diff options
author | Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com> | 2023-06-08 13:42:54 +0200 |
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committer | Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com> | 2023-06-08 13:42:54 +0200 |
commit | bfd019d10fdabf70f9b01264aea6d6c7595f9226 (patch) | |
tree | c9b24c0a2ad6e764faac98f2611687bdb5354c47 /crypto | |
parent | b62d9e20049209c3d4a15835a9473594d75641eb (diff) | |
parent | c662b043cdca89bf0f03fc37251000ac69a3a548 (diff) | |
download | lwn-bfd019d10fdabf70f9b01264aea6d6c7595f9226.tar.gz lwn-bfd019d10fdabf70f9b01264aea6d6c7595f9226.zip |
Merge branch 'crypto-splice-net-make-af_alg-handle-sendmsg-msg_splice_pages'
David Howells says:
====================
crypto, splice, net: Make AF_ALG handle sendmsg(MSG_SPLICE_PAGES)
Here are patches to make AF_ALG handle the MSG_SPLICE_PAGES internal
sendmsg flag. MSG_SPLICE_PAGES is an internal hint that tells the protocol
that it should splice the pages supplied if it can. The sendpage functions
are then turned into wrappers around that.
This set consists of the following parts:
(1) Move netfs_extract_iter_to_sg() to somewhere more general and rename
it to drop the "netfs" prefix. We use this to extract directly from
an iterator into a scatterlist.
(2) Make AF_ALG use iov_iter_extract_pages(). This has the additional
effect of pinning pages obtained from userspace rather than taking
refs on them. Pages from kernel-backed iterators would not be pinned,
but AF_ALG isn't really meant for use by kernel services.
(3) Change AF_ALG still further to use extract_iter_to_sg().
(4) Make af_alg_sendmsg() support MSG_SPLICE_PAGES support and make
af_alg_sendpage() just a wrapper around sendmsg(). This has to take
refs on the pages pinned for the moment.
(5) Make hash_sendmsg() support MSG_SPLICE_PAGES by simply ignoring it.
hash_sendpage() is left untouched to be removed later, after the
splice core has been changed to call sendmsg().
====================
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230606130856.1970660-1-dhowells@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com>
Diffstat (limited to 'crypto')
-rw-r--r-- | crypto/af_alg.c | 181 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | crypto/algif_aead.c | 38 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | crypto/algif_hash.c | 110 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | crypto/algif_skcipher.c | 10 |
4 files changed, 171 insertions, 168 deletions
diff --git a/crypto/af_alg.c b/crypto/af_alg.c index 5f7252a5b7b4..7d4b6016b83d 100644 --- a/crypto/af_alg.c +++ b/crypto/af_alg.c @@ -531,50 +531,25 @@ static const struct net_proto_family alg_family = { .owner = THIS_MODULE, }; -int af_alg_make_sg(struct af_alg_sgl *sgl, struct iov_iter *iter, int len) -{ - size_t off; - ssize_t n; - int npages, i; - - n = iov_iter_get_pages2(iter, sgl->pages, len, ALG_MAX_PAGES, &off); - if (n < 0) - return n; - - npages = DIV_ROUND_UP(off + n, PAGE_SIZE); - if (WARN_ON(npages == 0)) - return -EINVAL; - /* Add one extra for linking */ - sg_init_table(sgl->sg, npages + 1); - - for (i = 0, len = n; i < npages; i++) { - int plen = min_t(int, len, PAGE_SIZE - off); - - sg_set_page(sgl->sg + i, sgl->pages[i], plen, off); - - off = 0; - len -= plen; - } - sg_mark_end(sgl->sg + npages - 1); - sgl->npages = npages; - - return n; -} -EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(af_alg_make_sg); - static void af_alg_link_sg(struct af_alg_sgl *sgl_prev, struct af_alg_sgl *sgl_new) { - sg_unmark_end(sgl_prev->sg + sgl_prev->npages - 