linux-next.git/kernel/bpf/core.c, branch master

bpf: Introduce jit_required flag and remove bpf_prog_has_kfunc_call()

2026-07-09T06:24:41+00:00

Introduce a 'jit_required' bitfield flag in struct bpf_prog to track whether a BPF program strictly requires the JIT compiler to run. This prevents a dangerous runtime fallback to the interpreter for features that are only implemented in the JIT compiler. Currently, bpf_prog_has_kfunc_call() is used only for kernel function calls, replace the kfunc-specific helper with the new 'jit_required' flag. This makes it easy to support other JIT-only BPF features, such as inlined helpers. Suggested-by: Alexei Starovoitov Suggested-by: KaFai Wan Suggested-by: Leon Hwang Acked-by: Leon Hwang Signed-off-by: Tiezhu Yang Signed-off-by: Eduard Zingerman

bpf: Account scratch buffer in bpf_prog_calc_tag

2026-07-09T05:00:02+00:00

bpf_prog_calc_tag() copies the instructions into a plain vmalloc() scratch buffer to blind the map fds before hashing. The buffer scales with the program, up to ~8MB at the 1M instruction limit, and is allocated on every program load, but unlike the rest of the load-time scratch memory it is not charged to the loader's memcg. Use GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT to account it like the other allocations scoped to the verification/load. Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20260708211537.371874-5-daniel@iogearbox.net Signed-off-by: Kumar Kartikeya Dwivedi

bpf: Prefer dirty packs for eBPF allocations

2026-07-01T08:34:41+00:00

The pack allocator only flushes predictors when reusing a dirty pack for cBPF, eBPF allocations never trigger a flush. Currently, eBPF picks the first free pack, which could be a clean pack. As an optimization, leaving a clean pack for cBPF can avoid flushes. Prefer dirty packs for eBPF and keep clean packs free for cBPF. This mirrors the existing cBPF preference for clean packs: each program kind prefers the pack that avoids an extra flush, and falls back to the other kind only when no preferred pack has room. eBPF reuse of a dirty pack is harmless since eBPF being privileged does not flush. Signed-off-by: Pawan Gupta Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann

bpf: Prefer packs that won't trigger an IBPB flush on allocation

2026-07-01T08:33:45+00:00

Currently BPF pack allocator picks the chunks from the first available pack. While this is okay, it naturally leads to more frequent flushes when there are multiple packs in the system that weren't used since the last flush. As an optimization prefer allocating the new programs from packs that are unused since last flush. When all packs are dirty, allocation forces a flush and marks all packs clean. Below are some future optimizations ideas: 1. Currently, the "dirty" tracking is only done at the pack-level. Flush frequency can further be reduced with chunk-level tracking. This requires a new bitmap per-pack to track the dirty state. 2. IBPB flush is done on all CPUs, even if only a single CPU ran the BPF program. On a system with hundreds of CPUs this could be a major bottleneck forcing hundreds of IPIs to deliver the flush. The solution is to track the CPUs where a BPF program ran, and issue IBPB only on those CPUs. 3. Avoid IBPB when flush is already done at other sources (e.g. context switch). Signed-off-by: Pawan Gupta Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann

bpf: Skip redundant IBPB in pack allocator

2026-07-01T08:33:40+00:00

bpf_prog_pack_alloc() issues IBPB on all CPUs on every cBPF allocation, even when reusing chunks from an existing pack where no new memory was touched since the last IBPB. Since IBPB on all CPUs is heavy, Dave Hansen suggested to track allocation since last IBPB, and only issue IBPB at reuse for the chunks that have not seen an IBPB since they were last freed. Track per-pack whether an IBPB is needed via arch_flush_needed. Set it when allocating a chunk, reset on IBPB flush. On reuse, conditionally issue the flush. Since IBPB invalidates all BTB entries, clear the flag on all packs after flushing. Signed-off-by: Pawan Gupta Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann

bpf: Restrict JIT predictor flush to cBPF

2026-07-01T08:33:38+00:00

Currently predictor flush on memory reuse is done for all BPF JIT allocations, but only cBPF programs can be loaded by an unprivileged user. eBPF is privileged by default, and flushing predictors for all CPUs on every eBPF reuse penalizes the common case for no security benefit. eBPF allocations can be frequent on busy systems, only flush predictors for cBPF programs. Trampoline and dispatcher allocations also skip the flush as they are eBPF-only. Signed-off-by: Pawan Gupta Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann

bpf: Support for hardening against JIT spraying

2026-07-01T08:33:35+00:00

The BPF JIT allocator packs many small programs into larger executable allocations and reuses space within those allocations as programs are loaded and freed. When fresh code is written into space that a previous program occupied, an indirect jump into the new program can reuse a branch prediction left behind by the old one. Flush the indirect branch predictors before reusing JIT memory so that indirect jumps into a newly written program don't reuse predictions from an old program that occupied the same space. Introduce bpf_arch_pred_flush_enabled static key and bpf_arch_pred_flush static call for flushing the branch predictors on JIT memory reuse. Architectures that need a flush, can update it to a predictor flush function. By default, its a NOP and does not emit any CALL. Allocations larger than a pack are not covered by this flush. That is safe because cBPF programs (the unprivileged attack surface) are bounded well below a pack size. Issue a warning if this assumption is ever violated while the flush is active. Signed-off-by: Pawan Gupta Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann

bpf: Tighten cgroup storage cookie checks for prog arrays

2026-06-10T23:16:46+00:00

The fix in commit abad3d0bad72 ("bpf: Fix oob access in cgroup local storage") is still incomplete. The prog-array compatibility check treats a program with no cgroup storage as compatible with any stored storage cookie. This allows a storage-less program to bridge a tail call chain between an entry program and a storage-using callee even though cgroup local storage at runtime still follows the caller's context, that is, A -> B(no storage) -> C(storage) path. Requiring exact cookie equality would break the legitimate case of a storage-less leaf program being tail called from a storage-using one. Instead, only accept a zero storage cookie if the program cannot perform tail calls itself. This keeps A -> B(no storage) working while rejecting the A -> B(no storage) -> C(storage) bridge. Fixes: abad3d0bad72 ("bpf: Fix oob access in cgroup local storage") Reported-by: Lin Ma Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann Acked-by: Yonghong Song Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20260610105539.705887-1-daniel@iogearbox.net Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov

bpf: Fix bpf_arena_handle_page_fault() redefinition without CONFIG_BPF_SYSCALL

2026-05-27T20:50:35+00:00

On configs with CONFIG_BPF=y but CONFIG_BPF_SYSCALL=n (e.g. arm multi_v7_defconfig), kernel/bpf/core.c defines a __weak bpf_arena_handle_page_fault() while bpf_defs.h already supplies a static inline stub for it, causing a redefinition error. Build the __weak definition only under CONFIG_BPF_SYSCALL, matching the bpf_defs.h declaration and the CONFIG_BPF_SYSCALL-gated strong definition in arena.c. Fixes: dc11a4dba246 ("bpf: Recover arena kernel faults with scratch page") Reported-by: Mark Brown Signed-off-by: Tejun Heo Acked-by: Song Liu Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20260527192632.2109419-1-tj@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov

Merge branch 'arena_direct_access'

2026-05-25T15:35:48+00:00

Tejun Heo says: ==================== This makes BPF arena memory directly dereferenceable from kernel code (struct_ops callbacks, kfuncs). Each arena gets a per-arena scratch page that an arch fault hook installs into empty PTEs on kernel-side faults, after KFENCE. The faulting instruction retries and the violation is reported through the program's BPF stream. v4: - Patch 1: note that the strict-zero cmpxchg is narrower than pte_none() in inline comments on both x86 and arm64. (Andrea) - Patch 2: stub bpf_arena_handle_page_fault() for !CONFIG_BPF_SYSCALL via a new include/linux/bpf_defs.h. (lkp) - Patch 7: scx_arena_alloc() retries via a loop instead of a single retry on pool growth. (Andrea) - Picked up Reviewed-by tags from Emil and Andrea. v3: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20260520235052.4180316-1-tj@kernel.org v2: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20260517211232.1670594-1-tj@kernel.org v1 (RFC): https://lore.kernel.org/r/20260427105109.2554518-1-tj@kernel.org Motivation ---------- sched_ext's ops_cid.set_cmask() hands the BPF scheduler a struct scx_cmask *. The kernel translates a kernel cpumask to a cmask, but it had no way to write into the arena, so the cmask lived in kernel memory and was passed as a trusted pointer. BPF cmask helpers all operate on arena cmasks though, so the BPF side had to word-by-word probe-read the kernel cmask into an arena cmask via cmask_copy_from_kernel() before any helper could touch it. It works, but is clumsy. The shape isn't unique to set_cmask. Sub-scheduler support is on the way and more sched_ext callbacks will want to pass structured data to BPF. Anywhere a kfunc or struct_ops callback wants to hand a struct to a BPF program, arena residence is the natural answer. Approach -------- Each arena gets a per-arena scratch page. Arenas stay sparsely mapped as today - PTEs are populated only for allocated pages. A new arch fault hook (bpf_arena_handle_page_fault) is wired into x86 page_fault_oops() and arm64 __do_kernel_fault(), after KFENCE. When a kernel-side access faults inside an arena's kern_vm range, the helper walks the stack to find the BPF program responsible, range-checks the fault address against prog->aux->arena, and atomically installs the scratch page into the empty PTE via the new ptep_try_set() wrapper. The kernel instruction retries and reads/writes the scratch page. Free paths and map destruction treat scratch as non-owned. Real allocation refuses to overwrite scratch (apply_range_set_cb returns -EBUSY). A scratched address stays dead until map destroy, since its presence means the BPF program has already malfunctioned. The mechanism is default behavior - no UAPI flag. What this preserves ------------------- All the debugging properties of today's sparse-PTE design are preserved: * BPF programs still fault on unmapped arena accesses. The fault semantics (instruction retry with rdst = 0) and the violation report through bpf_streams are unchanged for prog-side accesses. * The first kernel-side touch of an unmapped address is reported via bpf_streams the same way as a prog-side fault, with the stack walk attributing it to the originating prog. * User-side fault on a never-scratched address still lazy-allocates a real page (or returns SIGSEGV under BPF_F_SEGV_ON_FAULT). User-side fault on a scratched address SIGSEGVs. What changes for the kernel-side caller is just that an unmapped deref no longer oopses - it retries through the scratch page and emits a violation report. The same shape today's BPF instruction faults have. Patches 1-2 (atomic PTE install + arena scratch-page recovery) -------------------------------------------------------------- mm: Add ptep_try_set() for lockless empty-slot installs bpf: Recover arena kernel faults with scratch page Patches 3-5 (helpers used by struct_ops registration) ----------------------------------------------------- bpf: Add sleepable variant of bpf_arena_alloc_pages for kernel callers bpf: Add bpf_struct_ops_for_each_prog() bpf/arena: Add bpf_arena_map_kern_vm_start() and bpf_prog_arena() ==================== Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20260522172219.1423324-1-tj@kernel.org/ Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov