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author | Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> | 2017-03-31 02:24:03 +0200 |
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committer | David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> | 2017-04-01 12:36:37 -0700 |
commit | 79adffcd6489ef43bda2dfded3d637d7fb4fac80 (patch) | |
tree | 1c6aeede0c664ba8a71f789df9c383058b775893 /kernel/bpf/verifier.c | |
parent | fce366a9dd0ddc47e7ce05611c266e8574a45116 (diff) | |
download | lwn-79adffcd6489ef43bda2dfded3d637d7fb4fac80.tar.gz lwn-79adffcd6489ef43bda2dfded3d637d7fb4fac80.zip |
bpf, verifier: fix rejection of unaligned access checks for map_value_adj
Currently, the verifier doesn't reject unaligned access for map_value_adj
register types. Commit 484611357c19 ("bpf: allow access into map value
arrays") added logic to check_ptr_alignment() extending it from PTR_TO_PACKET
to also PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_ADJ, but for PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_ADJ no enforcement
is in place, because reg->id for PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_ADJ reg types is never
non-zero, meaning, we can cause BPF_H/_W/_DW-based unaligned access for
architectures not supporting efficient unaligned access, and thus worst
case could raise exceptions on some archs that are unable to correct the
unaligned access or perform a different memory access to the actual
requested one and such.
i) Unaligned load with !CONFIG_HAVE_EFFICIENT_UNALIGNED_ACCESS
on r0 (map_value_adj):
0: (bf) r2 = r10
1: (07) r2 += -8
2: (7a) *(u64 *)(r2 +0) = 0
3: (18) r1 = 0x42533a00
5: (85) call bpf_map_lookup_elem#1
6: (15) if r0 == 0x0 goto pc+11
R0=map_value(ks=8,vs=48,id=0),min_value=0,max_value=0 R10=fp
7: (61) r1 = *(u32 *)(r0 +0)
8: (35) if r1 >= 0xb goto pc+9
R0=map_value(ks=8,vs=48,id=0),min_value=0,max_value=0 R1=inv,min_value=0,max_value=10 R10=fp
9: (07) r0 += 3
10: (79) r7 = *(u64 *)(r0 +0)
R0=map_value_adj(ks=8,vs=48,id=0),min_value=3,max_value=3 R1=inv,min_value=0,max_value=10 R10=fp
11: (79) r7 = *(u64 *)(r0 +2)
R0=map_value_adj(ks=8,vs=48,id=0),min_value=3,max_value=3 R1=inv,min_value=0,max_value=10 R7=inv R10=fp
[...]
ii) Unaligned store with !CONFIG_HAVE_EFFICIENT_UNALIGNED_ACCESS
on r0 (map_value_adj):
0: (bf) r2 = r10
1: (07) r2 += -8
2: (7a) *(u64 *)(r2 +0) = 0
3: (18) r1 = 0x4df16a00
5: (85) call bpf_map_lookup_elem#1
6: (15) if r0 == 0x0 goto pc+19
R0=map_value(ks=8,vs=48,id=0),min_value=0,max_value=0 R10=fp
7: (07) r0 += 3
8: (7a) *(u64 *)(r0 +0) = 42
R0=map_value_adj(ks=8,vs=48,id=0),min_value=3,max_value=3 R10=fp
9: (7a) *(u64 *)(r0 +2) = 43
R0=map_value_adj(ks=8,vs=48,id=0),min_value=3,max_value=3 R10=fp
10: (7a) *(u64 *)(r0 -2) = 44
R0=map_value_adj(ks=8,vs=48,id=0),min_value=3,max_value=3 R10=fp
[...]
