From bfeb7e399bacae4ee46ad978f5fce3e47f0978d6 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Yauheni Kaliuta Date: Mon, 5 Sep 2022 12:01:49 +0300 Subject: bpf: Use bpf_capable() instead of CAP_SYS_ADMIN for blinding decision The full CAP_SYS_ADMIN requirement for blinding looks too strict nowadays. These days given unprivileged BPF is disabled by default, the main users for constant blinding coming from unprivileged in particular via cBPF -> eBPF migration (e.g. old-style socket filters). Signed-off-by: Yauheni Kaliuta Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20220831090655.156434-1-ykaliuta@redhat.com Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20220905090149.61221-1-ykaliuta@redhat.com --- Documentation/admin-guide/sysctl/net.rst | 3 +++ 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+) (limited to 'Documentation/admin-guide/sysctl') diff --git a/Documentation/admin-guide/sysctl/net.rst b/Documentation/admin-guide/sysctl/net.rst index 555681ef6195..6394f5dc2303 100644 --- a/Documentation/admin-guide/sysctl/net.rst +++ b/Documentation/admin-guide/sysctl/net.rst @@ -102,6 +102,9 @@ Values: - 1 - enable JIT hardening for unprivileged users only - 2 - enable JIT hardening for all users +where "privileged user" in this context means a process having +CAP_BPF or CAP_SYS_ADMIN in the root user name space. + bpf_jit_kallsyms ---------------- -- cgit v1.2.3