<feed xmlns='http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom'>
<title>linux-next.git/security/apparmor/include/audit.h, branch master</title>
<subtitle>Linux kernel latest source</subtitle>
<id>http://mirrors.hust.edu.cn/git/linux-next.git/atom?h=master</id>
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<updated>2026-08-11T05:49:42+00:00</updated>
<entry>
<title>apparmor: refactory mount to use check_perms</title>
<updated>2026-08-11T05:49:42+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>John Johansen</name>
<email>john.johansen@canonical.com</email>
</author>
<published>2026-07-27T12:36:53+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='http://mirrors.hust.edu.cn/git/linux-next.git/commit/?id=6c27cd23bd43c8adb1af6a96abfeee13b10da48d'/>
<id>urn:sha1:6c27cd23bd43c8adb1af6a96abfeee13b10da48d</id>
<content type='text'>
Move the mount permissions check to use the common backend
aa_check_perms() to check permissions. This will make it so caching,
audit, complain, logic can be handled consistently in a single place.

Signed-off-by: John Johansen &lt;john.johansen@canonical.com&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>apparmor: add audit mode to provide a mechanism to silence complain messages</title>
<updated>2026-08-11T05:49:42+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>John Johansen</name>
<email>john.johansen@canonical.com</email>
</author>
<published>2025-08-04T03:35:10+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='http://mirrors.hust.edu.cn/git/linux-next.git/commit/?id=97dd3f51bf0cb111a2c1cdef7ecca48e31223cb7'/>
<id>urn:sha1:97dd3f51bf0cb111a2c1cdef7ecca48e31223cb7</id>
<content type='text'>
Complain messages can be very noisy and fill the logs quickly. Allow
complain (allow) messages to be silenced separate from denied
messages.

Signed-off-by: John Johansen &lt;john.johansen@canonical.com&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>apparmor: make table entry count last enum for static tables</title>
<updated>2026-08-11T05:49:42+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>John Johansen</name>
<email>john.johansen@canonical.com</email>
</author>
<published>2026-07-23T22:41:38+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='http://mirrors.hust.edu.cn/git/linux-next.git/commit/?id=ef6f394039973716dc61fb82fc51243fb467caa9'/>
<id>urn:sha1:ef6f394039973716dc61fb82fc51243fb467caa9</id>
<content type='text'>
Instead of keeping an external define for the various tables indexed
by an enum, make the size the last entry of the enum so the table
size will get updated correctly with changes to the enum.

Reviewed-by: Georgia Garcia &lt;georgia.garcia@canonical.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: John Johansen &lt;john.johansen@canonical.com&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>apparmor: add support loading per permission tagging</title>
<updated>2026-01-29T09:27:47+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>John Johansen</name>
<email>john.johansen@canonical.com</email>
</author>
<published>2025-04-01T22:51:41+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='http://mirrors.hust.edu.cn/git/linux-next.git/commit/?id=3d28e2397af7a89ac3de33c686ed404cda59b5d5'/>
<id>urn:sha1:3d28e2397af7a89ac3de33c686ed404cda59b5d5</id>
<content type='text'>
Add support for the per permission tag index for a given permission
set. This will be used by both meta-data tagging, to allow annotating
accept states with context and debug information. As well as by rule
tainting and triggers to specify the taint or trigger to be applied.

Since these are low frequency ancillary data items they are stored
in a tighter packed format to that allows for sharing and reuse of the
strings between permissions and accept states. Reducing the amount of
kernel memory use at the cost of having to go through a couple if
index based indirections.

The tags are just strings that has no meaning with out context. When
used as meta-data for auditing and debugging its entirely information
for userspace, but triggers, and tainting can be used to affect the
domain. However they all exist in the same packed data set and can
be shared between different uses.

Signed-off-by: John Johansen &lt;john.johansen@canonical.com&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>apparmor: fix af_unix auditing to include all address information</title>
<updated>2025-07-16T05:39:43+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>John Johansen</name>
<email>john.johansen@canonical.com</email>
</author>
<published>2025-06-14T20:49:02+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='http://mirrors.hust.edu.cn/git/linux-next.git/commit/?id=a30a9fdb66319466a7c76b455524d27c75d2b05b'/>
<id>urn:sha1:a30a9fdb66319466a7c76b455524d27c75d2b05b</id>
<content type='text'>
The auditing of addresses currently doesn't include the source address
and mixes source and foreign/peer under the same audit name. Fix this
so source is always addr, and the foreign/peer is peer_addr.

