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authorVlastimil Babka (SUSE) <vbabka@kernel.org>2026-06-11 12:40:05 +0200
committerVlastimil Babka (SUSE) <vbabka@kernel.org>2026-06-12 11:25:12 +0200
commitdfdfd58cce1c3f5df8733b64595448996c08e424 (patch)
tree6ed493b60f93d13de69df011512a729da6cf460c /mm
parentd3c45a0fee745066eaf16d6fa70439d548316f6c (diff)
parente0f54249a491c62ef8196b9f13bd7d95dba47c6f (diff)
downloadlinux-next-dfdfd58cce1c3f5df8733b64595448996c08e424.tar.gz
linux-next-dfdfd58cce1c3f5df8733b64595448996c08e424.zip
Merge branch 'slab/for-7.2/alloc_token' into slab/for-next
Merge series "slab: support for compiler-assisted type-based slab cache partitioning" from Marco Elver. From the cover letter [6]: Rework the general infrastructure around RANDOM_KMALLOC_CACHES into more flexible KMALLOC_PARTITION_CACHES, with the former being a partitioning mode of the latter. Introduce a new mode, KMALLOC_PARTITION_TYPED, which leverages a feature available in Clang 22 and later, called "allocation tokens" via __builtin_infer_alloc_token() [1]. Unlike KMALLOC_PARTITION_RANDOM (formerly RANDOM_KMALLOC_CACHES), this mode deterministically assigns a slab cache to an allocation of type T, regardless of allocation site. The builtin __builtin_infer_alloc_token(<malloc-args>, ...) instructs the compiler to infer an allocation type from arguments commonly passed to memory-allocating functions and returns a type-derived token ID. The implementation passes kmalloc-args to the builtin: the compiler performs best-effort type inference, and then recognizes common patterns such as `kmalloc(sizeof(T), ...)`, `kmalloc(sizeof(T) * n, ...)`, but also `(T *)kmalloc(...)`. Where the compiler fails to infer a type the fallback token (default: 0) is chosen. Note: kmalloc_obj(..) APIs fix the pattern how size and result type are expressed, and therefore ensures there's not much drift in which patterns the compiler needs to recognize. Specifically, kmalloc_obj() and friends expand to `(TYPE *)KMALLOC(__obj_size, GFP)`, which the compiler recognizes via the cast to TYPE*. Clang's default token ID calculation is described as [1]: typehashpointersplit: This mode assigns a token ID based on the hash of the allocated type's name, where the top half ID-space is reserved for types that contain pointers and the bottom half for types that do not contain pointers. Separating pointer-containing objects from pointerless objects and data allocations can help mitigate certain classes of memory corruption exploits [2]: attackers who gains a buffer overflow on a primitive buffer cannot use it to directly corrupt pointers or other critical metadata in an object residing in a different, isolated heap region. It is important to note that heap isolation strategies offer a best-effort approach, and do not provide a 100% security guarantee, albeit achievable at relatively low performance cost. Note that this also does not prevent cross-cache attacks: while waiting for future features like SLAB_VIRTUAL [3] to provide physical page isolation, this feature should be deployed alongside SHUFFLE_PAGE_ALLOCATOR and init_on_free=1 to mitigate cross-cache attacks and page-reuse attacks as much as possible today. With all that, my kernel (x86 defconfig) shows me a histogram of slab cache object distribution per /proc/slabinfo (after boot): <slab cache> <objs> <hist> kmalloc-part-15 1465 ++++++++++++++ kmalloc-part-14 2988 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ kmalloc-part-13 1656 ++++++++++++++++ kmalloc-part-12 1045 ++++++++++ kmalloc-part-11 1697 ++++++++++++++++ kmalloc-part-10 1489 ++++++++++++++ kmalloc-part-09 965 +++++++++ kmalloc-part-08 710 +++++++ kmalloc-part-07 100 + kmalloc-part-06 217 ++ kmalloc-part-05 105 + kmalloc-part-04 4047 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ kmalloc-part-03 183 + kmalloc-part-02 283 ++ kmalloc-part-01 316 +++ kmalloc 1422 ++++++++++++++ The above /proc/slabinfo snapshot shows me there are 6673 allocated objects (slabs 00 - 07) that the compiler claims contain no pointers or it was unable to infer the type of, and 12015 objects that contain pointers (slabs 08 - 15). On a whole, this looks relatively sane. Additionally, when I compile my kernel with -Rpass=alloc-token, which provides diagnostics where (after dead-code elimination) type inference failed, I see 186 allocation sites where the compiler failed to identify a type (down from 966 when I sent the RFC [4]). Some initial review confirms these are mostly variable sized buffers, but also include structs with trailing flexible length arrays. Link: https://clang.llvm.org/docs/AllocToken.html [1] Link: https://blog.dfsec.com/ios/2025/05/30/blasting-past-ios-18/ [2] Link: https://lwn.net/Articles/944647/ [3] Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20250825154505.1558444-1-elver@google.com/ [4] Link: https://discourse.llvm.org/t/rfc-a-framework-for-allocator-partitioning-hints/87434 [5] Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20260511200136.3201646-1-elver@google.com/ [6]
Diffstat (limited to 'mm')
-rw-r--r--mm/Kconfig73
-rw-r--r--mm/kfence/kfence_test.c4
-rw-r--r--mm/slab.h4
-rw-r--r--mm/slab_common.c52
-rw-r--r--mm/slub.c150
5 files changed, 121 insertions, 162 deletions
diff --git a/mm/Kconfig b/mm/Kconfig
index e8bf1e9e6ad9..4f187b07eb48 100644
--- a/mm/Kconfig
+++ b/mm/Kconfig
@@ -248,22 +248,75 @@ config SLUB_STATS
out which slabs are relevant to a particular load.
Try running: slabinfo -DA
-config RANDOM_KMALLOC_CACHES
- default n
+config KMALLOC_PARTITION_CACHES
depends on !SLUB_TINY
- bool "Randomize slab caches for normal kmalloc"
+ bool "Partitioned slab caches for normal kmalloc"
+ default RANDOM_KMALLOC_CACHES
help
- A hardening feature that creates multiple copies of slab caches for
- normal kmalloc allocation and makes kmalloc randomly pick one based
- on code address, which makes the attackers more difficult to spray
- vulnerable memory objects on the heap for the purpose of exploiting
- memory vulnerabilities.
+ A hardening feature that creates multiple isolated copies of slab
+ caches for normal kmalloc allocations. This makes it more difficult
+ to exploit memory-safety vulnerabilities by attacking vulnerable
+ co-located memory objects. Several modes are provided.
Currently the number of copies is set to 16, a reasonably large value
that effectively diverges the memory objects allocated for different
subsystems or modules into different caches, at the expense of a
- limited degree of memory and CPU overhead that relates to hardware and
- system workload.
+ limited degree of memory and CPU overhead that relates to hardware
+ and system workload.
+
+choice
+ prompt "Partitioned slab cache mode"
+ depends on KMALLOC_PARTITION_CACHES
+ default KMALLOC_PARTITION_TYPED if CC_HAS_ALLOC_TOKEN
+ default KMALLOC_PARTITION_RANDOM
+ help
+ Selects the slab cache partitioning mode.
+
+config KMALLOC_PARTITION_RANDOM
+ bool "Randomize slab caches for normal kmalloc"
+ help
+ Randomly pick a slab cache based on code address and a per-boot
+ random seed.
+
+ This makes it harder for attackers to predict object co-location.
+ The placement is random: while attackers don't know which kmalloc
+ cache an object will be allocated from, they might circumvent
+ the randomization by retrying attacks across multiple machines until
+ the target objects are co-located.
+
+config KMALLOC_PARTITION_TYPED
+ bool "Type based slab cache selection for normal kmalloc"
+ depends on CC_HAS_ALLOC_TOKEN
+ help
+ Rely on Clang's allocation tokens to choose a slab cache, where token
+ IDs are derived from the allocated type.
+
+ Unlike KMALLOC_PARTITION_RANDOM, cache assignment is deterministic based
+ on type, which guarantees that objects of certain types are not
+ placed in the same cache. This effectively mitigates certain classes
+ of exploits that probabilistic defenses like KMALLOC_PARTITION_RANDOM
+ only make harder but not impossible. However, this also means the
+ cache assignment is predictable.
