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authorEric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>2014-04-23 14:29:27 -0700
committerGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>2014-06-26 15:12:37 -0400
commit1141a455802884d3bcbcf6b30e1d65d09cf286e1 (patch)
treecf3e9a2df48351395ea657c35fd0736090ae3845 /kernel/audit.c
parent738f378d77b04f685f2cd01aa4240d1bce5c9668 (diff)
downloadlwn-1141a455802884d3bcbcf6b30e1d65d09cf286e1.tar.gz
lwn-1141a455802884d3bcbcf6b30e1d65d09cf286e1.zip
net: Use netlink_ns_capable to verify the permisions of netlink messages
[ Upstream commit 90f62cf30a78721641e08737bda787552428061e ] It is possible by passing a netlink socket to a more privileged executable and then to fool that executable into writing to the socket data that happens to be valid netlink message to do something that privileged executable did not intend to do. To keep this from happening replace bare capable and ns_capable calls with netlink_capable, netlink_net_calls and netlink_ns_capable calls. Which act the same as the previous calls except they verify that the opener of the socket had the desired permissions as well. Reported-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net> Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Diffstat (limited to 'kernel/audit.c')
-rw-r--r--kernel/audit.c4
1 files changed, 2 insertions, 2 deletions
diff --git a/kernel/audit.c b/kernel/audit.c
index 6def25f1b351..a6c632757e57 100644
--- a/kernel/audit.c
+++ b/kernel/audit.c
@@ -593,13 +593,13 @@ static int audit_netlink_ok(struct sk_buff *skb, u16 msg_type)
case AUDIT_TTY_SET:
case AUDIT_TRIM:
case AUDIT_MAKE_EQUIV:
- if (!capable(CAP_AUDIT_CONTROL))
+ if (!netlink_capable(skb, CAP_AUDIT_CONTROL))
err = -EPERM;
break;
case AUDIT_USER:
case AUDIT_FIRST_USER_MSG ... AUDIT_LAST_USER_MSG:
case AUDIT_FIRST_USER_MSG2 ... AUDIT_LAST_USER_MSG2:
- if (!capable(CAP_AUDIT_WRITE))
+ if (!netlink_capable(skb, CAP_AUDIT_WRITE))
err = -EPERM;
break;
default: /* bad msg */