Fixes: c05e705812d1 ("apparmor: add fine grained af_unix mediation")
Signed-off-by: John Johansen &lt;john.johansen@canonical.com&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>apparmor: Remove use of the double lock</title>
<updated>2025-07-16T05:39:43+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>John Johansen</name>
<email>john.johansen@canonical.com</email>
</author>
<published>2025-04-01T22:28:13+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='http://mirrors.hust.edu.cn/git/linux-next.git/commit/?id=bc6e5f6933b8e7b74858ac830d5b9b4ca10a099a'/>
<id>urn:sha1:bc6e5f6933b8e7b74858ac830d5b9b4ca10a099a</id>
<content type='text'>
The use of the double lock is not necessary and problematic. Instead
pull the bits that need locks into their own sections and grab the
needed references.

Fixes: c05e705812d1 ("apparmor: add fine grained af_unix mediation")
Signed-off-by: John Johansen &lt;john.johansen@canonical.com&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>lsm: use lsm_prop in security_audit_rule_match</title>
<updated>2024-10-11T18:34:12+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Casey Schaufler</name>
<email>casey@schaufler-ca.com</email>
</author>
<published>2024-10-09T17:32:10+00:00</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:870b7fdc660b38c4e1bd8bf48e62aa352ddf8f42</id>
<content type='text'>
Change the secid parameter of security_audit_rule_match
to a lsm_prop structure pointer. Pass the entry from the
lsm_prop structure for the approprite slot to the LSM hook.

Change the users of security_audit_rule_match to use the
lsm_prop instead of a u32. The scaffolding function lsmprop_init()
fills the structure with the value of the old secid, ensuring that
it is available to the appropriate module hook. The sources of
the secid, security_task_getsecid() and security_inode_getsecid(),
will be converted to use the lsm_prop structure later in the series.
At that point the use of lsmprop_init() is dropped.

Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler &lt;casey@schaufler-ca.com&gt;
[PM: subject line tweak]
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore &lt;paul@paul-moore.com&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>ima: Avoid blocking in RCU read-side critical section</title>
<updated>2024-06-13T18:26:50+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>GUO Zihua</name>
<email>guozihua@huawei.com</email>
</author>
<published>2024-05-07T01:25:41+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='http://mirrors.hust.edu.cn/git/linux-next.git/commit/?id=9a95c5bfbf02a0a7f5983280fe284a0ff0836c34'/>
<id>urn:sha1:9a95c5bfbf02a0a7f5983280fe284a0ff0836c34</id>
<content type='text'>
A panic happens in ima_match_policy:

BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at 0000000000000010
PGD 42f873067 P4D 0
Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP NOPTI
CPU: 5 PID: 1286325 Comm: kubeletmonit.sh
Kdump: loaded Tainted: P
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996),
               BIOS 0.0.0 02/06/2015
RIP: 0010:ima_match_policy+0x84/0x450
Code: 49 89 fc 41 89 cf 31 ed 89 44 24 14 eb 1c 44 39
      7b 18 74 26 41 83 ff 05 74 20 48 8b 1b 48 3b 1d
      f2 b9 f4 00 0f 84 9c 01 00 00 &lt;44&gt; 85 73 10 74 ea
      44 8b 6b 14 41 f6 c5 01 75 d4 41 f6 c5 02 74 0f
RSP: 0018:ff71570009e07a80 EFLAGS: 00010207
RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 0000000000000200
RDX: ffffffffad8dc7c0 RSI: 0000000024924925 RDI: ff3e27850dea2000
RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: ffffffffabfce739
R10: ff3e27810cc42400 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: ff3e2781825ef970
R13: 00000000ff3e2785 R14: 000000000000000c R15: 0000000000000001
FS:  00007f5195b51740(0000)
GS:ff3e278b12d40000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 0000000000000010 CR3: 0000000626d24002 CR4: 0000000000361ee0
DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
Call Trace:
 ima_get_action+0x22/0x30
 process_measurement+0xb0/0x830
 ? page_add_file_rmap+0x15/0x170
 ? alloc_set_pte+0x269/0x4c0
 ? prep_new_page+0x81/0x140
 ? simple_xattr_get+0x75/0xa0
 ? selinux_file_open+0x9d/0xf0
 ima_file_check+0x64/0x90
 path_openat+0x571/0x1720
 do_filp_open+0x9b/0x110
 ? page_counter_try_charge+0x57/0xc0
 ? files_cgroup_alloc_fd+0x38/0x60
 ? __alloc_fd+0xd4/0x250
 ? do_sys_open+0x1bd/0x250
 do_sys_open+0x1bd/0x250
 do_syscall_64+0x5d/0x1d0
 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x65/0xca

