From 377e3f2d41309e55a915f79510db4372f9688c07 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Thomas Weißschuh <thomas.weissschuh@linutronix.de>
Date: Thu, 2 Jul 2026 10:21:31 +0200
Subject: MIPS: VDSO: Respect COMPAT_32BIT_TIME
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit

If CONFIG_COMPAT_32BIT_TIME is disabled then the vDSO should not
provide any 32-bit time related functionality. This is the intended
effect of the kconfig option and also the fallback system calls would
also not be implemented.

Signed-off-by: Thomas Weißschuh <thomas.weissschuh@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260702-vdso-compat_32bit_time-v3-7-db9f36d8d432@linutronix.de
---
 arch/mips/vdso/vdso.lds.S      | 2 ++
 arch/mips/vdso/vgettimeofday.c | 3 +++
 2 files changed, 5 insertions(+)

(limited to 'arch/mips')

diff --git a/arch/mips/vdso/vdso.lds.S b/arch/mips/vdso/vdso.lds.S
index 278ab6444e98..b11ee493c67f 100644
--- a/arch/mips/vdso/vdso.lds.S
+++ b/arch/mips/vdso/vdso.lds.S
@@ -97,9 +97,11 @@ VERSION
 	LINUX_2.6 {
 #ifdef CONFIG_GENERIC_GETTIMEOFDAY
 	global:
+#if _MIPS_SIM == _MIPS_SIM_ABI64 || defined(CONFIG_COMPAT_32BIT_TIME)
 		__vdso_clock_gettime;
 		__vdso_gettimeofday;
 		__vdso_clock_getres;
+#endif
 #if _MIPS_SIM != _MIPS_SIM_ABI64
 		__vdso_clock_gettime64;
 		__vdso_clock_getres_time64;
diff --git a/arch/mips/vdso/vgettimeofday.c b/arch/mips/vdso/vgettimeofday.c
index 00f9fcfc327e..a1fb06b8973e 100644
--- a/arch/mips/vdso/vgettimeofday.c
+++ b/arch/mips/vdso/vgettimeofday.c
@@ -12,6 +12,8 @@
 #include <vdso/gettime.h>
 
 #if _MIPS_SIM != _MIPS_SIM_ABI64
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_COMPAT_32BIT_TIME
 int __vdso_clock_gettime(clockid_t clock,
 			 struct old_timespec32 *ts)
 {
@@ -29,6 +31,7 @@ int __vdso_clock_getres(clockid_t clock_id,
 {
 	return __cvdso_clock_getres_time32(clock_id, res);
 }
+#endif /* CONFIG_COMPAT_32BIT_TIME */
 
 int __vdso_clock_gettime64(clockid_t clock,
 			   struct __kernel_timespec *ts)
-- 
cgit v1.2.3


From 7ba2ba74713c83408cc942b60dd869ab2c34c84f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Jinjie Ruan <ruanjinjie@huawei.com>
Date: Tue, 7 Jul 2026 21:06:40 +0200
Subject: seccomp, treewide: Rename and convert __secure_computing() to return
 boolean

The return value of __secure_computing() currently uses 0 to indicate
that a system call should be allowed, and -1 to indicate that it should
be blocked/killed. This 0/-1 pattern is non-intuitive for a security
check function and makes the control flow at the call sites less readable.

Furthermore, any potential future changes to these return values would
require a high-risk, error-prone audit of all its users across different
architectures.

Sanitize this logic by converting the return type of __secure_computing()
to a proper boolean, where 'true' explicitly means 'allow' and 'false'
means 'fail/deny'.

Update all the two dozen or so call sites across the tree to align with
this new boolean semantic. No functional changes are intended, as the
callers still return -1 to the lower-level assembly entry code upon
seccomp denial.

Rename the function to __seccomp_permit_syscall() so that the purpose is
entirely clear.

[ tglx: Rename the function ]

Suggested-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@kernel.org>
Suggested-by: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Jinjie Ruan <ruanjinjie@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@kernel.org>
Tested-by: Mukesh Kumar Chaurasiya (IBM) <mkchauras@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Mukesh Kumar Chaurasiya (IBM) <mkchauras@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260707190254.230735780@kernel.org
---
 arch/Kconfig                          |  2 +-
 arch/alpha/kernel/ptrace.c            |  2 +-
 arch/arm/kernel/ptrace.c              |  2 +-
 arch/arm64/kernel/ptrace.c            |  2 +-
 arch/csky/kernel/ptrace.c             |  2 +-
 arch/m68k/kernel/ptrace.c             |  2 +-
 arch/mips/kernel/ptrace.c             |  2 +-
 arch/parisc/kernel/ptrace.c           |  2 +-
 arch/sh/kernel/ptrace_32.c            |  2 +-
 arch/um/kernel/skas/syscall.c         |  2 +-
 arch/x86/entry/vsyscall/vsyscall_64.c | 14 +++++++-------
 arch/xtensa/kernel/ptrace.c           |  3 +--
 include/linux/entry-common.h          |  9 ++++-----
 include/linux/seccomp.h               | 12 ++++++------
 kernel/seccomp.c                      | 36 +++++++++++++++++------------------
 15 files changed, 45 insertions(+), 49 deletions(-)

(limited to 'arch/mips')

diff --git a/arch/Kconfig b/arch/Kconfig
index 0c01521c2f3f..d2dbed524f15 100644
--- a/arch/Kconfig
+++ b/arch/Kconfig
@@ -647,7 +647,7 @@ config HAVE_ARCH_SECCOMP_FILTER
 	  - syscall_set_return_value()
 	  - SIGSYS siginfo_t support
 	  - secure_computing is called from a ptrace_event()-safe context
-	  - secure_computing return value is checked and a return value of -1
+	  - secure_computing return value is checked and if false it
 	    results in the system call being skipped immediately.
 	  - seccomp syscall wired up
 	  - if !HAVE_SPARSE_SYSCALL_NR, have SECCOMP_ARCH_NATIVE,
diff --git a/arch/alpha/kernel/ptrace.c b/arch/alpha/kernel/ptrace.c
index 0687760ea466..2870101dafc9 100644
--- a/arch/alpha/kernel/ptrace.c
+++ b/arch/alpha/kernel/ptrace.c
@@ -387,7 +387,7 @@ asmlinkage unsigned long syscall_trace_enter(void)
 	 * If this fails, seccomp may already have set up the return value
 	 * (e.g. SECCOMP_RET_ERRNO / TRACE).
 	 */
-	if (secure_computing() == -1) {
+	if (!seccomp_permit_syscall()) {
 		if (regs->r19 == 0 && regs->r0 == (unsigned long)-1)
 			syscall_set_return_value(current, regs, -ENOSYS, 0);
 		syscall_set_nr(current, regs, -1);
diff --git a/arch/arm/kernel/ptrace.c b/arch/arm/kernel/ptrace.c
index 7951b2c06fec..45076fc92a06 100644
--- a/arch/arm/kernel/ptrace.c
+++ b/arch/arm/kernel/ptrace.c
@@ -855,7 +855,7 @@ asmlinkage int syscall_trace_enter(struct pt_regs *regs)
 
