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author | Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> | 2020-10-23 09:46:16 -0700 |
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committer | Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> | 2020-10-23 09:46:16 -0700 |
commit | 032c7ed958174957a4d6eac61806f66e1123d815 (patch) | |
tree | 0468862c64b825b437181700f2e9ba2870a83b1c /arch/arm64/kernel | |
parent | f9893351acaecf0a414baf9942b48d5bb5c688c6 (diff) | |
parent | 66dd3474702aa98d5844367e1577cdad78ef7c65 (diff) | |
download | lwn-032c7ed958174957a4d6eac61806f66e1123d815.tar.gz lwn-032c7ed958174957a4d6eac61806f66e1123d815.zip |
Merge tag 'arm64-upstream' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/arm64/linux
Pull more arm64 updates from Will Deacon:
"A small selection of further arm64 fixes and updates. Most of these
are fixes that came in during the merge window, with the exception of
the HAVE_MOVE_PMD mremap() speed-up which we discussed back in 2018
and somehow forgot to enable upstream.
- Improve performance of Spectre-v2 mitigation on Falkor CPUs (if
you're lucky enough to have one)
- Select HAVE_MOVE_PMD. This has been shown to improve mremap()
performance, which is used heavily by the Android runtime GC, and
it seems we forgot to enable this upstream back in 2018.
- Ensure linker flags are consistent between LLVM and BFD
- Fix stale comment in Spectre mitigation rework
- Fix broken copyright header
- Fix KASLR randomisation of the linear map
- Prevent arm64-specific prctl()s from compat tasks (return -EINVAL)"
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/kvmarm/20181108181201.88826-3-joelaf@google.com/
* tag 'arm64-upstream' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/arm64/linux:
arm64: proton-pack: Update comment to reflect new function name
arm64: spectre-v2: Favour CPU-specific mitigation at EL2
arm64: link with -z norelro regardless of CONFIG_RELOCATABLE
arm64: Fix a broken copyright header in gen_vdso_offsets.sh
arm64: mremap speedup - Enable HAVE_MOVE_PMD
arm64: mm: use single quantity to represent the PA to VA translation
arm64: reject prctl(PR_PAC_RESET_KEYS) on compat tasks
Diffstat (limited to 'arch/arm64/kernel')
-rw-r--r-- | arch/arm64/kernel/fpsimd.c | 4 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | arch/arm64/kernel/pointer_auth.c | 4 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | arch/arm64/kernel/proton-pack.c | 40 | ||||
-rwxr-xr-x | arch/arm64/kernel/vdso/gen_vdso_offsets.sh | 2 |
4 files changed, 26 insertions, 24 deletions
diff --git a/arch/arm64/kernel/fpsimd.c b/arch/arm64/kernel/fpsimd.c index a6d688c10745..062b21f30f94 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/kernel/fpsimd.c +++ b/arch/arm64/kernel/fpsimd.c @@ -678,7 +678,7 @@ int sve_set_current_vl(unsigned long arg) vl = arg & PR_SVE_VL_LEN_MASK; flags = arg & ~vl; - if (!system_supports_sve()) + if (!system_supports_sve() || is_compat_task()) return -EINVAL; ret = sve_set_vector_length(current, vl, flags); @@ -691,7 +691,7 @@ int sve_set_current_vl(unsigned long arg) /* PR_SVE_GET_VL */ int sve_get_current_vl(void) { - if (!system_supports_sve()) + if (!system_supports_sve() || is_compat_task()) return -EINVAL; return sve_prctl_status(0); diff --git a/arch/arm64/kernel/pointer_auth.c b/arch/arm64/kernel/pointer_auth.c index 1e77736a4f66..adb955fd9bdd 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/kernel/pointer_auth.c +++ b/arch/arm64/kernel/pointer_auth.c @@ -1,5 +1,6 @@ // SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 +#include <linux/compat.h> #include <linux/errno.h> #include <linux/prctl.h> #include <linux/random.h> @@ -17,6 +18,9 @@ int ptrauth_prctl_reset_keys(struct