+
+ Clang's default token ID calculation returns a bounded hash with
+ disjoint ranges for pointer-containing and pointerless objects: when
+ used as the slab cache index, this prevents buffer overflows on
+ primitive buffers from directly corrupting pointer-containing
+ objects.
+
+ The current effectiveness of Clang's type inference can be judged by
+ -Rpass=alloc-token, which provides diagnostics where (after dead-code
+ elimination) type inference failed.
+
+ Requires Clang 22 or later.
+
+endchoice
+
+config RANDOM_KMALLOC_CACHES
+ bool
+ transitional
+ help
+ Transitional config for migration to KMALLOC_PARTITION_CACHES.
endmenu # Slab allocator options
diff --git a/mm/kfence/kfence_test.c b/mm/kfence/kfence_test.c
index bac6f2aff101..c6048f57bae9 100644
--- a/mm/kfence/kfence_test.c
+++ b/mm/kfence/kfence_test.c
@@ -214,7 +214,7 @@ static void test_cache_destroy(void)
static inline size_t kmalloc_cache_alignment(size_t size)
{
/* just to get ->align so no need to pass in the real caller */
- enum kmalloc_cache_type type = kmalloc_type(GFP_KERNEL, 0);
+ enum kmalloc_cache_type type = kmalloc_type(GFP_KERNEL, __kmalloc_token(0));
return kmalloc_caches[type][__kmalloc_index(size, false)]->align;
}
@@ -285,7 +285,7 @@ static void *test_alloc(struct kunit *test, size_t size, gfp_t gfp, enum allocat
if (is_kfence_address(alloc)) {
struct slab *slab = virt_to_slab(alloc);
- enum kmalloc_cache_type type = kmalloc_type(GFP_KERNEL, _RET_IP_);
+ enum kmalloc_cache_type type = kmalloc_type(GFP_KERNEL, __kmalloc_token(size));
struct kmem_cache *s = test_cache ?:
kmalloc_caches[type][__kmalloc_index(size, false)];
diff --git a/mm/slab.h b/mm/slab.h
index bf2f87acf5e3..1bf9c3021ae3 100644
--- a/mm/slab.h
+++ b/mm/slab.h
@@ -362,12 +362,12 @@ static inline unsigned int size_index_elem(unsigned int bytes)
* KMALLOC_MAX_CACHE_SIZE and the caller must check that.
*/
static inline struct kmem_cache *
-kmalloc_slab(size_t size, kmem_buckets *b, gfp_t flags, unsigned long caller)
+kmalloc_slab(size_t size, kmem_buckets *b, gfp_t flags, kmalloc_token_t token)
{
unsigned int index;
if (!b)
- b = &kmalloc_caches[kmalloc_type(flags, caller)];
+ b = &kmalloc_caches[kmalloc_type(flags, token)];
if (size <= 192)
index = kmalloc_size_index[size_index_elem(size)];
else
diff --git a/mm/slab_common.c b/mm/slab_common.c
index d5a70a831a2a..388eb5980859 100644
--- a/mm/slab_common.c
+++ b/mm/slab_common.c
@@ -742,7 +742,7 @@ kmem_buckets kmalloc_caches[NR_KMALLOC_TYPES] __ro_after_init =
{ /* initialization for https://llvm.org/pr42570 */ };
EXPORT_SYMBOL(kmalloc_caches);
-#ifdef CONFIG_RANDOM_KMALLOC_CACHES
+#ifdef CONFIG_KMALLOC_PARTITION_RANDOM
unsigned long random_kmalloc_seed __ro_after_init;
EXPORT_SYMBOL(random_kmalloc_seed);
#endif
@@ -787,7 +787,7 @@ size_t kmalloc_size_roundup(size_t size)
* The flags don't matter since size_index is common to all.
* Neither does the caller for just getting ->object_size.
