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The domain layer FAM stores struct access_masks values directly, while a
ruleset stores the equivalent single mutable value. Per-category
permissions need additional per-layer data beyond the handled-access
bitfields.
Introduce struct layer_config as the common value type. Keeping the
handled bitfields in its .handled member leaves struct access_masks as a
lightweight parameter type for functions that only need those bitfields,
while the complete layer can be snapshotted with one assignment.
At this point struct layer_config only wraps the four-byte access_masks,
so it does not grow the per-domain allocation: the maximum 16-entry FAM
remains 64 bytes.
No functional change.
Cc: Günther Noack <gnoack@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Günther Noack <gnoack@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Tingmao Wang <m@maowtm.org>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20261014082718.1435842-3-mic@digikod.net
Signed-off-by: Mickaël Salaün <mic@digikod.net>
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The base stores the fs/net/scope quiet bitmasks in a struct access_masks
field named quiet_masks. A following commit adds the sibling struct
permission_masks field quiet_permission for capabilities and namespaces.
quiet_masks drops the access category and keeps the type half ("masks"),
while quiet_permission keeps the category and drops the type half, so
the two read as an inconsistent pair.
Rename the base field to quiet_access, giving the symmetric,
category-named pair quiet_access/quiet_permission that also matches the
UAPI handled_access_*/quiet_access_* naming. This is a
no-functional-change rename.
Cc: Günther Noack <gnoack@google.com>
Cc: Tingmao Wang <m@maowtm.org>
Reviewed-by: Tingmao Wang <m@maowtm.org>
Reviewed-by: Günther Noack <gnoack3000@gmail.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20261014082718.1435842-2-mic@digikod.net
Signed-off-by: Mickaël Salaün <mic@digikod.net>
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Merge the 4 namespace-related LSM and audit patches:
- 4f238e6e1c2c ("ns: Free anonymous mount namespaces via ns_common_free()")
- f675d2e95569 ("lsm: add LSM blob and hooks for namespaces")
- e26307d83048 ("lsm: add LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NS for namespace audit records")
- 11d73af7b083 ("lsm: update the BUILD_BUG_ON() in audit_log_lsm_data()")
A credential fix precede these commits.
Align with conflict resolution from commit 436485132d23 ("Automated
merge of 'lsm/dev' into 'stable-7.4'").
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/CAHC9VhSJ3jRybaU=6y2kOKA=KpGE8r=QTMPwdD3KptGcB7msTw@mail.gmail.com
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/CAHC9VhQQGcKJU_HF78cMSuCPf=2tj8xW78ELOYwb1xJJU8tuRA@mail.gmail.com
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20261020.oa9oezae6aX6@digikod.net/
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git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/vfs/vfs
Pull vfs idmap constification from Christian Brauner:
"This makes struct mnt_idmap const throughout the tree.
A mount's idmapping is immutable. The only thing modified after
alloc_mnt_idmap() is the reference count and that is hidden behind
mnt_idmap_get() and mnt_idmap_put(). Everything else only reads from
it. That is the same model struct cred uses and the idmapping is
sensitive enough to deserve it.
The conversion goes bottom up through the vfs{g,u}id and fs{g,u}id
helpers, the privilege checks, acl, xattr and quota and then every
inode operation that takes an idmap, so ->permission(), ->getattr(),
->setattr(), ->create(), ->mkdir(), ->mknod(), ->symlink(),
->rename(), ->tmpfile(), ->get_acl(), ->set_acl() and ->fileattr_set()
with their implementations in every filesystem, plus the LSM hooks.
struct vfsmount, struct mount_kattr and struct kstatmount store a
const pointer and nop_mnt_idmap and invalid_mnt_idmap live in rodata,
so anything that tries to modify them faults instead of silently
corrupting the initial idmapping"
* tag 'vfs-7.4-rc1.idmap' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/vfs/vfs: (27 commits)
fs: make nop_mnt_idmap and invalid_mnt_idmap const
fs: port mnt_idmap() and file_mnt_idmap() to const mnt_idmap
fs: port vfs_*() helpers to const mnt_idmap
fs: port ->setattr() to pass const mnt_idmap
fs: port ->getattr() to pass const mnt_idmap
fs: port ->create() to pass const mnt_idmap
fs: port ->symlink() to pass const mnt_idmap
fs: port ->mkdir() to pass const mnt_idmap
fs: port ->rename() to pass const mnt_idmap
fs: port ->mknod() to pass const mnt_idmap
fs: port ->tmpfile() to pass const mnt_idmap
fs: port ->get_acl() to pass const mnt_idmap
fs: port ->set_acl() to pass const mnt_idmap
fs: port ->fileattr_set() to pass const mnt_idmap
fs: port xattr to const mnt_idmap
fs: port ->permission() to pass const mnt_idmap
fs: port acl to const mnt_idmap
fs: port inode_init_owner() to const mnt_idmap
fs: port inode_owner_or_capable() to const mnt_idmap
fs: port privilege checking helpers to const mnt_idmap
...