1); - sg_chain(sgl_prev->sg, sgl_prev->npages + 1, sgl_new->sg); + sg_unmark_end(sgl_prev->sgt.sgl + sgl_prev->sgt.nents - 1); + sg_chain(sgl_prev->sgt.sgl, sgl_prev->sgt.nents + 1, sgl_new->sgt.sgl); } void af_alg_free_sg(struct af_alg_sgl *sgl) { int i; - for (i = 0; i < sgl->npages; i++) - put_page(sgl->pages[i]); + if (sgl->sgt.sgl) { + if (sgl->need_unpin) + for (i = 0; i < sgl->sgt.nents; i++) + unpin_user_page(sg_page(&sgl->sgt.sgl[i])); + if (sgl->sgt.sgl != sgl->sgl) + kvfree(sgl->sgt.sgl); + sgl->sgt.sgl = NULL; + } } EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(af_alg_free_sg); @@ -1015,7 +990,7 @@ int af_alg_sendmsg(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg, size_t size, while (size) { struct scatterlist *sg; size_t len = size; - size_t plen; + ssize_t plen; /* use the existing memory in an allocated page */ if (ctx->merge) { @@ -1060,35 +1035,58 @@ int af_alg_sendmsg(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg, size_t size, if (sgl->cur) sg_unmark_end(sg + sgl->cur - 1); - do { - struct page *pg; - unsigned int i = sgl->cur; - - plen = min_t(size_t, len, PAGE_SIZE); - - pg = alloc_page(GFP_KERNEL); - if (!pg) { - err = -ENOMEM; + if (msg->msg_flags & MSG_SPLICE_PAGES) { + struct sg_table sgtable = { + .sgl = sg, + .nents = sgl->cur, + .orig_nents = sgl->cur, + }; + + plen = extract_iter_to_sg(&msg->msg_iter, len, &sgtable, + MAX_SGL_ENTS, 0); + if (plen < 0) { + err = plen; goto unlock; } - sg_assign_page(sg + i, pg); - - err = memcpy_from_msg(page_address(sg_page(sg + i)), - msg, plen); - if (err) { - __free_page(sg_page(sg + i)); - sg_assign_page(sg + i, NULL); - goto unlock; - } - - sg[i].length = plen; + for (; sgl->cur < sgtable.nents; sgl->cur++) + get_page(sg_page(&sg[sgl->cur])); len -= plen; ctx->used += plen; copied += plen; size -= plen; - sgl->cur++; - } while (len && sgl->cur < MAX_SGL_ENTS); + } else { + do { + struct page *pg; + unsigned int i = sgl->cur; + + plen = min_t(size_t, len, PAGE_SIZE); + + pg = alloc_page(GFP_KERNEL); + if (!pg) { + err = -ENOMEM; + goto unlock; + } + + sg_assign_page(sg + i, pg); + + err = memcpy_from_msg( + page_address(sg_page(sg + i)), + msg, plen); + if (err) { + __free_page(sg_page(sg + i)); + sg_assign_page(sg + i, NULL); + goto unlock; + } + + sg[i].length = plen; + len -= plen; + ctx->used += plen; + copied += plen; + size -= plen; + sgl->cur++; + } while (len && sgl->cur < MAX_SGL_ENTS); + } if (!size) sg_mark_end(sg + sgl->cur - 1); @@ -1121,53 +1119,17 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(af_alg_sendmsg); ssize_t af_alg_sendpage(struct socket *sock, struct page *page, int offset, size_t size, int flags) { - struct sock *sk = sock->sk; - struct alg_sock *ask = alg_sk(sk); - struct af_alg_ctx *ctx = ask->private; - struct af_alg_tsgl *sgl; - int err = -EINVAL; + struct bio_vec bvec; + struct msghdr msg = { + .msg_flags = flags | MSG_SPLICE_PAGES, + }; if (flags & MSG_SENDPAGE_NOTLAST) - flags |= MSG_MORE; - - lock_sock(sk); - if (!ctx->more && ctx->used) - goto unlock; - - if (!size) - goto done; - - if (!af_alg_writable(sk)) { - err = af_alg_wait_for_wmem(sk, flags); - if (err) - goto unlock; - } - - err = af_alg_alloc_tsgl(sk); - if (err) - goto unlock; - - ctx->merge = 0; - sgl = list_entry(ctx->tsgl_list.prev, struct af_alg_tsgl, list); - - if (sgl->cur) - sg_unmark_end(sgl->sg + sgl->cur - 1); - - sg_mark_end(sgl->sg + sgl->cur); - - get_page(page); - sg_set_page(sgl->sg + sgl->cur, page, size, offset); - sgl->cur++; - ctx->used += size; + msg.msg_flags |= MSG_MORE; -done: - ctx->more = flags & MSG_MORE; - -unlock: - af_alg_data_wakeup(sk); - release_sock(sk); - - return err ?: size; + bvec_set_page(&bvec, page, size, offset); + iov_iter_bvec(&msg.msg_iter, ITER_SOURCE, &bvec, 1, size); + return sock_sendmsg(sock, &msg); } EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(af_alg_sendpage); @@ -1288,8 +1250,8 @@ int af_alg_get_rsgl(struct sock *sk, struct msghdr *msg, int flags, while (maxsize > len && msg_data_left(msg)) { struct af_alg_rsgl *rsgl; + ssize_t err; size_t seglen; - int err; /* limit the amount of readable buffers */ if (!af_alg_readable(sk)) @@ -1306,16 +1268,23 @@ int af_alg_get_rsgl(struct sock *sk, struct msghdr *msg, int flags, return -ENOMEM; } - rsgl->sgl.npages = 0; + rsgl->sgl.sgt.sgl = rsgl->sgl.sgl; + rsgl->sgl.sgt.nents = 0; + rsgl->sgl.sgt.orig_nents = 0; list_add_tail(&rsgl->list, &areq->rsgl_list); - /* make one iovec available as scatterlist */ - err = af_alg_make_sg(&rsgl->sgl, &msg->msg_iter, seglen); + sg_init_table(rsgl->sgl.sgt.sgl, ALG_MAX_PAGES); + err = extract_iter_to_sg(&msg->msg_iter, seglen, &rsgl->sgl.sgt, + ALG_MAX_PAGES, 0); if (err < 0) { rsgl->sg_num_bytes = 0; return err; } + sg_mark_end(rsgl->sgl.sgt.sgl + rsgl->sgl.sgt.nents - 1); + rsgl->sgl.need_unpin = + iov_iter_extract_will_pin(&msg->msg_iter); + /* chain the new scatterlist with previous one */ if (areq->last_rsgl) af_alg_link_sg(&areq->last_rsgl->sgl, &rsgl->sgl); diff --git a/crypto/algif_aead.c b/crypto/algif_aead.c index 42493b4d8ce4..35bfa283748d 100644 --- a/crypto/algif_aead.c +++ b/crypto/algif_aead.c @@ -9,8 +9,8 @@ * The following concept of the memory management is used: * * The kernel maintains two SGLs, the TX SGL and the RX SGL. The TX SGL is - * filled by user space with the data submitted via sendpage/sendmsg. Filling - * up the TX SGL does not cause a crypto operation -- the data will only be + * filled by user space with the data submitted via sendpage. Filling up + * the TX SGL does not cause a crypto operation -- the data will only be * tracked by the kernel. Upon receipt of one recvmsg call, the caller must * provide a buffer which is tracked with the RX SGL. * @@ -113,19 +113,19 @@ static int _aead_recvmsg(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg, } /* - * Data length provided by caller via sendmsg/sendpage that has not - * yet been processed. + * Data length provided by caller via sendmsg that has not yet been + * processed. */ used = ctx->used; /* - * Make sure sufficient data is present -- note, the same check is - * also present in sendmsg/sendpage. The checks in sendpage/sendmsg - * shall provide an information to the data sender that something is - * wrong, but they are irrelevant to maintain the kernel integrity. - * We need this check here too in case user space decides to not honor - * the error message in sendmsg/sendpage and still call recvmsg. This - * check here protects the kernel integrity. + * Make sure sufficient data is present -- note, the same check is also + * present in sendmsg. The checks in sendmsg shall provide an + * information to the data sender that something is wrong, but they are + * irrelevant to maintain the kernel integrity. We need this check + * here too in case user space decides to not honor the error message + * in sendmsg and still call recvmsg. This check here protects the + * kernel integrity. */ if (!aead_sufficient_data(sk)) return -EINVAL; @@ -210,7 +210,7 @@ static int _aead_recvmsg(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg, */ /* Use the RX SGL as source (and destination) for crypto op. */ - rsgl_src = areq->first_rsgl.sgl.sg; + rsgl_src = areq->first_rsgl.sgl.sgt.sgl; if (ctx->enc) { /* @@ -224,7 +224,8 @@ static int _aead_recvmsg(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg, * RX SGL: AAD || PT || Tag */ err = crypto_aead_copy_sgl(null_tfm, tsgl_src, - areq->first_rsgl.sgl.sg, processed); + areq->first_rsgl.sgl.sgt.sgl, + processed); if (err) goto free; af_alg_pull_tsgl(sk, processed, NULL, 0); @@ -242,7 +243,8 @@ static int _aead_recvmsg(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg, /* Copy AAD || CT to RX SGL buffer for in-place operation. */ err = crypto_aead_copy_sgl(null_tfm, tsgl_src, - areq->first_rsgl.sgl.sg, outlen); + areq->first_rsgl.sgl.sgt.sgl, + outlen); if (err) goto free; @@ -267,10 +269,10 @@ static int _aead_recvmsg(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg, if (usedpages) { /* RX SGL present */ struct af_alg_sgl *sgl_prev = &areq->last_rsgl->sgl; + struct scatterlist *sg = sgl_prev->sgt.sgl; - sg_unmark_end(sgl_prev->sg + sgl_prev->npages - 1); - sg_chain(sgl_prev->sg, sgl_prev->npages + 1, - areq->tsgl); + sg_unmark_end(sg + sgl_prev->sgt.nents - 1); + sg_chain(sg, sgl_prev->sgt.nents + 1, areq->tsgl); } else /* no RX SGL present (e.g. authentication only) */ rsgl_src = areq->tsgl; @@ -278,7 +280,7 @@ static int _aead_recvmsg(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg, /* Initialize the crypto operation */ aead_request_set_crypt(&areq->cra_u.aead_req, rsgl_src, - areq->first_rsgl.sgl.sg, used, ctx->iv); + areq->first_rsgl.sgl.sgt.sgl, used, ctx->iv); aead_request_set_ad(&areq->cra_u.aead_req, ctx->aead_assoclen); aead_request_set_tfm(&areq->cra_u.aead_req, tfm); diff --git a/crypto/algif_hash.c b/crypto/algif_hash.c index 63af72e19fa8..1a2d80c6c91a 100644 --- a/crypto/algif_hash.c +++ b/crypto/algif_hash.c @@ -63,70 +63,102 @@ static void hash_free_result(struct sock *sk, struct hash_ctx *ctx) static int hash_sendmsg(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg, size_t ignored) { - int limit = ALG_MAX_PAGES * PAGE_SIZE; struct sock *sk = sock->sk; struct alg_sock *ask = alg_sk(sk); struct hash_ctx *ctx = ask->private; - long copied = 0; + ssize_t copied = 0; + size_t len, max_pages, npages; + bool continuing = ctx->more, need_init = false; int err; - if (limit > sk->sk_sndbuf) - limit = sk->sk_sndbuf; + max_pages = min_t(size_t, ALG_MAX_PAGES, + DIV_ROUND_UP(sk->sk_sndbuf, PAGE_SIZE)); lock_sock(sk); - if (!ctx->more) { + if (!continuing) { if ((msg->msg_flags & MSG_MORE)) hash_free_result(sk, ctx); - - err = crypto_wait_req(crypto_ahash_init(&ctx->req), &ctx->wait); - if (err) - goto unlock; + need_init = true; } ctx->more = false; while (msg_data_left(msg)) { - int len = msg_data_left(msg); - - if (len > limit) - len = limit; - - len = af_alg_make_sg(&ctx->sgl, &msg->msg_iter, len); - if (len < 0) { - err = copied ? 0 : len; - goto unlock; + ctx->sgl.sgt.sgl = ctx->sgl.sgl; + ctx->sgl.sgt.nents = 0; + ctx->sgl.sgt.orig_nents = 0; + + err = -EIO; + npages = iov_iter_npages(&msg->msg_iter, max_pages); + if (npages == 0) + goto unlock_free; + + if (npages > ARRAY_SIZE(ctx->sgl.sgl)) { + err = -ENOMEM; + ctx->sgl.sgt.sgl = + kvmalloc(array_size(npages, + sizeof(*ctx->sgl.sgt.sgl)), + GFP_KERNEL); + if (!ctx->sgl.sgt.sgl) + goto unlock_free; } + sg_init_table(ctx->sgl.sgl, npages); - ahash_request_set_crypt(&ctx->req, ctx->sgl.sg, NULL, len); + ctx->sgl.need_unpin = iov_iter_extract_will_pin(&msg->msg_iter); - err = crypto_wait_req(crypto_ahash_update(&ctx->req), - &ctx->wait); - af_alg_free_sg(&ctx->sgl); - if (err) { - iov_iter_revert(&msg->msg_iter, len); - goto unlock; + err = extract_iter_to_sg(&msg->msg_iter, LONG_MAX, + &ctx->sgl.sgt, npages, 0); + if (err < 0) + goto unlock_free; + len = err; + sg_mark_end(ctx->sgl.sgt.sgl + ctx->sgl.sgt.nents - 1); + + if (!msg_data_left(msg)) { + err = hash_alloc_result(sk, ctx); + if (err) + goto unlock_free; } - copied += len; - } + ahash_request_set_crypt(&ctx->req, ctx->sgl.sgt.sgl, + ctx->result, len); - err = 0; + if (!msg_data_left(msg) && !continuing && + !