 	/* Do seccomp after ptrace; syscall may have changed. */
 #ifdef CONFIG_HAVE_ARCH_SECCOMP_FILTER
-	if (secure_computing() == -1)
+	if (!seccomp_permit_syscall())
 		return -1;
 #else
 	/* XXX: remove this once OABI gets fixed */
diff --git a/arch/arm64/kernel/ptrace.c b/arch/arm64/kernel/ptrace.c
index 4d08598e2891..253ce5d78c5a 100644
--- a/arch/arm64/kernel/ptrace.c
+++ b/arch/arm64/kernel/ptrace.c
@@ -2420,7 +2420,7 @@ int syscall_trace_enter(struct pt_regs *regs)
 	}
 
 	/* Do the secure computing after ptrace; failures should be fast. */
-	if (secure_computing() == -1)
+	if (!seccomp_permit_syscall())
 		return NO_SYSCALL;
 
 	if (test_thread_flag(TIF_SYSCALL_TRACEPOINT))
diff --git a/arch/csky/kernel/ptrace.c b/arch/csky/kernel/ptrace.c
index 6bb685a2646b..b902358f599b 100644
--- a/arch/csky/kernel/ptrace.c
+++ b/arch/csky/kernel/ptrace.c
@@ -323,7 +323,7 @@ asmlinkage int syscall_trace_enter(struct pt_regs *regs)
 		if (ptrace_report_syscall_entry(regs))
 			return -1;
 
-	if (secure_computing() == -1)
+	if (!seccomp_permit_syscall())
 		return -1;
 
 	if (test_thread_flag(TIF_SYSCALL_TRACEPOINT))
diff --git a/arch/m68k/kernel/ptrace.c b/arch/m68k/kernel/ptrace.c
index cfa2df24eced..28546d723c29 100644
--- a/arch/m68k/kernel/ptrace.c
+++ b/arch/m68k/kernel/ptrace.c
@@ -281,7 +281,7 @@ asmlinkage int syscall_trace_enter(void)
 	if (test_thread_flag(TIF_SYSCALL_TRACE))
 		ret = ptrace_report_syscall_entry(task_pt_regs(current));
 
-	if (secure_computing() == -1)
+	if (!seccomp_permit_syscall())
 		return -1;
 
 	return ret;
diff --git a/arch/mips/kernel/ptrace.c b/arch/mips/kernel/ptrace.c
index 3f4c94c88124..af1e005b2689 100644
--- a/arch/mips/kernel/ptrace.c
+++ b/arch/mips/kernel/ptrace.c
@@ -1328,7 +1328,7 @@ asmlinkage long syscall_trace_enter(struct pt_regs *regs)
 			return -1;
 	}
 
-	if (secure_computing())
+	if (!seccomp_permit_syscall())
 		return -1;
 
 	if (unlikely(test_thread_flag(TIF_SYSCALL_TRACEPOINT)))
diff --git a/arch/parisc/kernel/ptrace.c b/arch/parisc/kernel/ptrace.c
index 8a17ab7e6e0b..ac5d077762bc 100644
--- a/arch/parisc/kernel/ptrace.c
+++ b/arch/parisc/kernel/ptrace.c
@@ -351,7 +351,7 @@ long do_syscall_trace_enter(struct pt_regs *regs)
 	}
 
 	/* Do the secure computing check after ptrace. */
-	if (secure_computing() == -1)
+	if (!seccomp_permit_syscall())
 		return -1;
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_HAVE_SYSCALL_TRACEPOINTS
diff --git a/arch/sh/kernel/ptrace_32.c b/arch/sh/kernel/ptrace_32.c
index 06f765d71a29..7594bd5cbb4a 100644
--- a/arch/sh/kernel/ptrace_32.c
+++ b/arch/sh/kernel/ptrace_32.c
@@ -460,7 +460,7 @@ asmlinkage long do_syscall_trace_enter(struct pt_regs *regs)
 		return -1;
 	}
 
-	if (secure_computing() == -1)
+	if (!seccomp_permit_syscall())
 		return -1;
 
 	if (unlikely(test_thread_flag(TIF_SYSCALL_TRACEPOINT)))
diff --git a/arch/um/kernel/skas/syscall.c b/arch/um/kernel/skas/syscall.c
index ba7494f9bfe4..bc117733e8ef 100644
--- a/arch/um/kernel/skas/syscall.c
+++ b/arch/um/kernel/skas/syscall.c
@@ -27,7 +27,7 @@ void handle_syscall(struct uml_pt_regs *r)
 		goto out;
 
 	/* Do the seccomp check after ptrace; failures should be fast. */
-	if (secure_computing() == -1)
+	if (!seccomp_permit_syscall())
 		goto out;
 
 	syscall = UPT_SYSCALL_NR(r);
diff --git a/arch/x86/entry/vsyscall/vsyscall_64.c b/arch/x86/entry/vsyscall/vsyscall_64.c
index ea36de9fa864..1b68c1cc0d4f 100644
--- a/arch/x86/entry/vsyscall/vsyscall_64.c
+++ b/arch/x86/entry/vsyscall/vsyscall_64.c
@@ -118,10 +118,10 @@ static bool write_ok_or_segv(unsigned long ptr, size_t size)
 
 static bool __emulate_vsyscall(struct pt_regs *regs, unsigned long address)
 {
-	unsigned long caller;
-	int vsyscall_nr, syscall_nr, tmp;
+	unsigned long caller, orig_dx;
+	int vsyscall_nr, syscall_nr;
+	bool skip;
 	long ret;
-	unsigned long orig_dx;
 