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ipe_audit_enforce() starts an audit buffer but writes the state change
with audit_log(), which logs its own record. Ending the unused buffer
then emits an extra empty AUDIT_MAC_STATUS record.
Remove the unused buffer and log the state change with audit_log()
alone.
Fixes: a68916eaedcd ("ipe: add permissive toggle")
Assisted-by: LLM
Signed-off-by: Fan Wu <wufan@kernel.org>
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Policy text is separately allocated only when p->pkcs7 is NULL.
Correct the comment to match the existing free logic.
No functional changes.
Assisted-by: LLM
Signed-off-by: Fan Wu <wufan@kernel.org>
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The parser token tables contain one entry for each enum value followed
by a terminator. Add static assertions so adding an enum value without a
corresponding token fails the build.
Assisted-by: LLM
Signed-off-by: Fan Wu <wufan@kernel.org>
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The audit name tables are indexed by enum values but initialized
positionally. Adding an enum value in the middle can associate the
following names with the wrong values.
Use designated initializers to bind each name to its enum value.
No functional changes.
Assisted-by: LLM
Signed-off-by: Fan Wu <wufan@kernel.org>
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token_default() does not modify its argument, so make it const.
Assisted-by: LLM
Signed-off-by: Fan Wu <wufan@kernel.org>
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tpm2_key_decode() allocates 4 bytes more than needed. The ASN.1
callbacks tpm2_key_priv() and tpm2_key_pub() provide the lengths
of TPM2B_PRIVATE and TPM2B_PUBLIC, so ctx.priv_len and ctx.pub_len
already account for the 2-byte `size` field each of those structures
starts with.
I noticed this while reviewing commit 114f00d738f1 ("KEYS: trusted:
Fix tpm2_load_cmd() boundary check"), which correctly reports
ctx.priv_len + ctx.pub_len as the decoded blob size [1].
Let's allocate exactly that amount, matching the data copied into
the blob.
[1] https://lore.kernel.org/linux-integrity/apfoKo-BdwaLXtkT@sgarzare-redhat/
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v5.13+
Fixes: f2219745250f ("security: keys: trusted: use ASN.1 TPM2 key format for the blobs")
Signed-off-by: Stefano Garzarella <sgarzare@redhat.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20260923173506.41519-1-sgarzare@redhat.com
Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
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trusted_tpm_unseal() proceeds to pcrlock() when the TPM unseal operation
fails. If pcrlock() succeeds, its return value overwrites the unseal error,
causing key instantiation to succeed.
Return immediately when unseal fails to preserve the original error.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v5.15+
Fixes: 5d0682be3189 ("KEYS: trusted: Add generic trusted keys framework")
Signed-off-by: Srish Srinivasan <ssrish@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20260912062950.279104-2-ssrish@linux.ibm.com
Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
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Manual merge fixup in ns_common_types.h:ns_common to work around a conflict
with the nsfs RCU grace period fix.
* lsm/dev:
lsm: remove redundant NULL check in security_init()
selftests/landlock: Check full ioctl commands in audit records
lsm: Preserve full ioctl commands in audit records
doc: fix LSM ordering description for /sys/kernel/security/lsm
doc: describe CONFIG_LSM and lsm= as the selection mechanism
selftests/bpf: verify mount idmaps reach inode hooks
lsm: expose mount idmaps to inode hooks
rust: lsm: replace `core::mem::zeroed` with `pin_init::zeroed`
cred: prevent slab cache merging for cred_jar
lsm: don't call security_backing_file_free() multiple times
lsm: delete duplicate assignment in lsm_prepare()
lsm: update the BUILD_BUG_ON() in audit_log_lsm_data()
lsm: add LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NS for namespace audit records
lsm: add LSM blob and hooks for namespaces
ns: Free anonymous mount namespaces via ns_common_free()
cred: clarify that task_struct::cred is only for the current task
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ima_restore_measurement_list() parses the measurement list persisted across
kexec. It computes the parse end directly from the blob:
bufendp = buf + khdr->buffer_size;
khdr->buffer_size is a u64 read straight from the persisted buffer. The
only length checks in the function are size >= sizeof(*khdr), version == 1
and count -- none relates buffer_size to size, the actual buffer size the
caller (ima_load_kexec_buffer()) obtained from the ima-kexec-buffer region.
