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authorDan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>2020-05-05 21:33:31 +0300
committerMiklos Szeredi <mszeredi@redhat.com>2020-05-13 11:10:57 +0200
commit9aafc1b0187322fa4fd4eb905d0903172237206c (patch)
treef3c897f0dd4775ab542d1398ed12f147c0935fa3 /fs/overlayfs
parent15fd2ea9f4f3d85fef787ba7db1b87939d0a2754 (diff)
downloadlwn-9aafc1b0187322fa4fd4eb905d0903172237206c.tar.gz
lwn-9aafc1b0187322fa4fd4eb905d0903172237206c.zip
ovl: potential crash in ovl_fid_to_fh()
The "buflen" value comes from the user and there is a potential that it could be zero. In do_handle_to_path() we know that "handle->handle_bytes" is non-zero and we do: handle_dwords = handle->handle_bytes >> 2; So values 1-3 become zero. Then in ovl_fh_to_dentry() we do: int len = fh_len << 2; So now len is in the "0,4-128" range and a multiple of 4. But if "buflen" is zero it will try to copy negative bytes when we do the memcpy in ovl_fid_to_fh(). memcpy(&fh->fb, fid, buflen - OVL_FH_WIRE_OFFSET); And that will lead to a crash. Thanks to Amir Goldstein for his help with this patch. Fixes: cbe7fba8edfc ("ovl: make sure that real fid is 32bit aligned in memory") Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com> Reviewed-by: Amir Goldstein <amir73il@gmail.com> Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v5.5 Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@redhat.com>
Diffstat (limited to 'fs/overlayfs')
-rw-r--r--fs/overlayfs/export.c3
1 files changed, 3 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/fs/overlayfs/export.c b/fs/overlayfs/export.c
index 475c61f53f0f..ed5c1078919c 100644
--- a/fs/overlayfs/export.c
+++ b/fs/overlayfs/export.c
@@ -783,6 +783,9 @@ static struct ovl_fh *ovl_fid_to_fh(struct fid *fid, int buflen, int fh_type)
if (fh_type != OVL_FILEID_V0)
return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
+ if (buflen <= OVL_FH_WIRE_OFFSET)
+ return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
+
fh = kzalloc(buflen, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!fh)
return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);