lwn.git/arch/x86/kernel/kexec-bzimage64.c, branch automarkup

Merge branch 'next-integrity' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security

2019-03-11T00:32:04+00:00

Pull integrity updates from James Morris: "Mimi Zohar says: 'Linux 5.0 introduced the platform keyring to allow verifying the IMA kexec kernel image signature using the pre-boot keys. This pull request similarly makes keys on the platform keyring accessible for verifying the PE kernel image signature. Also included in this pull request is a new IMA hook that tags tmp files, in policy, indicating the file hash needs to be calculated. The remaining patches are cleanup'" * 'next-integrity' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security: evm: Use defined constant for UUID representation ima: define ima_post_create_tmpfile() hook and add missing call evm: remove set but not used variable 'xattr' encrypted-keys: fix Opt_err/Opt_error = -1 kexec, KEYS: Make use of platform keyring for signature verify integrity, KEYS: add a reference to platform keyring

Merge branch 'x86-boot-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip

2019-03-07T21:35:41+00:00

Pull x86 boot updates from Ingo Molnar: "Most of the changes center around the difficult problem of KASLR pinning down hot-removable memory regions. At the very early stage KASRL is making irreversible kernel address layout decisions we don't have full knowledge about the memory maps yet. So the changes from Chao Fan add this (parsing the RSDP table early), together with fixes from Borislav Petkov" * 'x86-boot-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip: x86/boot/compressed/64: Do not read legacy ROM on EFI system x86/boot: Correct RSDP parsing with 32-bit EFI x86/kexec: Fill in acpi_rsdp_addr from the first kernel x86/boot: Fix randconfig build error due to MEMORY_HOTREMOVE x86/boot: Fix cmdline_find_option() prototype visibility x86/boot/KASLR: Limit KASLR to extract the kernel in immovable memory only x86/boot: Parse SRAT table and count immovable memory regions x86/boot: Early parse RSDP and save it in boot_params x86/boot: Search for RSDP in memory x86/boot: Search for RSDP in the EFI tables x86/boot: Add "acpi_rsdp=" early parsing x86/boot: Copy kstrtoull() to boot/string.c x86/boot: Build the command line parsing code unconditionally

x86/kexec: Fill in acpi_rsdp_addr from the first kernel

2019-02-06T14:29:03+00:00

When efi=noruntime or efi=oldmap is used on the kernel command line, EFI services won't be available in the second kernel, therefore the second kernel will not be able to get the ACPI RSDP address from firmware by calling EFI services and so it won't boot. Commit e6e094e053af ("x86/acpi, x86/boot: Take RSDP address from boot params if available") added an acpi_rsdp_addr field to boot_params which stores the RSDP address for other kernel users. Recently, after 3a63f70bf4c3 ("x86/boot: Early parse RSDP and save it in boot_params") the acpi_rsdp_addr will always be filled with a valid RSDP address. So fill in that value into the second kernel's boot_params thus ensuring that the second kernel receives the RSDP value from the first kernel. [ bp: massage commit message. ] Signed-off-by: Kairui Song Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov Cc: AKASHI Takahiro Cc: Andrew Morton Cc: Baoquan He Cc: Chao Fan Cc: Dave Young Cc: David Howells Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" Cc: Ingo Molnar Cc: kexec@lists.infradead.org Cc: Philipp Rudo Cc: Thomas Gleixner Cc: x86-ml Cc: Yannik Sembritzki Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190204173852.4863-1-kasong@redhat.com

kexec, KEYS: Make use of platform keyring for signature verify

2019-02-04T22:34:07+00:00

This patch allows the kexec_file_load syscall to verify the PE signed kernel image signature based on the preboot keys stored in the .platform keyring, as fall back, if the signature verification failed due to not finding the public key in the secondary or builtin keyrings. This commit adds a VERIFY_USE_PLATFORM_KEYRING similar to previous VERIFY_USE_SECONDARY_KEYRING indicating that verify_pkcs7_signature should verify the signature using platform keyring. Also, decrease the error message log level when verification failed with -ENOKEY, so that if called tried multiple time with different keyring it won't generate extra noises. Signed-off-by: Kairui Song Cc: David Howells Acked-by: Dave Young (for kexec_file_load part) [zohar@linux.ibm.com: tweaked the first paragraph of the patch description, and fixed checkpatch warning.] Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar

x86/kexec: Don't setup EFI info if EFI runtime is not enabled

2019-02-01T17:18:54+00:00

Kexec-ing a kernel with "efi=noruntime" on the first kernel's command line causes the following null pointer dereference: BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at 0000000000000000 #PF error: [normal kernel read fault] Call Trace: efi_runtime_map_copy+0x28/0x30 bzImage64_load+0x688/0x872 arch_kexec_kernel_image_load+0x6d/0x70 kimage_file_alloc_init+0x13e/0x220 __x64_sys_kexec_file_load+0x144/0x290 do_syscall_64+0x55/0x1a0 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9 Just skip the EFI info setup if EFI runtime services are not enabled. [ bp: Massage commit message. ] Suggested-by: Dave Young Signed-off-by: Kairui Song Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov Acked-by: Dave Young Cc: AKASHI Takahiro Cc: Andrew Morton Cc: Ard Biesheuvel Cc: bhe@redhat.com Cc: David Howells Cc: erik.schmauss@intel.com Cc: fanc.fnst@cn.fujitsu.com Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" Cc: Ingo Molnar Cc: kexec@lists.infradead.org Cc: lenb@kernel.org Cc: linux-acpi@vger.kernel.org Cc: Philipp Rudo Cc: rafael.j.wysocki@intel.com Cc: robert.moore@intel.com Cc: Thomas Gleixner Cc: x86-ml Cc: Yannik Sembritzki Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190118111310.29589-2-kasong@redhat.com

