summaryrefslogtreecommitdiff
path: root/arch/x86/include
diff options
context:
space:
mode:
authorLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>2022-08-28 10:10:23 -0700
committerLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>2022-08-28 10:10:23 -0700
commit2f23a7c914317ac0b2a7e2bbe48dc00213652f98 (patch)
tree91b546d5b409847bc88de465c547a863490243a7 /arch/x86/include
parent4459d800f71d01042b36326fd8ece1f823b9da16 (diff)
parent00da0cb385d05a89226e150a102eb49d8abb0359 (diff)
downloadlwn-2f23a7c914317ac0b2a7e2bbe48dc00213652f98.tar.gz
lwn-2f23a7c914317ac0b2a7e2bbe48dc00213652f98.zip
Merge tag 'x86-urgent-2022-08-28' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip
Pull misc x86 fixes from Ingo Molnar: - Fix PAT on Xen, which caused i915 driver failures - Fix compat INT 80 entry crash on Xen PV guests - Fix 'MMIO Stale Data' mitigation status reporting on older Intel CPUs - Fix RSB stuffing regressions - Fix ORC unwinding on ftrace trampolines - Add Intel Raptor Lake CPU model number - Fix (work around) a SEV-SNP bootloader bug providing bogus values in boot_params->cc_blob_address, by ignoring the value on !SEV-SNP bootups. - Fix SEV-SNP early boot failure - Fix the objtool list of noreturn functions and annotate snp_abort(), which bug confused objtool on gcc-12. - Fix the documentation for retbleed * tag 'x86-urgent-2022-08-28' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip: Documentation/ABI: Mention retbleed vulnerability info file for sysfs x86/sev: Mark snp_abort() noreturn x86/sev: Don't use cc_platform_has() for early SEV-SNP calls x86/boot: Don't propagate uninitialized boot_params->cc_blob_address x86/cpu: Add new Raptor Lake CPU model number x86/unwind/orc: Unwind ftrace trampolines with correct ORC entry x86/nospec: Fix i386 RSB stuffing x86/nospec: Unwreck the RSB stuffing x86/bugs: Add "unknown" reporting for MMIO Stale Data x86/entry: Fix entry_INT80_compat for Xen PV guests x86/PAT: Have pat_enabled() properly reflect state when running on Xen
Diffstat (limited to 'arch/x86/include')
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h5
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/include/asm/intel-family.h2
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h92
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/include/asm/sev.h2
4 files changed, 57 insertions, 44 deletions
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h
index 235dc85c91c3..ef4775c6db01 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h
@@ -457,7 +457,8 @@
#define X86_BUG_ITLB_MULTIHIT X86_BUG(23) /* CPU may incur MCE during certain page attribute changes */
#define X86_BUG_SRBDS X86_BUG(24) /* CPU may leak RNG bits if not mitigated */
#define X86_BUG_MMIO_STALE_DATA X86_BUG(25) /* CPU is affected by Processor MMIO Stale Data vulnerabilities */
-#define X86_BUG_RETBLEED X86_BUG(26) /* CPU is affected by RETBleed */
-#define X86_BUG_EIBRS_PBRSB X86_BUG(27) /* EIBRS is vulnerable to Post Barrier RSB Predictions */
+#define X86_BUG_MMIO_UNKNOWN X86_BUG(26) /* CPU is too old and its MMIO Stale Data status is unknown */
+#define X86_BUG_RETBLEED X86_BUG(27) /* CPU is affected by RETBleed */
+#define X86_BUG_EIBRS_PBRSB X86_BUG(28) /* EIBRS is vulnerable to Post Barrier RSB Predictions */
#endif /* _ASM_X86_CPUFEATURES_H */
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/intel-family.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/intel-family.h
index def6ca121111..aeb38023a703 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/intel-family.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/intel-family.h
@@ -27,6 +27,7 @@
* _X - regular server parts
* _D - micro server parts
* _N,_P - other mobile parts
+ * _S - other client parts
*
* Historical OPTDIFFs:
*
@@ -112,6 +113,7 @@
#define INTEL_FAM6_RAPTORLAKE 0xB7
#define INTEL_FAM6_RAPTORLAKE_P 0xBA
+#define INTEL_FAM6_RAPTORLAKE_S 0xBF
/* "Small Core" Processors (Atom) */
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h
index e64fd20778b6..c936ce9f0c47 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h
@@ -35,33 +35,56 @@
#define RSB_CLEAR_LOOPS 32 /* To forcibly overwrite all entries */
/*
+ * Common helper for __FILL_RETURN_BUFFER and __FILL_ONE_RETURN.