ima_parse_buf() bounds every field read to bufendp, so a blob whose
internal buffer_size exceeds the real size makes the parse loop read past
the end of the buffer (CWE-125).
The buffer's memory range is validated against addressable RAM by
commit cbf9c4b9617b ("of: check previous kernel's ima-kexec-buffer
against memory bounds") and commit c5489d04337b ("x86/kexec: add a
sanity check on previous kernel's ima kexec buffer"), but the blob's
own declared size is never clamped to it. Reject a buffer_size larger
than size before the loop.
This is on the boot-time kexec-restore path (__init) and the buffer comes
from the previous kernel, so triggering it requires control of the
persisted buffer; it is an out-of-bounds read only.
Fixes: 94c3aac567a9 ("ima: on soft reboot, restore the measurement list")
Assisted-by: copilot-cli:claude-opus-4-6 frama-c
Signed-off-by: Fabrice Derepas <fabrice.derepas@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
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When recovering the IMA measurement list after kexec(), currently, the
counter of violations is not restored. This causes a mismatch between
the real number of violations and the value reported by the
<securityfs>/ima/violations file.
Restore the violations counter during the IMA measurement list recovery.
This mechanism does not take into account false positives. A legit
all-zeros hash is treated as a violation.
Reported-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com>
Closes: https://github.com/linux-integrity/linux/issues/13
Signed-off-by: Enrico Bravi <enrico.bravi@polito.it>
Reviewed-and-tested-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com>
[zohar@linux.ibm.com: Fixed patch description line length]
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
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Same problem as the dm-verity keyring: .fs-verity is allocated unlinked,
so the only way for userspace to name it is to scrape /proc/keys.
Suggested-by: Christian Brauner (Amutable) <brauner@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Christian Brauner (Amutable) <brauner@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Halaney <andrew@amutable.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20261008-ajhalaney-dmverity-key-identifier-v2-2-008456d189cb@amutable.com
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner (Amutable) <brauner@kernel.org>
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The .dm-verity keyring is not linked into any process keyring, so
request_key() and KEYCTL_SEARCH cannot find it. Userspace has to scrape
/proc/keys for the serial to use.
That's not great, one could put in a bogus description containing
a newline to confuse userspace further. For example, thanks to AI
models, which I run as root but you could show off as any old user:
# DESC=$'.dm-verity: 1\n0badf00d I--Q--- 1 perm 082f0000 0 0 keyring .dm-verity'
# k=$(echo -n "1234567" | keyctl padd user "$DESC" @s)
# keyctl setperm "$k" 0x3f010001
# cat /proc/keys | grep dm-verity
10402023 I------ 2 perm 082f0000 0 0 keyring .dm-verity: empty
12e0bee6 I--Q--- 1 perm 3f010001 0 0 user .dm-verity: 1
0badf00d I--Q--- 1 perm 082f0000 0 0 keyring .dm-verity: 7
0x0badf00d is not a keyring, it is the text inside our user's key
description. Telling the two apart needs a KEYCTL_DESCRIBE per row
which is annoying to do. i.e.:
# keyctl rdescribe 0x10402023
keyring;0;0;082f0000;.dm-verity
# keyctl rdescribe 0x0badf00d
keyctl_describe: Required key not available
Let's just give it a well known identifier, i.e.:
# keyctl rdescribe -10
keyring;0;0;082f0000;.dm-verity
This is exactly what
commit 264d8fd2794f ("bpf, keys: Add a bpf keyring for program signature validation")
did, and was the inspiration for this commit minus the spinlock bits
required due to dm-verity being a module.