task_struct *tsk, unsigned long arg) if (!system_supports_address_auth() && !system_supports_generic_auth()) return -EINVAL; + if (is_compat_thread(task_thread_info(tsk))) + return -EINVAL; + if (!arg) { ptrauth_keys_init_user(keys); return 0; diff --git a/arch/arm64/kernel/proton-pack.c b/arch/arm64/kernel/proton-pack.c index 68b710f1b43f..25f3c80b5ffe 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/kernel/proton-pack.c +++ b/arch/arm64/kernel/proton-pack.c @@ -67,7 +67,8 @@ ssize_t cpu_show_spectre_v1(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr, * - Mitigated in hardware and advertised by ID_AA64PFR0_EL1.CSV2. * - Mitigated in hardware and listed in our "safe list". * - Mitigated in software by firmware. - * - Mitigated in software by a CPU-specific dance in the kernel. + * - Mitigated in software by a CPU-specific dance in the kernel and a + * firmware call at EL2. * - Vulnerable. * * It's not unlikely for different CPUs in a big.LITTLE system to fall into @@ -204,8 +205,8 @@ static void install_bp_hardening_cb(bp_hardening_cb_t fn) __SMCCC_WORKAROUND_1_SMC_SZ; /* - * detect_harden_bp_fw() passes NULL for the hyp_vecs start/end if - * we're a guest. Skip the hyp-vectors work. + * Vinz Clortho takes the hyp_vecs start/end "keys" at + * the door when we're a guest. Skip the hyp-vectors work. */ if (!is_hyp_mode_available()) { __this_cpu_write(bp_hardening_data.fn, fn); @@ -259,6 +260,16 @@ static void qcom_link_stack_sanitisation(void) : "=&r" (tmp)); } +static bp_hardening_cb_t spectre_v2_get_sw_mitigation_cb(void) +{ + u32 midr = read_cpuid_id(); + if (((midr & MIDR_CPU_MODEL_MASK) != MIDR_QCOM_FALKOR) && + ((midr & MIDR_CPU_MODEL_MASK) != MIDR_QCOM_FALKOR_V1)) + return NULL; + + return qcom_link_stack_sanitisation; +} + static enum mitigation_state spectre_v2_enable_fw_mitigation(void) { bp_hardening_cb_t cb; @@ -284,26 +295,15 @@ static enum mitigation_state spectre_v2_enable_fw_mitigation(void) return SPECTRE_VULNERABLE; } + /* + * Prefer a CPU-specific workaround if it exists. Note that we + * still rely on firmware for the mitigation at EL2. + */ + cb = spectre_v2_get_sw_mitigation_cb() ?: cb; install_bp_hardening_cb(cb); return SPECTRE_MITIGATED; } -static enum mitigation_state spectre_v2_enable_sw_mitigation(void) -{ - u32 midr; - - if (spectre_v2_mitigations_off()) - return SPECTRE_VULNERABLE; - - midr = read_cpuid_id(); - if (((midr & MIDR_CPU_MODEL_MASK) != MIDR_QCOM_FALKOR) && - ((midr & MIDR_CPU_MODEL_MASK) != MIDR_QCOM_FALKOR_V1)) - return SPECTRE_VULNERABLE; - - install_bp_hardening_cb(qcom_link_stack_sanitisation); - return SPECTRE_MITIGATED; -} - void spectre_v2_enable_mitigation(const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities *__unused) { enum mitigation_state state; @@ -313,8 +313,6 @@ void spectre_v2_enable_mitigation(const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities *__unused) state = spectre_v2_get_cpu_hw_mitigation_state(); if (state == SPECTRE_VULNERABLE) state = spectre_v2_enable_fw_mitigation(); - if (state == SPECTRE_VULNERABLE) - state = spectre_v2_enable_sw_mitigation(); update_mitigation_state(&spectre_v2_state, state); } diff --git a/arch/arm64/kernel/vdso/gen_vdso_offsets.sh b/arch/arm64/kernel/vdso/gen_vdso_offsets.sh index 0664acaf61ff..8b806eacd0a6 100755 --- a/arch/arm64/kernel/vdso/gen_vdso_offsets.sh +++ b/arch/arm64/kernel/vdso/gen_vdso_offsets.sh @@ -8,7 +8,7 @@ # Doing this inside the Makefile will break the $(filter-out) function, # causing Kbuild to rebuild the vdso-offsets header file every time. # -# Author: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com +# Author: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com> # LC_ALL=C |