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"Prediction resistance", i.e. the property that the RNG's output is
unpredictable even after a state compromise, might sound like a nice
property to have. In reality, it's not very practical, as it requires
that fresh entropy be pulled on every request. (The normal Linux RNG
doesn't provide prediction resistance.) In the case of drbg.c, that
means pulling from "jitterentropy", which is extremely slow.
For some perspective, running a simple benchmark, generating 32 random
bytes takes the following amount of time:
get_random_bytes(): 90 ns
drbg_nopr_hmac_sha512: 3707 ns
drbg_pr_hmac_sha512: 773082 ns
So at least in this case, the "pr" (prediction-resistant) DRBG is over
200 times slower than the "nopr" (non-prediction-resistant) DRBG, or
over 8000 times slower than the normal Linux RNG. While anyone using
drbg.c has always had to tolerate that it's slower than the normal Linux
RNG, the "pr" DRBG is clearly at another level of slowness.
Thus, the following is also entirely unsurprising:
- FIPS 140-3 doesn't actually require that SP800-90A DRBG
implementations support prediction resistance. The non-prediction
resistant DRBGs can be, and have been, certified.
- drbg.c registers "drbg_nopr_hmac_sha512" with a higher cra_priority
than "drbg_pr_hmac_sha512". So "drbg_nopr_hmac_sha512" is already
the one actually being used in practice.
Given these considerations, it's clear that "drbg_pr_hmac_sha512" isn't
actually useful, and it essentially just existed as another curiosity in
the museum of crypto algorithms. Remove it to simplify the code.
Suggested-by: Joachim Vandersmissen <joachim@jvdsn.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
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Give this constant a name which is clearer and consistent with
DRBG_MAX_REQUEST_BYTES. No functional change.
Suggested-by: Joachim Vandersmissen <joachim@jvdsn.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
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This loop is a bit hard to read, with the loop counter that's used in
the HMAC being separate from the actual loop counter, which counts
backwards for some reason. Just replace it with a regular loop.
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
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A few miscellaneous cleanups to make the code a bit more readable:
- Replace (buf, buflen) with (out, outlen)
- Update (out, outlen) as we go along
- Use size_t for lengths
- Use min()
- Adjust some comments and log messages
- Rename a variable named 'len' to 'err', since it isn't a length
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
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We're now incorporating 32 bytes from get_random_bytes() in the
additional input string on every request. The additional input string
is processed with a call to drbg_hmac_update(), which is exactly how the
seed is processed. Thus, in reality this is as good as a reseed.
From the perspective of FIPS 140-3, it isn't as good as a reseed. But
it doesn't actually matter, because from FIPS's point of view
get_random_bytes() provides zero entropy anyway.
Thus, neither the reseed with more get_random_bytes() every 300s, nor
the logic that reseeds more frequently before rng_is_initialized(), is
actually needed anymore. Remove it to simplify the code significantly.
(Technically the use of get_random_bytes() in drbg_seed() itself could
be removed too. But it's safer to keep it there for now.)
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
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Currently a formal reseed happens only after each 1048576 requests.
That's quite a high number. Let's follow the example of BoringSSL and
use a more conservative value of 4096.
Note that in practice this makes little difference, now that we're
including 32 bytes from get_random_bytes() in the additional input on
every request anyway, which is a de facto reseed.
But for the same reason, we might as well decrease the actual reseed
interval to something more reasonable.
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
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Woodage & Shumow (2018) (https://eprint.iacr.org/2018/349.pdf) showed
that contrary to the claims made by NIST in SP800-90A, HMAC_DRBG doesn't
satisfy the formal definition of forward secrecy (i.e. "backtracking
resistance") when it's called with an empty additional input string.
The actual attack seems pretty benign, as it doesn't actually give the
attacker any previous RNG output, but rather just allows them to test
whether their guess of the previous block of RNG output is correct.
Regardless, it's an annoying design flaw, and it's yet another example
of why NIST's DRBGs aren't all that great.
Meanwhile, the kernel's HMAC_DRBG code also tries to reseed itself
automatically after random.c has reseeded itself. But the
implementation is buggy, as it just checks whether 300 seconds have
elapsed, rather than looking at the actual generation counter.