 	/* Confirm that the fault happened in 64-bit user mode */
 	if (!user_64bit_mode(regs))
@@ -197,16 +197,16 @@ static bool __emulate_vsyscall(struct pt_regs *regs, unsigned long address)
 	 */
 	regs->orig_ax = syscall_nr;
 	regs->ax = -ENOSYS;
-	tmp = secure_computing();
-	if ((!tmp && regs->orig_ax != syscall_nr) || regs->ip != address) {
+	skip = !seccomp_permit_syscall();
+	if ((!skip && regs->orig_ax != syscall_nr) || regs->ip != address) {
 		warn_bad_vsyscall(KERN_DEBUG, regs,
 				  "seccomp tried to change syscall nr or ip");
 		force_exit_sig(SIGSYS);
 		return true;
 	}
 	regs->orig_ax = -1;
-	if (tmp)
-		goto do_ret;  /* skip requested */
+	if (skip)
+		goto do_ret;
 
 	/*
 	 * With a real vsyscall, page faults cause SIGSEGV.
diff --git a/arch/xtensa/kernel/ptrace.c b/arch/xtensa/kernel/ptrace.c
index b80d54b2ea34..5c3ebb03513b 100644
--- a/arch/xtensa/kernel/ptrace.c
+++ b/arch/xtensa/kernel/ptrace.c
@@ -553,8 +553,7 @@ int do_syscall_trace_enter(struct pt_regs *regs)
 		return 0;
 	}
 
-	if (regs->syscall == NO_SYSCALL ||
-	    secure_computing() == -1) {
+	if (regs->syscall == NO_SYSCALL || !seccomp_permit_syscall()) {
 		do_syscall_trace_leave(regs);
 		return 0;
 	}
diff --git a/include/linux/entry-common.h b/include/linux/entry-common.h
index c8373525bdb1..99c49a402a9a 100644
--- a/include/linux/entry-common.h
+++ b/include/linux/entry-common.h
@@ -102,9 +102,8 @@ static __always_inline long syscall_trace_enter(struct pt_regs *regs, unsigned l
 
 	/* Do seccomp after ptrace, to catch any tracer changes. */
 	if (work & SYSCALL_WORK_SECCOMP) {
-		ret = __secure_computing();
-		if (ret == -1L)
-			return ret;
+		if (!__seccomp_permit_syscall())
+			return -1L;
 	}
 
 	/* Either of the above might have changed the syscall number */
@@ -115,7 +114,7 @@ static __always_inline long syscall_trace_enter(struct pt_regs *regs, unsigned l
 
 	syscall_enter_audit(regs, syscall);
 
-	return ret ? : syscall;
+	return syscall;
 }
 
 /**
@@ -138,7 +137,7 @@ static __always_inline long syscall_trace_enter(struct pt_regs *regs, unsigned l
  * It handles the following work items:
  *
  *  1) syscall_work flag dependent invocations of
- *     ptrace_report_syscall_entry(), __secure_computing(), trace_sys_enter()
+ *     ptrace_report_syscall_entry(), __seccomp_permit_syscall(), trace_sys_enter()
  *  2) Invocation of audit_syscall_entry()
  */
 static __always_inline long syscall_enter_from_user_mode_work(struct pt_regs *regs, long syscall)
diff --git a/include/linux/seccomp.h b/include/linux/seccomp.h
index 9b959972bf4a..fcb3eb9825e5 100644
--- a/include/linux/seccomp.h
+++ b/include/linux/seccomp.h
@@ -22,14 +22,14 @@
 #include <linux/atomic.h>
 #include <asm/seccomp.h>
 
-extern int __secure_computing(void);
+extern bool __seccomp_permit_syscall(void);
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_HAVE_ARCH_SECCOMP_FILTER
-static inline int secure_computing(void)
+static __always_inline bool seccomp_permit_syscall(void)
 {
 	if (unlikely(test_syscall_work(SECCOMP)))
-		return  __secure_computing();
-	return 0;
+		return  __seccomp_permit_syscall();
+	return true;
 }
 #else
 extern void secure_computing_strict(int this_syscall);
@@ -50,11 +50,11 @@ static inline int seccomp_mode(struct seccomp *s)
 struct seccomp_data;
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_HAVE_ARCH_SECCOMP_FILTER
-static inline int secure_computing(void) { return 0; }
+static inline bool seccomp_permit_syscall(void) { return true; }
 #else
 static inline void secure_computing_strict(int this_syscall) { return; }
 #endif
-static inline int __secure_computing(void) { return 0; }
+static inline bool __seccomp_permit_syscall(void) { return true; }
 
 static inline long prctl_get_seccomp(void)
 {
diff --git a/kernel/seccomp.c b/kernel/seccomp.c
index 066909393c38..86cf4460d69e 100644
--- a/kernel/seccomp.c
+++ b/kernel/seccomp.c
@@ -1100,12 +1100,13 @@ void secure_computing_strict(int this_syscall)
 	else
 		BUG();
 }
-int __secure_computing(void)
+
+bool __seccomp_permit_syscall(void)
 {
 	int this_syscall = syscall_get_nr(current, current_pt_regs());
 
 	secure_computing_strict(this_syscall);
-	return 0;
+	return true;
 }
 #else
 
@@ -1256,7 +1257,7 @@ out:
 	return -1;
 }
 
-static int __seccomp_filter(int this_syscall, const bool recheck_after_trace)
+static bool __seccomp_filter(int this_syscall, const bool recheck_after_trace)
 {
 	u32 filter_ret, action;
 	struct seccomp_data sd;
@@ -1294,7 +1295,7 @@ static int __seccomp_filter(int this_syscall, const bool recheck_after_trace)
 	case SECCOMP_RET_TRACE:
 		/* We've been put in this state by the ptracer already. */
 		if (recheck_after_trace)
-			return 0;
+			return true;
 
 		/* ENOSYS these calls if there is no tracer attached. */
 		if (!ptrace_event_enabled(current, PTRACE_EVENT_SECCOMP)) {
@@ -1329,20 +1330,17 @@ static int __seccomp_filter(int this_syscall, const bool recheck_after_trace)
 		 * a reload of all registers. This does not goto skip since
 		 * a skip would have already been reported.
 		 */
-		if (__seccomp_filter(this_syscall, true))
-			return -1;
-
-		return 0;
+		return __seccomp_filter(this_syscall, true);
 
 	case SECCOMP_RET_USER_NOTIF:
 		if (seccomp_do_user_notification(this_syscall, match, &sd))
 			goto skip;
 
