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author | Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> | 2009-06-11 10:01:41 -0700 |
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committer | Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> | 2009-06-11 10:01:41 -0700 |
commit | 3296ca27f50ecbd71db1d808c7a72d311027f919 (patch) | |
tree | 833eaa58b2013bda86d4bd95faf6efad7a2d5ca4 /fs | |
parent | e893123c7378192c094747dadec326b7c000c190 (diff) | |
parent | 73fbad283cfbbcf02939bdbda31fc4a30e729cca (diff) | |
download | lwn-3296ca27f50ecbd71db1d808c7a72d311027f919.tar.gz lwn-3296ca27f50ecbd71db1d808c7a72d311027f919.zip |
Merge branch 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/security-testing-2.6
* 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/security-testing-2.6: (44 commits)
nommu: Provide mmap_min_addr definition.
TOMOYO: Add description of lists and structures.
TOMOYO: Remove unused field.
integrity: ima audit dentry_open failure
TOMOYO: Remove unused parameter.
security: use mmap_min_addr indepedently of security models
TOMOYO: Simplify policy reader.
TOMOYO: Remove redundant markers.
SELinux: define audit permissions for audit tree netlink messages
TOMOYO: Remove unused mutex.
tomoyo: avoid get+put of task_struct
smack: Remove redundant initialization.
integrity: nfsd imbalance bug fix
rootplug: Remove redundant initialization.
smack: do not beyond ARRAY_SIZE of data
integrity: move ima_counts_get
integrity: path_check update
IMA: Add __init notation to ima functions
IMA: Minimal IMA policy and boot param for TCB IMA policy
selinux: remove obsolete read buffer limit from sel_read_bool
...
Diffstat (limited to 'fs')
-rw-r--r-- | fs/compat.c | 6 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | fs/exec.c | 10 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | fs/hugetlbfs/inode.c | 2 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | fs/namei.c | 6 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | fs/nfsd/vfs.c | 14 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | fs/proc/base.c | 6 |
6 files changed, 34 insertions, 10 deletions
diff --git a/fs/compat.c b/fs/compat.c index 681ed81e6be0..bb2a9b2e8173 100644 --- a/fs/compat.c +++ b/fs/compat.c @@ -1488,7 +1488,7 @@ int compat_do_execve(char * filename, if (!bprm) goto out_files; - retval = mutex_lock_interruptible(¤t->cred_exec_mutex); + retval = mutex_lock_interruptible(¤t->cred_guard_mutex); if (retval < 0) goto out_free; current->in_execve = 1; @@ -1550,7 +1550,7 @@ int compat_do_execve(char * filename, /* execve succeeded */ current->fs->in_exec = 0; current->in_execve = 0; - mutex_unlock(¤t->cred_exec_mutex); + mutex_unlock(¤t->cred_guard_mutex); acct_update_integrals(current); free_bprm(bprm); if (displaced) @@ -1573,7 +1573,7 @@ out_unmark: out_unlock: current->in_execve = 0; - mutex_unlock(¤t->cred_exec_mutex); + mutex_unlock(¤t->cred_guard_mutex); out_free: free_bprm(bprm); diff --git a/fs/exec.c b/fs/exec.c index 895823d0149d..a7fcd975c6b2 100644 --- a/fs/exec.c +++ b/fs/exec.c @@ -1016,7 +1016,7 @@ void install_exec_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm) commit_creds(bprm->cred); bprm->cred = NULL; - /* cred_exec_mutex must be held at least to this point to prevent + /* cred_guard_mutex must be held at least to this point to prevent * ptrace_attach() from altering our determination of the task's * credentials; any time after this it may be unlocked */ @@ -1026,7 +1026,7 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(install_exec_creds); /* * determine how safe it is to execute the proposed program - * - the caller must hold current->cred_exec_mutex to protect against + * - the caller must hold current->cred_guard_mutex to protect against * PTRACE_ATTACH */ int