*/
- return kmalloc_slab(size, NULL, GFP_KERNEL, 0)->object_size;
+ return kmalloc_slab(size, NULL, GFP_KERNEL, __kmalloc_token(0))->object_size;
}
/* Above the smaller buckets, size is a multiple of page size. */
@@ -821,26 +821,26 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(kmalloc_size_roundup);
#define KMALLOC_RCL_NAME(sz)
#endif
-#ifdef CONFIG_RANDOM_KMALLOC_CACHES
-#define __KMALLOC_RANDOM_CONCAT(a, b) a ## b
-#define KMALLOC_RANDOM_NAME(N, sz) __KMALLOC_RANDOM_CONCAT(KMA_RAND_, N)(sz)
-#define KMA_RAND_1(sz) .name[KMALLOC_RANDOM_START + 1] = "kmalloc-rnd-01-" #sz,
-#define KMA_RAND_2(sz) KMA_RAND_1(sz) .name[KMALLOC_RANDOM_START + 2] = "kmalloc-rnd-02-" #sz,
-#define KMA_RAND_3(sz) KMA_RAND_2(sz) .name[KMALLOC_RANDOM_START + 3] = "kmalloc-rnd-03-" #sz,
-#define KMA_RAND_4(sz) KMA_RAND_3(sz) .name[KMALLOC_RANDOM_START + 4] = "kmalloc-rnd-04-" #sz,
-#define KMA_RAND_5(sz) KMA_RAND_4(sz) .name[KMALLOC_RANDOM_START + 5] = "kmalloc-rnd-05-" #sz,
-#define KMA_RAND_6(sz) KMA_RAND_5(sz) .name[KMALLOC_RANDOM_START + 6] = "kmalloc-rnd-06-" #sz,
-#define KMA_RAND_7(sz) KMA_RAND_6(sz) .name[KMALLOC_RANDOM_START + 7] = "kmalloc-rnd-07-" #sz,
-#define KMA_RAND_8(sz) KMA_RAND_7(sz) .name[KMALLOC_RANDOM_START + 8] = "kmalloc-rnd-08-" #sz,
-#define KMA_RAND_9(sz) KMA_RAND_8(sz) .name[KMALLOC_RANDOM_START + 9] = "kmalloc-rnd-09-" #sz,
-#define KMA_RAND_10(sz) KMA_RAND_9(sz) .name[KMALLOC_RANDOM_START + 10] = "kmalloc-rnd-10-" #sz,
-#define KMA_RAND_11(sz) KMA_RAND_10(sz) .name[KMALLOC_RANDOM_START + 11] = "kmalloc-rnd-11-" #sz,
-#define KMA_RAND_12(sz) KMA_RAND_11(sz) .name[KMALLOC_RANDOM_START + 12] = "kmalloc-rnd-12-" #sz,
-#define KMA_RAND_13(sz) KMA_RAND_12(sz) .name[KMALLOC_RANDOM_START + 13] = "kmalloc-rnd-13-" #sz,
-#define KMA_RAND_14(sz) KMA_RAND_13(sz) .name[KMALLOC_RANDOM_START + 14] = "kmalloc-rnd-14-" #sz,
-#define KMA_RAND_15(sz) KMA_RAND_14(sz) .name[KMALLOC_RANDOM_START + 15] = "kmalloc-rnd-15-" #sz,
-#else // CONFIG_RANDOM_KMALLOC_CACHES
-#define KMALLOC_RANDOM_NAME(N, sz)
+#ifdef CONFIG_KMALLOC_PARTITION_CACHES
+#define __KMALLOC_PARTITION_CONCAT(a, b) a ## b
+#define KMALLOC_PARTITION_NAME(N, sz) __KMALLOC_PARTITION_CONCAT(KMA_PART_, N)(sz)
+#define KMA_PART_1(sz) .name[KMALLOC_PARTITION_START + 1] = "kmalloc-part-01-" #sz,
+#define KMA_PART_2(sz) KMA_PART_1(sz) .name[KMALLOC_PARTITION_START + 2] = "kmalloc-part-02-" #sz,
+#define KMA_PART_3(sz) KMA_PART_2(sz) .name[KMALLOC_PARTITION_START + 3] = "kmalloc-part-03-" #sz,
+#define KMA_PART_4(sz) KMA_PART_3(sz) .name[KMALLOC_PARTITION_START + 4] = "kmalloc-part-04-" #sz,
+#define KMA_PART_5(sz) KMA_PART_4(sz) .name[KMALLOC_PARTITION_START + 5] = "kmalloc-part-05-" #sz,
+#define KMA_PART_6(sz) KMA_PART_5(sz) .name[KMALLOC_PARTITION_START + 6] = "kmalloc-part-06-" #sz,