Suggested-by: Christian Brauner (Amutable) <brauner@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Christian Brauner (Amutable) <brauner@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Halaney <andrew@amutable.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20261008-ajhalaney-dmverity-key-identifier-v2-1-008456d189cb@amutable.com
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner (Amutable) <brauner@kernel.org>
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git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/mic/linux
Pull Landlock fix from Mickaël Salaün:
"This fixes a Clang bug by removing an annotation, which was introduced
mostly for documentation"
* tag 'landlock-7.3-rc7' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/mic/linux:
landlock: Drop __counted_by from landlock_domain.handled_masks
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With clang 22 and CONFIG_FORTIFY_SOURCE, the second
landlock_restrict_self() call hits a bogus fortify report in
inherit_ruleset():
memcpy: detected buffer overflow: 4 byte write of buffer size 0
Call Trace:
__fortify_panic
landlock_merge_ruleset
__se_sys_landlock_restrict_self
handled_masks[] lives in an anonymous struct inside the anonymous union
that overlays work_free. For such a flexible array, clang computes the
address of the __counted_by counter as the start of the array instead of
&num_layers. The bound is then read from handled_masks[0], i.e. from
the first layer's access masks, which is not a count. The same layout
crashes clang itself in a standalone test.
The annotation was added as documentation, so drop it rather than
restructure the union. Keep the information in the member comment.
Reported-by: syzbot+a0eecb22de4d821a9e5d@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Closes: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=a0eecb22de4d821a9e5d
Fixes: bd3a19800dd1 ("landlock: Add counted_by in landlock_domain")
Signed-off-by: Nguyen Ngoc Thang <ngocthang2710.1999@gmail.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20261010164450.194439-1-ngocthang2710.1999@gmail.com
Reviewed-by: Günther Noack <gnoack3000@gmail.com>
Reported-by: Konrad Dybcio <konrad.dybcio@oss.qualcomm.com>
Reported-by: Mike Bommarito <michael.bommarito@gmail.com>
Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20261009115108.17819-1-michael.bommarito@gmail.com
[mic: Rebased on master, where the array is handled_masks[], updated the
fortify report, added the clang bug link and the other reports]
Signed-off-by: Mickaël Salaün <mic@digikod.net>
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git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jarkko/linux-tpmdd
Pull keys fixes from Jarkko Sakkinen:
- key_get_persistent() created a new persistent keyring if one did not
exist, but failed to set a timeout on it in an error path, preventing
GC.
Call key_set_timeout() regardless of key_link() result if a
persistent keyring was created.
- __key_create_or_update() made a copy of keyring->restrict_link before
holding keyring->sem, which could cause add_key() to be executed
against stale keyring restrictions. Fix it by copying the value only
after taking keyring->sem
* tag 'keys-v7.3-rc7' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jarkko/linux-tpmdd:
KEYS: Fix add_key() race with keyring restriction
keys: finalize persistent keyring timeout after link attempt
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git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/selinux
Pull selinux fixes from Paul Moore:
- Preserve SECURITY_LSM_NATIVE_LABELS when reusing superblocks
Similar to a previous fix (see the commit description of Stephen's
fix) we need to check to see if we have already mounted/setup the
superblock passed into the security_sb_set_mnt_opts() LSM hook so we
don't mistakenly unset SECURITY_LSM_NATIVE_LABELS.
- Fix a potential AVC sequence number data race
* tag 'selinux-pr-20261005' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/selinux:
selinux: preserve NATIVE_LABELS on already-initialized sb in set_mnt_opts
selinux: fix data race on AVC latest_notif
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__key_create_or_update() snapshots keyring->restrict_link before taking
the destination keyring's semaphore. keyring_restrict() installs a
restriction while holding that semaphore.
This allows a writer to observe no restriction, wait for the keyring
owner to install a reject-all restriction and return successfully, and
then link a key using the stale NULL snapshot. The writer only needs
write permission on the destination keyring.
Move the restrict_link read after __key_link_lock() and
__key_link_begin(). The read and the subsequent restriction check are
then serialized with restriction installation by keyring->sem.
The race was reproduced on v7.2.8 in 19 executions where restriction
installation returned before the link completed. All 19 linked the key
despite the reject-all restriction. With this change, 312 executions
reached the same ordering and every add_key() call failed with -EPERM.
The issue was found by manual concurrency analysis assisted by AI-based
analysis and independently verified with a QEMU reproducer and kernel
instrumentation.