Let's just follow the example of BoringSSL and use the conservative
approach of always including 32 bytes of "regular" random data in the
additional input string. This fixes both issues described above.
This does reduce performance. But this should be tolerable, since:
- Due to earlier changes, the kernel code that was previously using
drbg.c regardless of FIPS mode is now using it only in FIPS mode.
- The additional input string is processed only once per request. So
if a lot of bytes are generated at once, the cost is amortized.
- The NIST DRBGs are notoriously slow anyway.
Note that this fix should have no impact (either positive or negative)
on FIPS 140 certifiability. From FIPS's point of view the code added by
this commit simply doesn't matter: it adds zero entropy to something
that doesn't need to contain entropy.
Fixes: 541af946fe13 ("crypto: drbg - SP800-90A Deterministic Random Bit Generator")
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
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drbg_kcapi_seed() calls drbg_uninstantiate() only to free drbg->jent and
set drbg->instantiated = false. However, the latter is necessary only
because drbg_kcapi_seed() sets drbg->instantiated = true too early. Fix
that, then just inline the freeing of drbg->jent.
Then, simplify the actual "uninstantiate" in drbg_kcapi_exit(). Just
free drbg->jent (note that this is a no-op on error and null pointers),
then memzero_explicit() the entire drbg_state.
Note that in reality the memzero_explicit() is redundant, since the
crypto_rng API zeroizes the memory anyway. But the way SP800-90A is
worded, it's easy to imagine that someone assessing conformance with it
would be looking for code in drbg.c that says it does an "Uninstantiate"
and does the zeroization. So it's probably worth keeping it somewhat
explicit, even though that means double zeroization in practice.
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
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Fold drbg_prepare_hrng() into its only caller.
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
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Clearly separate the code for the "reseed" and "instantiate" cases,
since what they need to do is quite different.
Note that the mutex guard makes the mutex start being held during the
call to drbg_uninstantiate(), which is fine.
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
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Fold drbg_instantiate() into its only caller.
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
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Put the DRBG implementation of the rng_alg methods in the order in which
they're called (cra_init => set_ent => seed => generate => cra_exit) so
that it's easier to understand the flow.
Also rename drbg_kcapi_random to drbg_kcapi_generate, and
drbg_kcapi_cleanup to drbg_kcapi_exit, so they match the method names.
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
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Simplify drbg_generate_long() to use a more straightforward loop, and
then fold it into its only caller. No functional change.
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
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Use straightforward (buffer, len) parameters instead of struct
drbg_string or lists of strings. This simplifies the code considerably.
For now struct drbg_string is still used in crypto_drbg_ctr_df(), so
move its definition to crypto/df_sp80090a.h.
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
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Currently some of the steps of "Instantiate the DRBG" occur in a
convoluted way in different places in the call stack:
drbg_instantiate()
=> drbg_seed(reseed=0) sets the raw HMAC key drbg_state::C to its
correct initial value, and it sets the state value
drbg_state::V to an *incorrect* initial value.
=> drbg_hmac_update(reseed=0) overwrites drbg_state::V with the
correct initial value, then prepares the hmac_sha512_key
drbg_state::key from the initial raw HMAC key drbg_state::C.
Later, each time the HMAC key is updated, drbg_hmac_update() also uses
drbg_state::C to temporarily store the new raw key.
Simplify all of this by:
- Making drbg_instantiate() set the correct initial values of
drbg_state::V and drbg_state::key.
- Converting drbg_hmac_update() to generate the raw key in a
temporary on-stack array instead of drbg_state::C.
- Removing drbg_state::C.
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
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Move the MODULE_ALIAS_CRYPTO lines in the middle of the file to the end
so that they are in the usual place and next to the other one.
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
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Set rng_alg::seed to different functions for the prediction-resistant
and non-prediction-resistant algorithms, so that the function does not
need to parse the algorithm name to figure out which algorithm it is.
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
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Now that none of the information in struct drbg_core is used, remove it.
The null-ity of the pointer drbg_state::core was used to keep track of
whether the DRBG has been instantiated. Replace it with a boolean.
No functional change.
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
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Since the HMAC algorithm is now fixed at HMAC-SHA512, just use the
HMAC-SHA512 library API. This is simpler and more efficient.