+#define KMA_PART_7(sz) KMA_PART_6(sz) .name[KMALLOC_PARTITION_START + 7] = "kmalloc-part-07-" #sz,
+#define KMA_PART_8(sz) KMA_PART_7(sz) .name[KMALLOC_PARTITION_START + 8] = "kmalloc-part-08-" #sz,
+#define KMA_PART_9(sz) KMA_PART_8(sz) .name[KMALLOC_PARTITION_START + 9] = "kmalloc-part-09-" #sz,
+#define KMA_PART_10(sz) KMA_PART_9(sz) .name[KMALLOC_PARTITION_START + 10] = "kmalloc-part-10-" #sz,
+#define KMA_PART_11(sz) KMA_PART_10(sz) .name[KMALLOC_PARTITION_START + 11] = "kmalloc-part-11-" #sz,
+#define KMA_PART_12(sz) KMA_PART_11(sz) .name[KMALLOC_PARTITION_START + 12] = "kmalloc-part-12-" #sz,
+#define KMA_PART_13(sz) KMA_PART_12(sz) .name[KMALLOC_PARTITION_START + 13] = "kmalloc-part-13-" #sz,
+#define KMA_PART_14(sz) KMA_PART_13(sz) .name[KMALLOC_PARTITION_START + 14] = "kmalloc-part-14-" #sz,
+#define KMA_PART_15(sz) KMA_PART_14(sz) .name[KMALLOC_PARTITION_START + 15] = "kmalloc-part-15-" #sz,
+#else // CONFIG_KMALLOC_PARTITION_CACHES
+#define KMALLOC_PARTITION_NAME(N, sz)
#endif
#define INIT_KMALLOC_INFO(__size, __short_size) \
@@ -849,7 +849,7 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(kmalloc_size_roundup);
KMALLOC_RCL_NAME(__short_size) \
KMALLOC_CGROUP_NAME(__short_size) \
KMALLOC_DMA_NAME(__short_size) \
- KMALLOC_RANDOM_NAME(RANDOM_KMALLOC_CACHES_NR, __short_size) \
+ KMALLOC_PARTITION_NAME(KMALLOC_PARTITION_CACHES_NR, __short_size) \
.size = __size, \
}
@@ -961,8 +961,8 @@ new_kmalloc_cache(int idx, enum kmalloc_cache_type type)
flags |= SLAB_CACHE_DMA;
}
-#ifdef CONFIG_RANDOM_KMALLOC_CACHES
- if (type >= KMALLOC_RANDOM_START && type <= KMALLOC_RANDOM_END)
+#ifdef CONFIG_KMALLOC_PARTITION_CACHES
+ if (type >= KMALLOC_PARTITION_START && type <= KMALLOC_PARTITION_END)
flags |= SLAB_NO_MERGE;
#endif
@@ -1010,7 +1010,7 @@ void __init create_kmalloc_caches(void)
for (i = KMALLOC_SHIFT_LOW; i <= KMALLOC_SHIFT_HIGH; i++)
new_kmalloc_cache(i, type);
}
-#ifdef CONFIG_RANDOM_KMALLOC_CACHES
+#ifdef CONFIG_KMALLOC_PARTITION_RANDOM
random_kmalloc_seed = get_random_u64();
#endif
diff --git a/mm/slub.c b/mm/slub.c
index 171fa500c7ee..e2ee8f1aaccf 100644
--- a/mm/slub.c
+++ b/mm/slub.c
@@ -2140,11 +2140,11 @@ static inline size_t obj_exts_alloc_size(struct kmem_cache *s,
if (!is_kmalloc_normal(s))
return sz;
- obj_exts_cache = kmalloc_slab(sz, NULL, gfp, 0);
+ obj_exts_cache = kmalloc_slab(sz, NULL, gfp, __kmalloc_token(0));
/*
- * We can't simply compare s with obj_exts_cache, because random kmalloc
- * caches have multiple caches per size, selected by caller address.
- * Since caller address may differ between kmalloc_slab() and actual
+ * We can't simply compare s with obj_exts_cache, because partitioned kmalloc
+ * caches have multiple caches per size, selected by caller address or type.