Fixes: 5ac7eace2d00 ("KEYS: Add a facility to restrict new links into a keyring")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: 성병찬 <tjdqudcks0424@naver.com>
Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20260930041802.6114-1-tjdqudcks0424@naver.com
Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
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When no keyring exists for the requested UID, KEYCTL_GET_PERSISTENT
creates and registers one before linking it to the requested destination.
The configured timeout is set only after the destination link succeeds.
A destination restricted with KEYCTL_RESTRICT_KEYRING makes that link fail
with -EPERM. With persistent_keyring_expiry set to 60 seconds, /proc/keys
still reports the registered keyring's expiry as "perm".
The failed call therefore leaves a quota-exempt keyring in the namespace's
hidden register, where it may remain until namespace teardown.
Rename the write-locked helper to key_get_or_create_persistent() and return
the key reference through a result parameter. Return 0 when it creates a
keyring and 1 when the retry finds an existing one. Return a negative error
on failure. Another caller may create the keyring between the initial
read-locked lookup and the retry under the write lock.
Set the timeout after permission checking and linking. Do this on success,
or on failure if the call allocated the keyring. This leaves a new keyring
collectible after failure without starting its timeout while linking is
still in progress.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v5.10+
Fixes: f36f8c75ae2e ("KEYS: Add per-user_namespace registers for persistent per-UID kerberos caches")
Assisted-by: LLM
Signed-off-by: Karl Mehltretter <kmehltretter@gmail.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20260912095440.79864-1-kmehltretter@gmail.com
Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
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Cross-merge BPF and other fixes after downstream PR.
Conflicts:
arch/arm64/net/bpf_jit_comp.c
arch/x86/net/bpf_jit_comp.c
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
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The permissive and neveraudit maps are read as ebitmaps and indexed by
type value, but their set bits are never checked. A bit that is not a
defined, non-attribute type is silently accepted. Validate every set bit
of both maps in policydb_index() with policydb_simpletype_isvalid().
Signed-off-by: Christian Göttsche <cgzones@googlemail.com>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
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user_read() reads each user's MLS range and default level but, unlike
range transitions and security contexts, never validates them.
Validate usr->range and usr->dfltlevel in user_index_check() when MLS is
enabled, once the level and category symbol tables are populated.
Signed-off-by: Christian Göttsche <cgzones@googlemail.com>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
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role->dominates, role->types and user->roles are read as ebitmaps but
their set bits are never checked against the role and type symbol
tables. A bit naming an undefined value is silently accepted, and an
out-of-range one is used to index those tables later; in particular
role_bounds_sanity_check() passes such a bit straight to sym_name(),
reading p->sym_val_to_name[] out of bounds on a crafted bounded role.
Validate the three bitmaps in policydb_index() once every symbol table
is populated (roles are read before types, so this cannot be done in
role_read()).
Signed-off-by: Christian Göttsche <cgzones@googlemail.com>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
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When an NFSv4 filesystem exported with security_label is mounted a
second time, sget_fc() returns the existing superblock and
nfs_get_root() calls security_sb_set_mnt_opts() again on it. Since the
superblock is already SB_INITIALIZED, selinux_set_mnt_opts() takes an
early exit without setting SECURITY_LSM_NATIVE_LABELS in
*set_kern_flags. nfs_get_root() then sees kflags without
SECURITY_LSM_NATIVE_LABELS set and clears NFS_CAP_SECURITY_LABEL on
the shared nfs_server, silently disabling per-file labeling for both
the new and the original mount.
Commit 3815a245b501 ("security/selinux: fix SECURITY_LSM_NATIVE_LABELS
on reused superblock") fixed the same problem in
selinux_sb_clone_mnt_opts(). The reused-superblock path for a plain
second mount now goes through sb_set_mnt_opts rather than
sb_clone_mnt_opts, so it needs the same treatment: on both
SE_SBINITIALIZED early exits, set SECURITY_LSM_NATIVE_LABELS in
*set_kern_flags when the superblock was already using
SECURITY_FS_USE_NATVE.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Closes: https://github.com/SELinuxProject/selinux-kernel/issues/69
Closes: https://github.com/SELinuxProject/selinux-kernel/issues/70
Closes: https://github.com/SELinuxProject/selinux-testsuite/issues/91
Closes: https://github.com/SELinuxProject/selinux-testsuite/issues/92
Fixes: eb9ae686507b ("SELinux: Add new labeling type native labels")
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
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Clear the hmac_sha1_ctx structure via __cleanup(hmac_sha1_zeroize_ctx)
to make sure that the function does not leak sensitive data on the stack
when returning without calling hmac_sha1_final().
Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Huth <thuth@redhat.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260916095022.604354-10-thuth@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@kernel.org>
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Since commit 5137e583ba26 ("lsm: cleanup the debug and console output
in lsm_init.c"), the NULL check for lsm_order_legacy in security_init()
has no effect.
So remove the check.
No functional change.
Signed-off-by: Sang-Heon Jeon <ekffu200098@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
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Now that integrity_audit_msg() accepts an errno parameter, it is
equivalent to integrity_audit_message(). Replace the remaining
integrity_audit_message() call sites with integrity_audit_msg() and remove
integrity_audit_message().
Signed-off-by: Frederick Lawler <fred@cloudflare.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
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integrity_audit_msg() hides error codes by wrapping
integrity_audit_message() which obfuscates the underlying reason for the
failure.
Update integrity_audit_msg() to take a errno argument, and pass that
through to integrity_audit_message(). Then update call sites to
take caller's respective error codes.
ima_appraise_measurement() stores xattr_len as the return code, but
can replace it with a error code later. Therefore conditionally use
a code if rc < 0, otherwise report zero. Lastly, conditionally use
-EINVAL for ima_release_policy().
Signed-off-by: Frederick Lawler <fred@cloudflare.com>
Reviewed-by: Enrico Bravi <enrico.bravi@polito.it>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
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git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/wufan/ipe
Pull IPE fixes from Fan Wu:
"Two fixes for use-after-free issues found by recent LLM-assisted code
analysis.
- move successful policy load auditing under the new policy
directory's inode lock, preventing a concurrent policy deletion
from freeing the policy while it is still being audited
- protect the dm-verity root hash with RCU, preventing policy
evaluation from racing with root hash replacement during preresume"
* tag 'ipe-pr-20260925' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/wufan/ipe:
ipe: protect the dm-verity root hash with RCU
ipe: fix use-after-free when auditing a newly loaded policy
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ipe_bdev_setintegrity() frees the old root hash when dm-verity publishes
a new one on ->preresume, while policy evaluation can still be
dereferencing it.
Protect the root hash with RCU. The evaluation path already runs under
rcu_read_lock().
Fixes: e155858dd995 ("ipe: add support for dm-verity as a trust provider")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Assisted-by: LLM
[FW: remove model name according to latest guideline]
Signed-off-by: Fan Wu <wufan@kernel.org>
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new_policy() audits the policy after ipe_new_policyfs_node() publishes it
and drops the new directory's inode lock. A concurrent delete can free
the policy while ipe_audit_policy_load() is still using it.
Audit the successful load under that lock.
Fixes: f44554b5067b ("audit,ipe: add IPE auditing support")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Assisted-by: LLM
[FW: remove model name according to latest guideline]
Signed-off-by: Fan Wu <wufan@kernel.org>
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avc_policy_seqno() reads latest_notif without holding notif_lock, while
avc_latest_notif_update() can update it under that lock. KCSAN reports
these concurrent accesses during policy boolean updates and permission
checks.
Use READ_ONCE() for the lockless read and WRITE_ONCE() for the update.
The spinlock continues to serialize the comparison and update against
other writers. Reads made while holding notif_lock cannot race with a
writer and can remain plain accesses.
This marks both sides of the intentional concurrent access and constrains
compiler transformations, without suppressing checking with data_race().
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: 788e7dd4c22e ("SELinux: Improve read/write performance")
Reported-by: syzbot+a7f7cb0737bd91aa698c@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Closes: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=a7f7cb0737bd91aa698c
Signed-off-by: Christian Göttsche <cgzones@googlemail.com>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
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avc_audit_required() returns early for a neveraudit domain, while
avc_xperms_audit_required() instead relies on security_compute_av()
(and security_compute_av_user()) having already zeroed
avd->auditallow and avd->auditdeny for such a domain. That leaves
its "else if (result)" branch as the only way left to audit a
neveraudit domain, and makes the two helpers read differently for
the same rule.