Remove error-handling code that is no longer needed.
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
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Now that the sizes of V and C are known at compile time, embed them into
struct drbg_state rather than using separate allocations.
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
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Since only one drbg_core remains, the state length, block length, and
security strength are now fixed values. Moreover, the maximum request
length, maximum additional data length, and maximum number of requests
were all already fixed values.
Simplify the code by just using #defines for all these fixed values.
In drbg_seed_from_random(), take advantage of the constant to define the
array size. Remove assertions that are no longer useful.
In the case of drbg_blocklen() and drbg_statelen(), replace these with a
single value DRBG_STATE_LEN, as for HMAC_DRBG they are the same thing.
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
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Now that there's only one set of state operations, use direct calls to
those operations.
No change in behavior. In particular, drbg_alloc_state() doesn't change
behavior, because the only remaining drbg_core uses HMAC_DRBG.
drbg_uninstantiate() doesn't change behavior, because a NULL d_ops
implied NULL priv_data which makes a drbg_fini_hash_kernel() a no-op.
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
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Now that "drbg_pr_hmac_sha512" and "drbg_nopr_hmac_sha512" are the only
crypto_rng algorithms left in crypto/drbg.c, simplify the algorithm
registration logic to register these more directly without relying on
the drbg_cores[] array (which will be removed).
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
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Remove support for the HMAC-SHA256 and HMAC-SHA384 variants of
HMAC_DRBG, leaving only the HMAC-SHA512 variant of HMAC_DRBG.
HMAC-SHA512 is already the default. The default did used to be
HMAC-SHA256, but several years ago it was upgraded to HMAC-SHA512 "to
support compliance with SP800-90B and SP800-90C". Given that the point
of crypto/drbg.c is compliance with those standards, and there's also no
technical reason to prefer HMAC-SHA384 in this situation even if
acceptable, there's really no point in offering anything else.
Note: now that only HMAC-SHA512 remains, a lot of unnecessary
abstractions can be removed. A later commit will do that. This commit
just straightforwardly removes the HMAC-SHA256 and HMAC-SHA384 code.
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
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Remove the support for HASH_DRBG. It's likely unused code, seeing as
HMAC_DRBG is always enabled and prioritized over it unless
NETLINK_CRYPTO is used to change the algorithm priorities.
There's also no compelling reason to support more than one of
[HMAC_DRBG, HASH_DRBG, CTR_DRBG]. By definition, callers cannot tell
any difference in their outputs. And all are FIPS-certifiable, which is
the only point of the kernel's NIST DRBGs anyway.
Switching to HASH_DRBG doesn't seem all that compelling, either. For
one, it's more complex than HMAC_DRBG.
Thus, let's just drop HASH_DRBG support and focus on HMAC_DRBG.
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Geert Uytterhoeven <geert@linux-m68k.org> # m68k
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
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Remove the support for CTR_DRBG. It's likely unused code, seeing as
HMAC_DRBG is always enabled and prioritized over it unless
NETLINK_CRYPTO is used to change the algorithm priorities.
There's also no compelling reason to support more than one of
[HMAC_DRBG, HASH_DRBG, CTR_DRBG]. By definition, callers cannot tell
any difference in their outputs. And all are FIPS-certifiable, which is
the only point of the kernel's NIST DRBGs anyway.
Switching to CTR_DRBG doesn't seem all that compelling, either. While
it's often the fastest NIST DRBG, it has several disadvantages:
- CTR_DRBG uses AES. Some platforms don't have AES acceleration at all,
causing a fallback to the table-based AES code which is very slow and
can be vulnerable to cache-timing attacks. In contrast, HMAC_DRBG
uses primitives that are consistently constant-time.
- CTR_DRBG is usually considered to be somewhat less cryptographically
robust than HMAC_DRBG. Granted, HMAC_DRBG isn't all that great
either, e.g. given the negative result from Woodage & Shumow (2018)
(https://eprint.iacr.org/2018/349.pdf), but that can be worked around.
- CTR_DRBG is more complex than HMAC_DRBG, risking bugs. Indeed, while
reviewing the CTR_DRBG code, I found two bugs, including one where it
can return success while leaving the output buffer uninitialized.