-		return 0;
+		return true;
 
 	case SECCOMP_RET_LOG:
 		seccomp_log(this_syscall, 0, action, true);
-		return 0;
+		return true;
 
 	case SECCOMP_RET_ALLOW:
 		/*
@@ -1350,7 +1348,7 @@ static int __seccomp_filter(int this_syscall, const bool recheck_after_trace)
 		 * this action since SECCOMP_RET_ALLOW is the starting
 		 * state in seccomp_run_filters().
 		 */
-		return 0;
+		return true;
 
 	case SECCOMP_RET_KILL_THREAD:
 	case SECCOMP_RET_KILL_PROCESS:
@@ -1367,46 +1365,46 @@ static int __seccomp_filter(int this_syscall, const bool recheck_after_trace)
 		} else {
 			do_exit(SIGSYS);
 		}
-		return -1; /* skip the syscall go directly to signal handling */
+		return false; /* skip the syscall go directly to signal handling */
 	}
 
 	unreachable();
 
 skip:
 	seccomp_log(this_syscall, 0, action, match ? match->log : false);
-	return -1;
+	return false;
 }
 #else
-static int __seccomp_filter(int this_syscall, const bool recheck_after_trace)
+static bool __seccomp_filter(int this_syscall, const bool recheck_after_trace)
 {
 	BUG();
 
-	return -1;
+	return false;
 }
 #endif
 
-int __secure_computing(void)
+bool __seccomp_permit_syscall(void)
 {
 	int mode = current->seccomp.mode;
 	int this_syscall;
 
 	if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_CHECKPOINT_RESTORE) &&
 	    unlikely(current->ptrace & PT_SUSPEND_SECCOMP))
-		return 0;
+		return true;
 
 	this_syscall = syscall_get_nr(current, current_pt_regs());
 
 	switch (mode) {
 	case SECCOMP_MODE_STRICT:
 		__secure_computing_strict(this_syscall);  /* may call do_exit */
-		return 0;
+		return true;
 	case SECCOMP_MODE_FILTER:
 		return __seccomp_filter(this_syscall, false);
 	/* Surviving SECCOMP_RET_KILL_* must be proactively impossible. */
 	case SECCOMP_MODE_DEAD:
 		WARN_ON_ONCE(1);
 		do_exit(SIGKILL);
-		return -1;
+		return false;
 	default:
 		BUG();
 	}
-- 
cgit v1.2.3


From 622f04e97415e62bd2ab61f7a27e7a296e8467b7 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@kernel.org>
Date: Tue, 7 Jul 2026 21:06:44 +0200
Subject: ptrace, treewide: Rename ptrace_report_syscall_entry() to
 ptrace_report_syscall_permit_entry()

The return value of that function is boolean and tells the caller whether
to permit the syscall processing or not.

Rename the function so the purpose is clear and make the return type bool.

Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@kernel.org>
Tested-by: Mukesh Kumar Chaurasiya (IBM) <mkchauras@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Jinjie Ruan <ruanjinjie@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: Radu Rendec <radu@rendec.net>
Reviewed-by: Mukesh Kumar Chaurasiya (IBM) <mkchauras@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Magnus Lindholm <linmag7@gmail.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260707190254.280015701@kernel.org
---
 arch/alpha/kernel/ptrace.c      |  2 +-
 arch/arc/kernel/ptrace.c        |  2 +-
 arch/arm/kernel/ptrace.c        |  2 +-
 arch/arm64/kernel/ptrace.c      |  2 +-
 arch/csky/kernel/ptrace.c       |  2 +-
 arch/hexagon/kernel/traps.c     |  2 +-
 arch/m68k/kernel/ptrace.c       |  2 +-
 arch/microblaze/kernel/ptrace.c |  2 +-
 arch/mips/kernel/ptrace.c       |  2 +-
 arch/nios2/kernel/ptrace.c      |  2 +-
 arch/openrisc/kernel/ptrace.c   |  2 +-
 arch/parisc/kernel/ptrace.c     | 10 ++++------
 arch/sh/kernel/ptrace_32.c      |  2 +-
 arch/sparc/kernel/ptrace_32.c   |  2 +-
 arch/sparc/kernel/ptrace_64.c   |  2 +-
 arch/um/kernel/ptrace.c         |  2 +-
 arch/xtensa/kernel/ptrace.c     |  2 +-
 include/asm-generic/syscall.h   |  4 ++--
 include/linux/entry-common.h    | 25 ++++++++++++-------------
 include/linux/ptrace.h          | 13 ++++++-------
 20 files changed, 40 insertions(+), 44 deletions(-)

(limited to 'arch/mips')

diff --git a/arch/alpha/kernel/ptrace.c b/arch/alpha/kernel/ptrace.c
index 2870101dafc9..768b0920a9de 100644
--- a/arch/alpha/kernel/ptrace.c
+++ b/arch/alpha/kernel/ptrace.c
@@ -375,7 +375,7 @@ asmlinkage unsigned long syscall_trace_enter(void)
 	struct pt_regs *regs = current_pt_regs();
 
 	if (test_thread_flag(TIF_SYSCALL_TRACE) &&
-		ptrace_report_syscall_entry(regs)) {
+		!ptrace_report_syscall_permit_entry(regs)) {
 		syscall_set_nr(current, regs, -1);
 		if (regs->r19 == 0 && regs->r0 == (unsigned long)-1)
 			syscall_set_return_value(current, regs, -ENOSYS, 0);
diff --git a/arch/arc/kernel/ptrace.c b/arch/arc/kernel/ptrace.c
index cad5367b7c37..fe2b6572e919 100644
--- a/arch/arc/kernel/ptrace.c
+++ b/arch/arc/kernel/ptrace.c
@@ -342,7 +342,7 @@ long arch_ptrace(struct task_struct *child, long request,
 asmlinkage int syscall_trace_enter(struct pt_regs *regs)
 {
 	if (test_thread_flag(TIF_SYSCALL_TRACE))
-		if (ptrace_report_syscall_entry(regs))
+		if (!ptrace_report_syscall_permit_entry(regs))
 			return ULONG_MAX;
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_HAVE_SYSCALL_TRACEPOINTS
diff --git a/arch/arm/kernel/ptrace.c b/arch/arm/kernel/ptrace.c
index 45076fc92a06..ed7a2a87a670 100644
--- a/arch/arm/kernel/ptrace.c
+++ b/arch/arm/kernel/ptrace.c
@@ -840,7 +840,7 @@ static void report_syscall(struct pt_regs *regs, enum ptrace_syscall_dir dir)
 
 	if (dir == PTRACE_SYSCALL_EXIT)
 		ptrace_report_syscall_exit(regs, 0);
-	else if (ptrace_report_syscall_entry(regs))
+	else if (!ptrace_report_syscall_permit_entry(regs))
 		current_thread_info()->abi_syscall = -1;
 