+ */
+#define __FILL_RETURN_SLOT \
+ ANNOTATE_INTRA_FUNCTION_CALL; \
+ call 772f; \
+ int3; \
+772:
+
+/*
+ * Stuff the entire RSB.
+ *
* Google experimented with loop-unrolling and this turned out to be
* the optimal version - two calls, each with their own speculation
* trap should their return address end up getting used, in a loop.
*/
-#define __FILL_RETURN_BUFFER(reg, nr, sp) \
- mov $(nr/2), reg; \
-771: \
- ANNOTATE_INTRA_FUNCTION_CALL; \
- call 772f; \
-773: /* speculation trap */ \
- UNWIND_HINT_EMPTY; \
- pause; \
- lfence; \
- jmp 773b; \
-772: \
- ANNOTATE_INTRA_FUNCTION_CALL; \
- call 774f; \
-775: /* speculation trap */ \
- UNWIND_HINT_EMPTY; \
- pause; \
- lfence; \
- jmp 775b; \
-774: \
- add $(BITS_PER_LONG/8) * 2, sp; \
- dec reg; \
- jnz 771b; \
- /* barrier for jnz misprediction */ \
+#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
+#define __FILL_RETURN_BUFFER(reg, nr) \
+ mov $(nr/2), reg; \
+771: \
+ __FILL_RETURN_SLOT \
+ __FILL_RETURN_SLOT \
+ add $(BITS_PER_LONG/8) * 2, %_ASM_SP; \
+ dec reg; \
+ jnz 771b; \
+ /* barrier for jnz misprediction */ \
+ lfence;
+#else
+/*
+ * i386 doesn't unconditionally have LFENCE, as such it can't
+ * do a loop.
+ */
+#define __FILL_RETURN_BUFFER(reg, nr) \
+ .rept nr; \
+ __FILL_RETURN_SLOT; \
+ .endr; \
+ add $(BITS_PER_LONG/8) * nr, %_ASM_SP;
+#endif
+
+/*
+ * Stuff a single RSB slot.
+ *
+ * To mitigate Post-Barrier RSB speculation, one CALL instruction must be
+ * forced to retire before letting a RET instruction execute.
+ *
+ * On PBRSB-vulnerable CPUs, it is not safe for a RET to be executed
+ * before this point.
+ */
+#define __FILL_ONE_RETURN \
+ __FILL_RETURN_SLOT \
+ add $(BITS_PER_LONG/8), %_ASM_SP; \
lfence;
#ifdef __ASSEMBLY__
@@ -132,28 +155,15 @@
#endif
.endm
-.macro ISSUE_UNBALANCED_RET_GUARD
- ANNOTATE_INTRA_FUNCTION_CALL
- call .Lunbalanced_ret_guard_\@
- int3
-.Lunbalanced_ret_guard_\@:
- add $(BITS_PER_LONG/8), %_ASM_SP
- lfence
-.endm
-
/*
* A simpler FILL_RETURN_BUFFER macro. Don't make people use the CPP
* monstrosity above, manually.
*/
-.macro FILL_RETURN_BUFFER reg:req nr:req ftr:req ftr2
-.ifb \ftr2
- ALTERNATIVE "jmp .Lskip_rsb_\@", "", \ftr
-.else
- ALTERNATIVE_2 "jmp .Lskip_rsb_\@", "", \ftr, "jmp .Lunbalanced_\@", \ftr2
-.endif
- __FILL_RETURN_BUFFER(\reg,\nr,%_ASM_SP)
-.Lunbalanced_\@:
- ISSUE_UNBALANCED_RET_GUARD
+.macro FILL_RETURN_BUFFER reg:req nr:req ftr:req ftr2=ALT_NOT(X86_FEATURE_ALWAYS)
+ ALTERNATIVE_2 "jmp .Lskip_rsb_\@", \
+ __stringify(__FILL_RETURN_BUFFER(\reg,\nr)), \ftr, \
+ __stringify(__FILL_ONE_RETURN), \ftr2
+
.Lskip_rsb_\@:
.endm
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/sev.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/sev.h
index 4a23e52fe0ee..ebc271bb6d8e 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/sev.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/sev.h
@@ -195,7 +195,7 @@ void snp_set_memory_shared(unsigned long vaddr, unsigned int npages);
void snp_set_memory_private(unsigned long vaddr, unsigned int npages);
void snp_set_wakeup_secondary_cpu(void);
bool snp_init(struct boot_params *bp);
-void snp_abort(void);
+void __init __noreturn snp_abort(void);
int snp_issue_guest_request(u64 exit_code, struct snp_req_data *input, unsigned long *fw_err);
#else
static inline void sev_es_ist_enter(struct pt_regs *regs) { }