- The kernel's implementation of CTR_DRBG uses an "ctr(aes)"
crypto_skcipher and relies on it returning the next counter value.
That's fragile, and indeed historically many "ctr(aes)"
crypto_skcipher implementations haven't done that. E.g. see
commit 511306b2d075 ("crypto: arm/aes-ce - update IV after partial final CTR block"),
commit fa5fd3afc7e6 ("crypto: arm64/aes-blk - update IV after partial final CTR block"),
commit 371731ec2179 ("crypto: atmel-aes - Fix saving of IV for CTR mode"),
commit 25baaf8e2c93 ("crypto: crypto4xx - fix ctr-aes missing output IV"),
commit 334d37c9e263 ("crypto: caam - update IV using HW support"),
commit 0a4491d3febe ("crypto: chelsio - count incomplete block in IV"),
commit e8e3c1ca57d4 ("crypto: s5p - update iv after AES-CBC op end").
I.e., there were many years where the kernel's CTR_DRBG code (if it
were to have actually been used) repeated outputs on some platforms.
AES-CTR also uses a 128-bit counter, which creates overflow edge cases
that are sometimes gotten wrong. E.g. see commit 009b30ac7444
("crypto: vmx - CTR: always increment IV as quadword").
So, while switching to CTR_DRBG for performance reasons isn't completely
out of the question (notably BoringSSL uses it), it would take quite a
bit more work to create a solid implementation of it in the kernel,
including a more solid implementation of AES-CTR itself (in lib/crypto/,
with a scalar bit-sliced fallback, etc). Since HMAC_DRBG has always
been the default NIST DRBG variant in the kernel and is in a better
state, let's just standardize on it for now.
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Geert Uytterhoeven <geert@linux-m68k.org> # m68k
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
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The inclusion of <crypto/internal/cipher.h> and the import of the
internal crypto namespace became unnecessary in commit ba0570bdf1d9
("crypto: drbg - Replace AES cipher calls with library calls").
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
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include/crypto/drbg.h no longer contains anything that is used
externally to crypto/drbg.c. Therefore, fold it into crypto/drbg.c.
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
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FIPS 140-2 required that a continuous test for repeated outputs be done
on both "Approved RNGs" and "Non-Approved RNGs".
That's apparently why crypto/drbg.c does such a test on the bytes it
pulls from get_random_bytes(), despite get_random_bytes() being a
"Non-Approved RNG" that is credited with zero entropy for FIPS purposes.
(From FIPS's point of view, the "Approved RNG" is jitterentropy.)
FIPS 140-3 "modernized" the continuous RNG test requirements. They're
now a bit more sophisticated, requiring both an "Adaptive Proportion
Test" and a "Repetition Count Test".
At the same time, FIPS 140-3 doesn't require continuous RNG tests on
"Non-Approved RNGs" if a "vetted conditioning component" is used. The
SP800-90A DRBGs are exactly such a vetted conditioning component, by
their design. (In the case of HASH_DRBG and CTR_DRBG, the derivation
function does have to be implemented. But the kernel does that.)
In other words: from FIPS 140-3's point of view, get_random_bytes()
still produces zero entropy, but the way the DRBG combines those bytes
with the jitterentropy bytes preserves all the "approved" entropy from
jitterentropy. Thus no test for get_random_bytes() is required.
Seeing as FIPS 140-2 certificates stopped being issued in 2021 in favor
of FIPS 140-3, this means this code is obsolete. Remove it.
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
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Fold the contents of the inline functions crypto_drbg_get_bytes_addtl(),
crypto_drbg_get_bytes_addtl_test(), and crypto_drbg_reset_test() into
their only caller in drbg_cavs_test(). It ends up being much simpler.
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
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This commented-out code doesn't compile. Even if it did, it wouldn't
actually do what it was apparently intended to do, seeing as the "test"
for "drbg_pr_hmac_sha512" and "drbg_pr_ctr_aes256" is alg_test_null().
Just delete it to avoid keeping broken code around, and so that there
isn't any perceived need to try to update it as the DRBG code is
refactored.
