netfilter: x_tables: validate e->target_offset early

[ Upstream commit bdf533de6968e9686df777dc178486f600c6e617 ]

We should check that e->target_offset is sane before
mark_source_chains gets called since it will fetch the target entry
for loop detection.

Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de>
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sasha.levin@oracle.com>

3 files changed, 24 insertions, 27 deletions

diff --git a/net/ipv4/netfilter/arp_tables.c b/net/ipv4/netfilter/arp_tables.c
index a61200754f4b..e500f4fcf868 100644
--- a/net/ipv4/netfilter/arp_tables.c
+++ b/net/ipv4/netfilter/arp_tables.c
@@ -469,14 +469,12 @@ static int mark_source_chains(const struct xt_table_info *newinfo,
 	return 1;
 }
 
-static inline int check_entry(const struct arpt_entry *e, const char *name)
+static inline int check_entry(const struct arpt_entry *e)
 {
 	const struct xt_entry_target *t;
 
-	if (!arp_checkentry(&e->arp)) {
-		duprintf("arp_tables: arp check failed %p %s.\n", e, name);
+	if (!arp_checkentry(&e->arp))
 		return -EINVAL;
-	}
 
 	if (e->target_offset + sizeof(struct xt_entry_target) > e->next_offset)
 		return -EINVAL;
@@ -517,10 +515,6 @@ find_check_entry(struct arpt_entry *e, const char *name, unsigned int size)
 	struct xt_target *target;
 	int ret;
 
-	ret = check_entry(e, name);
-	if (ret)
-		return ret;
-
 	t = arpt_get_target(e);
 	target = xt_request_find_target(NFPROTO_ARP, t->u.user.name,
 					t->u.user.revision);
@@ -565,6 +559,7 @@ static inline int check_entry_size_and_hooks(struct arpt_entry *e,
 					     unsigned int valid_hooks)
 {
 	unsigned int h;
+	int err;
 
 	if ((unsigned long)e % __alignof__(struct arpt_entry) != 0 ||
 	    (unsigned char *)e + sizeof(struct arpt_entry) >= limit) {
@@ -579,6 +574,10 @@ static inline int check_entry_size_and_hooks(struct arpt_entry *e,
 		return -EINVAL;
 	}
 
+	err = check_entry(e);
+	if (err)
+		return err;
+
 	/* Check hooks & underflows */
 	for (h = 0; h < NF_ARP_NUMHOOKS; h++) {
 		if (!(valid_hooks & (1 << h)))
@@ -1239,7 +1238,7 @@ check_compat_entry_size_and_hooks(struct compat_arpt_entry *e,
 	}
 
 	/* For purposes of check_entry casting the compat entry is fine */
-	ret = check_entry((struct arpt_entry *)e, name);
+	ret = check_entry((struct arpt_entry *)e);
 	if (ret)
 		return ret;
 
diff --git a/net/ipv4/netfilter/ip_tables.c b/net/ipv4/netfilter/ip_tables.c
index 2d0e265fef6e..a75ff8a8420f 100644
--- a/net/ipv4/netfilter/ip_tables.c
+++ b/net/ipv4/netfilter/ip_tables.c
@@ -564,14 +564,12 @@ static void cleanup_match(struct xt_entry_match *m, struct net *net)
 }
 
 static int
-check_entry(const struct ipt_entry *e, const char *name)
+check_entry(const struct ipt_entry *e)
 {
 	const struct xt_entry_target *t;
 
-	if (!ip_checkentry(&e->ip)) {
-		duprintf("ip check failed %p %s.\n", e, name);
+	if (!ip_checkentry(&e->ip))
 		return -EINVAL;
-	}
 
 	if (e->target_offset + sizeof(struct xt_entry_target) >
 	    e->next_offset)
@@ -661,10 +659,6 @@ find_check_entry(struct ipt_entry *e, struct net *net, const char *name,
 	struct xt_mtchk_param mtpar;
 	struct xt_entry_match *ematch;
 
-	ret = check_entry(e, name);
-	if (ret)
-		return ret;
-
 	j = 0;
 	mtpar.net	= net;
 	mtpar.table     = name;
@@ -728,6 +722,7 @@ check_entry_size_and_hooks(struct ipt_entry *e,
 			   unsigned int valid_hooks)
 {
 	unsigned int h;
+	int err;
 
 	if ((unsigned long)e % __alignof__(struct ipt_entry) != 0 ||
 	    (unsigned char *)e + sizeof(struct ipt_entry) >= limit) {
@@ -742,6 +737,10 @@ check_entry_size_and_hooks(struct ipt_entry *e,
 		return -EINVAL;
 	}
 
+	err = check_entry(e);
+	if (err)
+		return err;
+
 	/* Check hooks & underflows */
 	for (h = 0; h < NF_INET_NUMHOOKS; h++) {
 		if (!(valid_hooks & (1 << h)))
@@ -1505,7 +1504,7 @@ check_compat_entry_size_and_hooks(struct compat_ipt_entry *e,
 	}
 
 	/* For purposes of check_entry casting the compat entry is fine */
-	ret = check_entry((struct ipt_entry *)e, name);
+	ret = check_entry((struct ipt_entry *)e);
 	if (ret)
 		return ret;
 
diff --git a/net/ipv6/netfilter/ip6_tables.c b/net/ipv6/netfilter/ip6_tables.c
index 62f5b0d0bc9b..ef764a67cc64 100644
--- a/net/ipv6/netfilter/ip6_tables.c
+++ b/net/ipv6/netfilter/ip6_tables.c
@@ -577,14 +577,12 @@ static void cleanup_match(struct xt_entry_match *m, struct net *net)
 }
 
 static int
-check_entry(const struct ip6t_entry *e, const char *name)
+check_entry(const struct ip6t_entry *e)
 {
 	const struct xt_entry_target *t;
 
-	if (!ip6_checkentry(&e->ipv6)) {
-		duprintf("ip_tables: ip check failed %p %s.\n", e, name);
+	if (!ip6_checkentry(&e->ipv6))
 		return -EINVAL;
-	}
 
 	if (e->target_offset + sizeof(struct xt_entry_target) >
 	    e->next_offset)
@@ -675,10 +673,6 @@ find_check_entry(struct ip6t_entry *e, struct net *net, const char *name,
 	struct xt_mtchk_param mtpar;
 	struct xt_entry_match *ematch;
 
-	ret = check_entry(e, name);
-	if (ret)
-		return ret;
-
 	j = 0;
 	mtpar.net	= net;
 	mtpar.table     = name;
@@ -742,6 +736,7 @@ check_entry_size_and_hooks(struct ip6t_entry *e,
 			   unsigned int valid_hooks)
 {
 	unsigned int h;
+	int err;
 
 	if ((unsigned long)e % __alignof__(struct ip6t_entry) != 0 ||
 	    (unsigned char *)e + sizeof(struct ip6t_entry) >= limit) {
@@ -756,6 +751,10 @@ check_entry_size_and_hooks(struct ip6t_entry *e,
 		return -EINVAL;
 	}
 
+	err = check_entry(e);
+	if (err)
+		return err;
+
 	/* Check hooks & underflows */
 	for (h = 0; h < NF_INET_NUMHOOKS; h++) {
 		if (!(valid_hooks & (1 << h)))
@@ -1520,7 +1519,7 @@ check_compat_entry_size_and_hooks(struct compat_ip6t_entry *e,
 	}
 
 	/* For purposes of check_entry casting the compat entry is fine */
-	ret = check_entry((struct ip6t_entry *)e, name);
+	ret = check_entry((struct ip6t_entry *)e);
 	if (ret)
 		return ret;