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author | Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> | 2023-07-31 09:39:56 +0200 |
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committer | Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> | 2023-07-31 09:39:56 +0200 |
commit | fe3015748a905e08eb0e1750aa2928f520063d59 (patch) | |
tree | d15524d1f7931e8e5964e9ff8368792d09282da5 /Documentation | |
parent | 16aae4c64600a6319a6f10dbff833fa198bf9599 (diff) | |
parent | 5d0c230f1de8c7515b6567d9afba1f196fb4e2f4 (diff) | |
download | lwn-fe3015748a905e08eb0e1750aa2928f520063d59.tar.gz lwn-fe3015748a905e08eb0e1750aa2928f520063d59.zip |
Merge 6.5-rc4 into tty-next
We need the serial/tty fixes in here as well for testing and future
development.
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Diffstat (limited to 'Documentation')
-rw-r--r-- | Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-module | 11 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | Documentation/admin-guide/devices.txt | 2 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/spectre.rst | 11 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | Documentation/arch/arm64/silicon-errata.rst | 3 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | Documentation/filesystems/tmpfs.rst | 47 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | Documentation/networking/napi.rst | 13 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | Documentation/process/embargoed-hardware-issues.rst | 3 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | Documentation/process/security-bugs.rst | 39 |
8 files changed, 67 insertions, 62 deletions
diff --git a/Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-module b/Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-module index 08886367d047..62addab47d0c 100644 --- a/Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-module +++ b/Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-module @@ -60,3 +60,14 @@ Description: Module taint flags: C staging driver module E unsigned module == ===================== + +What: /sys/module/grant_table/parameters/free_per_iteration +Date: July 2023 +KernelVersion: 6.5 but backported to all supported stable branches +Contact: Xen developer discussion <xen-devel@lists.xenproject.org> +Description: Read and write number of grant entries to attempt to free per iteration. + + Note: Future versions of Xen and Linux may provide a better + interface for controlling the rate of deferred grant reclaim + or may not need it at all. +Users: Qubes OS (https://www.qubes-os.org) diff --git a/Documentation/admin-guide/devices.txt b/Documentation/admin-guide/devices.txt index 06c525e01ea5..b1b57f638b94 100644 --- a/Documentation/admin-guide/devices.txt +++ b/Documentation/admin-guide/devices.txt @@ -2691,7 +2691,7 @@ 45 = /dev/ttyMM1 Marvell MPSC - port 1 (obsolete unused) 46 = /dev/ttyCPM0 PPC CPM (SCC or SMC) - port 0 ... - 47 = /dev/ttyCPM5 PPC CPM (SCC or SMC) - port 5 + 49 = /dev/ttyCPM5 PPC CPM (SCC or SMC) - port 3 50 = /dev/ttyIOC0 Altix serial card ... 81 = /dev/ttyIOC31 Altix serial card diff --git a/Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/spectre.rst b/Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/spectre.rst index 4d186f599d90..32a8893e5617 100644 --- a/Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/spectre.rst +++ b/Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/spectre.rst @@ -484,11 +484,14 @@ Spectre variant 2 Systems which support enhanced IBRS (eIBRS) enable IBRS protection once at boot, by setting the IBRS bit, and they're automatically protected against - Spectre v2 variant attacks, including cross-thread branch target injections - on SMT systems (STIBP). In other words, eIBRS enables STIBP too. + Spectre v2 variant attacks. - Legacy IBRS systems clear the IBRS bit on exit to userspace and - therefore explicitly enable STIBP for that + On Intel's enhanced IBRS systems, this includes cross-thread branch target + injections on SMT systems (STIBP). In other words, Intel eIBRS enables + STIBP, too. + + AMD Automatic IBRS does not protect userspace, and Legacy IBRS systems clear + the IBRS bit on exit to userspace, therefore both explicitly enable STIBP. The retpoline mitigation is turned on by default on vulnerable CPUs. It can be forced on or off by the administrator diff --git a/Documentation/arch/arm64/silicon-errata.rst b/Documentation/arch/arm64/silicon-errata.rst index 496cdca5cb99..bedd3a1d7b42 100644 --- a/Documentation/arch/arm64/silicon-errata.rst +++ b/Documentation/arch/arm64/silicon-errata.rst @@ -148,6 +148,9 @@ stable kernels. | ARM | MMU-700 | #2268618,2812531| N/A | +----------------+-----------------+-----------------+-----------------------------+ +----------------+-----------------+-----------------+-----------------------------+ +| ARM | GIC-700 | #2941627 | ARM64_ERRATUM_2941627 | ++----------------+-----------------+-----------------+-----------------------------+ ++----------------+-----------------+-----------------+-----------------------------+ | Broadcom | Brahma-B53 | N/A | ARM64_ERRATUM_845719 | +----------------+-----------------+-----------------+-----------------------------+ | Broadcom | Brahma-B53 | N/A | ARM64_ERRATUM_843419 | diff --git a/Documentation/filesystems/tmpfs.rst b/Documentation/filesystems/tmpfs.rst index f18f46be5c0c..2cd8fa332feb 100644 --- a/Documentation/filesystems/tmpfs.rst +++ b/Documentation/filesystems/tmpfs.rst @@ -84,8 +84,6 @@ nr_inodes The maximum number of inodes for this instance. The default is half of the number of your physical RAM pages, or (on a machine with highmem) the number of lowmem RAM pages, whichever is the lower. -noswap Disables swap. Remounts must respect the original settings. - By default swap is enabled. ========= ============================================================ These parameters accept a suffix k, m or g for kilo, mega and giga and @@ -99,36 +97,31 @@ mount with such options, since it allows any user with write access to use up all the memory on the machine; but enhances the scalability of that instance in a system with many CPUs making intensive use of it. +tmpfs blocks may be swapped out, when there is a shortage of memory. +tmpfs has a mount option to disable its use of swap: + +====== =========================================================== +noswap Disables swap. Remounts must respect the original settings. + By default swap is enabled. +====== =========================================================== + tmpfs also supports Transparent Huge Pages which requires a kernel configured with CONFIG_TRANSPARENT_HUGEPAGE and with huge supported for your system (has_transparent_hugepage(), which is architecture specific). The mount options for this are: -====== ============================================================ -huge=0 never: disables huge pages for the mount -huge=1 always: enables huge pages for the mount -huge=2 within_size: only allocate huge pages if the page will be - fully within i_size, also respect fadvise()/madvise() hints. -huge=3 advise: only allocate huge pages if requested with - fadvise()/madvise() -====== ============================================================ - -There is a sysfs file which you can also use to control system wide THP -configuration for all tmpfs mounts, the file is: - -/sys/kernel/mm/transparent_hugepage/shmem_enabled - -This sysfs file is placed on top of THP sysfs directory and so is registered -by THP code. It is however only used to control all tmpfs mounts with one -single knob. Since it controls all tmpfs mounts it should only be used either -for emergency or testing purposes. The values you can set for shmem_enabled are: - -== ============================================================ --1 deny: disables huge on shm_mnt and all mounts, for - emergency use --2 force: enables huge on shm_mnt and all mounts, w/o needing - option, for testing -== ============================================================ +================ ============================================================== +huge=never Do not allocate huge pages. This is the default. +huge=always Attempt to allocate huge page every time a new page is needed. +huge=within_size Only allocate huge page if it will be fully within i_size. + Also respect madvise(2) hints. +huge=advise Only allocate huge page if requested with madvise(2). +================ ============================================================== + +See also Documentation/admin-guide/mm/transhuge.rst, which describes the +sysfs file /sys/kernel/mm/transparent_hugepage/shmem_enabled: which can +be used to deny huge pages on all tmpfs mounts in an emergency, or to +force huge pages on all tmpfs mounts for testing. tmpfs has a mount option to set the NUMA memory allocation policy for all files in that instance (if CONFIG_NUMA is enabled) - which can be diff --git a/Documentation/networking/napi.rst b/Documentation/networking/napi.rst index a7a047742e93..7bf7b95c4f7a 100644 --- a/Documentation/networking/napi.rst +++ b/Documentation/networking/napi.rst @@ -65,15 +65,16 @@ argument - drivers can process completions for any number of Tx packets but should only process up to ``budget`` number of Rx packets. Rx processing is usually much more expensive. -In other words, it is recommended to ignore the budget argument when -performing