+ * Since caller address or type may differ between kmalloc_slab() and actual
* allocation, bump size when sizes are equal.
*/
if (s->object_size == obj_exts_cache->object_size)
@@ -5312,7 +5312,7 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(__kmalloc_large_node_noprof);
static __always_inline
void *__do_kmalloc_node(size_t size, kmem_buckets *b, gfp_t flags, int node,
- unsigned long caller)
+ unsigned long caller, kmalloc_token_t token)
{
struct kmem_cache *s;
void *ret;
@@ -5327,37 +5327,28 @@ void *__do_kmalloc_node(size_t size, kmem_buckets *b, gfp_t flags, int node,
if (unlikely(!size))
return ZERO_SIZE_PTR;
- s = kmalloc_slab(size, b, flags, caller);
+ s = kmalloc_slab(size, b, flags, token);
ret = slab_alloc_node(s, NULL, flags, node, caller, size);
ret = kasan_kmalloc(s, ret, size, flags);
trace_kmalloc(caller, ret, size, s->size, flags, node);
return ret;
}
-void *__kmalloc_node_noprof(DECL_BUCKET_PARAMS(size, b), gfp_t flags, int node)
+void *__kmalloc_node_noprof(DECL_KMALLOC_PARAMS(size, b, token), gfp_t flags, int node)
{
- return __do_kmalloc_node(size, PASS_BUCKET_PARAM(b), flags, node, _RET_IP_);
+ return __do_kmalloc_node(size, PASS_BUCKET_PARAM(b), flags, node,
+ _RET_IP_, PASS_TOKEN_PARAM(token));
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(__kmalloc_node_noprof);
-void *__kmalloc_noprof(size_t size, gfp_t flags)
+void *__kmalloc_noprof(DECL_TOKEN_PARAMS(size, token), gfp_t flags)
{
- return __do_kmalloc_node(size, NULL, flags, NUMA_NO_NODE, _RET_IP_);
+ return __do_kmalloc_node(size, NULL, flags, NUMA_NO_NODE, _RET_IP_,
+ PASS_TOKEN_PARAM(token));
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(__kmalloc_noprof);
-/**
- * kmalloc_nolock - Allocate an object of given size from any context.
- * @size: size to allocate
- * @gfp_flags: GFP flags. Only __GFP_ACCOUNT, __GFP_ZERO, __GFP_NO_OBJ_EXT
- * allowed.
- * @node: node number of the target node.
- *
- * Return: pointer to the new object or NULL in case of error.
- * NULL does not mean EBUSY or EAGAIN. It means ENOMEM.
- * There is no reason to call it again and expect !NULL.
- */
-void *kmalloc_nolock_noprof(size_t size, gfp_t gfp_flags, int node)
+void *_kmalloc_nolock_noprof(DECL_TOKEN_PARAMS(size, token), gfp_t gfp_flags, int node)
{
gfp_t alloc_gfp = __GFP_NOWARN | __GFP_NOMEMALLOC | gfp_flags;
size_t orig_size = size;
@@ -5385,7 +5376,7 @@ void *kmalloc_nolock_noprof(size_t size, gfp_t gfp_flags, int node)
retry:
if (unlikely(size > KMALLOC_MAX_CACHE_SIZE))
return NULL;
- s = kmalloc_slab(size, NULL, alloc_gfp, _RET_IP_);
+ s = kmalloc_slab(size, NULL, alloc_gfp, PASS_TOKEN_PARAM(token));
if (!(s->flags & __CMPXCHG_DOUBLE) && !kmem_cache_debug(s))
/*
@@ -5438,12 +5429,13 @@ success:
ret = kasan_kmalloc(s, ret, orig_size, alloc_gfp);
return ret;
}
-EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(kmalloc_nolock_noprof);
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(_kmalloc_nolock_noprof);
-void *__kmalloc_node_track_caller_noprof(DECL_BUCKET_PARAMS(size, b), gfp_t flags,
+void *__kmalloc_node_track_caller_noprof(DECL_KMALLOC_PARAMS(size, b, token), gfp_t flags,
int node, unsigned long caller)
{
- return __do_kmalloc_node(size, PASS_BUCKET_PARAM(b), flags, node, caller);
+ return __do_kmalloc_node(size, PASS_BUCKET_PARAM(b), flags, node,
+ caller, PASS_TOKEN_PARAM(token));
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(__kmalloc_node_track_caller_noprof);
@@ -6702,7 +6694,7 @@ void kfree_nolock(const void *object)
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(kfree_nolock);
