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authorRick Edgecombe <rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com>2024-03-11 09:15:57 -0700
committerWei Liu <wei.liu@kernel.org>2024-04-10 21:33:32 +0000
commit3d788b2fbe6a1a1a9e3db09742b90809d51638b7 (patch)
tree4e18bff31f9e31eebe26799c4841c1cfc4e03414 /drivers/uio
parentbbf9ac34677b57506a13682b31a2a718934c0e31 (diff)
downloadlwn-3d788b2fbe6a1a1a9e3db09742b90809d51638b7.tar.gz
lwn-3d788b2fbe6a1a1a9e3db09742b90809d51638b7.zip
uio_hv_generic: Don't free decrypted memory
In CoCo VMs it is possible for the untrusted host to cause set_memory_encrypted() or set_memory_decrypted() to fail such that an error is returned and the resulting memory is shared. Callers need to take care to handle these errors to avoid returning decrypted (shared) memory to the page allocator, which could lead to functional or security issues. The VMBus device UIO driver could free decrypted/shared pages if set_memory_decrypted() fails. Check the decrypted field in the gpadl to decide whether to free the memory. Signed-off-by: Rick Edgecombe <rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Michael Kelley <mhklinux@outlook.com> Reviewed-by: Kuppuswamy Sathyanarayanan <sathyanarayanan.kuppuswamy@linux.intel.com> Acked-by: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240311161558.1310-5-mhklinux@outlook.com Signed-off-by: Wei Liu <wei.liu@kernel.org> Message-ID: <20240311161558.1310-5-mhklinux@outlook.com>
Diffstat (limited to 'drivers/uio')
-rw-r--r--drivers/uio/uio_hv_generic.c12
1 files changed, 8 insertions, 4 deletions
diff --git a/drivers/uio/uio_hv_generic.c b/drivers/uio/uio_hv_generic.c
index 20d9762331bd..6be3462b109f 100644
--- a/drivers/uio/uio_hv_generic.c
+++ b/drivers/uio/uio_hv_generic.c
@@ -181,12 +181,14 @@ hv_uio_cleanup(struct hv_device *dev, struct hv_uio_private_data *pdata)
{
if (pdata->send_gpadl.gpadl_handle) {
vmbus_teardown_gpadl(dev->channel, &pdata->send_gpadl);
- vfree(pdata->send_buf);
+ if (!pdata->send_gpadl.decrypted)
+ vfree(pdata->send_buf);
}
if (pdata->recv_gpadl.gpadl_handle) {
vmbus_teardown_gpadl(dev->channel, &pdata->recv_gpadl);
- vfree(pdata->recv_buf);
+ if (!pdata->recv_gpadl.decrypted)
+ vfree(pdata->recv_buf);
}
}
@@ -295,7 +297,8 @@ hv_uio_probe(struct hv_device *dev,
ret = vmbus_establish_gpadl(channel, pdata->recv_buf,
RECV_BUFFER_SIZE, &pdata->recv_gpadl);
if (ret) {
- vfree(pdata->recv_buf);
+ if (!pdata->recv_gpadl.decrypted)
+ vfree(pdata->recv_buf);
goto fail_close;
}
@@ -317,7 +320,8 @@ hv_uio_probe(struct hv_device *dev,
ret = vmbus_establish_gpadl(channel, pdata->send_buf,
SEND_BUFFER_SIZE, &pdata->send_gpadl);
if (ret) {
- vfree(pdata->send_buf);
+ if (!pdata->send_gpadl.decrypted)
+ vfree(pdata->send_buf);
goto fail_close;
}