Add the same early return to avc_xperms_audit_required(), so both
audit gates state the neveraudit rule directly and the extended
permission audit path no longer depends on the auditallow/auditdeny
mask having been zeroed elsewhere.
No behavior changes today: avc_has_extended_perms() only reaches the
"result" branch once the identically computed "denied" is already
nonzero, so that branch was already unreachable in practice.
Signed-off-by: Christian Göttsche <cgzones@googlemail.com>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
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filename_trans_read_helper() validates the target type, target class and
each datum's otype, but the per-datum stypes ebitmap is read without any
bound on its set bits.
Reject a stypes bitmap whose highest set bit is not a defined type.
Signed-off-by: Christian Göttsche <cgzones@googlemail.com>
Reviewed-by: Stephen Smalley <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
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The symbol index functions assign unconditionally, so two symbols that
share a value silently overwrite each other and leave another value with
no entry.
Reject a value whose slot is already populated, for commons, classes,
roles, types, users, sensitivities and categories;
booleans already have their own "declared but not defined" check.
Signed-off-by: Christian Göttsche <cgzones@googlemail.com>
Reviewed-by: Stephen Smalley <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
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handle-unknown is a single three-valued choice - deny, reject or allow -
but the policydb header spells it as two independent bits and
policydb_read() takes any combination of them.
libsepol writes exactly one of the three values
(POLICYDB_CONFIG_UNKNOWN_MASK & p->handle_unknown), so no policy built by
the reference toolchain carries this combination.
Signed-off-by: Christian Göttsche <cgzones@googlemail.com>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
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Constify read-only decision structs to ease reasoning where decisions
are actually modified, and where only processed.
Signed-off-by: Christian Göttsche <cgzones@googlemail.com>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com>
[PM: fixed line length issues]
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
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git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/mic/linux
Pull Landlock fixes from Mickaël Salaün:
"This mainly fixes the Landlock tracepoint support merged this cycle so
that denial and rule events report the intended policy context,
whether through tracefs or BTF-visible callbacks.
The size of this all is mainly from propagating the corrected contract
through event definitions and producers, adding new tests for the
reported context, and updating the documentation.
Also improve annotation and fix a GCC 16 build warning"
* tag 'landlock-7.3-rc5' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/mic/linux:
landlock: Widen ruleset versions to 64 bits
landlock: Add counted_by in landlock_domain
landlock: Fix tracepoint contract documentation
selftests/landlock: Test network denial context
selftests/landlock: Test filesystem denial blockers
landlock: Report the effective signal number
landlock: Report the actual ptrace tracer
landlock: Fix network denial trace context
landlock: Fix rule tracepoint context
landlock: Fix filesystem denial blocker reporting
landlock: Fix tracepoint fixed-width type names
landlock: Work around gcc-16 -Wuninitialized warning
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Cross-merge BPF and other fixes after downstream PR.
Conflicts:
kernel/bpf/helpers.c
tools/testing/selftests/bpf/prog_tests/cb_refs.c
tools/testing/selftests/bpf/prog_tests/verifier.c
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
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Now that everything takes a mnt_idmap as const store a const pointer in
struct vfsmount, struct mount_kattr and struct kstatmount and return one
from mnt_idmap(), file_mnt_idmap() and ovl_upper_mnt_idmap(). Finally,
also make mnt_idmap_get() return a const pointer. Also convert the
remaining local variables that are initialized from the accessors.
alloc_mnt_idmap() keeps returning a non-const pointer. It is the only
place where an idmapping is actually written to.
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260901-work-idmap-const-v1-26-54ccd48e100b@kernel.org
Reviewed-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Reviewed-by: Seth Forshee <sforshee@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner (Amutable) <brauner@kernel.org>
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Convert to const struct mnt_idmap.
A mount's idmapping is immutable. The only thing that is allowed to be
modified afterwards is the reference count and that is hidden behind
mnt_idmap_get() and mnt_idmap_put(). Everything else only ever reads
from the idmapping. This is the same model that struct cred uses and the
idmapping is also rather sensitive.
So make the idmap argument const wherever we can. The conversion is done
from the bottom up so callers can continue to pass a non-const pointer
to a const parameter until the conversion is finished.
No functional changes.
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260901-work-idmap-const-v1-24-54ccd48e100b@kernel.org
Acked-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Reviewed-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Reviewed-by: Seth Forshee <sforshee@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner (Amutable) <brauner@kernel.org>
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Convert to const struct mnt_idmap.