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
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The kconfig symbol CRYPTO_DRBG_HMAC is always enabled when
CRYPTO_DRBG_MENU is enabled, and all checks for CRYPTO_DRBG_HMAC are in
code conditional on CRYPTO_DRBG_MENU. Thus, the only purpose of the
CRYPTO_DRBG_HMAC symbol is to select CRYPTO_HMAC and CRYPTO_SHA512.
Move those two selections to CRYPTO_DRBG_MENU, remove the checks for
CRYPTO_DRBG_HMAC, and remove the CRYPTO_DRBG_HMAC symbol itself.
Note that this also fixes an issue where CRYPTO_HMAC and CRYPTO_SHA512
were unnecessarily being forced to built-in when CRYPTO_DRBG=m.
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
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When fips_enabled=1, it seems to have been intended for one of the
algorithms defined in crypto/drbg.c to be the highest priority "stdrng"
algorithm, so that it is what is used by "stdrng" users.
However, the code only boosts the priority to 400, which is less than
the priority 500 used in drivers/crypto/caam/caamprng.c. Thus, the CAAM
RNG could be used instead.
Fix this by boosting the priority by 2000 instead of 200.
Fixes: 541af946fe13 ("crypto: drbg - SP800-90A Deterministic Random Bit Generator")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
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Fix drbg_healthcheck_sanity() to correctly check the return value of
drbg_generate(). drbg_generate() returns 0 on success, or a negative
errno value on failure. drbg_healthcheck_sanity() incorrectly assumed
that it returned a positive value on success.
This didn't make the sanity check fail, but it made it ineffective.
Fixes: cde001e4c3c3 ("crypto: rng - RNGs must return 0 in success case")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
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drbg_cpu_to_be32() is being used to do a plain write to a byte array,
which doesn't have any alignment guarantee. This can cause a misaligned
write. Replace it with the correct function, put_unaligned_be32().
Fixes: 72f3e00dd67e ("crypto: drbg - replace int2byte with cpu_to_be")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
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drbg_ctr_generate() sometimes returns success when it fails, leaving the
output buffer uninitialized. Fix it.
Fixes: cde001e4c3c3 ("crypto: rng - RNGs must return 0 in success case")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
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Fix several typos in comments and messages.
No functional change.
Signed-off-by: Sun Chaobo <suncoding913@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
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This was done entirely with mindless brute force, using
git grep -l '\<k[vmz]*alloc_objs*(.*, GFP_KERNEL)' |
xargs sed -i 's/\(alloc_objs*(.*\), GFP_KERNEL)/\1)/'
to convert the new alloc_obj() users that had a simple GFP_KERNEL
argument to just drop that argument.
Note that due to the extreme simplicity of the scripting, any slightly
more complex cases spread over multiple lines would not be triggered:
they definitely exist, but this covers the vast bulk of the cases, and
the resulting diff is also then easier to check automatically.
For the same reason the 'flex' versions will be done as a separate
conversion.
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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This is the result of running the Coccinelle script from
scripts/coccinelle/api/kmalloc_objs.cocci. The script is designed to
avoid scalar types (which need careful case-by-case checking), and
instead replace kmalloc-family calls that allocate struct or union
object instances:
Single allocations: kmalloc(sizeof(TYPE), ...)
are replaced with: kmalloc_obj(TYPE, ...)
Array allocations: kmalloc_array(COUNT, sizeof(TYPE), ...)
are replaced with: kmalloc_objs(TYPE, COUNT, ...)
Flex array allocations: kmalloc(struct_size(PTR, FAM, COUNT), ...)
are replaced with: kmalloc_flex(*PTR, FAM, COUNT, ...)
(where TYPE may also be *VAR)
The resulting allocations no longer return "void *", instead returning
"TYPE *".
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <kees@kernel.org>
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git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip
Pull locking updates from Ingo Molnar:
"Lock debugging:
- Implement compiler-driven static analysis locking context checking,
using the upcoming Clang 22 compiler's context analysis features
(Marco Elver)
We removed Sparse context analysis support, because prior to
removal even a defconfig kernel produced 1,700+ context tracking
Sparse warnings, the overwhelming majority of which are false
positives. On an allmodconfig kernel the number of false positive
context tracking Sparse warnings grows to over 5,200... On the plus
side of the balance actual locking bugs found by Sparse context
analysis is also rather ... sparse: I found only 3 such commits in
the last 3 years. So the rate of false positives and the
maintenance overhead is rather high and there appears to be no
active policy in place to achieve a zero-warnings baseline to move
the annotations & fixers to developers who introduce new code.
