diff options
Diffstat (limited to 'fs')
| -rw-r--r-- | fs/crypto/keyring.c | 23 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | fs/lockd/clnt4xdr.c | 9 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | fs/lockd/xdr4.c | 13 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | fs/nfs/Kconfig | 2 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | fs/nfs/dir.c | 2 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | fs/nfs/read.c | 3 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | fs/nfsd/Kconfig | 2 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | fs/nfsd/vfs.c | 9 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | fs/super.c | 15 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | fs/verity/enable.c | 25 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | fs/verity/verify.c | 12 |
11 files changed, 71 insertions, 44 deletions
diff --git a/fs/crypto/keyring.c b/fs/crypto/keyring.c index 78086f8dbda5..13d336a6cc5d 100644 --- a/fs/crypto/keyring.c +++ b/fs/crypto/keyring.c @@ -92,6 +92,8 @@ void fscrypt_put_master_key_activeref(struct super_block *sb, * destroying any subkeys embedded in it. */ + if (WARN_ON(!sb->s_master_keys)) + return; spin_lock(&sb->s_master_keys->lock); hlist_del_rcu(&mk->mk_node); spin_unlock(&sb->s_master_keys->lock); @@ -207,10 +209,11 @@ static int allocate_filesystem_keyring(struct super_block *sb) * Release all encryption keys that have been added to the filesystem, along * with the keyring that contains them. * - * This is called at unmount time. The filesystem's underlying block device(s) - * are still available at this time; this is important because after user file - * accesses have been allowed, this function may need to evict keys from the - * keyslots of an inline crypto engine, which requires the block device(s). + * This is called at unmount time, after all potentially-encrypted inodes have + * been evicted. The filesystem's underlying block device(s) are still + * available at this time; this is important because after user file accesses + * have been allowed, this function may need to evict keys from the keyslots of + * an inline crypto engine, which requires the block device(s). */ void fscrypt_destroy_keyring(struct super_block *sb) { @@ -227,12 +230,12 @@ void fscrypt_destroy_keyring(struct super_block *sb) hlist_for_each_entry_safe(mk, tmp, bucket, mk_node) { /* - * Since all inodes were already evicted, every key - * remaining in the keyring should have an empty inode - * list, and should only still be in the keyring due to - * the single active ref associated with ->mk_secret. - * There should be no structural refs beyond the one - * associated with the active ref. + * Since all potentially-encrypted inodes were already + * evicted, every key remaining in the keyring should + * have an empty inode list, and should only still be in + * the keyring due to the single active ref associated + * with ->mk_secret. There should be no structural refs + * beyond the one associated with the active ref. */ WARN_ON(refcount_read(&mk->mk_active_refs) != 1); WARN_ON(refcount_read(&mk->mk_struct_refs) != 1); diff --git a/fs/lockd/clnt4xdr.c b/fs/lockd/clnt4xdr.c index 7df6324ccb8a..8161667c976f 100644 --- a/fs/lockd/clnt4xdr.c +++ b/fs/lockd/clnt4xdr.c @@ -261,7 +261,6 @@ static int decode_nlm4_holder(struct xdr_stream *xdr, struct nlm_res *result) u32 exclusive; int error; __be32 *p; - s32 end; memset(lock, 0, sizeof(*lock)); locks_init_lock(fl); @@ -285,13 +284,7 @@ static int decode_nlm4_holder(struct xdr_stream *xdr, struct nlm_res *result) fl->fl_type = exclusive != 0 ? F_WRLCK : F_RDLCK; p = xdr_decode_hyper(p, &l_offset); xdr_decode_hyper(p, &l_len); - end = l_offset + l_len - 1; - - fl->fl_start = (loff_t)l_offset; - if (l_len == 0 || end < 0) - fl->fl_end = OFFSET_MAX; - else - fl->fl_end = (loff_t)end; + nlm4svc_set_file_lock_range(fl, l_offset, l_len); error = 0; out: return