 	regs->ARM_ip = ip;
diff --git a/arch/arm64/kernel/ptrace.c b/arch/arm64/kernel/ptrace.c
index 253ce5d78c5a..5709e9d3c321 100644
--- a/arch/arm64/kernel/ptrace.c
+++ b/arch/arm64/kernel/ptrace.c
@@ -2379,7 +2379,7 @@ static int report_syscall_entry(struct pt_regs *regs)
 	int regno, ret;
 
 	saved_reg = ptrace_save_reg(regs, PTRACE_SYSCALL_ENTER, &regno);
-	ret = ptrace_report_syscall_entry(regs);
+	ret = !ptrace_report_syscall_permit_entry(regs);
 	if (ret)
 		forget_syscall(regs);
 	regs->regs[regno] = saved_reg;
diff --git a/arch/csky/kernel/ptrace.c b/arch/csky/kernel/ptrace.c
index b902358f599b..ee2867a1576e 100644
--- a/arch/csky/kernel/ptrace.c
+++ b/arch/csky/kernel/ptrace.c
@@ -320,7 +320,7 @@ long arch_ptrace(struct task_struct *child, long request,
 asmlinkage int syscall_trace_enter(struct pt_regs *regs)
 {
 	if (test_thread_flag(TIF_SYSCALL_TRACE))
-		if (ptrace_report_syscall_entry(regs))
+		if (!ptrace_report_syscall_permit_entry(regs))
 			return -1;
 
 	if (!seccomp_permit_syscall())
diff --git a/arch/hexagon/kernel/traps.c b/arch/hexagon/kernel/traps.c
index e732aa01c2ff..6fe0c1b62c1b 100644
--- a/arch/hexagon/kernel/traps.c
+++ b/arch/hexagon/kernel/traps.c
@@ -345,7 +345,7 @@ void do_trap0(struct pt_regs *regs)
 
 		/* allow strace to catch syscall args  */
 		if (unlikely(test_thread_flag(TIF_SYSCALL_TRACE) &&
-			ptrace_report_syscall_entry(regs)))
+			!ptrace_report_syscall_permit_entry(regs)))
 			return;  /*  return -ENOSYS somewhere?  */
 
 		/* Interrupts should be re-enabled for syscall processing */
diff --git a/arch/m68k/kernel/ptrace.c b/arch/m68k/kernel/ptrace.c
index 28546d723c29..4575f6487a9a 100644
--- a/arch/m68k/kernel/ptrace.c
+++ b/arch/m68k/kernel/ptrace.c
@@ -279,7 +279,7 @@ asmlinkage int syscall_trace_enter(void)
 	int ret = 0;
 
 	if (test_thread_flag(TIF_SYSCALL_TRACE))
-		ret = ptrace_report_syscall_entry(task_pt_regs(current));
+		ret = !ptrace_report_syscall_permit_entry(task_pt_regs(current));
 
 	if (!seccomp_permit_syscall())
 		return -1;
diff --git a/arch/microblaze/kernel/ptrace.c b/arch/microblaze/kernel/ptrace.c
index 5234d0c1dcaa..236264e932d6 100644
--- a/arch/microblaze/kernel/ptrace.c
+++ b/arch/microblaze/kernel/ptrace.c
@@ -139,7 +139,7 @@ asmlinkage unsigned long do_syscall_trace_enter(struct pt_regs *regs)
 	secure_computing_strict(regs->r12);
 
 	if (test_thread_flag(TIF_SYSCALL_TRACE) &&
-	    ptrace_report_syscall_entry(regs))
+	    !ptrace_report_syscall_permit_entry(regs))
 		/*
 		 * Tracing decided this syscall should not happen.
 		 * We'll return a bogus call number to get an ENOSYS
diff --git a/arch/mips/kernel/ptrace.c b/arch/mips/kernel/ptrace.c
index af1e005b2689..5a0e298857b6 100644
--- a/arch/mips/kernel/ptrace.c
+++ b/arch/mips/kernel/ptrace.c
@@ -1324,7 +1324,7 @@ asmlinkage long syscall_trace_enter(struct pt_regs *regs)
 	user_exit();
 
 	if (test_thread_flag(TIF_SYSCALL_TRACE)) {
-		if (ptrace_report_syscall_entry(regs))
+		if (!ptrace_report_syscall_permit_entry(regs))
 			return -1;
 	}
 
diff --git a/arch/nios2/kernel/ptrace.c b/arch/nios2/kernel/ptrace.c
index c88f5cabc0c1..2cd7e1ecbd74 100644
--- a/arch/nios2/kernel/ptrace.c
+++ b/arch/nios2/kernel/ptrace.c
@@ -133,7 +133,7 @@ asmlinkage int do_syscall_trace_enter(void)
 	int ret = 0;
 
 	if (test_thread_flag(TIF_SYSCALL_TRACE))
-		ret = ptrace_report_syscall_entry(task_pt_regs(current));
+		ret = !ptrace_report_syscall_permit_entry(task_pt_regs(current));
 
 	return ret;
 }
diff --git a/arch/openrisc/kernel/ptrace.c b/arch/openrisc/kernel/ptrace.c
index 552489b24855..287a9718f0c6 100644
--- a/arch/openrisc/kernel/ptrace.c
+++ b/arch/openrisc/kernel/ptrace.c
@@ -293,7 +293,7 @@ asmlinkage long do_syscall_trace_enter(struct pt_regs *regs)
 	long ret = 0;
 
 	if (test_thread_flag(TIF_SYSCALL_TRACE) &&
-	    ptrace_report_syscall_entry(regs))
+	    !ptrace_report_syscall_permit_entry(regs))
 		/*
 		 * Tracing decided this syscall should not happen.
 		 * We'll return a bogus call number to get an ENOSYS
diff --git a/arch/parisc/kernel/ptrace.c b/arch/parisc/kernel/ptrace.c
index ac5d077762bc..1d9e210702e1 100644
--- a/arch/parisc/kernel/ptrace.c
+++ b/arch/parisc/kernel/ptrace.c
@@ -326,7 +326,7 @@ long compat_arch_ptrace(struct task_struct *child, compat_long_t request,
 long do_syscall_trace_enter(struct pt_regs *regs)
 {
 	if (test_thread_flag(TIF_SYSCALL_TRACE)) {
-		int rc = ptrace_report_syscall_entry(regs);
+		bool permit = ptrace_report_syscall_permit_entry(regs);
 
 		/*
 		 * As tracesys_next does not set %r28 to -ENOSYS
@@ -334,12 +334,10 @@ long do_syscall_trace_enter(struct pt_regs *regs)
 		 */
 		regs->gr[28] = -ENOSYS;
 
-		if (rc) {
+		if (!permit) {
 			/*
-			 * A nonzero return code from
-			 * ptrace_report_syscall_entry() tells us
-			 * to prevent the syscall execution.  Skip
-			 * the syscall call and the syscall restart handling.
+			 * Skip the syscall call and the syscall restart
+			 * handling.
 			 *
 			 * Note that the tracer may also just change
 			 * regs->gr[20] to an invalid syscall number,
diff --git a/arch/sh/kernel/ptrace_32.c b/arch/sh/kernel/ptrace_32.c
index 7594bd5cbb4a..8794081483fb 100644
--- a/arch/sh/kernel/ptrace_32.c
+++ b/arch/sh/kernel/ptrace_32.c
@@ -455,7 +455,7 @@ long arch_ptrace(struct task_struct *child, long request,
 asmlinkage long do_syscall_trace_enter(struct pt_regs *regs)
 {
 	if (test_thread_flag(TIF_SYSCALL_TRACE) &&
-	    ptrace_report_syscall_entry(regs)) {
+	    !ptrace_report_syscall_permit_entry(regs)) {
 		regs->regs[0] = -ENOSYS;
 		return -1;
 	}
diff --git a/arch/sparc/kernel/ptrace_32.c b/arch/sparc/kernel/ptrace_32.c
index c56333975fb1..5991b1731fee 100644
--- a/arch/sparc/kernel/ptrace_32.c
+++ b/arch/sparc/kernel/ptrace_32.c
@@ -441,7 +441,7 @@ asmlinkage int syscall_trace(struct pt_regs *regs, int syscall_exit_p)
 		if (syscall_exit_p)
 			ptrace_report_syscall_exit(regs, 0);
 		else
-			ret = ptrace_report_syscall_entry(regs);
+			ret = !ptrace_report_syscall_permit_entry(regs);
 	}
 
 	return ret;
diff --git a/arch/sparc/kernel/ptrace_64.c b/arch/sparc/kernel/ptrace_64.c
index 9fc67fa9336f..825ddf55fece 100644
--- a/arch/sparc/kernel/ptrace_64.c
+++ b/arch/sparc/kernel/ptrace_64.c
@@ -1093,7 +1093,7 @@ asmlinkage int syscall_trace_enter(struct pt_regs *regs)
 		user_exit();
 
 	if (test_thread_flag(TIF_SYSCALL_TRACE))
-		ret = ptrace_report_syscall_entry(regs);
+		ret = !ptrace_report_syscall_permit_entry(regs);
 
 	if (unlikely(test_thread_flag(TIF_SYSCALL_TRACEPOINT)))
 		trace_sys_enter(regs, regs->u_regs[UREG_G1]);
diff --git a/arch/um/kernel/ptrace.c b/arch/um/kernel/ptrace.c
index fdbb37b5c399..7da0a5223aa6 100644
--- a/arch/um/kernel/ptrace.c
+++ b/arch/um/kernel/ptrace.c
@@ -135,7 +135,7 @@ int syscall_trace_enter(struct pt_regs *regs)
 	if (!test_thread_flag(TIF_SYSCALL_TRACE))
 		return 0;
 
-	return ptrace_report_syscall_entry(regs);
+	return !ptrace_report_syscall_permit_entry(regs);
 }
 
 void syscall_trace_leave(struct pt_regs *regs)
diff --git a/arch/xtensa/kernel/ptrace.c b/arch/xtensa/kernel/ptrace.c
index 5c3ebb03513b..364e4fdabb00 100644
--- a/arch/xtensa/kernel/ptrace.c
+++ b/arch/xtensa/kernel/ptrace.c
@@ -547,7 +547,7 @@ int do_syscall_trace_enter(struct pt_regs *regs)
 		regs->areg[2] = -ENOSYS;
 
 	if (test_thread_flag(TIF_SYSCALL_TRACE) &&
-	    ptrace_report_syscall_entry(regs)) {
+	    !ptrace_report_syscall_permit_entry(regs)) {
 		regs->areg[2] = -ENOSYS;
 		regs->syscall = NO_SYSCALL;
 		return 0;
diff --git a/include/asm-generic/syscall.h b/include/asm-generic/syscall.h
index c5a3ad53beec..b53bdd389948 100644
--- a/include/asm-generic/syscall.h
+++ b/include/asm-generic/syscall.h
@@ -58,8 +58,8 @@ void syscall_set_nr(struct task_struct *task, struct pt_regs *regs, int nr);
  *
  * It's only valid to call this when @task is stopped for system
  * call exit tracing (due to %SYSCALL_WORK_SYSCALL_TRACE or
- * %SYSCALL_WORK_SYSCALL_AUDIT), after ptrace_report_syscall_entry()
- * returned nonzero to prevent the system call from taking place.
+ * %SYSCALL_WORK_SYSCALL_AUDIT), after ptrace_report_syscall_permit_entry()
+ * returned False to prevent the system call from taking place.
  *
  * This rolls back the register state in @regs so it's as if the
  * system call instruction was a no-op.  The registers containing
diff --git a/include/linux/entry-common.h b/include/linux/entry-common.h
index 99c49a402a9a..07d97def7dcb 100644
--- a/include/linux/entry-common.h
+++ b/include/linux/entry-common.h
@@ -39,21 +39,22 @@
 				 SYSCALL_WORK_SYSCALL_EXIT_TRAP)
 
 /**
- * arch_ptrace_report_syscall_entry - Architecture specific ptrace_report_syscall_entry() wrapper
+ * arch_ptrace_report_syscall_permit_entry - Architecture specific wrapper for
+ *					     ptrace_report_syscall_permit_entry()
  * @regs: Pointer to the register state at syscall entry
  *
- * Invoked from syscall_trace_enter() to wrap ptrace_report_syscall_entry().
+ * Invoked from syscall_trace_enter() to wrap ptrace_report_syscall_permit_entry().
  *
- * This allows architecture specific ptrace_report_syscall_entry()
+ * This allows architecture specific ptrace_report_syscall_permit_entry()
  * implementations. If not defined by the architecture this falls back to
- * to ptrace_report_syscall_entry().
+ * to ptrace_report_syscall_permit_entry().
  */
-static __always_inline int arch_ptrace_report_syscall_entry(struct pt_regs *regs);
+static __always_inline bool arch_ptrace_report_syscall_permit_entry(struct pt_regs *regs);
 