TX buffer reclamation to ensure that the reclamation is not -arbitrarily bounded; however, it is required to honor the budget argument -for RX processing. +In other words for Rx processing the ``budget`` argument limits how many +packets driver can process in a single poll. Rx specific APIs like page +pool or XDP cannot be used at all when ``budget`` is 0. +skb Tx processing should happen regardless of the ``budget``, but if +the argument is 0 driver cannot call any XDP (or page pool) APIs. .. warning:: - The ``budget`` argument may be 0 if core tries to only process Tx completions - and no Rx packets. + The ``budget`` argument may be 0 if core tries to only process + skb Tx completions and no Rx or XDP packets. The poll method returns the amount of work done. If the driver still has outstanding work to do (e.g. ``budget`` was exhausted) diff --git a/Documentation/process/embargoed-hardware-issues.rst b/Documentation/process/embargoed-hardware-issues.rst index df978127f2d7..cb686238f21d 100644 --- a/Documentation/process/embargoed-hardware-issues.rst +++ b/Documentation/process/embargoed-hardware-issues.rst @@ -254,7 +254,6 @@ an involved disclosed party. The current ambassadors list: Samsung Javier González <javier.gonz@samsung.com> Microsoft James Morris <jamorris@linux.microsoft.com> - VMware Xen Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com> Canonical John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com> @@ -263,10 +262,8 @@ an involved disclosed party. The current ambassadors list: Red Hat Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com> SUSE Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz> - Amazon Google Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> - GCC LLVM Nick Desaulniers <ndesaulniers@google.com> ============= ======================================================== diff --git a/Documentation/process/security-bugs.rst b/Documentation/process/security-bugs.rst index 82e29837d589..5a6993795bd2 100644 --- a/Documentation/process/security-bugs.rst +++ b/Documentation/process/security-bugs.rst @@ -63,31 +63,28 @@ information submitted to the security list and any followup discussions of the report are treated confidentially even after the embargo has been lifted, in perpetuity. -Coordination ------------- - -Fixes for sensitive bugs, such as those that might lead to privilege -escalations, may need to be coordinated with the private -<linux-distros@vs.openwall.org> mailing list so that distribution vendors -are well prepared to issue a fixed kernel upon public disclosure of the -upstream fix. Distros will need some time to test the proposed patch and -will generally request at least a few days of embargo, and vendor update -publication prefers to happen Tuesday through Thursday. When appropriate, -the security team can assist with this coordination, or the reporter can -include linux-distros from the start. In this case, remember to prefix -the email Subject line with "[vs]" as described in the linux-distros wiki: -<http://oss-security.openwall.org/wiki/mailing-lists/distros#how-to-use-the-lists> +Coordination with other groups +------------------------------ + +The kernel security team strongly recommends that reporters of potential +security issues NEVER contact the "linux-distros" mailing list until +AFTER discussing it with the kernel security team. Do not Cc: both +lists at once. You may contact the linux-distros mailing list after a +fix has been agreed on and you fully understand the requirements that +doing so will impose on you and the kernel community. + +The different lists have different goals and the linux-distros rules do +not contribute to actually fixing any potential security problems. CVE assignment -------------- -The security team does not normally assign CVEs, nor do we require them -for reports or fixes, as this can needlessly complicate the process and -may delay the bug handling. If a reporter wishes to have a CVE identifier -assigned ahead of public disclosure, they will need to contact the private -linux-distros list, described above. When such a CVE identifier is known -before a patch is provided, it is desirable to mention it in the commit -message if the reporter agrees. +The security team does not assign CVEs, nor do we require them for +reports or fixes, as this can needlessly complicate the process and may +delay the bug handling. If a reporter wishes to have a CVE identifier +assigned, they should find one by themselves, for example by contacting +MITRE directly. However under no circumstances will a patch inclusion +be delayed to wait for a CVE identifier to arrive. Non-disclosure agreements ------------------------- |