Commit c7423dbdbc9e ("ima: Handle -ESTALE returned by
ima_filter_rule_match()") introduced call to ima_lsm_copy_rule within a
RCU read-side critical section which contains kmalloc with GFP_KERNEL.
This implies a possible sleep and violates limitations of RCU read-side
critical sections on non-PREEMPT systems.

Sleeping within RCU read-side critical section might cause
synchronize_rcu() returning early and break RCU protection, allowing a
UAF to happen.

The root cause of this issue could be described as follows:
|	Thread A	|	Thread B	|
|			|ima_match_policy	|
|			|  rcu_read_lock	|
|ima_lsm_update_rule	|			|
|  synchronize_rcu	|			|
|			|    kmalloc(GFP_KERNEL)|
|			|      sleep		|
==&gt; synchronize_rcu returns early
|  kfree(entry)		|			|
|			|    entry = entry-&gt;next|
==&gt; UAF happens and entry now becomes NULL (or could be anything).
|			|    entry-&gt;action	|
==&gt; Accessing entry might cause panic.

To fix this issue, we are converting all kmalloc that is called within
RCU read-side critical section to use GFP_ATOMIC.

Fixes: c7423dbdbc9e ("ima: Handle -ESTALE returned by ima_filter_rule_match()")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: GUO Zihua &lt;guozihua@huawei.com&gt;
Acked-by: John Johansen &lt;john.johansen@canonical.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Mimi Zohar &lt;zohar@linux.ibm.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Casey Schaufler &lt;casey@schaufler-ca.com&gt;
[PM: fixed missing comment, long lines, !CONFIG_IMA_LSM_RULES case]
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore &lt;paul@paul-moore.com&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>apparmor: add io_uring mediation</title>
<updated>2023-10-18T22:58:49+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Georgia Garcia</name>
<email>georgia.garcia@canonical.com</email>
</author>
<published>2023-03-20T17:43:41+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='http://mirrors.hust.edu.cn/git/linux-next.git/commit/?id=c4371d90633b73cf6e86aff43ff2b5d95ad2b9eb'/>
<id>urn:sha1:c4371d90633b73cf6e86aff43ff2b5d95ad2b9eb</id>
<content type='text'>
For now, the io_uring mediation is limited to sqpoll and
override_creds.

Signed-off-by: Georgia Garcia &lt;georgia.garcia@canonical.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: John Johansen &lt;john.johansen@canonical.com&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>apparmor: add user namespace creation mediation</title>
<updated>2023-10-18T22:49:02+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>John Johansen</name>
<email>john.johansen@canonical.com</email>
</author>
<published>2022-09-09T23:00:09+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='http://mirrors.hust.edu.cn/git/linux-next.git/commit/?id=fa9b63adabcfa9b724120ef3352cf6fb82b4b9a5'/>
<id>urn:sha1:fa9b63adabcfa9b724120ef3352cf6fb82b4b9a5</id>
<content type='text'>
Unprivileged user namespace creation is often used as a first step
in privilege escalation attacks. Instead of disabling it at the
sysrq level, which blocks its legitimate use as for setting up a sandbox,
allow control on a per domain basis.

This allows an admin to quickly lock down a system while also still
allowing legitimate use.

Reviewed-by: Georgia Garcia &lt;georgia.garcia@canonical.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: John Johansen &lt;john.johansen@canonical.com&gt;
</content>
</entry>
</feed>