-#ifndef arch_ptrace_report_syscall_entry
-static __always_inline int arch_ptrace_report_syscall_entry(struct pt_regs *regs)
+#ifndef arch_ptrace_report_syscall_permit_entry
+static __always_inline bool arch_ptrace_report_syscall_permit_entry(struct pt_regs *regs)
 {
-	return ptrace_report_syscall_entry(regs);
+	return ptrace_report_syscall_permit_entry(regs);
 }
 #endif
 
@@ -73,8 +74,6 @@ static inline void syscall_enter_audit(struct pt_regs *regs, long syscall)
 static __always_inline long syscall_trace_enter(struct pt_regs *regs, unsigned long work,
 						long syscall)
 {
-	long ret = 0;
-
 	/*
 	 * Handle Syscall User Dispatch.  This must comes first, since
 	 * the ABI here can be something that doesn't make sense for
@@ -95,8 +94,8 @@ static __always_inline long syscall_trace_enter(struct pt_regs *regs, unsigned l
 
 	/* Handle ptrace */
 	if (work & (SYSCALL_WORK_SYSCALL_TRACE | SYSCALL_WORK_SYSCALL_EMU)) {
-		ret = arch_ptrace_report_syscall_entry(regs);
-		if (ret || (work & SYSCALL_WORK_SYSCALL_EMU))
+		if (!arch_ptrace_report_syscall_permit_entry(regs) ||
+		    (work & SYSCALL_WORK_SYSCALL_EMU))
 			return -1L;
 	}
 
@@ -137,7 +136,7 @@ static __always_inline long syscall_trace_enter(struct pt_regs *regs, unsigned l
  * It handles the following work items:
  *
  *  1) syscall_work flag dependent invocations of
- *     ptrace_report_syscall_entry(), __seccomp_permit_syscall(), trace_sys_enter()
+ *     ptrace_report_syscall_permit_entry(), __seccomp_permit_syscall(), trace_sys_enter()
  *  2) Invocation of audit_syscall_entry()
  */
 static __always_inline long syscall_enter_from_user_mode_work(struct pt_regs *regs, long syscall)
diff --git a/include/linux/ptrace.h b/include/linux/ptrace.h
index ef314f7a9ecc..2839d5c8eaa0 100644
--- a/include/linux/ptrace.h
+++ b/include/linux/ptrace.h
@@ -405,13 +405,13 @@ extern void sigaction_compat_abi(struct k_sigaction *act, struct k_sigaction *oa
 /*
  * ptrace report for syscall entry and exit looks identical.
  */
-static inline int ptrace_report_syscall(unsigned long message)
+static inline bool ptrace_report_syscall(unsigned long message)
 {
 	int ptrace = current->ptrace;
 	int signr;
 
 	if (!(ptrace & PT_PTRACED))
-		return 0;
+		return true;
 
 	signr = ptrace_notify(SIGTRAP | ((ptrace & PT_TRACESYSGOOD) ? 0x80 : 0),
 			      message);
@@ -424,11 +424,11 @@ static inline int ptrace_report_syscall(unsigned long message)
 	if (signr)
 		send_sig(signr, current, 1);
 
-	return fatal_signal_pending(current);
+	return !fatal_signal_pending(current);
 }
 
 /**
- * ptrace_report_syscall_entry - task is about to attempt a system call
+ * ptrace_report_syscall_permit_entry - task is about to attempt a system call
  * @regs:		user register state of current task
  *
  * This will be called if %SYSCALL_WORK_SYSCALL_TRACE or
@@ -438,7 +438,7 @@ static inline int ptrace_report_syscall(unsigned long message)
  * call number and arguments to be tried.  It is safe to block here,
  * preventing the system call from beginning.
  *
- * Returns zero normally, or nonzero if the calling arch code should abort
+ * Returns True normally, or False if the calling architecture code should abort
  * the system call.  That must prevent normal entry so no system call is
  * made.  If @task ever returns to user mode after this, its register state
  * is unspecified, but should be something harmless like an %ENOSYS error
@@ -447,8 +447,7 @@ static inline int ptrace_report_syscall(unsigned long message)
  *
  * Called without locks, just after entering kernel mode.
  */
-static inline __must_check int ptrace_report_syscall_entry(
-	struct pt_regs *regs)
+static inline __must_check bool ptrace_report_syscall_permit_entry(struct pt_regs *regs)
 {
 	return ptrace_report_syscall(PTRACE_EVENTMSG_SYSCALL_ENTRY);
 }
-- 
cgit v1.2.3


From 8c0015572c61d1dd0b54f2d035c8b3731dc44b78 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Thomas Weißschuh <thomas.weissschuh@linutronix.de>
Date: Thu, 9 Jul 2026 09:28:39 +0200
Subject: MIPS: vdso: Stop using CONFIG_HAVE_GENERIC_VDSO
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit

HAVE_GENERIC_VDSO is about to become an implementation detail.

Use the MIPS-specific symbol instead. It is equivalent here.

Signed-off-by: Thomas Weißschuh <thomas.weissschuh@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Vincenzo Frascino <vincenzo.frascino@arm.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260709-vdso-have_generic_vdso-v1-3-d2e1061f268b@linutronix.de
---
 arch/mips/kernel/vdso.c | 4 ++--
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

(limited to 'arch/mips')

diff --git a/arch/mips/kernel/vdso.c b/arch/mips/kernel/vdso.c
index bd1fc17d3975..29a10045f2b6 100644
--- a/arch/mips/kernel/vdso.c
+++ b/arch/mips/kernel/vdso.c
@@ -129,7 +129,7 @@ int arch_setup_additional_pages(struct linux_binprm *bprm, int uses_interp)
 	 * This ensures that when the kernel updates the VDSO data userland
 	 * will observe it without requiring cache invalidations.
 	 */
-	if (cpu_has_dc_aliases && IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_HAVE_GENERIC_VDSO)) {
+	if (cpu_has_dc_aliases && IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_MIPS_GENERIC_GETTIMEOFDAY)) {
 		base = __ALIGN_MASK(base, shm_align_mask);
 		base += ((unsigned long)vdso_k_time_data - gic_size) & shm_align_mask;
 	}
@@ -137,7 +137,7 @@ int arch_setup_additional_pages(struct linux_binprm *bprm, int uses_interp)
 	data_addr = base + gic_size;
 	vdso_addr = data_addr + VDSO_NR_PAGES * PAGE_SIZE;
 
-	if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_HAVE_GENERIC_VDSO)) {
+	if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_MIPS_GENERIC_GETTIMEOFDAY)) {
 		vma = vdso_install_vvar_mapping(mm, data_addr);
 		if (IS_ERR(vma)) {
 			ret = PTR_ERR(vma);
-- 
cgit v1.2.3


From 52447180f4fb095390477ba541bb08f24aeb4e92 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Thomas Weißschuh <thomas.weissschuh@linutronix.de>
Date: Thu, 9 Jul 2026 09:28:41 +0200
Subject: vdso: Drop HAVE_GENERIC_VDSO from architecture kconfig files
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit

Now that GENERIC_GETTIMEOFDAY and VDSO_GETRANDOM enable
HAVE_GENERIC_VDSO automatically, the architecture specific kconfig files
do not need to do so anymore.