(msg->msg_flags & MSG_MORE)) { + err = crypto_ahash_digest(&ctx->req); + } else { + if (need_init) { + err = crypto_wait_req( + crypto_ahash_init(&ctx->req), + &ctx->wait); + if (err) + goto unlock_free; + need_init = false; + } + + if (msg_data_left(msg) || (msg->msg_flags & MSG_MORE)) + err = crypto_ahash_update(&ctx->req); + else + err = crypto_ahash_finup(&ctx->req); + continuing = true; + } - ctx->more = msg->msg_flags & MSG_MORE; - if (!ctx->more) { - err = hash_alloc_result(sk, ctx); + err = crypto_wait_req(err, &ctx->wait); if (err) - goto unlock; + goto unlock_free; - ahash_request_set_crypt(&ctx->req, NULL, ctx->result, 0); - err = crypto_wait_req(crypto_ahash_final(&ctx->req), - &ctx->wait); + copied += len; + af_alg_free_sg(&ctx->sgl); } + ctx->more = msg->msg_flags & MSG_MORE; + err = 0; unlock: release_sock(sk); + return copied ?: err; - return err ?: copied; +unlock_free: + af_alg_free_sg(&ctx->sgl); + goto unlock; } static ssize_t hash_sendpage(struct socket *sock, struct page *page, @@ -141,8 +173,8 @@ static ssize_t hash_sendpage(struct socket *sock, struct page *page, flags |= MSG_MORE; lock_sock(sk); - sg_init_table(ctx->sgl.sg, 1); - sg_set_page(ctx->sgl.sg, page, size, offset); + sg_init_table(ctx->sgl.sgl, 1); + sg_set_page(ctx->sgl.sgl, page, size, offset); if (!(flags & MSG_MORE)) { err = hash_alloc_result(sk, ctx); @@ -151,7 +183,7 @@ static ssize_t hash_sendpage(struct socket *sock, struct page *page, } else if (!ctx->more) hash_free_result(sk, ctx); - ahash_request_set_crypt(&ctx->req, ctx->sgl.sg, ctx->result, size); + ahash_request_set_crypt(&ctx->req, ctx->sgl.sgl, ctx->result, size); if (!(flags & MSG_MORE)) { if (ctx->more) diff --git a/crypto/algif_skcipher.c b/crypto/algif_skcipher.c index ee8890ee8f33..b1f321b9f846 100644 --- a/crypto/algif_skcipher.c +++ b/crypto/algif_skcipher.c @@ -9,10 +9,10 @@ * The following concept of the memory management is used: * * The kernel maintains two SGLs, the TX SGL and the RX SGL. The TX SGL is - * filled by user space with the data submitted via sendpage/sendmsg. Filling - * up the TX SGL does not cause a crypto operation -- the data will only be - * tracked by the kernel. Upon receipt of one recvmsg call, the caller must - * provide a buffer which is tracked with the RX SGL. + * filled by user space with the data submitted via sendmsg. Filling up the TX + * SGL does not cause a crypto operation -- the data will only be tracked by + * the kernel. Upon receipt of one recvmsg call, the caller must provide a + * buffer which is tracked with the RX SGL. * * During the processing of the recvmsg operation, the cipher request is * allocated and prepared. As part of the recvmsg operation, the processed @@ -105,7 +105,7 @@ static int _skcipher_recvmsg(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg, /* Initialize the crypto operation */ skcipher_request_set_tfm(&areq->cra_u.skcipher_req, tfm); skcipher_request_set_crypt(&areq->cra_u.skcipher_req, areq->tsgl, - areq->first_rsgl.sgl.sg, len, ctx->iv); + areq->first_rsgl.sgl.sgt.sgl, len, ctx->iv); if (msg->msg_iocb && !is_sync_kiocb(msg->msg_iocb)) { /* AIO operation */ |