Merge tag 'arm64-fixes' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/arm64/linux

Pull arm64 fixes from Will Deacon:
 "The important one is a change to the way in which we handle protection
  keys around signal delivery so that we're more closely aligned with
  the x86 behaviour, however there is also a revert of the previous fix
  to disable software tag-based KASAN with GCC, since a workaround
  materialised shortly afterwards.

  I'd love to say we're done with 6.12, but we're aware of some
  longstanding fpsimd register corruption issues that we're almost at
  the bottom of resolving.

  Summary:

   - Fix handling of POR_EL0 during signal delivery so that pushing the
     signal context doesn't fail based on the pkey configuration of the
     interrupted context and align our user-visible behaviour with that
     of x86.

   - Fix a bogus pointer being passed to the CPU hotplug code from the
     Arm SDEI driver.

   - Re-enable software tag-based KASAN with GCC by using an alternative
     implementation of '__no_sanitize_address'"

* tag 'arm64-fixes' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/arm64/linux:
  arm64: signal: Improve POR_EL0 handling to avoid uaccess failures
  firmware: arm_sdei: Fix the input parameter of cpuhp_remove_state()
  Revert "kasan: Disable Software Tag-Based KASAN with GCC"
  kasan: Fix Software Tag-Based KASAN with GCC

4 files changed, 85 insertions, 20 deletions

diff --git a/arch/arm64/kernel/signal.c b/arch/arm64/kernel/signal.c
index 561986947530..c7d311d8b92a 100644
--- a/arch/arm64/kernel/signal.c
+++ b/arch/arm64/kernel/signal.c
@@ -19,6 +19,7 @@
 #include <linux/ratelimit.h>
 #include <linux/rseq.h>
 #include <linux/syscalls.h>
+#include <linux/pkeys.h>
 
 #include <asm/daifflags.h>
 #include <asm/debug-monitors.h>
@@ -66,10 +67,63 @@ struct rt_sigframe_user_layout {
 	unsigned long end_offset;
 };
 
+/*
+ * Holds any EL0-controlled state that influences unprivileged memory accesses.
+ * This includes both accesses done in userspace and uaccess done in the kernel.
+ *
+ * This state needs to be carefully managed to ensure that it doesn't cause
+ * uaccess to fail when setting up the signal frame, and the signal handler
+ * itself also expects a well-defined state when entered.
+ */
+struct user_access_state {
+	u64 por_el0;
+};
+
 #define BASE_SIGFRAME_SIZE round_up(sizeof(struct rt_sigframe), 16)
 #define TERMINATOR_SIZE round_up(sizeof(struct _aarch64_ctx), 16)
 #define EXTRA_CONTEXT_SIZE round_up(sizeof(struct extra_context), 16)
 
+/*
+ * Save the user access state into ua_state and reset it to disable any
+ * restrictions.
+ */
+static void save_reset_user_access_state(struct user_access_state *ua_state)
+{
+	if (system_supports_poe()) {
+		u64 por_enable_all = 0;
+
+		for (int pkey = 0; pkey < arch_max_pkey(); pkey++)
+			por_enable_all |= POE_RXW << (pkey * POR_BITS_PER_PKEY);
+
+		ua_state->por_el0 = read_sysreg_s(SYS_POR_EL0);
+		write_sysreg_s(por_enable_all, SYS_POR_EL0);
+		/* Ensure that any subsequent uaccess observes the updated value */
+		isb();
+	}
+}
+
+/*
+ * Set the user access state for invoking the signal handler.
+ *
+ * No uaccess should be done after that function is called.
+ */
+static void set_handler_user_access_state(void)
+{
+	if (system_supports_poe())
+		write_sysreg_s(POR_EL0_INIT, SYS_POR_EL0);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Restore the user access state to the values saved in ua_state.
+ *
+ * No uaccess should be done after that function is called.
+ */
+static void restore_user_access_state(const struct user_access_state *ua_state)
+{
+	if (system_supports_poe())
+		write_sysreg_s(ua_state->por_el0, SYS_POR_EL0);
+}
+
 static void init_user_layout(struct rt_sigframe_user_layout *user)
 {
 	const size_t reserved_size =
@@ -261,18 +315,20 @@ static int restore_fpmr_context(struct user_ctxs *user)
 	return err;
 }
 
