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author | David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> | 2018-01-14 11:01:33 -0500 |
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committer | David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> | 2018-01-14 11:01:33 -0500 |
commit | 8155aedf512edd3f88ef19f7cacf476ace7d1322 (patch) | |
tree | 3113dc2556227d089f65dcae87833583a80ab4f9 /kernel/bpf/verifier.c | |
parent | 5dd966c680b616911a66d4576a9ed53aaf5f89ea (diff) | |
parent | bbeb6e4323dad9b5e0ee9f60c223dd532e2403b1 (diff) | |
download | lwn-8155aedf512edd3f88ef19f7cacf476ace7d1322.tar.gz lwn-8155aedf512edd3f88ef19f7cacf476ace7d1322.zip |
Merge git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/bpf/bpf
Daniel Borkmann says:
====================
pull-request: bpf 2018-01-13
The following pull-request contains BPF updates for your *net* tree.
The main changes are:
1) Follow-up fix to the recent BPF out-of-bounds speculation
fix that prevents max_entries overflows and an undefined
behavior on 32 bit archs on index_mask calculation, from
Daniel.
2) Reject unsupported BPF_ARSH opcode in 32 bit ALU mode that
was otherwise throwing an unknown opcode warning in the
interpreter, from Daniel.
3) Typo fix in one of the user facing verbose() messages that
was added during the BPF out-of-bounds speculation fix,
from Colin.
====================
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Diffstat (limited to 'kernel/bpf/verifier.c')
-rw-r--r-- | kernel/bpf/verifier.c | 7 |
1 files changed, 6 insertions, 1 deletions
diff --git a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c index b414d6b2d470..20eb04fd155e 100644 --- a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c +++ b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c @@ -2493,6 +2493,11 @@ static int check_alu_op(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_insn *insn) return -EINVAL; } + if (opcode == BPF_ARSH && BPF_CLASS(insn->code) != BPF_ALU64) { + verbose(env, "BPF_ARSH not supported for 32 bit ALU\n"); + return -EINVAL; + } + if ((opcode == BPF_LSH || opcode == BPF_RSH || opcode == BPF_ARSH) && BPF_SRC(insn->code) == BPF_K) { int size = BPF_CLASS(insn->code) == BPF_ALU64 ? 64 : 32; @@ -4472,7 +4477,7 @@ static int fixup_bpf_calls(struct bpf_verifier_env *env) */ map_ptr = env->insn_aux_data[i + delta].map_ptr; if (map_ptr == BPF_MAP_PTR_POISON) { - verbose(env, "tail_call obusing map_ptr\n"); + verbose(env, "tail_call abusing map_ptr\n"); return -EINVAL; } if (!map_ptr->unpriv_array) |