static __always_inline __realloc_size(2) void *
-__do_krealloc(const void *p, size_t new_size, unsigned long align, gfp_t flags, int nid)
+__do_krealloc(const void *p, size_t new_size, unsigned long align, gfp_t flags, int nid, kmalloc_token_t token)
{
void *ret;
size_t ks = 0;
@@ -6774,7 +6766,7 @@ __do_krealloc(const void *p, size_t new_size, unsigned long align, gfp_t flags,
return (void *)p;
alloc_new:
- ret = kmalloc_node_track_caller_noprof(new_size, flags, nid, _RET_IP_);
+ ret = __kmalloc_node_track_caller_noprof(PASS_KMALLOC_PARAMS(new_size, NULL, token), flags, nid, _RET_IP_);
if (ret && p) {
/* Disable KASAN checks as the object's redzone is accessed. */
kasan_disable_current();
@@ -6785,45 +6777,7 @@ alloc_new:
return ret;
}
-/**
- * krealloc_node_align - reallocate memory. The contents will remain unchanged.
- * @p: object to reallocate memory for.
- * @new_size: how many bytes of memory are required.
- * @align: desired alignment.
- * @flags: the type of memory to allocate.
- * @nid: NUMA node or NUMA_NO_NODE
- *
- * If @p is %NULL, krealloc() behaves exactly like kmalloc(). If @new_size
- * is 0 and @p is not a %NULL pointer, the object pointed to is freed.
- *
- * Only alignments up to those guaranteed by kmalloc() will be honored. Please see
- * Documentation/core-api/memory-allocation.rst for more details.
- *
- * If __GFP_ZERO logic is requested, callers must ensure that, starting with the
- * initial memory allocation, every subsequent call to this API for the same
- * memory allocation is flagged with __GFP_ZERO. Otherwise, it is possible that
- * __GFP_ZERO is not fully honored by this API.
- *
- * When slub_debug_orig_size() is off, krealloc() only knows about the bucket
- * size of an allocation (but not the exact size it was allocated with) and
- * hence implements the following semantics for shrinking and growing buffers
- * with __GFP_ZERO::
- *
- * new bucket
- * 0 size size
- * |--------|----------------|
- * | keep | zero |
- *
- * Otherwise, the original allocation size 'orig_size' could be used to
- * precisely clear the requested size, and the new size will also be stored
- * as the new 'orig_size'.
- *
- * In any case, the contents of the object pointed to are preserved up to the
- * lesser of the new and old sizes.
- *
- * Return: pointer to the allocated memory or %NULL in case of error
- */
-void *krealloc_node_align_noprof(const void *p, size_t new_size, unsigned long align,
+void *krealloc_node_align_noprof(const void *p, DECL_TOKEN_PARAMS(new_size, token), unsigned long align,
gfp_t flags, int nid)
{
void *ret;
@@ -6833,7 +6787,7 @@ void *krealloc_node_align_noprof(const void *p, size_t new_size, unsigned long a
return ZERO_SIZE_PTR;
}
- ret = __do_krealloc(p, new_size, align, flags, nid);
+ ret = __do_krealloc(p, new_size, align, flags, nid, PASS_TOKEN_PARAM(token));
if (ret && kasan_reset_tag(p) != kasan_reset_tag(ret))
kfree(p);
@@ -6865,28 +6819,7 @@ static gfp_t kmalloc_gfp_adjust(gfp_t flags, size_t size)
return flags;
}
-/**
- * __kvmalloc_node - attempt to allocate physically contiguous memory, but upon
- * failure, fall back to non-contiguous (vmalloc) allocation.
- * @size: size of the request.
- * @b: which set of kmalloc buckets to allocate from.
- * @align: desired alignment.
- * @flags: gfp mask for the allocation - must be compatible (superset) with GFP_KERNEL.
- * @node: numa node to allocate from
- *
- * Only alignments up to those guaranteed by kmalloc() will be honored. Please see
- * Documentation/core-api/memory-allocation.rst for more details.