Clang context analysis is more complete and more aggressive in
trying to find bugs, at least in principle. Plus it has a different
model to enabling it: it's enabled subsystem by subsystem, which
results in zero warnings on all relevant kernel builds (as far as
our testing managed to cover it). Which allowed us to enable it by
default, similar to other compiler warnings, with the expectation
that there are no warnings going forward. This enforces a
zero-warnings baseline on clang-22+ builds (Which are still limited
in distribution, admittedly)
Hopefully the Clang approach can lead to a more maintainable
zero-warnings status quo and policy, with more and more subsystems
and drivers enabling the feature. Context tracking can be enabled
for all kernel code via WARN_CONTEXT_ANALYSIS_ALL=y (default
disabled), but this will generate a lot of false positives.
( Having said that, Sparse support could still be added back,
if anyone is interested - the removal patch is still
relatively straightforward to revert at this stage. )
Rust integration updates: (Alice Ryhl, Fujita Tomonori, Boqun Feng)
- Add support for Atomic<i8/i16/bool> and replace most Rust native
AtomicBool usages with Atomic<bool>
- Clean up LockClassKey and improve its documentation
- Add missing Send and Sync trait implementation for SetOnce
- Make ARef Unpin as it is supposed to be
- Add __rust_helper to a few Rust helpers as a preparation for
helper LTO
- Inline various lock related functions to avoid additional function
calls
WW mutexes:
- Extend ww_mutex tests and other test-ww_mutex updates (John
Stultz)
Misc fixes and cleanups:
- rcu: Mark lockdep_assert_rcu_helper() __always_inline (Arnd
Bergmann)
- locking/local_lock: Include more missing headers (Peter Zijlstra)
- seqlock: fix scoped_seqlock_read kernel-doc (Randy Dunlap)
- rust: sync: Replace `kernel::c_str!` with C-Strings (Tamir
Duberstein)"
* tag 'locking-core-2026-02-08' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip: (90 commits)
locking/rwlock: Fix write_trylock_irqsave() with CONFIG_INLINE_WRITE_TRYLOCK
rcu: Mark lockdep_assert_rcu_helper() __always_inline
compiler-context-analysis: Remove __assume_ctx_lock from initializers
tomoyo: Use scoped init guard
crypto: Use scoped init guard
kcov: Use scoped init guard
compiler-context-analysis: Introduce scoped init guards
cleanup: Make __DEFINE_LOCK_GUARD handle commas in initializers
seqlock: fix scoped_seqlock_read kernel-doc
tools: Update context analysis macros in compiler_types.h
rust: sync: Replace `kernel::c_str!` with C-Strings
rust: sync: Inline various lock related methods
rust: helpers: Move #define __rust_helper out of atomic.c
rust: wait: Add __rust_helper to helpers
rust: time: Add __rust_helper to helpers
rust: task: Add __rust_helper to helpers
rust: sync: Add __rust_helper to helpers
rust: refcount: Add __rust_helper to helpers
rust: rcu: Add __rust_helper to helpers
rust: processor: Add __rust_helper to helpers
...
