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author | Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com> | 2019-12-30 21:19:36 -0600 |
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committer | Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au> | 2020-01-09 11:30:53 +0800 |
commit | 674f368a952c48ede71784935a799a5205b92b6c (patch) | |
tree | e8610dafbeb92ae5f91d53579e071e8ff58303e4 /crypto/sm4_generic.c | |
parent | 5c925e8b10a5f43f220755aceb9d5f14b2f4e2c5 (diff) | |
download | lwn-674f368a952c48ede71784935a799a5205b92b6c.tar.gz lwn-674f368a952c48ede71784935a799a5205b92b6c.zip |
crypto: remove CRYPTO_TFM_RES_BAD_KEY_LEN
The CRYPTO_TFM_RES_BAD_KEY_LEN flag was apparently meant as a way to
make the ->setkey() functions provide more information about errors.
However, no one actually checks for this flag, which makes it pointless.
Also, many algorithms fail to set this flag when given a bad length key.
Reviewing just the generic implementations, this is the case for
aes-fixed-time, cbcmac, echainiv, nhpoly1305, pcrypt, rfc3686, rfc4309,
rfc7539, rfc7539esp, salsa20, seqiv, and xcbc. But there are probably
many more in arch/*/crypto/ and drivers/crypto/.
Some algorithms can even set this flag when the key is the correct
length. For example, authenc and authencesn set it when the key payload
is malformed in any way (not just a bad length), the atmel-sha and ccree
drivers can set it if a memory allocation fails, and the chelsio driver
sets it for bad auth tag lengths, not just bad key lengths.
So even if someone actually wanted to start checking this flag (which
seems unlikely, since it's been unused for a long time), there would be
a lot of work needed to get it working correctly. But it would probably
be much better to go back to the drawing board and just define different
return values, like -EINVAL if the key is invalid for the algorithm vs.
-EKEYREJECTED if the key was rejected by a policy like "no weak keys".
That would be much simpler, less error-prone, and easier to test.
So just remove this flag.
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Horia Geantă <horia.geanta@nxp.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Diffstat (limited to 'crypto/sm4_generic.c')
-rw-r--r-- | crypto/sm4_generic.c | 16 |
1 files changed, 5 insertions, 11 deletions
diff --git a/crypto/sm4_generic.c b/crypto/sm4_generic.c index 71ffb343709a..016dbc595705 100644 --- a/crypto/sm4_generic.c +++ b/crypto/sm4_generic.c @@ -143,29 +143,23 @@ int crypto_sm4_expand_key(struct crypto_sm4_ctx *ctx, const u8 *in_key, EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(crypto_sm4_expand_key); /** - * crypto_sm4_set_key - Set the AES key. + * crypto_sm4_set_key - Set the SM4 key. * @tfm: The %crypto_tfm that is used in the context. * @in_key: The input key. * @key_len: The size of the key. * - * Returns 0 on success, on failure the %CRYPTO_TFM_RES_BAD_KEY_LEN flag in tfm - * is set. The function uses crypto_sm4_expand_key() to expand the key. + * This function uses crypto_sm4_expand_key() to expand the key. * &crypto_sm4_ctx _must_ be the private data embedded in @tfm which is * retrieved with crypto_tfm_ctx(). + * + * Return: 0 on success; -EINVAL on failure (only happens for bad key lengths) */ int crypto_sm4_set_key(struct crypto_tfm *tfm, const u8 *in_key, unsigned int key_len) { struct crypto_sm4_ctx *ctx = crypto_tfm_ctx(tfm); - u32 *flags = &tfm->crt_flags; - int ret; - - ret = crypto_sm4_expand_key(ctx, in_key, key_len); - if (!ret) - return 0; - *flags |= CRYPTO_TFM_RES_BAD_KEY_LEN; - return -EINVAL; + return crypto_sm4_expand_key(ctx, in_key, key_len); } EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(crypto_sm4_set_key); |