x86/kexec: Fix a kexec_file_load() failure

2019-01-15T11:12:50+00:00

Commit b6664ba42f14 ("s390, kexec_file: drop arch_kexec_mem_walk()") changed the behavior of kexec_locate_mem_hole(): it will try to allocate free memory only when kbuf.mem is initialized to zero. However, x86's kexec_file_load() implementation reuses a struct kexec_buf allocated on the stack and its kbuf.mem member gets set by each kexec_add_buffer() invocation. The second kexec_add_buffer() will reuse the same kbuf but not reinitialize kbuf.mem. Therefore, explictily reset kbuf.mem each time in order for kexec_locate_mem_hole() to locate a free memory region each time. [ bp: massage commit message. ] Fixes: b6664ba42f14 ("s390, kexec_file: drop arch_kexec_mem_walk()") Signed-off-by: Dave Young Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov Acked-by: Baoquan He Cc: "Eric W. Biederman" Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" Cc: AKASHI Takahiro Cc: Andrew Morton Cc: Ingo Molnar Cc: Martin Schwidefsky Cc: Philipp Rudo Cc: Thomas Gleixner Cc: Vivek Goyal Cc: Yannik Sembritzki Cc: Yi Wang Cc: kexec@lists.infradead.org Cc: x86-ml Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20181228011247.GA9999@dhcp-128-65.nay.redhat.com

Fix kexec forbidding kernels signed with keys in the secondary keyring to boot

2018-08-16T16:57:20+00:00

The split of .system_keyring into .builtin_trusted_keys and .secondary_trusted_keys broke kexec, thereby preventing kernels signed by keys which are now in the secondary keyring from being kexec'd. Fix this by passing VERIFY_USE_SECONDARY_KEYRING to verify_pefile_signature(). Fixes: d3bfe84129f6 ("certs: Add a secondary system keyring that can be added to dynamically") Signed-off-by: Yannik Sembritzki Signed-off-by: David Howells Cc: kexec@lists.infradead.org Cc: keyrings@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org Cc: stable@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds

kexec_file: do not add extra alignment to efi memmap

2018-04-21T00:18:36+00:00

Chun-Yi reported a kernel warning message below: WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 0 at ../mm/early_ioremap.c:182 early_iounmap+0x4f/0x12c() early_iounmap(ffffffffff200180, 00000118) [0] size not consistent 00000120 The problem is x86 kexec_file_load adds extra alignment to the efi memmap: in bzImage64_load(): efi_map_sz = efi_get_runtime_map_size(); efi_map_sz = ALIGN(efi_map_sz, 16); And __efi_memmap_init maps with the size including the alignment bytes but efi_memmap_unmap use nr_maps * desc_size which does not include the extra bytes. The alignment in kexec code is only needed for the kexec buffer internal use Actually kexec should pass exact size of the efi memmap to 2nd kernel. Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180417083600.GA1972@dhcp-128-65.nay.redhat.com Signed-off-by: Dave Young Reported-by: joeyli Tested-by: Randy Wright Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds

kernel/kexec_file.c: allow archs to set purgatory load address

2018-04-14T00:10:28+00:00

For s390 new kernels are loaded to fixed addresses in memory before they are booted. With the current code this is a problem as it assumes the kernel will be loaded to an 'arbitrary' address. In particular, kexec_locate_mem_hole searches for a large enough memory region and sets the load address (kexec_bufer->mem) to it. Luckily there is a simple workaround for this problem. By returning 1 in arch_kexec_walk_mem, kexec_locate_mem_hole is turned off. This allows the architecture to set kbuf->mem by hand. While the trick works fine for the kernel it does not for the purgatory as here the architectures don't have access to its kexec_buffer. Give architectures access to the purgatories kexec_buffer by changing kexec_load_purgatory to take a pointer to it. With this change architectures have access to the buffer and can edit it as they need. A nice side effect of this change is that we can get rid of the purgatory_info->purgatory_load_address field. As now the information stored there can directly be accessed from kbuf->mem. Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180321112751.22196-11-prudo@linux.vnet.ibm.com Signed-off-by: Philipp Rudo Reviewed-by: Martin Schwidefsky Acked-by: Dave Young Cc: AKASHI Takahiro Cc: Eric Biederman Cc: Heiko Carstens Cc: Ingo Molnar Cc: Michael Ellerman Cc: Thiago Jung Bauermann Cc: Vivek Goyal Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds

kexec_file,x86,powerpc: factor out kexec_file_ops functions

2018-04-14T00:10:27+00:00

As arch_kexec_kernel_image_{probe,load}(), arch_kimage_file_post_load_cleanup() and arch_kexec_kernel_verify_sig() are almost duplicated among architectures, they can be commonalized with an architecture-defined kexec_file_ops array. So let's factor them out. Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180306102303.9063-3-takahiro.akashi@linaro.org Signed-off-by: AKASHI Takahiro Acked-by: Dave Young Tested-by: Dave Young Cc: Vivek Goyal Cc: Baoquan He Cc: Michael Ellerman Cc: Thiago Jung Bauermann Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds