From dbca9dfd3bfc6fd3592a0fee997bf418f805c321 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Tianchu Chen Date: Wed, 23 Sep 2026 14:43:51 +0000 Subject: wifi: mwifiex: bound SDIO fw dump count by memory table size mwifiex_sdio_fw_dump() reads the number of memory regions (dump_num) from a device register and uses it to index the static 15-entry mem_type_mapping_tbl[] without any bounds check. A bogus device can report a dump_num larger than the table; each out-of-table loop iteration then reads entry->mem_name and entry->done_flag and stores a vmalloc pointer and a device-controlled size past the end of the table, into adjacent .data (up to ~5.6KiB when dump_num is 255). The dump path runs after command timeouts or firmware crashes, so a bogus device can first force an error to trigger the dump and then report a bogus dump_num. Limit dump_num to the table size instead of aborting the dump. This is not expected to change the behavior on normal devices. Discovered by Atuin - Automated Vulnerability Discovery Engine. Assisted-by: LLM Signed-off-by: Tianchu Chen Acked-by: Brian Norris Link: https://patch.msgid.link/33a45fd59b5569cbce79142d2e012e191989ec26@linux.dev Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg --- drivers/net/wireless/marvell/mwifiex/sdio.c | 3 +++ 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+) (limited to 'drivers') diff --git a/drivers/net/wireless/marvell/mwifiex/sdio.c b/drivers/net/wireless/marvell/mwifiex/sdio.c index f039d6f19183..c15d6e1dd8f6 100644 --- a/drivers/net/wireless/marvell/mwifiex/sdio.c +++ b/drivers/net/wireless/marvell/mwifiex/sdio.c @@ -2795,6 +2795,9 @@ static void mwifiex_sdio_fw_dump(struct mwifiex_adapter *adapter) mwifiex_dbg(adapter, ERROR, "SDIO read memory length err\n"); goto done; } + /* Limit the dump count to the memory table size */ + if (dump_num > ARRAY_SIZE(mem_type_mapping_tbl)) + dump_num = ARRAY_SIZE(mem_type_mapping_tbl); /* Read the length of every memory which will dump */ for (idx = 0; idx < dump_num; idx++) { -- cgit v1.2.3