seccomp: add system call filtering using BPF

[This patch depends on luto@mit.edu's no_new_privs patch:
   https://lkml.org/lkml/2012/1/30/264
 The whole series including Andrew's patches can be found here:
   https://github.com/redpig/linux/tree/seccomp
 Complete diff here:
   https://github.com/redpig/linux/compare/1dc65fed...seccomp
]

This patch adds support for seccomp mode 2.  Mode 2 introduces the
ability for unprivileged processes to install system call filtering
policy expressed in terms of a Berkeley Packet Filter (BPF) program.
This program will be evaluated in the kernel for each system call
the task makes and computes a result based on data in the format
of struct seccomp_data.

A filter program may be installed by calling:
  struct sock_fprog fprog = { ... };
  ...
  prctl(PR_SET_SECCOMP, SECCOMP_MODE_FILTER, &fprog);

The return value of the filter program determines if the system call is
allowed to proceed or denied.  If the first filter program installed
allows prctl(2) calls, then the above call may be made repeatedly
by a task to further reduce its access to the kernel.  All attached
programs must be evaluated before a system call will be allowed to
proceed.

Filter programs will be inherited across fork/clone and execve.
However, if the task attaching the filter is unprivileged
(!CAP_SYS_ADMIN) the no_new_privs bit will be set on the task.  This
ensures that unprivileged tasks cannot attach filters that affect
privileged tasks (e.g., setuid binary).

There are a number of benefits to this approach. A few of which are
as follows:
- BPF has been exposed to userland for a long time
- BPF optimization (and JIT'ing) are well understood
- Userland already knows its ABI: system call numbers and desired
  arguments
- No time-of-check-time-of-use vulnerable data accesses are possible.
- system call arguments are loaded on access only to minimize copying
  required for system call policy decisions.

Mode 2 support is restricted to architectures that enable
HAVE_ARCH_SECCOMP_FILTER.  In this patch, the primary dependency is on
syscall_get_arguments().  The full desired scope of this feature will
add a few minor additional requirements expressed later in this series.
Based on discussion, SECCOMP_RET_ERRNO and SECCOMP_RET_TRACE seem to be
the desired additional functionality.

No architectures are enabled in this patch.

Signed-off-by: Will Drewry <wad@chromium.org>
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com>
Reviewed-by: Indan Zupancic <indan@nul.nu>
Acked-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>