For the PTR_TO_PACKET type, reg->id is initially zero when skb->data
was fetched, it later receives a reg->id from env->id_gen generator
once another register with UNKNOWN_VALUE type was added to it via
check_packet_ptr_add(). The purpose of this reg->id is twofold: i) it
is used in find_good_pkt_pointers() for setting the allowed access
range for regs with PTR_TO_PACKET of same id once verifier matched
on data/data_end tests, and ii) for check_ptr_alignment() to determine
that when not having efficient unaligned access and register with
UNKNOWN_VALUE was added to PTR_TO_PACKET, that we're only allowed
to access the content bytewise due to unknown unalignment. reg->id
was never intended for PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE{,_ADJ} types and thus is
always zero, the only marking is in PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_OR_NULL that
was added after 484611357c19 via 57a09bf0a416 ("bpf: Detect identical
PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_OR_NULL registers"). Above tests will fail for
non-root environment due to prohibited pointer arithmetic.
The fix splits register-type specific checks into their own helper
instead of keeping them combined, so we don't run into a similar
issue in future once we extend check_ptr_alignment() further and
forget to add reg->type checks for some of the checks.
Fixes: 484611357c19 ("bpf: allow access into map value arrays")
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Reviewed-by: Josef Bacik <jbacik@fb.com>
Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Diffstat (limited to 'kernel/bpf/verifier.c')
-rw-r--r-- | kernel/bpf/verifier.c | 58 |
1 files changed, 38 insertions, 20 deletions
diff --git a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c index 86deddecff25..a834068a400e 100644 --- a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c +++ b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c @@ -765,38 +765,56 @@ static bool is_pointer_value(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int regno) } } -static int check_ptr_alignment(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, - struct bpf_reg_state *reg, int off, int size) +static int check_pkt_ptr_alignment(const struct bpf_reg_state *reg, + int off, int size) { - if (reg->type != PTR_TO_PACKET && reg->type != PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_ADJ) { - if (off % size != 0) { - verbose("misaligned access off %d size %d\n", - off, size); - return -EACCES; - } else { - return 0; - } - } - - if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_HAVE_EFFICIENT_UNALIGNED_ACCESS)) - /* misaligned access to packet is ok on x86,arm,arm64 */ - return 0; - if (reg->id && size != 1) { - verbose("Unknown packet alignment. Only byte-sized access allowed\n"); + verbose("Unknown alignment. Only byte-sized access allowed in packet access.\n"); return -EACCES; } /* skb->data is NET_IP_ALIGN-ed */ - if (reg->type == PTR_TO_PACKET && - (NET_IP_ALIGN + reg->off + off) % size != 0) { + if ((NET_IP_ALIGN + reg->off + off) % size != 0) { verbose("misaligned packet access off %d+%d+%d size %d\n", NET_IP_ALIGN, reg->off, off, size); return -EACCES; } + return 0; } +static int check_val_ptr_alignment(const struct bpf_reg_state *reg, + int size) +{ + if (size != 1) { + verbose("Unknown alignment. Only byte-sized access allowed in value access.\n"); + return -EACCES; + } + + return 0; +} + +static int check_ptr_alignment(const struct bpf_reg_state *reg, + int off, int size) +{ + switch (reg->type) { + case PTR_TO_PACKET: + return IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_HAVE_EFFICIENT_UNALIGNED_ACCESS) ? 0 : + check_pkt_ptr_alignment(reg, off, size); + case PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_ADJ: + return IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_HAVE_EFFICIENT_UNALIGNED_ACCESS) ? 0 : + check_val_ptr_alignment(reg, size); + default: + if (off % size != 0) { + verbose("misaligned access off %d size %d\n", + off, size); + return -EACCES; + } + + return 0; + } +} + /* check whether memory at (regno + off) is accessible for t = (read | write) * if t==write, value_regno is a register which value is stored into memory * if t==read, value_regno is a register which will receive the value from memory @@ -818,7 +836,7 @@ static int check_mem_access(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, u32 regno, int off, if (size < 0) return size; - err = check_ptr_alignment(env, reg, off, size); + err = check_ptr_alignment(reg, off, size); if (err) return err; |