nfsd4: permit read opens of executable-only files

commit a043226bc140a2c1dde162246d68a67e5043e6b2 upstream.

A client that wants to execute a file must be able to read it.  Read
opens over nfs are therefore implicitly allowed for executable files
even when those files are not readable.

NFSv2/v3 get this right by using a passed-in NFSD_MAY_OWNER_OVERRIDE on
read requests, but NFSv4 has gotten this wrong ever since
dc730e173785e29b297aa605786c94adaffe2544 "nfsd4: fix owner-override on
open", when we realized that the file owner shouldn't override
permissions on non-reclaim NFSv4 opens.

So we can't use NFSD_MAY_OWNER_OVERRIDE to tell nfsd_permission to allow
reads of executable files.

So, do the same thing we do whenever we encounter another weird NFS
permission nit: define yet another NFSD_MAY_* flag.

The industry's future standardization on 128-bit processors will be
motivated primarily by the need for integers with enough bits for all
the NFSD_MAY_* flags.

Reported-by: Leonardo Borda <leonardoborda@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: J. Bruce Fields <bfields@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>

1 files changed, 2 insertions, 1 deletions

diff --git a/fs/nfsd/vfs.c b/fs/nfsd/vfs.c
index fd0acca5370a..acf88aea211a 100644
--- a/fs/nfsd/vfs.c
+++ b/fs/nfsd/vfs.c
@@ -2114,7 +2114,8 @@ nfsd_permission(struct svc_rqst *rqstp, struct svc_export *exp,
 
 	/* Allow read access to binaries even when mode 111 */
 	if (err == -EACCES && S_ISREG(inode->i_mode) &&
-	    acc == (NFSD_MAY_READ | NFSD_MAY_OWNER_OVERRIDE))
+	     (acc == (NFSD_MAY_READ | NFSD_MAY_OWNER_OVERRIDE) ||
+	      acc == (NFSD_MAY_READ | NFSD_MAY_READ_IF_EXEC)))
 		err = inode_permission(inode, MAY_EXEC);
 
 	return err? nfserrno(err) : 0;