v18: - rebase to v3.4-rc2
     - s/chk/check/ (akpm@linux-foundation.org,jmorris@namei.org)
     - allocate with GFP_KERNEL|__GFP_NOWARN (indan@nul.nu)
     - add a comment for get_u32 regarding endianness (akpm@)
     - fix other typos, style mistakes (akpm@)
     - added acked-by
v17: - properly guard seccomp filter needed headers (leann@ubuntu.com)
     - tighten return mask to 0x7fff0000
v16: - no change
v15: - add a 4 instr penalty when counting a path to account for seccomp_filter
       size (indan@nul.nu)
     - drop the max insns to 256KB (indan@nul.nu)
     - return ENOMEM if the max insns limit has been hit (indan@nul.nu)
     - move IP checks after args (indan@nul.nu)
     - drop !user_filter check (indan@nul.nu)
     - only allow explicit bpf codes (indan@nul.nu)
     - exit_code -> exit_sig
v14: - put/get_seccomp_filter takes struct task_struct
       (indan@nul.nu,keescook@chromium.org)
     - adds seccomp_chk_filter and drops general bpf_run/chk_filter user
     - add seccomp_bpf_load for use by net/core/filter.c
     - lower max per-process/per-hierarchy: 1MB
     - moved nnp/capability check prior to allocation
       (all of the above: indan@nul.nu)
v13: - rebase on to 88ebdda6159ffc15699f204c33feb3e431bf9bdc
v12: - added a maximum instruction count per path (indan@nul.nu,oleg@redhat.com)
     - removed copy_seccomp (keescook@chromium.org,indan@nul.nu)
     - reworded the prctl_set_seccomp comment (indan@nul.nu)
v11: - reorder struct seccomp_data to allow future args expansion (hpa@zytor.com)
     - style clean up, @compat dropped, compat_sock_fprog32 (indan@nul.nu)
     - do_exit(SIGSYS) (keescook@chromium.org, luto@mit.edu)
     - pare down Kconfig doc reference.
     - extra comment clean up
v10: - seccomp_data has changed again to be more aesthetically pleasing
       (hpa@zytor.com)
     - calling convention is noted in a new u32 field using syscall_get_arch.
       This allows for cross-calling convention tasks to use seccomp filters.
       (hpa@zytor.com)
     - lots of clean up (thanks, Indan!)
 v9: - n/a
 v8: - use bpf_chk_filter, bpf_run_filter. update load_fns
     - Lots of fixes courtesy of indan@nul.nu:
     -- fix up load behavior, compat fixups, and merge alloc code,
     -- renamed pc and dropped __packed, use bool compat.
     -- Added a hidden CONFIG_SECCOMP_FILTER to synthesize non-arch
        dependencies
 v7:  (massive overhaul thanks to Indan, others)
     - added CONFIG_HAVE_ARCH_SECCOMP_FILTER
     - merged into seccomp.c
     - minimal seccomp_filter.h
     - no config option (part of seccomp)
     - no new prctl
     - doesn't break seccomp on systems without asm/syscall.h
       (works but arg access always fails)
     - dropped seccomp_init_task, extra free functions, ...
     - dropped the no-asm/syscall.h code paths
     - merges with network sk_run_filter and sk_chk_filter
 v6: - fix memory leak on attach compat check failure
     - require no_new_privs || CAP_SYS_ADMIN prior to filter
       installation. (luto@mit.edu)
     - s/seccomp_struct_/seccomp_/ for macros/functions (amwang@redhat.com)
     - cleaned up Kconfig (amwang@redhat.com)
     - on block, note if the call was compat (so the # means something)
 v5: - uses syscall_get_arguments
       (indan@nul.nu,oleg@redhat.com, mcgrathr@chromium.org)
      - uses union-based arg storage with hi/lo struct to
        handle endianness.  Compromises between the two alternate
        proposals to minimize extra arg shuffling and account for
        endianness assuming userspace uses offsetof().
        (mcgrathr@chromium.org, indan@nul.nu)
      - update Kconfig description
      - add include/seccomp_filter.h and add its installation
      - (naive) on-demand syscall argument loading
      - drop seccomp_t (eparis@redhat.com)
 v4:  - adjusted prctl to make room for PR_[SG]ET_NO_NEW_PRIVS
      - now uses current->no_new_privs
        (luto@mit.edu,torvalds@linux-foundation.com)
      - assign names to seccomp modes (rdunlap@xenotime.net)
      - fix style issues (rdunlap@xenotime.net)
      - reworded Kconfig entry (rdunlap@xenotime.net)
 v3:  - macros to inline (oleg@redhat.com)
      - init_task behavior fixed (oleg@redhat.com)
      - drop creator entry and extra NULL check (oleg@redhat.com)
      - alloc returns -EINVAL on bad sizing (serge.hallyn@canonical.com)
      - adds tentative use of "always_unprivileged" as per
        torvalds@linux-foundation.org and luto@mit.edu
 v2:  - (patch 2 only)
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>

1 files changed, 72 insertions, 4 deletions

diff --git a/include/linux/seccomp.h b/include/linux/seccomp.h
index d61f27fcaa97..86bb68fc7683 100644
--- a/include/linux/seccomp.h
+++ b/include/linux/seccomp.h
@@ -1,14 +1,67 @@
 #ifndef _LINUX_SECCOMP_H
 #define _LINUX_SECCOMP_H
 