A mount's idmapping is immutable. The only thing that is allowed to be
modified afterwards is the reference count and that is hidden behind
mnt_idmap_get() and mnt_idmap_put(). Everything else only ever reads
from the idmapping. This is the same model that struct cred uses and the
idmapping is also rather sensitive.
So make the idmap argument const wherever we can. The conversion is done
from the bottom up so callers can continue to pass a non-const pointer
to a const parameter until the conversion is finished.
No functional changes.
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260901-work-idmap-const-v1-20-54ccd48e100b@kernel.org
Reviewed-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Reviewed-by: Seth Forshee <sforshee@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner (Amutable) <brauner@kernel.org>
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Convert to const struct mnt_idmap.
A mount's idmapping is immutable. The only thing that is allowed to be
modified afterwards is the reference count and that is hidden behind
mnt_idmap_get() and mnt_idmap_put(). Everything else only ever reads
from the idmapping. This is the same model that struct cred uses and the
idmapping is also rather sensitive.
So make the idmap argument const wherever we can. The conversion is done
from the bottom up so callers can continue to pass a non-const pointer
to a const parameter until the conversion is finished.
No functional changes.
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260901-work-idmap-const-v1-18-54ccd48e100b@kernel.org
Acked-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Reviewed-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Reviewed-by: Seth Forshee <sforshee@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner (Amutable) <brauner@kernel.org>
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Convert to const struct mnt_idmap.
A mount's idmapping is immutable. The only thing that is allowed to be
modified afterwards is the reference count and that is hidden behind
mnt_idmap_get() and mnt_idmap_put(). Everything else only ever reads
from the idmapping. This is the same model that struct cred uses and the
idmapping is also rather sensitive.
So make the idmap argument const wherever we can. The conversion is done
from the bottom up so callers can continue to pass a non-const pointer
to a const parameter until the conversion is finished.
No functional changes.
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260901-work-idmap-const-v1-17-54ccd48e100b@kernel.org
Acked-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Reviewed-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Reviewed-by: Seth Forshee <sforshee@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner (Amutable) <brauner@kernel.org>
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Convert to const struct mnt_idmap.
A mount's idmapping is immutable. The only thing that is allowed to be
modified afterwards is the reference count and that is hidden behind
mnt_idmap_get() and mnt_idmap_put(). Everything else only ever reads
from the idmapping. This is the same model that struct cred uses and the
idmapping is also rather sensitive.
So make the idmap argument const wherever we can. The conversion is done
from the bottom up so callers can continue to pass a non-const pointer
to a const parameter until the conversion is finished.
No functional changes.
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260901-work-idmap-const-v1-13-54ccd48e100b@kernel.org
Acked-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Reviewed-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Reviewed-by: Seth Forshee <sforshee@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner (Amutable) <brauner@kernel.org>
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|
Convert to const struct mnt_idmap.
A mount's idmapping is immutable. The only thing that is allowed to be
modified afterwards is the reference count and that is hidden behind
mnt_idmap_get() and mnt_idmap_put(). Everything else only ever reads
from the idmapping. This is the same model that struct cred uses and the
idmapping is also rather sensitive.
So make the idmap argument const wherever we can. The conversion is done
from the bottom up so callers can continue to pass a non-const pointer
to a const parameter until the conversion is finished.
No functional changes.
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260901-work-idmap-const-v1-12-54ccd48e100b@kernel.org
Acked-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Reviewed-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Reviewed-by: Seth Forshee <sforshee@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner (Amutable) <brauner@kernel.org>
|
|
Convert to const struct mnt_idmap.
A mount's idmapping is immutable. The only thing that is allowed to be
modified afterwards is the reference count and that is hidden behind
mnt_idmap_get() and mnt_idmap_put(). Everything else only ever reads
from the idmapping. This is the same model that struct cred uses and the
idmapping is also rather sensitive.
So make the idmap argument const wherever we can. The conversion is done
from the bottom up so callers can continue to pass a non-const pointer
to a const parameter until the conversion is finished.
No functional changes.
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260901-work-idmap-const-v1-11-54ccd48e100b@kernel.org
Acked-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Reviewed-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Reviewed-by: Seth Forshee <sforshee@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner (Amutable) <brauner@kernel.org>
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