-static int preserve_poe_context(struct poe_context __user *ctx)
+static int preserve_poe_context(struct poe_context __user *ctx,
+				const struct user_access_state *ua_state)
 {
 	int err = 0;
 
 	__put_user_error(POE_MAGIC, &ctx->head.magic, err);
 	__put_user_error(sizeof(*ctx), &ctx->head.size, err);
-	__put_user_error(read_sysreg_s(SYS_POR_EL0), &ctx->por_el0, err);
+	__put_user_error(ua_state->por_el0, &ctx->por_el0, err);
 
 	return err;
 }
 
-static int restore_poe_context(struct user_ctxs *user)
+static int restore_poe_context(struct user_ctxs *user,
+			       struct user_access_state *ua_state)
 {
 	u64 por_el0;
 	int err = 0;
@@ -282,7 +338,7 @@ static int restore_poe_context(struct user_ctxs *user)
 
 	__get_user_error(por_el0, &(user->poe->por_el0), err);
 	if (!err)
-		write_sysreg_s(por_el0, SYS_POR_EL0);
+		ua_state->por_el0 = por_el0;
 
 	return err;
 }
@@ -850,7 +906,8 @@ invalid:
 }
 
 static int restore_sigframe(struct pt_regs *regs,
-			    struct rt_sigframe __user *sf)
+			    struct rt_sigframe __user *sf,
+			    struct user_access_state *ua_state)
 {
 	sigset_t set;
 	int i, err;
@@ -899,7 +956,7 @@ static int restore_sigframe(struct pt_regs *regs,
 		err = restore_zt_context(&user);
 
 	if (err == 0 && system_supports_poe() && user.poe)
-		err = restore_poe_context(&user);
+		err = restore_poe_context(&user, ua_state);
 
 	return err;
 }
@@ -908,6 +965,7 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE0(rt_sigreturn)
 {
 	struct pt_regs *regs = current_pt_regs();
 	struct rt_sigframe __user *frame;
+	struct user_access_state ua_state;
 
 	/* Always make any pending restarted system calls return -EINTR */
 	current->restart_block.fn = do_no_restart_syscall;
@@ -924,12 +982,14 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE0(rt_sigreturn)
 	if (!access_ok(frame, sizeof (*frame)))
 		goto badframe;
 
-	if (restore_sigframe(regs, frame))
+	if (restore_sigframe(regs, frame, &ua_state))
 		goto badframe;
 
 	if (restore_altstack(&frame->uc.uc_stack))
 		goto badframe;
 
+	restore_user_access_state(&ua_state);
+
 	return regs->regs[0];
 
 badframe:
@@ -1035,7 +1095,8 @@ static int setup_sigframe_layout(struct rt_sigframe_user_layout *user,
 }
 
 static int setup_sigframe(struct rt_sigframe_user_layout *user,
-			  struct pt_regs *regs, sigset_t *set)
+			  struct pt_regs *regs, sigset_t *set,
+			  const struct user_access_state *ua_state)
 {
 	int i, err = 0;
 	struct rt_sigframe __user *sf = user->sigframe;
@@ -1097,10 +1158,9 @@ static int setup_sigframe(struct rt_sigframe_user_layout *user,
 		struct poe_context __user *poe_ctx =
 			apply_user_offset(user, user->poe_offset);
 
-		err |= preserve_poe_context(poe_ctx);
+		err |= preserve_poe_context(poe_ctx, ua_state);
 	}
 
-
 	/* ZA state if present */
 	if (system_supports_sme() && err == 0 && user->za_offset) {
 		struct za_context __user *za_ctx =
@@ -1237,9 +1297,6 @@ static void setup_return(struct pt_regs *regs, struct k_sigaction *ka,
 		sme_smstop();
 	}
 