+#include <linux/compiler.h>
+#include <linux/types.h>
+
+
+/* Valid values for seccomp.mode and prctl(PR_SET_SECCOMP, <mode>) */
+#define SECCOMP_MODE_DISABLED	0 /* seccomp is not in use. */
+#define SECCOMP_MODE_STRICT	1 /* uses hard-coded filter. */
+#define SECCOMP_MODE_FILTER	2 /* uses user-supplied filter. */
+
+/*
+ * All BPF programs must return a 32-bit value.
+ * The bottom 16-bits are reserved for future use.
+ * The upper 16-bits are ordered from least permissive values to most.
+ *
+ * The ordering ensures that a min_t() over composed return values always
+ * selects the least permissive choice.
+ */
+#define SECCOMP_RET_KILL	0x00000000U /* kill the task immediately */
+#define SECCOMP_RET_ALLOW	0x7fff0000U /* allow */
+
+/* Masks for the return value sections. */
+#define SECCOMP_RET_ACTION	0x7fff0000U
+#define SECCOMP_RET_DATA	0x0000ffffU
+
+/**
+ * struct seccomp_data - the format the BPF program executes over.
+ * @nr: the system call number
+ * @arch: indicates system call convention as an AUDIT_ARCH_* value
+ *        as defined in <linux/audit.h>.
+ * @instruction_pointer: at the time of the system call.
+ * @args: up to 6 system call arguments always stored as 64-bit values
+ *        regardless of the architecture.
+ */
+struct seccomp_data {
+	int nr;
+	__u32 arch;
+	__u64 instruction_pointer;
+	__u64 args[6];
+};
 
+#ifdef __KERNEL__
 #ifdef CONFIG_SECCOMP
 
 #include <linux/thread_info.h>
 #include <asm/seccomp.h>
 
+struct seccomp_filter;
+/**
+ * struct seccomp - the state of a seccomp'ed process
+ *
+ * @mode:  indicates one of the valid values above for controlled
+ *         system calls available to a process.
+ * @filter: The metadata and ruleset for determining what system calls
+ *          are allowed for a task.
+ *
+ *          @filter must only be accessed from the context of current as there
+ *          is no locking.
+ */
 struct seccomp {
 	int mode;
+	struct seccomp_filter *filter;
 };
 
 extern void __secure_computing(int);
@@ -19,7 +72,7 @@ static inline void secure_computing(int this_syscall)
 }
 
 extern long prctl_get_seccomp(void);
-extern long prctl_set_seccomp(unsigned long);
+extern long prctl_set_seccomp(unsigned long, char __user *);
 
 static inline int seccomp_mode(struct seccomp *s)
 {
@@ -31,15 +84,16 @@ static inline int seccomp_mode(struct seccomp *s)
 #include <linux/errno.h>
 
 struct seccomp { };
+struct seccomp_filter { };
 
-#define secure_computing(x) do { } while (0)
+#define secure_computing(x) 0
 
 static inline long prctl_get_seccomp(void)
 {
 	return -EINVAL;
 }
 
-static inline long prctl_set_seccomp(unsigned long arg2)
+static inline long prctl_set_seccomp(unsigned long arg2, char __user *arg3)
 {
 	return -EINVAL;
 }
@@ -48,7 +102,21 @@ static inline int seccomp_mode(struct seccomp *s)
 {
 	return 0;
 }
-
 #endif /* CONFIG_SECCOMP */
 
+#ifdef CONFIG_SECCOMP_FILTER
+extern void put_seccomp_filter(struct task_struct *tsk);
+extern void get_seccomp_filter(struct task_struct *tsk);
+extern u32 seccomp_bpf_load(int off);
+#else  /* CONFIG_SECCOMP_FILTER */
+static inline void put_seccomp_filter(struct task_struct *tsk)
+{
+	return;
+}
+static inline void get_seccomp_filter(struct task_struct *tsk)
+{
+	return;
+}
+#endif /* CONFIG_SECCOMP_FILTER */
+#endif /* __KERNEL__ */
 #endif /* _LINUX_SECCOMP_H */