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author | Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net> | 2014-06-10 12:45:42 -0700 |
---|---|---|
committer | Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> | 2014-06-16 13:42:52 -0700 |
commit | 4f80c6c1825a91cecf3b3bd19c824e768d98fe48 (patch) | |
tree | cdb4e44336c2a34d559d3a609784d74a37c7301a | |
parent | 853771148c5aa5998c423ed4dddd7605d4b4c949 (diff) | |
download | lwn-4f80c6c1825a91cecf3b3bd19c824e768d98fe48.tar.gz lwn-4f80c6c1825a91cecf3b3bd19c824e768d98fe48.zip |
fs,userns: Change inode_capable to capable_wrt_inode_uidgid
commit 23adbe12ef7d3d4195e80800ab36b37bee28cd03 upstream.
The kernel has no concept of capabilities with respect to inodes; inodes
exist independently of namespaces. For example, inode_capable(inode,
CAP_LINUX_IMMUTABLE) would be nonsense.
This patch changes inode_capable to check for uid and gid mappings and
renames it to capable_wrt_inode_uidgid, which should make it more
obvious what it does.
Fixes CVE-2014-4014.
Cc: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Cc: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@ubuntu.com>
Cc: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Cc: Dave Chinner <david@fromorbit.com>
Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
-rw-r--r-- | fs/attr.c | 8 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | fs/inode.c | 10 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | fs/namei.c | 11 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | include/linux/capability.h | 2 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | kernel/capability.c | 18 |
5 files changed, 25 insertions, 24 deletions
diff --git a/fs/attr.c b/fs/attr.c index 8dd5825ec708..66fa6251c398 100644 --- a/fs/attr.c +++ b/fs/attr.c @@ -50,14 +50,14 @@ int inode_change_ok(const struct inode *inode, struct iattr *attr) if ((ia_valid & ATTR_UID) && (!uid_eq(current_fsuid(), inode->i_uid) || !uid_eq(attr->ia_uid, inode->i_uid)) && - !inode_capable(inode, CAP_CHOWN)) + !capable_wrt_inode_uidgid(inode, CAP_CHOWN)) return -EPERM; /* Make sure caller can chgrp. */ if ((ia_valid & ATTR_GID) && (!uid_eq(current_fsuid(), inode->i_uid) || (!in_group_p(attr->ia_gid) && !gid_eq(attr->ia_gid, inode->i_gid))) && - !inode_capable(inode, CAP_CHOWN)) + !capable_wrt_inode_uidgid(inode, CAP_CHOWN)) return -EPERM; /* Make sure a caller can chmod. */ @@ -67,7 +67,7 @@ int inode_change_ok(const struct inode *inode, struct iattr *attr) /* Also check the setgid bit! */ if (!in_group_p((ia_valid & ATTR_GID) ? attr->ia_gid : inode->i_gid) && - !inode_capable(inode, CAP_FSETID)) + !capable_wrt_inode_uidgid(inode, CAP_FSETID)) attr->ia_mode &= ~S_ISGID; } @@ -160,7 +160,7 @@ void setattr_copy(struct inode *inode, const struct iattr *attr) umode_t mode = attr->ia_mode; if (!in_group_p(inode->i_gid) && - !inode_capable(inode, CAP_FSETID)) + !capable_wrt_inode_uidgid(inode, CAP_FSETID)) mode &= ~S_ISGID; inode->i_mode = mode; } diff --git a/fs/inode.c b/fs/inode.c index 00d5fc3b86e1..1b300a06b8be 100644 --- a/fs/inode.c +++ b/fs/inode.c @@ -1837,14 +1837,18 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(inode_init_owner); * inode_owner_or_capable - check current task permissions to inode * @inode: inode being checked * - * Return true if current either has CAP_FOWNER to the inode, or - * owns the file. + * Return true if current either has CAP_FOWNER in a namespace with the + * inode owner uid mapped, or owns the file. */ bool inode_owner_or_capable(const struct inode *inode) { + struct user_namespace *ns; + if (uid_eq(current_fsuid(), inode->i_uid)) return true; - if (inode_capable(inode, CAP_FOWNER)) + + ns = current_user_ns(); + if (ns_capable(ns, CAP_FOWNER) && kuid_has_mapping(ns, inode->i_uid)) return true; return false; } diff --git a/fs/namei.c b/fs/namei.c index 1211ee5a1cb3..6ac16a37ded2 100644 --- a/fs/namei.c +++ b/fs/namei.c @@ -321,10 +321,11 @@ int generic_permission(struct inode *inode, int mask) if (S_ISDIR(inode->i_mode)) { /* DACs are overridable for directories */ - if (inode_capable(inode, CAP_DAC_OVERRIDE)) + if (capable_wrt_inode_uidgid(inode, CAP_DAC_OVERRIDE)) return 0; if (!(mask & MAY_WRITE)) - if (inode_capable(inode, CAP_DAC_READ_SEARCH)) + if (capable_wrt_inode_uidgid(inode, + CAP_DAC_READ_SEARCH)) return 0; return -EACCES; } @@ -334,7 +335,7 @@ int generic_permission(struct inode *inode, int mask) * at least one exec bit set. */ if (!(mask & MAY_EXEC) || (inode->i_mode & S_IXUGO)) - if (inode_capable(inode, CAP_DAC_OVERRIDE)) + if (capable_wrt_inode_uidgid(inode, CAP_DAC_OVERRIDE)) return 0; /* @@ -342,7 +343,7 @@ int generic_permission(struct inode *inode, int mask) */ mask &= MAY_READ | MAY_WRITE | MAY_EXEC; if (mask == MAY_READ) - if (inode_capable(inode, CAP_DAC_READ_SEARCH)) + if (capable_wrt_inode_uidgid(inode, CAP_DAC_READ_SEARCH)) return 0; return -EACCES; @@ -2199,7 +2200,7 @@ static inline int check_sticky(struct inode *dir, struct inode *inode) return 0; if (uid_eq(dir->i_uid, fsuid)) return 0; - return !inode_capable(inode, CAP_FOWNER); + return !capable_wrt_inode_uidgid(inode, CAP_FOWNER); } /* diff --git a/include/linux/capability.h b/include/linux/capability.h index d9a4f7f40f32..15f90929fb51 100644 --- a/include/linux/capability.h +++ b/include/linux/capability.h @@ -211,7 +211,7 @@ extern bool has_ns_capability_noaudit(struct task_struct *t, extern bool capable(int cap); extern bool ns_capable(struct user_namespace *ns, int cap); extern bool nsown_capable(int cap); -extern bool inode_capable(const struct inode *inode, int cap); +extern bool capable_wrt_inode_uidgid(const struct inode *inode, int cap); extern bool file_ns_capable(const struct file *file, struct user_namespace *ns, int cap); /* audit system wants to get cap info from files as well */ diff --git a/kernel/capability.c b/kernel/capability.c index f6c2ce5701e1..d52eecc0942b 100644 --- a/kernel/capability.c +++ b/kernel/capability.c @@ -445,22 +445,18 @@ bool nsown_capable(int cap) } /** - * inode_capable - Check superior capability over inode + * capable_wrt_inode_uidgid - Check nsown_capable and uid and gid mapped * @inode: The inode in question * @cap: The capability in question * - * Return true if the current task has the given superior capability - * targeted at it's own user namespace and that the given inode is owned - * by the current user namespace or a child namespace. - * - * Currently we check to see if an inode is owned by the current - * user namespace by seeing if the inode's owner maps into the - * current user namespace. - * + * Return true if the current task has the given capability targeted at + * its own user namespace and that the given inode's uid and gid are + * mapped into the current user namespace. */ -bool inode_capable(const struct inode *inode, int cap) +bool capable_wrt_inode_uidgid(const struct inode *inode, int cap) { struct user_namespace *ns = current_user_ns(); - return ns_capable(ns, cap) && kuid_has_mapping(ns, inode->i_uid); + return ns_capable(ns, cap) && kuid_has_mapping(ns, inode->i_uid) && + kgid_has_mapping(ns, inode->i_gid); } |