Remove the corresponding lines.

Keep them for riscv, loongarch and powerpc as those have their own
explicit usage of the vDSO datastore provided by HAVE_GENERIC_VDSO.

Signed-off-by: Thomas Weißschuh <thomas.weissschuh@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Vincenzo Frascino <vincenzo.frascino@arm.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260709-vdso-have_generic_vdso-v1-5-d2e1061f268b@linutronix.de
---
 arch/arm/mm/Kconfig | 1 -
 arch/arm64/Kconfig  | 1 -
 arch/mips/Kconfig   | 1 -
 arch/riscv/Kconfig  | 4 ++--
 arch/s390/Kconfig   | 1 -
 arch/sparc/Kconfig  | 1 -
 arch/x86/Kconfig    | 1 -
 7 files changed, 2 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)

(limited to 'arch/mips')

diff --git a/arch/arm/mm/Kconfig b/arch/arm/mm/Kconfig
index 871bd58d2ccc..f7bea397a201 100644
--- a/arch/arm/mm/Kconfig
+++ b/arch/arm/mm/Kconfig
@@ -924,7 +924,6 @@ config VDSO
 	bool "Enable VDSO for acceleration of some system calls"
 	depends on AEABI && MMU && CPU_V7
 	default y if ARM_ARCH_TIMER
-	select HAVE_GENERIC_VDSO
 	select GENERIC_GETTIMEOFDAY
 	help
 	  Place in the process address space an ELF shared object
diff --git a/arch/arm64/Kconfig b/arch/arm64/Kconfig
index b3afe0688919..11e733b6a3cf 100644
--- a/arch/arm64/Kconfig
+++ b/arch/arm64/Kconfig
@@ -229,7 +229,6 @@ config ARM64
 	select HAVE_SYSCALL_TRACEPOINTS
 	select HAVE_KPROBES
 	select HAVE_KRETPROBES
-	select HAVE_GENERIC_VDSO
 	select HOTPLUG_CORE_SYNC_DEAD if HOTPLUG_CPU
 	select HOTPLUG_SMT if HOTPLUG_CPU
 	select IRQ_DOMAIN
diff --git a/arch/mips/Kconfig b/arch/mips/Kconfig
index 8555bbf47c63..a06f24317306 100644
--- a/arch/mips/Kconfig
+++ b/arch/mips/Kconfig
@@ -3163,7 +3163,6 @@ config MIPS_EXTERNAL_TIMER
 config MIPS_GENERIC_GETTIMEOFDAY
 	def_bool y
 	select GENERIC_GETTIMEOFDAY
-	select HAVE_GENERIC_VDSO
 	depends on CSRC_R4K || CLKSRC_MIPS_GIC
 	# GCC (at least up to version 9.2) appears to emit function calls that make use
 	# of the GOT when targeting microMIPS, which we can't use in the VDSO due to
diff --git a/arch/riscv/Kconfig b/arch/riscv/Kconfig
index 353cbfcff783..9aa8c4df0cd8 100644
--- a/arch/riscv/Kconfig
+++ b/arch/riscv/Kconfig
@@ -110,7 +110,7 @@ config RISCV
 	select GENERIC_CPU_VULNERABILITIES
 	select GENERIC_EARLY_IOREMAP
 	select GENERIC_ENTRY
-	select GENERIC_GETTIMEOFDAY if HAVE_GENERIC_VDSO && 64BIT
+	select GENERIC_GETTIMEOFDAY if MMU && 64BIT
 	select GENERIC_IDLE_POLL_SETUP
 	select GENERIC_IOREMAP if MMU
 	select HAVE_IOREMAP_PROT if MMU
@@ -227,7 +227,7 @@ config RISCV
 	select THREAD_INFO_IN_TASK
 	select TRACE_IRQFLAGS_SUPPORT
 	select UACCESS_MEMCPY if !MMU
-	select VDSO_GETRANDOM if HAVE_GENERIC_VDSO && 64BIT
+	select VDSO_GETRANDOM if MMU && 64BIT
 	select USER_STACKTRACE_SUPPORT
 	select ZONE_DMA32 if 64BIT
 
diff --git a/arch/s390/Kconfig b/arch/s390/Kconfig
index 84404e6778d5..c9c55e3ddf1d 100644
--- a/arch/s390/Kconfig
+++ b/arch/s390/Kconfig
@@ -215,7 +215,6 @@ config S390
 	select HAVE_FUNCTION_GRAPH_TRACER
 	select HAVE_FUNCTION_TRACER
 	select HAVE_GCC_PLUGINS
-	select HAVE_GENERIC_VDSO
 	select HAVE_IOREMAP_PROT if PCI
 	select HAVE_KERNEL_BZIP2
 	select HAVE_KERNEL_GZIP
diff --git a/arch/sparc/Kconfig b/arch/sparc/Kconfig
index 0e9c906c4b5d..4dd79311133f 100644
--- a/arch/sparc/Kconfig
+++ b/arch/sparc/Kconfig
@@ -113,7 +113,6 @@ config SPARC64
 	select ARCH_SUPPORTS_SCHED_SMT if SMP
 	select ARCH_SUPPORTS_SCHED_MC  if SMP
 	select ARCH_HAS_LAZY_MMU_MODE
-	select HAVE_GENERIC_VDSO
 	select GENERIC_GETTIMEOFDAY
 
 config ARCH_PROC_KCORE_TEXT
diff --git a/arch/x86/Kconfig b/arch/x86/Kconfig
index bdad90f210e4..2f4a78024a96 100644
--- a/arch/x86/Kconfig
+++ b/arch/x86/Kconfig
@@ -302,7 +302,6 @@ config X86
 	select HAVE_UNSTABLE_SCHED_CLOCK
 	select HAVE_UNWIND_USER_FP		if X86_64
 	select HAVE_USER_RETURN_NOTIFIER
-	select HAVE_GENERIC_VDSO
 	select VDSO_GETRANDOM			if X86_64
 	select HOTPLUG_PARALLEL			if SMP && X86_64
 	select HOTPLUG_SMT			if SMP
-- 
cgit v1.2.3