- *
- * Uses kmalloc to get the memory but if the allocation fails then falls back
- * to the vmalloc allocator. Use kvfree for freeing the memory.
- *
- * GFP_NOWAIT and GFP_ATOMIC are supported, the __GFP_NORETRY modifier is not.
- * __GFP_RETRY_MAYFAIL is supported, and it should be used only if kmalloc is
- * preferable to the vmalloc fallback, due to visible performance drawbacks.
- *
- * Return: pointer to the allocated memory of %NULL in case of failure
- */
-void *__kvmalloc_node_noprof(DECL_BUCKET_PARAMS(size, b), unsigned long align,
+void *__kvmalloc_node_noprof(DECL_KMALLOC_PARAMS(size, b, token), unsigned long align,
gfp_t flags, int node)
{
bool allow_block;
@@ -6898,7 +6831,7 @@ void *__kvmalloc_node_noprof(DECL_BUCKET_PARAMS(size, b), unsigned long align,
*/
ret = __do_kmalloc_node(size, PASS_BUCKET_PARAM(b),
kmalloc_gfp_adjust(flags, size),
- node, _RET_IP_);
+ node, _RET_IP_, PASS_TOKEN_PARAM(token));
if (ret || size <= PAGE_SIZE)
return ret;
@@ -6967,34 +6900,7 @@ void kvfree_sensitive(const void *addr, size_t len)
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(kvfree_sensitive);
-/**
- * kvrealloc_node_align - reallocate memory; contents remain unchanged
- * @p: object to reallocate memory for
- * @size: the size to reallocate
- * @align: desired alignment
- * @flags: the flags for the page level allocator
- * @nid: NUMA node id
- *
- * If @p is %NULL, kvrealloc() behaves exactly like kvmalloc(). If @size is 0
- * and @p is not a %NULL pointer, the object pointed to is freed.
- *
- * Only alignments up to those guaranteed by kmalloc() will be honored. Please see
- * Documentation/core-api/memory-allocation.rst for more details.
- *
- * If __GFP_ZERO logic is requested, callers must ensure that, starting with the
- * initial memory allocation, every subsequent call to this API for the same
- * memory allocation is flagged with __GFP_ZERO. Otherwise, it is possible that
- * __GFP_ZERO is not fully honored by this API.
- *
- * In any case, the contents of the object pointed to are preserved up to the
- * lesser of the new and old sizes.
- *
- * This function must not be called concurrently with itself or kvfree() for the
- * same memory allocation.
- *
- * Return: pointer to the allocated memory or %NULL in case of error
- */
-void *kvrealloc_node_align_noprof(const void *p, size_t size, unsigned long align,
+void *kvrealloc_node_align_noprof(const void *p, DECL_TOKEN_PARAMS(size, token), unsigned long align,
gfp_t flags, int nid)
{
void *n;
@@ -7002,10 +6908,10 @@ void *kvrealloc_node_align_noprof(const void *p, size_t size, unsigned long alig
if (is_vmalloc_addr(p))
return vrealloc_node_align_noprof(p, size, align, flags, nid);
- n = krealloc_node_align_noprof(p, size, align, kmalloc_gfp_adjust(flags, size), nid);
+ n = krealloc_node_align_noprof(p, PASS_TOKEN_PARAMS(size, token), align, kmalloc_gfp_adjust(flags, size), nid);
if (!n) {
/* We failed to krealloc(), fall back to kvmalloc(). */
- n = kvmalloc_node_align_noprof(size, align, flags, nid);
+ n = __kvmalloc_node_noprof(PASS_KMALLOC_PARAMS(size, NULL, token), align, flags, nid);
if (!n)
return NULL;
@@ -8521,7 +8427,7 @@ static void __init bootstrap_kmalloc_sheaves(void)
{
enum kmalloc_cache_type type;
- for (type = KMALLOC_NORMAL; type <= KMALLOC_RANDOM_END; type++) {
+ for (type = KMALLOC_NORMAL; type <= KMALLOC_PARTITION_END; type++) {
for (int idx = 0; idx < KMALLOC_SHIFT_HIGH + 1; idx++) {
if (kmalloc_caches[type][idx])
bootstrap_cache_sheaves(kmalloc_caches[type][idx]);