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git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/herbert/crypto-2.6
Pull crypto update from Herbert Xu:
"API:
- Fix race condition in hwrng core by using RCU
Algorithms:
- Allow authenc(sha224,rfc3686) in fips mode
- Add test vectors for authenc(hmac(sha384),cbc(aes))
- Add test vectors for authenc(hmac(sha224),cbc(aes))
- Add test vectors for authenc(hmac(md5),cbc(des3_ede))
- Add lz4 support in hisi_zip
- Only allow clear key use during self-test in s390/{phmac,paes}
Drivers:
- Set rng quality to 900 in airoha
- Add gcm(aes) support for AMD/Xilinx Versal device
- Allow tfms to share device in hisilicon/trng"
* tag 'v7.0-p1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/herbert/crypto-2.6: (100 commits)
crypto: img-hash - Use unregister_ahashes in img_{un}register_algs
crypto: testmgr - Add test vectors for authenc(hmac(md5),cbc(des3_ede))
crypto: cesa - Simplify return statement in mv_cesa_dequeue_req_locked
crypto: testmgr - Add test vectors for authenc(hmac(sha224),cbc(aes))
crypto: testmgr - Add test vectors for authenc(hmac(sha384),cbc(aes))
hwrng: core - use RCU and work_struct to fix race condition
crypto: starfive - Fix memory leak in starfive_aes_aead_do_one_req()
crypto: xilinx - Fix inconsistant indentation
crypto: rng - Use unregister_rngs in register_rngs
crypto: atmel - Use unregister_{aeads,ahashes,skciphers}
hwrng: optee - simplify OP-TEE context match
crypto: ccp - Add sysfs attribute for boot integrity
dt-bindings: crypto: atmel,at91sam9g46-sha: add microchip,lan9691-sha
dt-bindings: crypto: atmel,at91sam9g46-aes: add microchip,lan9691-aes
dt-bindings: crypto: qcom,inline-crypto-engine: document the Milos ICE
crypto: caam - fix netdev memory leak in dpaa2_caam_probe
crypto: hisilicon/qm - increase wait time for mailbox
crypto: hisilicon/qm - obtain the mailbox configuration at one time
crypto: hisilicon/qm - remove unnecessary code in qm_mb_write()
crypto: hisilicon/qm - move the barrier before writing to the mailbox register
...
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Convert lock initialization to scoped guarded initialization where
lock-guarded members are initialized in the same scope.
This ensures the context analysis treats the context as active during member
initialization. This is required to avoid errors once implicit context
assertion is removed.
Signed-off-by: Marco Elver <elver@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260119094029.1344361-5-elver@google.com
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Switch from the old AES library functions (which use struct
crypto_aes_ctx) to the new ones (which use struct aes_enckey). This
eliminates the unnecessary computation and caching of the decryption
round keys. The new AES en/decryption functions are also much faster
and use AES instructions when supported by the CPU.
Note that in addition to the change in the key preparation function and
the key struct type itself, the change in the type of the key struct
results in aes_encrypt() (which is temporarily a type-generic macro)
calling the new encryption function rather than the old one.
Acked-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20260112192035.10427-30-ebiggers@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@kernel.org>
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Enable context analysis for crypto subsystem.
This demonstrates a larger conversion to use Clang's context
analysis. The benefit is additional static checking of locking rules,
along with better documentation.
Note the use of the __acquire_ret macro how to define an API where a
function returns a pointer to an object (struct scomp_scratch) with a
lock held. Additionally, the analysis only resolves aliases where the
analysis unambiguously sees that a variable was not reassigned after
initialization, requiring minor code changes.
Signed-off-by: Marco Elver <elver@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20251219154418.3592607-36-elver@google.com
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Now that drbg_get_random_bytes() always returns 0, checking its result at
the call sites stopped to make sense -- make this function return *void*
instead of *int*...
Signed-off-by: Sergey Shtylyov <s.shtylyov@omp.ru>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
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Currently, drbg_fips_continuous_test() only returns 0 and -EAGAIN, so an
early return from the *do*/*while* loop in drbg_get_random_bytes() just
isn't possible. Make drbg_fips_continuous_test() return bool instead of
*int* (using true instead of 0 and false instead of -EAGAIN). This way,
we can further simplify drbg_get_random_bytes()...
Found by Linux Verification Center (linuxtesting.org) with the Svace static
analysis tool.
Suggested-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: Sergey Shtylyov <s.shtylyov@omp.ru>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
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In drbg_fips_continuous_test(), not only the initializer of the ret local
variable is useless, the variable itself does not seem needed as it only
stores the result of memcmp() until it's checked on the next line -- get
rid of the variable...
Signed-off-by: Sergey Shtylyov <s.shtylyov@omp.ru>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
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The ctx array in struct sdesc is never used. Delete it as it's
bogus since the previous member ends with a flexible array.
Reported-by: Gustavo A. R. Silva <gustavoars@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
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Replace aes used in drbg with library calls.
Signed-off-by: Harsh Jain <h.jain@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
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Export drbg_ctr_df() derivative function to new module df_sp80090.
Signed-off-by: Harsh Jain <h.jain@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
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