check_unsafe_exec(struct linux_binprm *bprm) @@ -1268,7 +1268,7 @@ int do_execve(char * filename, if (!bprm) goto out_files; - retval = mutex_lock_interruptible(¤t->cred_exec_mutex); + retval = mutex_lock_interruptible(¤t->cred_guard_mutex); if (retval < 0) goto out_free; current->in_execve = 1; @@ -1331,7 +1331,7 @@ int do_execve(char * filename, /* execve succeeded */ current->fs->in_exec = 0; current->in_execve = 0; - mutex_unlock(¤t->cred_exec_mutex); + mutex_unlock(¤t->cred_guard_mutex); acct_update_integrals(current); free_bprm(bprm); if (displaced) @@ -1354,7 +1354,7 @@ out_unmark: out_unlock: current->in_execve = 0; - mutex_unlock(¤t->cred_exec_mutex); + mutex_unlock(¤t->cred_guard_mutex); out_free: free_bprm(bprm); diff --git a/fs/hugetlbfs/inode.c b/fs/hugetlbfs/inode.c index c1462d43e721..941c8425c10b 100644 --- a/fs/hugetlbfs/inode.c +++ b/fs/hugetlbfs/inode.c @@ -30,6 +30,7 @@ #include <linux/dnotify.h> #include <linux/statfs.h> #include <linux/security.h> +#include <linux/ima.h> #include <asm/uaccess.h> @@ -986,6 +987,7 @@ struct file *hugetlb_file_setup(const char *name, size_t size, int acctflag) &hugetlbfs_file_operations); if (!file) goto out_dentry; /* inode is already attached */ + ima_counts_get(file); return file; diff --git a/fs/namei.c b/fs/namei.c index 967c3db92724..c82805d088e1 100644 --- a/fs/namei.c +++ b/fs/namei.c @@ -853,7 +853,8 @@ static int __link_path_walk(const char *name, struct nameidata *nd) err = inode_permission(nd->path.dentry->d_inode, MAY_EXEC); if (!err) - err = ima_path_check(&nd->path, MAY_EXEC); + err = ima_path_check(&nd->path, MAY_EXEC, + IMA_COUNT_UPDATE); if (err) break; @@ -1515,7 +1516,8 @@ int may_open(struct path *path, int acc_mode, int flag) return error; error = ima_path_check(path, - acc_mode & (MAY_READ | MAY_WRITE | MAY_EXEC)); + acc_mode & (MAY_READ | MAY_WRITE | MAY_EXEC), + IMA_COUNT_UPDATE); if (error) return error; /* diff --git a/fs/nfsd/vfs.c b/fs/nfsd/vfs.c index b660435978d2..bd584bcf1d9f 100644 --- a/fs/nfsd/vfs.c +++ b/fs/nfsd/vfs.c @@ -55,6 +55,7 @@ #include <linux/security.h> #endif /* CONFIG_NFSD_V4 */ #include <linux/jhash.h> +#include <linux/ima.h> #include <asm/uaccess.h> @@ -735,6 +736,8 @@ nfsd_open(struct svc_rqst *rqstp, struct svc_fh *fhp, int type, flags, cred); if (IS_ERR(*filp)) host_err = PTR_ERR(*filp); + else + ima_counts_get(*filp); out_nfserr: err = nfserrno(host_err); out: @@ -2024,6 +2027,7 @@ nfsd_permission(struct svc_rqst *rqstp, struct svc_export *exp, struct dentry *dentry, int acc) { struct inode *inode = dentry->d_inode; + struct path path; int err; if (acc == NFSD_MAY_NOP) @@ -2096,7 +2100,17 @@ nfsd_permission(struct svc_rqst *rqstp, struct svc_export *exp, if (err == -EACCES && S_ISREG(inode->i_mode) && acc == (NFSD_MAY_READ | NFSD_MAY_OWNER_OVERRIDE)) err = inode_permission(inode, MAY_EXEC); + if (err) + goto nfsd_out; + /* Do integrity (permission) checking now, but defer incrementing + * IMA counts to the actual file open. + */ + path.mnt = exp->ex_path.mnt; + path.dentry = dentry; + err = ima_path_check(&path, acc & (MAY_READ | MAY_WRITE | MAY_EXEC), + IMA_COUNT_LEAVE); +nfsd_out: return err? nfserrno(err) : 0; } diff --git a/fs/proc/base.c b/fs/proc/base.c index 3326bbf9ab95..1539e630c47d 100644 --- a/fs/proc/base.c +++ b/fs/proc/base.c @@ -2128,9 +2128,15 @@ static ssize_t proc_pid_attr_write(struct file * file, const char __user * buf, if (copy_from_user(page, buf, count)) goto out_free; + /* Guard against adverse ptrace interaction */ + length = mutex_lock_interruptible(&task->cred_guard_mutex); + if (length < 0) + goto out_free; + length = security_setprocattr(task, (char*)file->f_path.dentry->d_name.name, (void*)page, count); + mutex_unlock(&task->cred_guard_mutex); out_free: free_page((unsigned long) page); out: |