-	if (system_supports_poe())
-		write_sysreg_s(POR_EL0_INIT, SYS_POR_EL0);
-
 	if (ka->sa.sa_flags & SA_RESTORER)
 		sigtramp = ka->sa.sa_restorer;
 	else
@@ -1253,6 +1310,7 @@ static int setup_rt_frame(int usig, struct ksignal *ksig, sigset_t *set,
 {
 	struct rt_sigframe_user_layout user;
 	struct rt_sigframe __user *frame;
+	struct user_access_state ua_state;
 	int err = 0;
 
 	fpsimd_signal_preserve_current_state();
@@ -1260,13 +1318,14 @@ static int setup_rt_frame(int usig, struct ksignal *ksig, sigset_t *set,
 	if (get_sigframe(&user, ksig, regs))
 		return 1;
 
+	save_reset_user_access_state(&ua_state);
 	frame = user.sigframe;
 
 	__put_user_error(0, &frame->uc.uc_flags, err);
 	__put_user_error(NULL, &frame->uc.uc_link, err);
 
 	err |= __save_altstack(&frame->uc.uc_stack, regs->sp);
-	err |= setup_sigframe(&user, regs, set);
+	err |= setup_sigframe(&user, regs, set, &ua_state);
 	if (err == 0) {
 		setup_return(regs, &ksig->ka, &user, usig);
 		if (ksig->ka.sa.sa_flags & SA_SIGINFO) {
@@ -1276,6 +1335,11 @@ static int setup_rt_frame(int usig, struct ksignal *ksig, sigset_t *set,
 		}
 	}
 
+	if (err == 0)
+		set_handler_user_access_state();
+	else
+		restore_user_access_state(&ua_state);
+
 	return err;
 }
 
diff --git a/drivers/firmware/arm_sdei.c b/drivers/firmware/arm_sdei.c
index 285fe7ad490d..3e8051fe8296 100644
--- a/drivers/firmware/arm_sdei.c
+++ b/drivers/firmware/arm_sdei.c
@@ -763,7 +763,7 @@ static int sdei_device_freeze(struct device *dev)
 	int err;
 
 	/* unregister private events */
-	cpuhp_remove_state(sdei_entry_point);
+	cpuhp_remove_state(sdei_hp_state);
 
 	err = sdei_unregister_shared();
 	if (err)
diff --git a/include/linux/compiler-gcc.h b/include/linux/compiler-gcc.h
index f805adaa316e..cd6f9aae311f 100644
--- a/include/linux/compiler-gcc.h
+++ b/include/linux/compiler-gcc.h
@@ -80,7 +80,11 @@
 #define __noscs __attribute__((__no_sanitize__("shadow-call-stack")))
 #endif
 
+#ifdef __SANITIZE_HWADDRESS__
+#define __no_sanitize_address __attribute__((__no_sanitize__("hwaddress")))
+#else
 #define __no_sanitize_address __attribute__((__no_sanitize_address__))
+#endif
 
 #if defined(__SANITIZE_THREAD__)
 #define __no_sanitize_thread __attribute__((__no_sanitize_thread__))
diff --git a/lib/Kconfig.kasan b/lib/Kconfig.kasan
index 233ab2096924..98016e137b7f 100644
--- a/lib/Kconfig.kasan
+++ b/lib/Kconfig.kasan
@@ -22,11 +22,8 @@ config ARCH_DISABLE_KASAN_INLINE
 config CC_HAS_KASAN_GENERIC
 	def_bool $(cc-option, -fsanitize=kernel-address)
 
-# GCC appears to ignore no_sanitize_address when -fsanitize=kernel-hwaddress
-# is passed. See https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=218854 (and
-# the linked LKML thread) for more details.
 config CC_HAS_KASAN_SW_TAGS
-	def_bool !CC_IS_GCC && $(cc-option, -fsanitize=kernel-hwaddress)
+	def_bool $(cc-option, -fsanitize=kernel-hwaddress)
 
 # This option is only required for software KASAN modes.
 # Old GCC versions do not have proper support for no_sanitize_address.
@@ -101,7 +98,7 @@ config KASAN_SW_TAGS
 	help
 	  Enables Software Tag-Based KASAN.
 
-	  Requires Clang.
+	  Requires GCC 11+ or Clang.
 
 	  Supported only on arm64 CPUs and relies on Top Byte Ignore.