMMON_OR_NULL: + case PTR_TO_TCP_SOCK: + case PTR_TO_TCP_SOCK_OR_NULL: verbose(env, "R%d pointer arithmetic on %s prohibited\n", dst, reg_type_str[ptr_reg->type]); return -EACCES; @@ -4644,6 +4662,8 @@ static void mark_ptr_or_null_reg(struct bpf_func_state *state, reg->type = PTR_TO_SOCKET; } else if (reg->type == PTR_TO_SOCK_COMMON_OR_NULL) { reg->type = PTR_TO_SOCK_COMMON; + } else if (reg->type == PTR_TO_TCP_SOCK_OR_NULL) { + reg->type = PTR_TO_TCP_SOCK; } if (is_null || !(reg_is_refcounted(reg) || reg_may_point_to_spin_lock(reg))) { @@ -5839,6 +5859,8 @@ static bool regsafe(struct bpf_reg_state *rold, struct bpf_reg_state *rcur, case PTR_TO_SOCKET_OR_NULL: case PTR_TO_SOCK_COMMON: case PTR_TO_SOCK_COMMON_OR_NULL: + case PTR_TO_TCP_SOCK: + case PTR_TO_TCP_SOCK_OR_NULL: /* Only valid matches are exact, which memcmp() above * would have accepted */ @@ -6161,6 +6183,8 @@ static bool reg_type_mismatch_ok(enum bpf_reg_type type) case PTR_TO_SOCKET_OR_NULL: case PTR_TO_SOCK_COMMON: case PTR_TO_SOCK_COMMON_OR_NULL: + case PTR_TO_TCP_SOCK: + case PTR_TO_TCP_SOCK_OR_NULL: return false; default: return true; @@ -7166,6 +7190,9 @@ static int convert_ctx_accesses(struct bpf_verifier_env *env) case PTR_TO_SOCK_COMMON: convert_ctx_access = bpf_sock_convert_ctx_access; break; + case PTR_TO_TCP_SOCK: + convert_ctx_access = bpf_tcp_sock_convert_ctx_access; + break; default: continue; } |