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authorAndy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>2017-12-04 15:07:29 +0100
committerIngo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>2017-12-17 14:27:52 +0100
commitc482feefe1aeb150156248ba0fd3e029bc886605 (patch)
tree41e3c0c88f477adacb911da988925c87dc4e3a89 /arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c
parent0f9a48100fba3f189724ae88a450c2261bf91c80 (diff)
downloadlwn-c482feefe1aeb150156248ba0fd3e029bc886605.tar.gz
lwn-c482feefe1aeb150156248ba0fd3e029bc886605.zip
x86/entry/64: Make cpu_entry_area.tss read-only
The TSS is a fairly juicy target for exploits, and, now that the TSS is in the cpu_entry_area, it's no longer protected by kASLR. Make it read-only on x86_64. On x86_32, it can't be RO because it's written by the CPU during task switches, and we use a task gate for double faults. I'd also be nervous about errata if we tried to make it RO even on configurations without double fault handling. [ tglx: AMD confirmed that there is no problem on 64-bit with TSS RO. So it's probably safe to assume that it's a non issue, though Intel might have been creative in that area. Still waiting for confirmation. ] Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov <bpetkov@suse.de> Cc: Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com> Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com> Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com> Cc: David Laight <David.Laight@aculab.com> Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com> Cc: Eduardo Valentin <eduval@amazon.com> Cc: Greg KH <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com> Cc: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com> Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com> Cc: aliguori@amazon.com Cc: daniel.gruss@iaik.tugraz.at Cc: hughd@google.com Cc: keescook@google.com Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20171204150606.733700132@linutronix.de Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Diffstat (limited to 'arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c')
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c29
1 files changed, 19 insertions, 10 deletions
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c
index 3de7480e4f32..c2eada1056de 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c
@@ -487,6 +487,9 @@ static DEFINE_PER_CPU_PAGE_ALIGNED(char, exception_stacks
[(N_EXCEPTION_STACKS - 1) * EXCEPTION_STKSZ + DEBUG_STKSZ]);
#endif
+static DEFINE_PER_CPU_PAGE_ALIGNED(struct SYSENTER_stack_page,
+ SYSENTER_stack_storage);
+
static void __init
set_percpu_fixmap_pages(int idx, void *ptr, int pages, pgprot_t prot)
{
@@ -500,23 +503,29 @@ static void __init setup_cpu_entry_area(int cpu)
#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
extern char _entry_trampoline[];
- /* On 64-bit systems, we use a read-only fixmap GDT. */
+ /* On 64-bit systems, we use a read-only fixmap GDT and TSS. */
pgprot_t gdt_prot = PAGE_KERNEL_RO;
+ pgprot_t tss_prot = PAGE_KERNEL_RO;
#else
/*
* On native 32-bit systems, the GDT cannot be read-only because
* our double fault handler uses a task gate, and entering through
- * a task gate needs to change an available TSS to busy. If the GDT
- * is read-only, that will triple fault.
+ * a task gate needs to change an available TSS to busy. If the
+ * GDT is read-only, that will triple fault. The TSS cannot be
+ * read-only because the CPU writes to it on task switches.
*
- * On Xen PV, the GDT must be read-only because the hypervisor requires
- * it.
+ * On Xen PV, the GDT must be read-only because the hypervisor
+ * requires it.
*/
pgprot_t gdt_prot = boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_XENPV) ?
PAGE_KERNEL_RO : PAGE_KERNEL;
+ pgprot_t tss_prot = PAGE_KERNEL;
#endif
__set_fixmap(get_cpu_entry_area_index(cpu, gdt), get_cpu_gdt_paddr(cpu), gdt_prot);
+ set_percpu_fixmap_pages(get_cpu_entry_area_index(cpu, SYSENTER_stack_page),
+ per_cpu_ptr(&SYSENTER_stack_storage, cpu), 1,
+ PAGE_KERNEL);
/*
* The Intel SDM says (Volume 3, 7.2.1):
@@ -539,9 +548,9 @@ static void __init setup_cpu_entry_area(int cpu)
offsetofend(struct tss_struct, x86_tss)) & PAGE_MASK);
BUILD_BUG_ON(sizeof(struct tss_struct) % PAGE_SIZE != 0);
set_percpu_fixmap_pages(get_cpu_entry_area_index(cpu, tss),
- &per_cpu(cpu_tss, cpu),
+ &per_cpu(cpu_tss_rw, cpu),
sizeof(struct tss_struct) / PAGE_SIZE,
- PAGE_KERNEL);
+ tss_prot);
#ifdef CONFIG_X86_32
per_cpu(cpu_entry_area, cpu) = get_cpu_entry_area(cpu);
@@ -1305,7 +1314,7 @@ void enable_sep_cpu(void)
return;
cpu = get_cpu();
- tss = &per_cpu(cpu_tss, cpu);
+ tss = &per_cpu(cpu_tss_rw, cpu);
/*
* We cache MSR_IA32_SYSENTER_CS's value in the TSS's ss1 field --
@@ -1575,7 +1584,7 @@ void cpu_init(void)
if (cpu)
load_ucode_ap();
- t = &per_cpu(cpu_tss, cpu);
+ t = &per_cpu(cpu_tss_rw, cpu);
oist = &per_cpu(orig_ist, cpu);
#ifdef CONFIG_NUMA
@@ -1667,7 +1676,7 @@ void cpu_init(void)
{
int cpu = smp_processor_id();
struct task_struct *curr = current;
- struct tss_struct *t = &per_cpu(cpu_tss, cpu);
+ struct tss_struct *t = &per_cpu(cpu_tss_rw, cpu);
wait_for_master_cpu(cpu);