error; diff --git a/fs/lockd/xdr4.c b/fs/lockd/xdr4.c index 712fdfeb8ef0..5fcbf30cd275 100644 --- a/fs/lockd/xdr4.c +++ b/fs/lockd/xdr4.c @@ -33,6 +33,17 @@ loff_t_to_s64(loff_t offset) return res; } +void nlm4svc_set_file_lock_range(struct file_lock *fl, u64 off, u64 len) +{ + s64 end = off + len - 1; + + fl->fl_start = off; + if (len == 0 || end < 0) + fl->fl_end = OFFSET_MAX; + else + fl->fl_end = end; +} + /* * NLM file handles are defined by specification to be a variable-length * XDR opaque no longer than 1024 bytes. However, this implementation @@ -80,7 +91,7 @@ svcxdr_decode_lock(struct xdr_stream *xdr, struct nlm_lock *lock) locks_init_lock(fl); fl->fl_flags = FL_POSIX; fl->fl_type = F_RDLCK; - + nlm4svc_set_file_lock_range(fl, lock->lock_start, lock->lock_len); return true; } diff --git a/fs/nfs/Kconfig b/fs/nfs/Kconfig index 14a72224b657..450d6c3bc05e 100644 --- a/fs/nfs/Kconfig +++ b/fs/nfs/Kconfig @@ -75,7 +75,7 @@ config NFS_V3_ACL config NFS_V4 tristate "NFS client support for NFS version 4" depends on NFS_FS - select SUNRPC_GSS + select RPCSEC_GSS_KRB5 select KEYS help This option enables support for version 4 of the NFS protocol diff --git a/fs/nfs/dir.c b/fs/nfs/dir.c index a41c3ee4549c..6fbcbb8d6587 100644 --- a/fs/nfs/dir.c +++ b/fs/nfs/dir.c @@ -3089,7 +3089,6 @@ static void nfs_access_add_rbtree(struct inode *inode, else goto found; } - set->timestamp = ktime_get_ns(); rb_link_node(&set->rb_node, parent, p); rb_insert_color(&set->rb_node, root_node); list_add_tail(&set->lru, &nfsi->access_cache_entry_lru); @@ -3114,6 +3113,7 @@ void nfs_access_add_cache(struct inode *inode, struct nfs_access_entry *set, cache->fsgid = cred->fsgid; cache->group_info = get_group_info(cred->group_info); cache->mask = set->mask; + cache->timestamp = ktime_get_ns(); /* The above field assignments must be visible * before this item appears on the lru. We cannot easily diff --git a/fs/nfs/read.c b/fs/nfs/read.c index c380cff4108e..e90988591df4 100644 --- a/fs/nfs/read.c +++ b/fs/nfs/read.c @@ -15,6 +15,7 @@ #include <linux/stat.h> #include <linux/mm.h> #include <linux/slab.h> +#include <linux/task_io_accounting_ops.h> #include <linux/pagemap.h> #include <linux/sunrpc/clnt.h> #include <linux/nfs_fs.h> @@ -337,6 +338,7 @@ int nfs_read_folio(struct file *file, struct folio *folio) trace_nfs_aop_readpage(inode, folio); nfs_inc_stats(inode, NFSIOS_VFSREADPAGE); + task_io_account_read(folio_size(folio)); /* * Try to flush any pending writes to the file.. @@ -393,6 +395,7 @@ void nfs_readahead(struct readahead_control *ractl) trace_nfs_aop_readahead(inode, readahead_pos(ractl), nr_pages); nfs_inc_stats(inode, NFSIOS_VFSREADPAGES); + task_io_account_read(readahead_length(ractl)); ret = -ESTALE; if (NFS_STALE(inode)) diff --git a/fs/nfsd/Kconfig b/fs/nfsd/Kconfig index 7c441f2bd444..43b88eaf0673 100644 --- a/fs/nfsd/Kconfig +++ b/fs/nfsd/Kconfig @@ -73,7 +73,7 @@ config NFSD_V4 bool "NFS server support for NFS version 4" depends on NFSD && PROC_FS select FS_POSIX_ACL - select SUNRPC_GSS + select RPCSEC_GSS_KRB5 select CRYPTO select CRYPTO_MD5 select CRYPTO_SHA256 diff --git a/fs/nfsd/vfs.c b/fs/nfsd/vfs.c index 502e1b7742db..5783209f17fc 100644 --- a/fs/nfsd/vfs.c +++ b/fs/nfsd/vfs.c @@ -941,8 +941,15 @@ nfsd_splice_actor(struct pipe_inode_info *pipe, struct pipe_buffer *buf, struct page *last_page; last_page = page + (offset + sd->len - 1) / PAGE_SIZE; - for (page += offset / PAGE_SIZE; page <= last_page; page++) + for (page += offset / PAGE_SIZE; page <= last_page; page++) { + /* + * Skip page replacement when extending the contents + * of the current page. + */ + if (page == *(rqstp->rq_next_page - 1)) + continue; svc_rqst_replace_page(rqstp, page); + } if (rqstp->rq_res.page_len == 0) // first call rqstp->rq_res.page_base = offset % PAGE_SIZE; rqstp->rq_res.page_len += sd->len; diff --git a/fs/super.c b/fs/super.c index 84332d5cb817..04bc62ab7dfe 100644 --- a/fs/super.c +++ b/fs/super.c @@ -475,13 +475,22 @@ void generic_shutdown_super(struct super_block *sb) cgroup_writeback_umount(); - /* evict all inodes with zero refcount */ + /* Evict all inodes with zero refcount. */ evict_inodes(sb); - /* only nonzero refcount inodes can have marks */ + + /* + * Clean up and evict any inodes that still have references due + * to fsnotify or the security policy. + */ fsnotify_sb_delete(sb); - fscrypt_destroy_keyring(sb); security_sb_delete(sb); + /* + * Now that all potentially-encrypted inodes have been evicted, + * the fscrypt keyring can be destroyed. + */ + fscrypt_destroy_keyring(sb); + if (sb->s_dio_done_wq) { destroy_workqueue(sb->s_dio_done_wq); sb->s_dio_done_wq = NULL; diff --git a/fs/verity/enable.c b/fs/verity/enable.c index e13db6507b38..7a0e3a84d370 100644 --- a/fs/verity/enable.c +++ b/fs/verity/enable.c @@ -8,7 +8,6 @@ #include "fsverity_private.h" #include <linux/mount.h> -#include <linux/pagemap.h> #include <linux/sched/signal.h> #include <linux/uaccess.h> @@ -367,25 +366,27 @@ int fsverity_ioctl_enable(struct file *filp, const void __user *uarg) goto out_drop_write; err = enable_verity(filp, &arg); - if (err) - goto out_allow_write_access; /* - * Some pages of the file may have been evicted from pagecache after - * being used in the Merkle tree construction, then read into pagecache - * again by another process reading from the file concurrently. Since - * these pages didn't undergo verification against the file digest which - * fs-verity now claims to be enforcing, we have to wipe the pagecache - * to ensure that all future reads are verified. + * We no longer drop the inode's pagecache after enabling verity. This + * used to be done to try to avoid a race condition where pages could be + * evicted after being used in the Merkle tree construction, then + * re-instantiated by a concurrent read. Such pages are unverified, and + * the backing storage could have filled them with different content, so + * they shouldn't be used to fulfill reads once verity is enabled. + * + * But, dropping the pagecache has a big performance impact, and it + * doesn't fully solve the race condition anyway. So for those reasons, + * and also because this race condition isn't very important relatively + * speaking (especially for small-ish files, where the chance of a page + * being used, evicted, *and* re-instantiated all while enabling verity + * is quite small), we no longer drop the inode's pagecache. */ - filemap_write_and_wait(inode->i_mapping); - invalidate_inode_pages2(inode->i_mapping); /* * allow_write_access() is needed to pair with deny_write_access(). * Regardless, the filesystem won't allow writing to verity files. */ -out_allow_write_access: allow_write_access(filp); out_drop_write: mnt_drop_write_file(filp); diff --git a/fs/verity/verify.c b/fs/verity/verify.c index f50e3b5b52c9..e2508222750b 100644 --- a/fs/verity/verify.c +++ b/fs/verity/verify.c @@ -387,15 +387,15 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(fsverity_enqueue_verify_work); int __init fsverity_init_workqueue(void) { /* - * Use an unbound workqueue to allow bios to be verified in parallel - * even when they happen to complete on the same CPU. This sacrifices - * locality, but it's worthwhile since hashing is CPU-intensive. + * Use a high-priority workqueue to prioritize verification work, which + * blocks reads from completing, over regular application tasks. * - * Also use a high-priority workqueue to prioritize verification work, - * which blocks reads from completing, over regular application tasks. + * For performance reasons, don't use an unbound workqueue. Using an + * unbound workqueue for crypto operations causes excessive scheduler + * latency on ARM64. */ fsverity_read_workqueue = alloc_workqueue("fsverity_read_queue", - WQ_UNBOUND | WQ_HIGHPRI, + WQ_HIGHPRI, num_online_cpus()); if (!fsverity_read_workqueue) return -ENOMEM; |